In Re: Estate of W. Herold; Apl of: Univ of Pgh.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 22, 2025
• Docket: 22 WAP 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-28-2024] [MO: Todd, C.J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

BRAD LEE HEROLD, AS EXECUTOR OF : No. 22 WAP 2023 THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM L. HEROLD : : Appeal from the Order of the : Commonwealth Court entered v. : February 16, 2023, at No. 998 CD : 2021, Affirming the Order of the : Court of Common Pleas of UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH - OF THE : Allegheny County entered May 17, COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF HIGHER : 2021, at No. GD-19-014532 and EDUCATION AND 3M COMPANY; ABB : remanding. MOTORS AND MECHANICAL, INC. F/K/A : BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY; ALLIED : ARGUED: April 10, 2024 GLOVE CORPORATION; A.O. SMITH : CORPORATION; ARMSTRONG : INTERNATIONAL, INC.; AURORA PUMP : COMPANY; BALTIMORE AIRCOIL : COMPANY, INC.; BEAZER EAST, INC. : INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR TO : KOPPERS COMPANY, INC., AND : SUCCESSOR-IN INTEREST TO THIEM : CORPORATION AND UNIVERSAL : REFRACTORIES COMPANY; BMI : REFRACTOR SERVICES, INC.; : INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN- : INTEREST TO PREMIER REFRACTORIES, : INC., F/K/A ADIENCE, INC., SUCCESSOR- : IN-INTEREST TO ADIENCE COMPANY, : LP, AS SUCCESSOR TO BMI, : INC.;BURNHAM BOILER CORPORATION : N/D/B/A BURNHAM COMMERCIAL; : BRYAN STEAM, LLC; CARRIER : CORPORATION; CBS CORPORATION, A : DELAWARE CORPORATION, F/K/A : VIACOM INC., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER : TO CBS CORPORATION, A : PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATION, F/K/A : WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC : CORPORATION AND WESTINGHOUSE : AIR BRAKE COMPANY; CLEAVER : BROOKS, INC., F/K/A AQUA-CHEM, INC. : D/B/A CLEAVER BROOKS DIVISION; : CRANE CO.; DELVAL EQUIPMENT : CORPORATION; DEZURIK, INC.; DONALD : MCKAY SMITH, INC.; DUNHAM-BUSH, : INC.; E.E. ZIMMERMAN COMPANY; : EATON CORPORATION IN ITS OWN : RIGHT AND AS SUCCESSOR TO : CUTLER-HAMMER,INCORPORATED; : EICHLEAY CORPORATION; FERRO : ENGINEERING DIVISION OF ON MARINE : SERVICES COMPANY, LLC, F/K/A : OGLEBAY NORTON : COMPANY;FLOWSERVE US, INC., : INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR TO : BYRON JACKSON PUMPS, : FLOWSERVEGESTRA, DURAMETALLIC : CORP., ALDRICH PUMPS; CAMERON : PUMPS; VOGT VALVES;WILSON-SNYDER : CENTRIFUGAL PUMP; AND ROCKWELL : VALVES; FMC CORPORATION, : INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN- : INTEREST TO PEERLESS PUMP : COMPANY, CHICAGO PUMP COMPANY, : STERLING FLUID SYSTEM, INC. AND : FORMER SUBSIDIARY CROSBY VALVE, : INC.; FOSECO, INC.; FOSTER WHEELER : CORPORATION; GARDNER DENVER, : INC.; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; : GRINNELL LLC; GOULDS PUMPS, LLC; : I.U. NORTH AMERICA, INC.; AMERICA, : INC. AS SUCCESSOR-BY-MERGER TO : THE GARP COMPANY, F/K/A THE GAGE : COMPANY, F/K/A PITTSBURGH GAGE : AND SUPPLY COMPANY; IMO : INDUSTRIES, INC., F/K/A IMO DELAVAL, : INC., F/K/A TRANSAMERICAN DELAVAL, : INC., F/K/A DELAVAL TURBIN, INC., : DELAVAL TURBIN, INC., DEVALCO : CORPORATION; INGERSOLL-RAND : COMPANY; INSUL COMPANY, INC.; ITT : CORPORATION, F/K/A ITT INDUSTRIES, : INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN- : INTEREST TO BELL & GOSSETT : DOMESTIC PUMP; J.H. FRANCE : REFRACTORIES COMPANY; KRUMAN : EQUIPMENT COMPANY; MALLINCKRODT : US LLC, IN ITS OWN RIGHT AND AS :

[J-28-2024] [MO: Todd, C.J.] - 2 SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO IMCERA : GROUP, INC., AND INTERNATIONAL : GROUP, INC., AND INTERNATIONAL : MINERALS AND CHEMICAL : CORPORATION, AND AS SUCCESSOR- : IN-INTEREST TO E.J. LAVINO; MINE : SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY, LLC AS : SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST BY MERGER : WITH MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES : COMPANY; MINNOTTE CONTRACTING : CORPORATION; M.S. JACOBS & : ASSOCIATES, INC.; NAGLE PUMPS, INC.; : PEERLESS INDUSTRIES, INC.; POWER : PIPING COMPANY; RILEY POWER INC.; : SAFETY FIRST INDUSTRIES, INC., IN ITS : OWN RIGHT AND AS SUCCESSOR-IN- : INTEREST TO SAFETY-FIRST SUPPLY, : INC.; SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC. : F/K/A SQUARE D COMPANY, IN ITS OWN : RIGHT AND AS SUCCESSOR TO THE : ELECTRIC CONTROLLER AND : MANUFACTURING (EC&M); SPIRAX : SARCO, INC.; SPX COOLING : TECHNOLOGIES, INC., F/K/A MARLEY : COOLING TECHNOLOGIES INC., F/K/A : THE MARLEY COOLING COMPANY; : TACO, INC. F/K/A TACO HEATERS, INC.; : THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER : COMPANY; THE GORDON-RUPP : COMPANY; THE H.B. SMITH COMPANY, : INC.; TRANE U.S. INC., SUCCESSOR-BY- : MERGER TO AMERICAN STANDARD, : INC., UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION; : UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION; : WARREN PUMPS LLC; WEIL-MCLAIN : COMPANY, INC.; YORK INTERNATIONAL : CORPORATION; AND ZURN INDUSTRIES, : LLC F/K/A ZURN INDUSTRIES, INC. A/K/A : ERIE CITY IRON WORKS : : : APPEAL OF: UNIVERSITY OF : PITTSBURGH - OF THE : COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF HIGHER : EDUCATION

[J-28-2024] [MO: Todd, C.J.] - 3 DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: JANUARY 22, 2025 In Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013), this Court held that the

Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA)1 provides the exclusive remedy only for those

occupational disease-based disabilities that “manifest within 300 weeks of an employee’s

last exposure to the hazards of the disease.” Tooey, 81 A.3d at 865. For the reasons

outlined in his dissenting opinion, I agree with Justice Wecht that this Court’s decision in

Tooey was “simply wrong.” (Dissenting Op. at 13 (Wecht, J., dissenting).) Namely, as

Justice Wecht cogently explains, the 300-week disease manifestation requirement in the

WCA is unambiguous and reflects the General Assembly’s clear intent “to prevent

workers whose occupational diseases manifest beyond the statutory time limit from suing

their employers in tort.” (Id.; see also id. at 9-10 (discussing role of WCA’s disease

manifestation requirement as “an essential element of the grand bargain underlying the

law”).) To the extent that the Tooey Court looked beyond the “clear and unambiguous”

language of the WCA to hold otherwise, I believe that this was in error. See

Commonwealth v. Green, 291 A.3d 317, 327 (Pa. 2023) (“If the statutory language is clear

and unambiguous in setting forth the intent of the General Assembly, then ‘we cannot

disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’”).

On this point, I also agree with Justice Wecht that the Tooey Court compounded

its error by invoking the WCA’s “remedial purpose as a sort of tiebreaker,” while failing to

consider the “similar manifestation requirement” in the Occupational Disease Act (ODA).2

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.

2 Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1201-1603.

[J-28-2024] [MO: Todd, C.J.] - 4 (Dissenting Op. at 14 (Wecht, J., dissenting) (citing Section 301(c) of the ODA, 77 P.S.

§ 1401(c)).)

Furthermore, I agree with Justice Wecht that the statutory language at issue here

is distinct from the language that this Court considered in Tooey. Notably, and as Justice

Wecht observes, where the WCA uses the word “apply,” the ODA uses the word “mean.”

(Id. at 14 n.35.) This “variance in language,” and the WCA’s particular use of a term

denoting “jurisdictional significance,” suggests that the two acts are not “susceptible to

the [same] construction.” (Id. (citing Herold v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 291 A.3d 489, 503 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2023) (“Herold’s construction merely highlights that the ODA covers his claim

but, in fact, offers no compensation for his devastating illness.”)).) Consequently, I agree

with Justice Wecht that “[t]he ODA’s exclusive remedy provision applies to ‘any disability

or death resulting from occupational disease,’ regardless of whether that disability or

death is a ‘compensable disability or death’ under . . . Section 301(c)” of the ODA. (Id.

at 16-17 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sections 303 and 301(c) of the ODA, 77 P.S.

§§ 1403, 1401(c)).) Simply put, “[t]he unambiguous text of the ODA is not reasonably

susceptible to any other construction,” and this Court need not look further in pursuit of

the law’s spirit. (Id. at 19); see also Green, 291 A.3d at 327.

Due to these errors within the Tooey Court’s analysis, I would take the opportunity

to overrule the decision rather than rely upon it here to interpret the ODA’s similar, but

distinct, provisions. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020)

(providing “factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a past decision, including

‘the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with

other related decisions, . . . and reliance on the decision’”).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

[J-28-2024] [MO: Todd, C.J.] - 5