In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation

98 F.R.D. 48, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18858
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 3, 1983
DocketMDL 323
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 98 F.R.D. 48 (In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 98 F.R.D. 48, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18858 (E.D. Pa. 1983).

Opinion

[67]*67MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE: ATTORNEYS’ FEES — PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS and “MINORITY” STATES

McGLYNN, District Judge.

In Kramer v. Scientific Control Corporation, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Kramer, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 90, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976), our Court of Appeals, although acknowledging the benefits that accrue from class action law suits, noted that “critics have challenged the altruism of some class action lawyers and charged that the paramount motivation for such litigation was counsel’s desire to generate substantial fees.” Id. at 1090-91. Indeed, it is a “widely held notion” that in settled class actions, particularly in the securities and treble damage antitrust context, the great bulk of the money received from the defendants is not distributed to class members, but rather is “devoured by avaricious attorneys” who demand astronomical attorneys’ fees. See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 664, 667 (1979). As the Second-Circuit has stated:

Class actions, termed by some as “lawyer’s lawsuits”, see Developments in the Law — Class Actions, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1605 (1976), have received a good deal of criticism; and much of this has been directed at the substantial fees awarded to class attorneys. See, e.g., Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1049-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092, 94 S.Ct. 722, 38 L.Ed.2d 549 (1973). Terms such as “golden harvest of fees”, Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.1972), “astronomical fees”, M. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff’s Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 366 (1972), and “enormous fees”, Comment, 54 U.Det.J.Urb.L. 598, 611 (1977), are used to describe the allowances which often run into the millions of dollars. Critics point particularly to overgenerous application of the equitable fund doctrine, by means of which massive fees are awarded attorneys with too little regard for the interests of the class members. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.1977). [Much of] [t]his criticism ... is justified. ...

Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir.1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472, 100 [68]*68S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (footnote omitted).

Presently before the court in this antitrust class action proceeding, are the fee petitions of forty-one private law firms and state attorneys general for approximately $21 million in counsel fees and expenses out of $50,650,000 (net of interest) in settlement proceeds. These requests approximate 40 percent of the class recovery. Twenty of the applications seek fees (not including expenses) in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. A dozen firms seek more than a half a million dollars; six seek approximately $1 million or more; two firms each seek some $2 million in fees and one firm, consisting of only four attorneys, requests nearly $4.3 million in fees. These fee petitions are grossly excessive on their face and, regrettably, lend substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impressions of the plaintiffs’ class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action industry.

This Memorandum of Decision reflects my judgment on the fee petitions in question. My task has not been an easy one. The fee petitions and supporting documentation are voluminous and reflect the time of more than 160 attorneys and scores of paralegals and legal assistants. In addition, the court has had to consider serious and detailed objections to the fee petitions, the petitioners’ responses to these objections, hundreds of pages of transcript from the 41 days of fee hearings and over a thousand exhibits which were admitted into evidence during those hearings.

Before proceeding to individual fee petitions, I will outline the pertinent history of this litigation, describe the organizing activities of plaintiffs’ counsel, review generally the evidence adduced at the fee petition hearings and outline the legal principles which control my rulings.

1. The History of the Litigation

The Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation (MDL 323) began nearly six years ago in mid-1977 with the filing of fifteen complaints in eight separate District Courts. On March 3, 1978, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the fifteen cases before it under common docket number 323, and transferred them to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a federal grand jury was investigating possible antitrust violations in the fine paper industry.1 See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 446 F.Supp. 759 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.1978).

Within a year of the transfer, twenty-three additional cases had been filed, and a total of thirty-eight cases were consolidated. The named plaintiffs in the thirty-eight lawsuits were divided into two categories. One group of lawsuits became known as the Private Plaintiffs, which included certain “Minority State Plaintiffs”. These plaintiffs alleged a horizontal conspiracy among fifteen named defendants to fix and raise the prices at which fine paper was sold to their customers. These fifteen defendants, known as the “Mill-Defendants”, manufactured fine paper and sold it both to middlemen (“Merchants”) and other buyers, such as publishing houses, greeting card companies, printers and commercial and other industrial users.

The remaining fourteen plaintiffs were state governmental entities, known as the “Majority States”, which alleged a single horizontal and vertical conspiracy among the fifteen mill-defendants and the middlemen, “independent” merchants, to fix the prices of fine paper which was sold to governmental entities in the fourteen states.2

The plaintiffs filed two separate motions for class certification. One, filed on behalf of the private plaintiffs, requested the court to certify private plaintiffs (and the “Mi[69]*69nority States”) who alleged a horizontal conspiracy, as representatives of a nationwide direct purchaser class. The other was filed by the Majority States, requesting the court to certify fourteen separate statewide governmental entity classes, each alleging horizontal and vertical conspiracies. After a hearing and argument, I entered an order on February 10, 1979, which denied the Majority States’ class certification motion and certified the private plaintiffs and Minority States as class representatives on behalf of the following classes:

Nationwide Direct Purchaser Class:

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Bluebook (online)
98 F.R.D. 48, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18858, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-fine-paper-antitrust-litigation-paed-1983.