In Re Ducich

385 F. Supp. 1287, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5889
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedNovember 7, 1974
Docket74-5646
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 385 F. Supp. 1287 (In Re Ducich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Ducich, 385 F. Supp. 1287, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5889 (C.D. Cal. 1974).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WESTOYER, District Judge.

This appeal arises out of Bankruptcy Rules 401 and 601, effective October 1, 1973, which rules read in part as follows:

“Rule 401. ' Petition as Automatic Stay of Certain Actions on Unsecured Debts
“(a) Stay of Actions. The filing of a petition [in bankruptcy] shall operate as a stay of the commence *1289 ment or continuation of any action against the bankrupt, or the enforcement of any judgment against him, if the action or judgment is founded on an unsecured provable debt other than one not dischargeable under clause (1), (5), (6), or (7) of § 17a of the Act.
« X X X
“ * * *
“(d) Relief from Stay. On the filing of a complaint by a creditor seeking relief from a stay provided by this rule, the bankruptcy court shall, set the trial for the earliest possible date, and it shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character. The court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or condition such stay.”
“Rule 601. Petition as Automatic Stay Against Lien. Enforcement
“(a) Stay Against Lien Enforcement. The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay of any act or the commencement or continuation of any court proceeding to enforce (1) a lien against property in the custody of the bankruptcy court, or (2) a lien against the property of the bankrupt obtained within 4 months before bankruptcy by attachment, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings.
X X X
Relief from Stay. On the filing of a complaint seeking relief from a stay provided in this rule, the bankruptcy court shall, subject to the provisions of subdivision (d) of this rule, set the trial for the earliest possible date, and it shall take precedence over all matters, except older matters of the same character. The court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or condition such stay. A party seeking continuation of a stay against lien enforcement shall show that he is entitled thereto.”

The statement of the case is ably set forth in Appellant’s Brief on Appeal, pages 1 and 2, as follows:

“In April of 1974, respondent THERAPEUTICS INC. (hereinafter referred to as the Judgment Creditor) obtained a small claims judgment against the bankrupt and respondent ROBERT DAN DUCICH (hereinafter referred to as the “Bankrupt”) (Findings of Fact, hereinafter referred to as “F.F.”, page 2, lines 9-12) and caused the respondent and appellent (hereinafter referred to as the “levying officer”) to serve a writ of execution, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 682.-3, on the bankrupt’s employer, CERTIFIED GROCERS (hereinafter referred to as the “bankrupt’s employer”) (FF: p. 2, lines 14-22). Pursuant to the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 682.3, the bankrupt’s employer began deducting and forwarding to the levying officer the appropriate portions of the bankrupt’s earnings to be forwarded in due course by the levying officer to the judgment creditor. (F.F., p. 2, lines 19-27).
“On or about May 6, 1974, the bankrupt filed a voluntary bankruptcy (F.F., p. 2, lines 29-30) and a notice from the bankrupt to the effect that a petition in bankruptcy had been fild and that Bankruptcy Rules 401 and 601 provide for an automatic stay of certain actions was served upon the levying officer, the judgment creditor, and the bankrupt’s employer. (F.F. p. 3, lines 5-7).
“The judgment creditor did not issue a direction to the levying officer to release the garnishment and the bankrupt’s employer continued to send portions of the bankrupt’s salary to the levying officer, and the levying officer received (F.F. p. 5, line 15 to F.F. p. 6, line 2) but did not pay said sums to the judgment creditor. (Judgment, lines 23-26)
“Because of the levying officer’s refusal to issue a direction to release the garnishment to the bankrupt’s employer, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 682.3(a)(1), and *1290 because of the levying officer’s refusal to cease receiving the money forwarded to him by the bankrupt’s employer, the bankrupt filed a motion with the bankruptcy court to, inter alia, have the levying officer held in contempt for violation of Bankruptcy Rules 401 and 601.
“The bankruptcy court held that the levying officer’s actions were in violation of both Bankruptcy Rules 401 and 601, but that the actions of the levying officer were without willful intent and in the absence of a judicial interpretation or ruling on the effect of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, on a garnishment against the earnings of a judgment debtor (F.F. p. 6, lines 4-13), and that, therefore, the actions of the levying officer were not contemptuous (F.F., p. 10, lines 1-32). The bankruptcy court further ordered the levying officer to give the bankrupt’s employer a direction to release the writ of execution previously served (Judgment, lines 27-31). From this decision of the bankruptcy court, the levying officer takes this appeal. * * *»

It will be noted that Rules 401 and 601 state: “The filing of a petition shall operate as a stay * * In the present case, after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, Bankrupt’s employer continued to withhold part of the Bankrupt’s salary and continued to forward the same to the Marshal of Municipal Courts, pursuant to the writ of execution.

Before the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Marshal had forwarded to the Judgment 'Creditor the amounts received from Bankrupt’s employer. After having knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding, the Marshal received and retained said amounts until $339.13 (Amended Judgment, line 24) has been accumulated. Bankrupt made demand upon the Marshal for the money so accumulated, which demand was refused; whereupon Bankrupt’s counsel, on June 11, 1974, filed in the bankruptcy court a Motion for Determination of Contempt and for Order for Attorney Fees, seeking to hold the Marshal in contempt and to obtain possession of the funds held by him. On June 21, 1974 counsel for Bankrupt filed a Complaint for Order Declaring Lien Null and Void.

After holding hearing on the pleadings before him the Bankruptcy Judge filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on July 11, 1974 and, on July 23, 1974, filed an Amended Judgment. As hereinbefore stated the Bankruptcy Judge held, inter alia, that the Marshal’s actions were in violation of Bankruptcy Rules 401 and 601 but that the actions of the levying officer were without willful intent and, in the absence of judicial interpretation or ruling on the effect of a garnishment against the earnings of a Judgment Debtor who filed bankruptcy, the said actions were not contemptuous; and the Bankruptcy Judge denied the Motion for Determination of Contempt and for Order for Attorney Fees (Amended Judgment, Item 1). In this ruling the Bankruptcy Judge is affirmed.

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385 F. Supp. 1287, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ducich-cacd-1974.