In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.

133 B.R. 13, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1560, 1991 WL 222083
United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 25, 1991·No. 18-36488·Published·Cited by 50 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON REASONABLENESS OF PROFESSIONAL FEES

FRANCIS G. CONRAD, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter 1 is before us by result of our May 23, 1991 bench order directing certain professionals (Attorneys, Accountants, Investment Bankers/Advisors) to submit proprietary data, under seal, on how their firms calculate rates and disbursements charged to the Drexel Bum-ham Lambert Group, Inc. (DBL) bankruptcy estate. An evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 8, 1991.

The review of professional fees by a Court, particularly when, as here, many of the professionals, although not all, have performed in an exemplary manner, is distasteful to the Court and demeaning to the professional. Unfortunately, however, it is mandated by the Bankruptcy Code, § 330.

The analysis of professional rates is a classic case of statutory construction. The starting point in every case involving statutory construction is the language itself. In Re Burke Mountain Recreation, Inc., 64 B.R. 799, 802 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1986). Section 330’s standards do not stand in isolation, however. We need to look at § 330 as it relates to the fundamental changes specifically wrought by the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the practical results of other changes made by the Code, and the reality of modem economic life.

The first and foremost change Congress specifically enacted in 1978 was that attorneys or other professionals whose retentions have been approved by the Bankruptcy Court are to be compensated based on market rates, rather than the principle of “strict economy.” Congress explicitly rejected the Judge-created notions or stan *16 dards that “economy of the estate” required the bankrupt’s estate to compensate attorneys at less than the rates established by the free market. In rejecting the prior standard for awarding professional compensation, and insisting on a standard established by the free market (tempered by other factors discussed herein) for the purchase and sale of professional services, Congress explicitly made known its intention to avoid the problems that existed from the inevitable operation of “Gresham’s Law,” created by the prior standard, that is, low fees drive competent professionals away from bankruptcy or to those bankruptcy-involved clients who would pay market rates.

The second substantial change Congress specifically enacted in 1978, which bears on the general issue before us, was a fundamental change in the system of case administration. No longer would Bankruptcy judges or the Securities and Exchange Commission play a business role in a corporate reorganization case. 2 Rather, Congress commanded that the debtor and committees of creditors and security holders, supplemented with professionals to the extent the Bankruptcy Court deemed appropriate, should guide a corporate reorganization. The debtor and the committees would negotiate and hopefully fashion a consensual plan that would result from the particular calculus of facts, leverages, and interests available to each constituency. Official committees were intended to play a central role in this process.

Substantial discretion resides in the Bankruptcy Court to authorize the number of committees and professionals needed, based on the particular facts of each case. Where a Bankruptcy Court has authorized multiple committees, it has done so usually because the interests of various constituencies are substantially different and cannot be represented by the debtor or a single committee. Those committees, and the professionals they are permitted to retain, have interests by definition that conflict with the interests of others. Those committees and their retained professionals are charged with the duty to advance their constituencies’ specific interests in the reorganization process, but always tempered by their fiduciary duty to the debtor.

The practical development that has occurred since the enactment of the 1978 Code, at least with respect to complex corporate reorganization cases under Chapter 11, is that the skills of a “pure bankruptcy” legal specialist have had to be augmented by the specialized legal skills of other areas of sophisticated legal practice. Aside from railroad reorganizations and reorganizations occasioned by underlying fraud, there were comparatively few substantial corporate reorganizations during the period from the end of World War II to the enactment of the Code in 1978. In 1978, the Code eliminated any “insolvency” requirement as a precondition for a corporation filing for reorganization. The Code expanded the scope of “claims” that could be dealt with in a reorganization proceeding and encouraged, by a variety of mechanisms, the availability of Chapter 11 as a “fresh start”, for a corporate debtor. Because of these legal changes and the slow but inexorable changes in the national and international economies, corporations could and did seek to reorganize through Chapter 11 in a wide variety of contexts.

Corporate life itself had become far more complex than in 1898 when the Bankruptcy Act was enacted, or than in 1938 when the former Chapters X and XI were added. Corporate life has become even more complex since the 1970’s, when the Code was being debated and drafted. By the late 20th century, the complexity of corporate and capital structures occasioned or dictated by a myriad of operational, competitive, tax and regulatory considerations at the state, federal and international levels, and the legal problems to be faced once a Chapter 11 petition was filed have been extraordinarily more diverse and complex than those of the prior 75 years.

*17 Corporate reorganizations present substantial legal issues in addition to, but separate from, bankruptcy law. There is no dispute that an attorney retained under § 327 has to be expert in bankruptcy law. Whatever problems exist must be handled within the complex of rights and obligations created by the Bankruptcy Code to achieve a plan meeting the requirements of § 1129. In corporate reorganizations today, the retained attorney must often have access to additional legal expertise not thought of as “bankruptcy law” expertise. These areas of “non-bankruptcy” legal expertise in corporate reorganizations often include, for example, tax (federal, state, local, and international); a wide variety of areas of state and federal regulatory law (e.g., labor, PBGC, SEC, DOT); specialized areas of litigation (e.g., securities, antitrust, product liability); corporate divestitures; and the latest forms of corporate finance. Debtors and committees today often retain special counsel for such specialized exper-tises to supplement and support bankruptcy counsel.

These examples vividly demonstrate the wide variety of “non-bankruptcy” legal topics that debtors and official committees, and their retained counsel, have to address to represent adequately their respective constituencies in large cases, and, in particular, in the formulation of a plan. This consideration that the legal practice “in” bankruptcy is not just the legal practice “of” bankruptcy law bears upon the issue addressed by this memorandum: compensation of attorneys for their services at market rates.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1560, 1991 WL 222083 (N.Y. 1991).

133 B.R. 13 (In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Untitled Case
D. Idaho, 2026
Untitled Case
N.D. Illinois, 2023
Untitled Case
N.D. Illinois, 2022
Alejandro Cervantes
E.D. California, 2020
Joseph J Porada, Jr.
N.D. Illinois, 2019
In re Hungry Horse, LLC
574 B.R. 740 (D. New Mexico, 2017)
In re All Island Truck Leasing Corp.
546 B.R. 522 (E.D. New York, 2016)
In re Boomerang Tube, Inc.
548 B.R. 69 (D. Delaware, 2016)
In re Quigley Co.
500 B.R. 347 (S.D. New York, 2013)
In Re Trans National Communications International, Inc.
462 B.R. 339 (D. Massachusetts, 2011)
Nicholas v. Oren (In re Nicholas)
496 B.R. 69 (E.D. New York, 2011)
In Re Borders Group, Inc.
456 B.R. 195 (S.D. New York, 2011)
In Re First Street Mart, Inc.
450 B.R. 581 (M.D. North Carolina, 2011)
In Re Value City Holdings, Inc.
436 B.R. 300 (S.D. New York, 2010)
In Re Energy Partners, Ltd.
409 B.R. 211 (S.D. Texas, 2009)
In Re Ahead Communications Systems, Inc.
395 B.R. 512 (D. Connecticut, 2008)
In Re Brous
370 B.R. 563 (S.D. New York, 2007)