In Re Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/appellant v. Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor/appellee

50 F.3d 530, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4844, 1995 WL 104129
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMarch 14, 1995
Docket94-1472
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 50 F.3d 530 (In Re Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/appellant v. Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor/appellee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor. Metrobank, Creditor/appellant v. Donald Allen Trimble, Debtor/appellee, 50 F.3d 530, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4844, 1995 WL 104129 (8th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Appellant/creditor Metrobank appeals from the district court decision that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the value of the bank’s secured interest in an encumbered vehicle that the appel-lee/debtor intends to retain under his chapter 13 reorganization plan is limited to the wholesale value of the vehicle. We reverse.

I.

Appellee/debtor Donald Allen Trimble secured financing through appellant/creditor Metrobank, for the purchase of a 1988 Ford Ranger pickup. Subsequently, the debtor filed for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The principal balance owing on the truck at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy was $6,404.84. Under the proposed chapter 13 plan, Metrobank’s secured interest in the vehicle was valued at $4,000 with interest, while the remainder of the debt was unsecured, to be paid through the plan without interest. Although the plan provided that Metrobank’s claim would be paid in full, Metrobank objected to the plan, arguing that it was fully secured and that interest should be paid on the entire debt. 1 By a joint stipulation of fact, the parties agreed that the wholesale value of the vehicle is $4,000 and the retail value is $6,500. The bankruptcy court ruled that the bank was only secured to the extent of the wholesale value of the vehicle. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling.

II.

Section 1325(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, if a debtor in chapter 13 intends to retain property subject to a lien, the secured creditor must receive the present value of its allowed secured claim. Unless the creditor’s present value is preserved, confirmation cannot occur over the creditor’s *531 objections. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). The amount of a secured claim is determined by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), which provides in relevant part:

An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property....

11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Courts interpreting section 506(a) have placed varying importance on the statute’s two clauses, resulting in disagreement as to the proper valuation method of a creditor’s secured claim. One line of cases determines that the decisive language of section 506(a) is the language of the first sentence which provides that the creditor’s claim is secured to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 303, 121 L.Ed.2d 226 (1992); In re Overholt, 125 B.R. 202, 214 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1990). The proponents of this theory contend that, based on the language of the first sentence of section 506(a), the property interest being valued is the creditor’s lien interest in the collateral and not the debtor’s ownership interest. According to this theory, because a lien is simply a right to take possession of the collateral and sell it in satisfaction of an obligation, the value of the lien is equal to the amount the creditor could receive upon sale of the collateral, or, in other words, the wholesale value of the collateral.

A second line of cases focuses instead on the language of the second sentence of section 506(a) which provides that the creditor’s lien interest must be valued in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the collateral. See, e.g., In re Rash, 31 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir.1994); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr.D.Minn.1993). Under this theory, where the debtor intends to retain and use the collateral, the value of the creditor’s secured interest should be based upon the replacement cost to the debtor, or the retail value of the collateral. “[W]hen a debtor intends to continue use of creditor’s collateral, the Debtors are acknowledging the value of the collateral to be greater than if liquidated.” In re Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Penz, 102 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr.E.D.Okla.1989)). As the court wrote in Green:

It is true that the plain meaning of the first sentence of section 506(a) requires a valuation of the creditor’s lien interest in the collateral. However, the fact that a hen in property gives the lienholder a right to repossess and sell the collateral does not automatically mean that the value of the hen is equal to the amount that the creditor would receive upon disposition of the cohateral in satisfaction of its hen. It must be remembered that a hen is fundamentally a security interest which secures payment of an obhgation. To value such an interest in property based solely on the amount that could be realized upon sale of the collateral ignores the value associated with the right to receive the stream of payments that the hen secures.

In re Green, 151 B.R. at 505 (emphasis in original). Therefore, according to this theory, “the value of the creditor’s hen is derived from the stream of payments that the hen secures, rather than the right to foreclose, since no liquidation of the cohateral is contemplated.” In re Rash, 31 F.3d at 329 (quoting In re Green, 151 B.R. at 504). Nor should the costs associated with the sale of the cohateral be deducted since no sale is contemplated. Because the value of the creditor’s hen is to be determined in hght of the debtor’s intended use of the cohateral and the purpose of the valuation, the value will be dictated by the facts of each particular case. See S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854, 6312 (“[C]ourts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis.”).

We adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in In re Rash, and other courts that have focused on the second sentence of section *532 506(a), and we now conclude that the value of Metrobank’s lien interest is properly based on the retail value of the collateral without deduction for costs of sale. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the retad valuation method is the only method that gives full effect to the entire language of section 506(a).

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Bluebook (online)
50 F.3d 530, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4844, 1995 WL 104129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-donald-allen-trimble-debtor-metrobank-creditorappellant-v-donald-ca8-1995.