OPINION
WEISBERGER, Justice.
These four consolidated cases come before us on appeals from orders of the District and Family Courts either involuntarily committing a patient to the Institute of Mental Health (IMH) or recertifying a patient for retention in that facility after he or she has been confined therein for one or more six-month periods. An equally divided court had previously denied and dismissed these appeals. We, however, granted a subsequent motion for reargument. In Re Doe, R.I., 432 A.2d 327, reh. granted, R.I., 435 A.2d 330 (1981). Although the facts of all four cases pose similar problems, the cases are not identical and, therefore, a brief exposition of the facts of each will follow.
John Doe was civilly certified to the IMH by a justice of the District Court for care and treatment on July 7,1978, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 40.1-5-8. This certification was based upon findings that the patient was in need of care and treatment in a facility, that he would likely benefit therefrom, that his continued unsupervised presence in the community would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental disability, and that no suitable alternatives to certification existed. These factual findings were made as required by statute upon a quantum of evidence determined to be beyond a reasonable doubt. On January 5, 1979, a petition was filed in the Sixth Division of the District Court pursuant to § 40.1-5-11, [714]*714seeking to recertify John Doe for an additional six-month period. It should be noted that this petition was not filed within a period of no less than fifteen days and no more than thirty days prior to the scheduled expiration date of a six-month period as required by the statute. It is undisputed that the recertification petition missed the target date by approximately twelve days.
Richard Roe has been a patient at the IMH continuously since at least March of 1976. He was last certified in July 1977. Because his records were lost, no certification petition in respect to Richard was filed until after the expiration of the statutory period. Consequently, on December 19, 1978, Richard was discharged and readmitted on an emergency petition pursuant to the terms of § 40.1-5-7. Thereafter, a certification petition was filed on December 28, 1978. This petition was challenged on the ground of lack of timeliness. The court rejected the challenge and found that the statutory requirements for certification were met by clear and convincing evidence.
Joseph Roe had been civilly certified to the IMH by a justice of the District Court on July 7, 1978. A petition for recertification for an additional six months was filed on December 28, 1978. It is undisputed that this petition missed the target date by approximately six days. The mental health advocate moved that the petition be dismissed and the patient unconditionally discharged pursuant to the provisions of § 40.1-5-11, which reads in pertinent part:
“At the expiration of the six (6) month period set forth in § 40.1-5-8(10) hereunder, or any subsequent six (6) month period following recertification pursuant to this section the patient shall be unconditionally released unless a recertification petition is filed by the official in charge of a facility or his designated agent within no less than fifteen (15) days and no more than thirty (80) days prior to the scheduled expiration date of a six (6) month period. A hearing must be held pursuant to said petition and a decision rendered before the expiration of said six (6) month period.”
The trial court denied the motion, made the necessary statutory findings based upon clear and convincing evidence, and recerti-fied Joseph.
Nancy was admitted to the IMH on an emergency certificate on December 15, 1978, after a history of attempted suicide. Subsequently, on December 28,1978, a petition for civil-court certification was filed in the Family Court. This petition was challenged on the ground that it was filed two days beyond the ten-day period of emergency commitment authorized in § 40.1-5-7. The Family Court justice rejected this challenge and certified Nancy for a period of six months for care and treatment. He based his ruling in part upon Nancy’s indication that she would be willing to remain at the IMH adolescent unit as a voluntary patient. It is undisputed, however, that the certification vitiated her proposed voluntary status. The required statutory findings were made in support of the certification on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.
All of the cases raise a common issue. May a District Court or Family Court justice certify or recertify a patient who is found by the appropriate quantum of evidence to be in need of care and treatment at a mental health facility when that patient’s continued unsupervised presence in the community poses a likelihood of serious harm to the patient or to others — in the event that the petition is not filed within the time limitations set forth by statute even though all other requirements for certification have been met?
The Rhode Island Mental Health Law was carefully crafted in order to guarantee that the liberty of an individual patient would be scrupulously protected and that this liberty would be impaired only in the event of findings of stringent necessity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the case of an initial certification, and proof by clear and convincing evidence supporting identical findings in the case of a recertification. The statute provides for institutional review proceedings at least every ninety days, by a review panel composed of at least one [715]*715psychiatrist and two other mental-health professionals involved in treating the patient. § 40.1-5-10. The statute further provides, as indicated above, for unconditional discharge at the end of a six-month certification period unless the patient is re-certified under the circumstances and in accordance with the timetable set forth in § 40.1-5-11. However, before we decide whether the time schedule for filing of re-certification petitions or initial petitions is mandatory, as opposed to directory, some attention must be given to the result of this “unconditional release.” The purpose of the statutory provisions for review is to ensure that a patient may not become forgotten or “warehoused” when the need for supervised care and treatment no longer exists. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). These objectives are indeed worthy and merit faithful implementation by the judiciary.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the sanction for the procedural default is the discontinuing of treatment and an unconditional discharge of a patient who has been found by the court either beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence to be in need of such care and treatment and whose unsupervised presence in the community would create a likelihood of serious harm to the patient or to others. It is true that the Legislature couches the “remedy” in terms of unconditional discharge, but that remedy might also be described in terms of ejection from the very facility where treatment may be given. We must take judicial notice of the well-known fact that there are patients in the IMH who literally are unable to survive outside that institution.
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OPINION
WEISBERGER, Justice.
These four consolidated cases come before us on appeals from orders of the District and Family Courts either involuntarily committing a patient to the Institute of Mental Health (IMH) or recertifying a patient for retention in that facility after he or she has been confined therein for one or more six-month periods. An equally divided court had previously denied and dismissed these appeals. We, however, granted a subsequent motion for reargument. In Re Doe, R.I., 432 A.2d 327, reh. granted, R.I., 435 A.2d 330 (1981). Although the facts of all four cases pose similar problems, the cases are not identical and, therefore, a brief exposition of the facts of each will follow.
John Doe was civilly certified to the IMH by a justice of the District Court for care and treatment on July 7,1978, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 40.1-5-8. This certification was based upon findings that the patient was in need of care and treatment in a facility, that he would likely benefit therefrom, that his continued unsupervised presence in the community would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental disability, and that no suitable alternatives to certification existed. These factual findings were made as required by statute upon a quantum of evidence determined to be beyond a reasonable doubt. On January 5, 1979, a petition was filed in the Sixth Division of the District Court pursuant to § 40.1-5-11, [714]*714seeking to recertify John Doe for an additional six-month period. It should be noted that this petition was not filed within a period of no less than fifteen days and no more than thirty days prior to the scheduled expiration date of a six-month period as required by the statute. It is undisputed that the recertification petition missed the target date by approximately twelve days.
Richard Roe has been a patient at the IMH continuously since at least March of 1976. He was last certified in July 1977. Because his records were lost, no certification petition in respect to Richard was filed until after the expiration of the statutory period. Consequently, on December 19, 1978, Richard was discharged and readmitted on an emergency petition pursuant to the terms of § 40.1-5-7. Thereafter, a certification petition was filed on December 28, 1978. This petition was challenged on the ground of lack of timeliness. The court rejected the challenge and found that the statutory requirements for certification were met by clear and convincing evidence.
Joseph Roe had been civilly certified to the IMH by a justice of the District Court on July 7, 1978. A petition for recertification for an additional six months was filed on December 28, 1978. It is undisputed that this petition missed the target date by approximately six days. The mental health advocate moved that the petition be dismissed and the patient unconditionally discharged pursuant to the provisions of § 40.1-5-11, which reads in pertinent part:
“At the expiration of the six (6) month period set forth in § 40.1-5-8(10) hereunder, or any subsequent six (6) month period following recertification pursuant to this section the patient shall be unconditionally released unless a recertification petition is filed by the official in charge of a facility or his designated agent within no less than fifteen (15) days and no more than thirty (80) days prior to the scheduled expiration date of a six (6) month period. A hearing must be held pursuant to said petition and a decision rendered before the expiration of said six (6) month period.”
The trial court denied the motion, made the necessary statutory findings based upon clear and convincing evidence, and recerti-fied Joseph.
Nancy was admitted to the IMH on an emergency certificate on December 15, 1978, after a history of attempted suicide. Subsequently, on December 28,1978, a petition for civil-court certification was filed in the Family Court. This petition was challenged on the ground that it was filed two days beyond the ten-day period of emergency commitment authorized in § 40.1-5-7. The Family Court justice rejected this challenge and certified Nancy for a period of six months for care and treatment. He based his ruling in part upon Nancy’s indication that she would be willing to remain at the IMH adolescent unit as a voluntary patient. It is undisputed, however, that the certification vitiated her proposed voluntary status. The required statutory findings were made in support of the certification on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.
All of the cases raise a common issue. May a District Court or Family Court justice certify or recertify a patient who is found by the appropriate quantum of evidence to be in need of care and treatment at a mental health facility when that patient’s continued unsupervised presence in the community poses a likelihood of serious harm to the patient or to others — in the event that the petition is not filed within the time limitations set forth by statute even though all other requirements for certification have been met?
The Rhode Island Mental Health Law was carefully crafted in order to guarantee that the liberty of an individual patient would be scrupulously protected and that this liberty would be impaired only in the event of findings of stringent necessity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the case of an initial certification, and proof by clear and convincing evidence supporting identical findings in the case of a recertification. The statute provides for institutional review proceedings at least every ninety days, by a review panel composed of at least one [715]*715psychiatrist and two other mental-health professionals involved in treating the patient. § 40.1-5-10. The statute further provides, as indicated above, for unconditional discharge at the end of a six-month certification period unless the patient is re-certified under the circumstances and in accordance with the timetable set forth in § 40.1-5-11. However, before we decide whether the time schedule for filing of re-certification petitions or initial petitions is mandatory, as opposed to directory, some attention must be given to the result of this “unconditional release.” The purpose of the statutory provisions for review is to ensure that a patient may not become forgotten or “warehoused” when the need for supervised care and treatment no longer exists. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975). These objectives are indeed worthy and merit faithful implementation by the judiciary.
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the sanction for the procedural default is the discontinuing of treatment and an unconditional discharge of a patient who has been found by the court either beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence to be in need of such care and treatment and whose unsupervised presence in the community would create a likelihood of serious harm to the patient or to others. It is true that the Legislature couches the “remedy” in terms of unconditional discharge, but that remedy might also be described in terms of ejection from the very facility where treatment may be given. We must take judicial notice of the well-known fact that there are patients in the IMH who literally are unable to survive outside that institution. The very thought of ejecting such patients, regardless of the consequences, because an official of the institution has failed to file a petition within the statutory time frame, absent a saving judicial discretion, is indeed a chilling concept. Even Draco of Athens might pause before including such a “remedy” in his code.
The concern for “Mad Ludwig of Bavaria” 1 and other horror stories have caused civil rights advocates and legal commentators to become more concerned about the civil liberties of the mentally ill than about their need for therapeutic response. Mental patients are unique in that those who are subject to involuntary commitment are by definition unable to make an informed choice for themselves about their need for treatment. They frequently are completely lacking in insight and indeed may be wholly in the grip of hallucination and thereby out of touch with reality.
We would find it unconscionable to withhold other kinds of medical treatment from patients in need thereof by way of imposing supposed sanctions upon errant officials. Suppose, for example, that officials of a hospital might be punished for some procedural default by being forbidden to perform necessary surgery or from dispensing needed medication to their patients; such a result would seem ludicrous, indeed. Nevertheless, we are urged to punish officials of a mental-health facility by ejecting patients who have been found by overwhelming evidence to be in need of treatment, unless the officials file a recertification petition within the rigid time constraints or discharge the patient and file an emergency certificate. However, there is no guarantee that the official will file and follow up upon such an emergency certificate more correctly than he filed the recertification petition. In such [716]*716a situation we believe that the trial justice must have a reasonable area of discretion, such as was sought to be exercised by the trial justices in the cases at bar. Not only do we recognize that the statutes must be given their plain meaning but we also have often held that no statute should be construed in such a way as to reach an unjust, absurd, or unreasonable result.2 Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764, 769, 263 A.2d 681, 684 (1970); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 239, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (1968); Town of Seituate v. O’Rourke, 103 R.I. 499, 512-13, 239 A .2d 176, 184 (1968).
The evident purpose of this statute was remedial. It was designed to establish a due-process framework for the commitment of mentally ill persons and for their periodic reevaluation. This remedial purpose would not, in our opinion, be furthered by depriving the patient of needed institutional care as a sanction for any deviation, however slight, from the statutory timetable. In situations where a slight delay on the part of a public officer might prejudice private rights or the public interest, it is a general rule of statutory construction that time provisions are construed to be directory. This is especially applicable where a mandatory construction might do great injury to persons not at fault. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 57.19 at 443 (4th ed. Sands 1973). We have recognized this rule of construction in Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, 118 R.I. 160, 164-65, 372 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (1977). As a consequence, we construe the time requirement as directory rather than as mandatory and would accord the trial justice the discretion to allow retention of a patient who is in need of care even though a petition might not have been filed precisely within the period set forth in the commitment or recertification sections. See Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v, McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 177, 319 A.2d 358, 363-64 (1974).
Affording a trial justice discretion does not mean that the time provisions may be completely disregarded. Moreover, the failure of public officials to apply promptly for required judicial authorization to commit or retain involuntary patients may give rise to civil liability in the event that such a patient should be wrongfully deprived of his liberty. Such sanctions would be imposed upon the official and not upon the patient by depriving him of needed care and treatment.
In respect to the petition of Richard Roe, the IMH officials, realizing that there was a recertification gap of approximately a year and a half, discharged Richard on December 19, 1978. They then readmitted him on an emergency petition. Nine days later a petition for civil certification was filed pursuant to § 40.1-5-8. Our dissenting justices agree that this procedure was in accordance with statutory requirements. However, the trial justice, in hearing this petition, determined that the evidence presented in support thereof was “clear” and “convincing.” This standard is appropriate for recertification proceedings, but not for an initial commitment, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As a consequence, we shall vacate the commit[717]*717ment order of Richard Roe and remand the case to the District Court in order that the trial justice may reappraise the evidence in the light of the appropriate standard of quantum of proof.
Similarly, the finding of the Family Court justice in respect to Nancy was based upon an insufficient quantum of proof, since Nancy’s certification was for an initial petition for commitment rather than a re-certification. Consequently, we shall vacate the commitment order of Nancy and remand the case to the Family Court in order that the trial justice may reappraise the evidence in the light of the appropriate standard of proof.
For the reasons stated, the appeals of John and Joseph are denied and dismissed. The orders of the District Court in these cases are affirmed. The appeals of Richard and Nancy are sustained, and the cases are remanded to the District and Family Courts respectively for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 The papers in the cases may be remanded to the appropriate courts.