In Re Duke

447 B.R. 365, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 805, 2011 WL 837805
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 11, 2011
Docket14-70558
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 447 B.R. 365 (In Re Duke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Duke, 447 B.R. 365, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 805, 2011 WL 837805 (Ga. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES P. SMITH, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter presents the issue of whether certain “supplemental provisions” contained in Debtors’ Chapter 18 plan can be imposed upon Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (‘Wells Fargo”), which holds the first priority security deed on Debtors’ residence.

FACTS

Debtors filed their Chapter 13 case on August 5, 2010. Wells Fargo filed a proof of claim for $58,451.91, which includes a prepetition arrearage claim of $1,494.44. Wells Fargo’s claim is secured solely by Debtors’ principal residence.

As it relates to Wells Fargo, Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan provides for the Chapter 13 trustee to pay the arrearage claim, plus interest of 7.25 % per annum, from periodic payments received from Debtors. Debtors are to make their monthly postpetition payments to Wells Fargo outside of the plan.

Debtors also included in their plan certain “special provisions” seeking to impose affirmative duties on Wells Fargo (or any servicer of the claim) with respect to the claim and any payments it will receive. Those “special provisions” are attached as Addendum-1 to this Opinion. Wells Fargo objected to confirmation of Debtors’ plan on the grounds, inter alia, that these “special provisions” violate 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). 1

After hearing argument of counsel at the confirmation hearing on November 23, 2010, and upon the recommendation of the Chapter 13 trustee, the Court confirmed Debtors’ Chapter 13 plan without the “special provisions”, reserving a decision upon those provisions until the parties had an opportunity to file briefs.

Debtors and Wells Fargo have now filed their briefs. The Chapter 13 trustee has not filed a brief and thus has taken no position on whether the “special provisions” can be imposed on Wells Fargo as part of the confirmed plan.

DISCUSSION

In considering this matter, the Court requested on two occasions that the parties either stipulate or introduce into evidence the note and security deed evidencing Wells Fargo’s claim. On two separate occasions, Wells Fargo attached to its briefs copies of what it contends are the security deed and an assignment thereof to Wells Fargo. However, without proper authentication, these documents are not admissible as evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a).

Counsel for Debtors has filed a stipulation of authenticity of the security deed attached to the proof of claim filed by Wells Fargo. However, counsel for Debtors has not stipulated as to the authenticity of the note attached to the proof of claim. 2

*368 Although Debtors bear the ultimate burden to prove the plan is confirma-ble, Wells Fargo, as the objecting creditor, has the initial burden of going forward with some evidence to support its objection. See In re Glisson, 430 B.R. 920, 923 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2009). Wells Fargo contends that the “special provisions” improperly modify its rights in violation of section 1322(b)(2). Accordingly, Wells Fargo has the initial burden of introducing the relevant loan documents which establish its rights. Since the security deed, to which Debtors have stipulated, is the only admissible document evidencing Wells Fargo’s claim and its rights, this is the only document which the Court may consider in ruling on Wells Fargo’s objection. 3

Wells Fargo argues that the “special provisions” violate 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) which provides, in pertinent part:

(b) ... the plan may—
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence ...

In addition, the “special provisions” bring into play other provisions of the Code which will be discussed as appropriate.

Subparagraphs (a) and (c) of the proposed “special provisions” direct the application of payments on the prepetition ar-rearage and on the postpetition payments on the loan. These provisions are inappropriate for a number of reasons.

First, the Bankruptcy Code already provides for the application of plan payments. As the court in In re Carlton, 437 B.R. 412 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2010) explained:

Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits a chapter 13 plan from modifying ‘a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence ... ’ (e.g. the Bank’s claim in this case), but Section 1322(b)(5) carves out an exception. It states that ‘notwithstanding [Section 1322(b)(2) the plan may] provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending ... ’ In other words, Section 1322(b)(5) allows a chapter 13 debtor to bifurcate payment of his home mortgage. First, the plan may provide for payment of the on-going, postpetition installments as they become due under the mortgage contract, and those installments are to be treated and applied as if there were no default and no arrears. Second, the plan may provide for the cure of the prepetition arrears by spreading their payment over a reasonable time, which is usually the life of the plan. ‘The effect of section 1322(b)(2) and (5) is to potentially split the treatment of mortgagee’s secured claim by the plan — one secured for the mortgage going forward and one secured for the arrearage — but it does not compromise the amount of the aggregate secured claim or the rights of the secured party to recover the arrearage.’ [Universal American Mortgage Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman) ], 331 F.3d at 821, n. 5 [11th Cir.2003] (citing Nobelman v. Am. Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 331-32, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993)).
*369 This Court concludes that when a plan provides for the payment of both prepet-ition arrears and on-going postpetition mortgage payments—as does the Debt- or’s Plan in this case—an attempt in the plan to recapitulate in detail the manner in which the payments are to be applied adds nothing but clutter, creates ambiguity and uncertainty with regard to whether something more or less than what the Code allows was intended, and otherwise enhances the opportunity for mischief and fosters litigation.... This Court adopts the conclusions reached by the court in In re Maupin, [384 B.R. 421, 430 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2007) ] with regard to crowding chapter 13 plans with extraordinary provisions that include questionable interpretations of the Code: ‘[I]f Paragraph 11 L is an accurate statement of law, then it is unnecessary. If it is not an accurate statement of law, then it violates the implied statutory prohibition against including any provision that is not consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
447 B.R. 365, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 805, 2011 WL 837805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-duke-gamb-2011.