Joseph J Porada, Jr.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 23, 2019
Docket17-36268
StatusUnknown

This text of Joseph J Porada, Jr. (Joseph J Porada, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Joseph J Porada, Jr., (Ill. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION In re: ) ) Case No, 17bk36268 JOSEPH J. PORADA, ) ) Chapter 11 Debtor. ) ). Honorable Tumothy A. Barnes FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF ORDER AWARDING TO FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP, ATTORNEYS FOR DEBTOR, FOR ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF FINAL COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES TOTAL FEES REQUESTED: $119,609.87 TOTAL COSTS REQUESTED: $917.09 TOTAL FEES REDUCED: $ 9,056.00 TOTAL COSTS REDUCED: $ 8.00 TOTAL FEES ALLOWED: $110,553.87 TOTAL COSTS ALLOWED: $ 909.09 TOTAL FEES AND COSTS ALLOWED: $ 111,462.96 Pursuant to the court’s comments at the hearing on December 18, 2019 on the Final Application of Fox Rothschild LLP for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses and for Related Relief [Dkt. No. 127] (the “Application”); the court having heard from Fox Rothschild LLP (“Fex”) and the Debtor and having considered the Debtor’s Objection to the Application [Dkt. No. 131] (the “Objection”) and all related filings to the Application and the Objection; the Objection further only being germane to the Application and not to the prior services previously and finally approved in the absence of an objection; THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS THAT: Attached to this Order is an annotated copy of the invoices submitted by Fox in support of the Application. Where an entry is not annotated, the court finds that the entry meets the requirements for reimbutsement under 11 U.S.C. § 330. Where the attached time and expense entries have been underlined, such annotations reflect disallowance in whole or in part. The basis for cach disallowance is reflected by numerical notations that appear on the right of each underlined entry. The numerical notations correspond to the enumerated paragraphs below.

No party objected to the previous applications of counsel, which were filed by Shaw Fishman Glantz & Towbin LLC (“Shaw’’} and Fox, successor to Shaw via merger. Nonetheless, the court has reviewed and determined the propriety of all prior applications and reduced them in accordance with the applicable standards and practices of this court. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Compensation for Shaw Fishman Glantz & ‘Towbin LLC, Debtor's Attorney [Dkt. No. 64]; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Compensation for Fox Rothschild LLP, Debtor's Attorney [Dkt. No. 87}.

(1) Unreasonable Time -- TOTAL of disallowed amounts: $ 3,234.00 The majority’ of the Objection concerns the reasonableness of Fox’s discretion in billing the bankruptcy estate for certain tasks performed. The court always examines applications before it for reasonableness and denies compensation for a task to the extent that a professional or paraprofessional expended an unreasonable amount of time on the task in hight of the nature of the task, the experience and knowledge of the professional performing the task, and the amount of time previously expended by the professional or another on the task. Iv re Pettibone, 74 293, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (Schmetterer, }.) (“The Court will determine what is the reasonable amount of tme an attorney should have to spend on a given project... An attorney should not be rewarded for inefficiency. Similarly, attorneys will not be fully compensated for spending an unreasonable number of hours on activities of little benefit to the estate.”); Ia re Wildman, 72 BUR. 700, 713 (Banks. N.D. Ill. 1987) (Schmetterer, J.) (same). Here, the Debtor argues that many tasks should have been billed or performed at a lower cost based on the outcome or current status of the task performed. There are many ways the court examines applications for compensation and the court has repeatedly informed those that practice in front of the court that the court sometimes, absent an objection, is focused on the trees and not the forest—meaning the court looks for issues with respect to individual time entries or categories under the standards applied in this court (lumping, unallowable costs, time increments, etc.). This is due to the nature of interim versus final applications and the ability of the court to use hindsight in the final application. Hindsight and the knowledge of outcome, however, are not always a great determiner of reasonableness of attorney’s compensation. A court must not attempt to determine the reasonableness of time spent by an attorney by looking at the matter solely in hindsight or determining reasonableness by the outcome of the issue or matter. Brandt v. Schal Associates, fue, 131 FR.D. 485, 493 on reconsideration in part, 131 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1990) aff'd, 960 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1992) ({I]t would be entirely inappropriate for this Court to hold that the expenditure of time by defense counsel in this area was unreasonable based on any such retrospective and result-oriented approach.”); Koval v. PaineWebber Hous. ¢» Healthcare Funding, Inc, 128 F.R.D. 654, 657 (N.D. IL 1989) (“No court, however experienced in the law practice the judge may have been before taking the bench, can feel comfortable with trying to reconstruct the reasonableness of fees viewed from the outside and in hindsight.”); Hamer v. Lake Cuty., 819 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cit. 1987) (“[]]t ts important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.”); Iv re Drexe/ Burnhara Lambert Group, Inc, 133 B.R. 13, 23 (Bankr. $.D.N.Y. 1991) (In determining reasonableness, “the Court must not penalize attommeys by viewing the efforts of counsel with the benefit of ‘20/20 hindsight.’...[H]ours for an activity or project should be disallowed only where a Court is convinced

2 The Objection and the reply in support thereof [Dkt. No. 128] (the “Reply”}, oudine many arguments, but some of the arguments are actually more commentary which the court need not address. For this reason, the court will not consider the Debtor’s arguments considering the frugality of the Debtor, the discussion about the Debtor’s personality and view on lawyers /litigation and the Debtor’s discussion of the view of other parties’ concerning the Application because no other parties have objected to the Application.

OE IEE EO

it is readily apparent that no reasonable attorney should have undertaken that activity or project or where the time devoted was excessive.”). In this case, the Objection focuses on three tasks that the Debtor views as unreasonable. The court has examined the Application in its entirety and in hght of the Objection, and the coutt will address each of the tasks, in turn: i Operating Reports: In the Application, Fox seeks $7,286.00 for the filing of operating reports. 10 operating reports were filed by Fox during the Application period for an average of $728.60/ operating report. The Debtor argues that Fox’s fees for pteparation of operating reports ate not reasonable and that Fox, as a larger firm than Debtor’s current counsel, should have used better discretion in billing a smaller amount for this task. Further, Debtor's current counsel argues that he is charging only $200.00 per report. In fact, many of the Debtor’s arguments are attacks on Fox’s billing practices predicated on the allegations of the Debtor’s current counsel that he could have performed the work in a less expensive manner. However, Fox and the Debtot’s current counsel’s firm ate two very different sized firms and charge different rates for their work performed.

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Related

In Re Wildman
72 B.R. 700 (N.D. Illinois, 1987)
In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
133 B.R. 13 (S.D. New York, 1991)
Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC
576 U.S. 121 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Brandt v. Schal Associates, Inc.
131 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Illinois, 1990)

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Joseph J Porada, Jr., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/joseph-j-porada-jr-ilnb-2019.