In re D.D.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 115605, 115622
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as In re D.D., 2026-Ohio-1973.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE D.D., ET AL. : : Nos. 115605 and 115622 Minor Children : : [Appeals by T.C., Mother, and T.H., : Grandmother/Former Legal Custodian] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 28, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD23903469, AD23903470, AD23903471, AD23903472, and AD23903473

Appearances:

Wargo Law, LLC and Leslie Wargo, for appellant T.C.

Rosel C. Hurley, III, for appellant T.H.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

In this consolidated appeal, appellant-mother T.C. (“Mother”) and

appellant-maternal grandmother and former legal custodian T.H. (“Grandmother”) appeal from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile

Division (the “juvenile court”), that terminated Mother’s parental rights, terminated

Grandmother’s legal custody rights, and granted permanent custody of five of

Mother’s children to appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family

Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”).

For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Grandmother’s appeal (Appeal

No. 115622) for lack of standing and affirm the juvenile court.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

This case involves five children, D.D. (date of birth August 14, 2010),

Sa.D. (date of birth September 23, 2011), St.D. (date of birth September 22, 2012),

J.D. (date of birth October 23, 2019), and K.D. (date of birth January 8, 2021). S.D.

(“Father”) is the father of the five children.1 The three oldest children, D.D., Sa.D.,

and St.D., were removed from Mother’s care in 2013 and were placed in the legal

custody of Grandmother in 2015. In 2018, Mother and Father had their parental

rights terminated with respect to two other children, who were placed in the

permanent custody of CCDCFS. In or around January 2023, CCDCFS again became

involved with the family, following a physical altercation between Mother and D.D.

Because Grandmother had difficulty obtaining housing for herself and the older

children, she and the older children had moved in with Mother and Father (and the

1 Because Father stipulated to the granting of permanent custody to the agency and

has not appealed the juvenile’s court’s judgment, we limit our discussion of the facts, evidence, and findings to those that pertain primarily to Mother and Grandmother. two youngest children).2 After Grandmother and the children moved into the

parents’ home, there was significant conflict between Mother and the older children.

At that time, there were also concerns of educational neglect (i.e., the three oldest

children had not been consistently attending school), behavioral issues involving the

two oldest children (e.g., talking back and not listening that resulted in physical

confrontations) that the parents and Grandmother had difficulty managing,

inappropriate discipline of the older children by Mother (e.g., allegedly slapping

D.D. in the face and throwing a tote and broom at her), poor housing conditions

(e.g., bed bugs, roaches, trash, and clutter) that precluded the family from receiving

in-home counseling services, and housing instability for Grandmother. In January

2023, Sa.D. had been hospitalized for a week for suicidal ideations. At that time, the

three oldest children had been referred for individual counseling and the family had

been referred for family counseling.

On March 20, 2023, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that the

children were neglected (D.D., Sa.D., and St.D.) or dependent (J.D. and K.D.) and

requesting an order of temporary custody, along with a motion for predispositional

temporary custody. With respect to the three oldest children, the complaint alleged

that (1) Grandmother had failed to ensure that the children were regularly attending

school and, as a result, the children were failing classes and missing in-school

2 Before Grandmother moved in with Mother and Father, some or all of the

children in Grandmother’s custody were, at times, living with Grandmother or were split up, living with different family members. counseling sessions; (2) Grandmother struggled to maintain stable, appropriate

housing for the children; (3) the children had “behavioral issues” that the adults did

not appropriately address; (4) the adults failed to ensure that the children

participated in counseling services to address their behaviors; (5) Mother “regularly

engage[d] in verbal altercations” with the older children; and (6) Grandmother had

“failed to prevent the continued occurrence of conflict in the home.”3 With respect

to the two youngest children, the complaint alleged that they had “been exposed to

violence in the home” related to the adults’ “inability to appropriately interact” with

the older children or “appropriately address their behaviors.” The complaint also

referenced the prior adjudication of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. as dependent and the

prior termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to two other children.

Following a hearing held on July 12, 2023, the children were placed in agency

custody. The children remained in the uninterrupted custody of the agency since

that time.

3 At the adjudication and disposition hearings held in July 2023, CCDCFS case

worker Chaquelya Patterson testified that, at the time the agency filed its complaint in March 2023, D.D. had missed 58 days of school, Sa.D. had missed 77 days of school, and St.D. had missed 68 days of school. She indicated that the reasons for the lack of school attendance included “[o]ngoing transportation issues. There are times when they didn’t have money to get the kids to school, or there’s been also times where one of the kids wouldn’t go to school, and then they weren’t able to take all of them to go back and forth. There’s also times when they’ve been sick.” She stated that the school had “provided support to the family” by “offer[ing] them gas cards to school” and that she had spoken with the family about possibly transferring the children to a school that was closer to their residence to make it easier to get the children back and forth to school. She stated that Sa.D. was transferred to an online school program when she did not want to go to school but that she still would attend the online program only two or three days per week. Patterson testified that there was no claim that Grandmother had engaged in physical altercations with, or inappropriate discipline of, any of the children. On August 3, 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated D.D., Sa.D., and St.D.

neglected and J.D. and K.D. dependent and committed the children to the

temporary custody of the agency. The juvenile court approved a case plan that

required the parents and Grandmother to complete an approved parenting

program, for the family to engage in family counseling to address the conflict in the

home with the older children, for Grandmother to ensure that the older children

were prepared for and attended school every day, and for Grandmother to establish

and maintain safe, stable, and appropriate housing for herself and the older

children. Case-plan services for the three oldest children included individual and

family counseling. The permanency plan was reunification of the three oldest

children with Grandmother and reunification of the two youngest children with

Mother.

Following a hearing before the magistrate (and with the agreement of

Mother and Grandmother), temporary custody was extended in April 2024. The

juvenile court found that Mother and Grandmother had made some progress on the

case plan but that sufficient progress had not yet been made to alleviate the cause

for the removal of the children from the home.

Sometime in or around June 2024, Mother separated from Father and

moved out of Father’s home. Accordingly, the case plan was amended to require

Mother to obtain stable, safe, and appropriate housing. After separating from

Father, Mother moved in with Grandmother. In August 2024, the magistrate held a hearing to discuss, among other

things, the agency’s proposed reduction in visitation to biweekly visits. The agency

case worker, Chaquelya Patterson, indicated that the agency was requesting the

reduction because it did not believe the children were benefiting from the visits. She

explained:

[D]uring the visits, the three oldest children . . . they use explicit words. They become very disrespectful to the parents and to the worker as well. And the parents, they do not respond in a way where they are redirecting the children.

We have not seen what they were learning in their parenting classes apply to the visits. . . .

Anytime I try to redirect the children or even just inform the mother or the grandmother what’s going on, I get ignored. And we had several meetings about this. And we had a meeting about this to talk to the family about it. . . .

So we had meetings about the visits and the appropriateness of the visits and nothing still has changed from the family.

She also noted that, despite her discussions with Mother and Grandmother about

these issues, Mother and Grandmother continued to have inappropriate “adult

conversations” with the children during visits that “don’t need to be had there” and

that Grandmother had talked to the children “about things that become very

emotional to the children.”

The juvenile court rejected the agency’s proposed reduction of

visitation, reasoning that it would not be in the children’s best interest given that

they were seeing some benefit from the family counseling. However, the magistrate

warned Mother and Grandmother that they risked the children being placed in permanent custody if they did not promptly make significant progress in resolving

the issues with their parenting:

I’m very concerned regarding the reports that I’ve received here today by the Agency and by the Guardian ad Litem regarding the lack of progress regarding parenting skills by the grandmother, mother . . . . [W]e’re a year and a half into this case, any issues regarding parenting skills should have been resolved long before right now. And it sounds like the Agency has services in place. There’s family counseling and there’s a glimmer of hope with that family counseling that is actually showing some benefit. . . .

[Mother, Grandmother, and Father] you are the adults in this situation. You are the parents and grandparents of these children, the legal custodian of the three older children. It’s your responsibility and (inaudible) the Court’s expectation of you to appropriately parent these children.

And if you don’t know what that means, then you need to work with Ms. Patterson, work with a parenting coach, work with family counselor. Because if we are a year and a half into this case, and Ms. Patterson and other professionals are still bringing these issues to your attention and they’re not being resolved, [t]hen the Court is going to start asking why they can’t be resolved and are they even capable of — are you capable of resolving that. We’re coming up on the year and a half mark and the Agency is gonna need to file a motion, that’s either gonna be a motion to return these children to you, from what I’m hearing right now, it doesn’t sound like we’re there.

It’s going to be a motion to extend or it’s gonna be a motion to modify to permanent custody. So your behavior is going to help direct that decision. You start showing some improvements, then I would expect we’re looking at an extension. And if it stays the same or gets worse, I would expect the closer we get to that two year mark, we’re gonna be looking at a motion for permanent custody.

On September 19, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary

custody to permanent custody. The agency argued that the children should be

committed to the permanent custody of the agency because they had been in agency

custody since July 2023, Mother’s parental rights had been previously terminated with respect to two other children, and Mother and Grandmother had “failed to

benefit from case plan services” and lacked stable, safe, and appropriate housing.

On December 19, 2024, Mother filed a “motion for legal custody to [M]other or

relative,” requesting that she be granted legal custody of the children or,

alternatively, that an unidentified “relative” be granted legal custody of the children.

Mother indicated that the motion would be supplemented with a statement of

understanding for legal custody, but no such statement was filed with respect to the

“relative.”

A. The Permanent-Custody Hearing

On August 12, 2025, the juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on

the agency’s motion for permanent custody and Mother’s motion for legal custody.

At the time of the hearing, D.D. was 14 (nearly 15), Sa.D. was 13, St.D. was 12, J.D.

was 5, and K.D. was 4.

The agency presented testimony from Patterson and Kayla Morales,

extended case workers for CCDCFS. Mother presented testimony from Mary Beth

Hooper, Mother’s therapist at OhioGuidestone. CCDCFS also introduced various

exhibits, consisting primarily of copies of journal entries and case plans from these

cases and others, which were admitted into evidence over Mother’s objection.4 A

summary of the relevant evidence follows.

4 Although Mother’s counsel objected generally to the admission of CCDCFS’s

exhibits “for various reasons,” including because “[w]e don’t think a lot of them are relevant,” he did not raise any specific objection or articulate any specific reason why any particular exhibit should not be admitted. 1. Testimony by CCDCFS Case Workers

Patterson was the CCDCFS case worker assigned to the family from

May 2023 to November 2024; Morales was the CCDCFS case worker assigned to the

family beginning in November 2024. They testified regarding the family’s history

with CCDCFS, the children’s custodial history in these cases, Mother and

Grandmother’s compliance with case-plan services, and the extent to which Mother

and Grandmother met case-plan objectives.

Patterson testified that, when the agency became involved with the

family in January 2023, following a physical altercation between Mother and D.D.,

a safety plan was put in place pursuant to which Father and Grandmother were to

make sure that any interaction between Mother and D.D. did not escalate to a

physical altercation. She indicated that while the safety plan was in place, additional

concerns arose related to the “very deplorable” condition “inside the home” — i.e.,

“trash stacked on trash, clothes piled up, toys piled up everywhere . . . the sink . . .

full of dishes, and . . . flies, bugs, all throughout the house” — the older children not

attending school regularly, and emotional abuse, leading the agency to seek

temporary custody of the children. Patterson stated that, at that time, the agency

made referrals for Community Collaborative services, for family counseling, and for

individual counseling for the older children, but that the family was not “consistently

compliant” with services.

With respect to the family’s prior involvement with the agency,

Patterson explained that the three oldest children had been previously adjudicated in 2013 and that two of the parents’ other children had been previously committed

to the permanent custody of the agency. In addition, Patterson stated that while

three of Grandmother’s other grandchildren were in her care (when they were in the

legal custody of another relative), these children became “[c]ourt involved” and were

ultimately placed in the permanent custody of the agency.5

Patterson explained that the case-plan objectives for Mother involved

parenting, family counseling, and housing and that the case-plan objectives for

Grandmother involved parenting, family counseling, housing, and making sure that

the children attended school daily and attended all medical appointments.

Patterson explained that the purpose of family counseling was to

facilitate communication between the adults and the children, i.e., to teach the

adults “how to communicate with the children and . . . to use certain therapy tools,

like how to redirect the children when the children do become disrespectful to them,

or if they become frustrated in how the children [are] reacting to them.” Patterson

testified that although the family had been engaged in family counseling through the

National Youth Advocate Program (“NYAP”) from approximately May 2024 to

October 2024, she did not see any indication that behaviors were improving and that

she did not believe Mother or Grandmother had made significant progress on that

element of their case plans. Patterson testified that family counseling was

5 No other testimony was presented as to when this occurred, the ages of the

children, or the circumstances that led to the children becoming “[c]ourt involved” and placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS. However, copies of the journal entries from these cases were included in the exhibits submitted by CCDCFS. discontinued in October 2024 because the therapist indicated “in her professional

opinion that the family was not benefiting from family therapy.”

Morales testified that when she was assigned to the case, she made an

additional referral for family counseling through Choices Behavioral and that

Mother, Grandmother, and the older children reengaged in family counseling in

May 2025. She indicated that the gap in family-counseling services was because of

difficulties in locating a provider and scheduling issues.

Patterson testified that the family had two hours of supervised

visitation each week and that visitation was initially held at Community

Collaborative but was later moved to Mother and Grandmother’s home. Patterson

stated that Mother and Grandmother were consistent with visitation. She explained

that the visits were supervised because of Mother and Grandmother’s lack of

parenting skills, “[t]he kids not looking at them as like a parental figure, the kids

being disrespectful, [and] the parents not being able to redirect the children.” She

indicated that during visits, sometimes the siblings “would get along and sometimes

they wouldn’t.” She described the interactions between the adults and the children

during visits as “very chaotic,” “not being able to communicate with each other,” and

the children “cussing them out.” She indicated that the older children (in particular

D.D. and Sa.D.) would be “bickering” and “getting into it,” “fighting amongst each

other,” “their trauma . . . coming out during visits,” such that she would have to step

in and advise the adults that the children need to be redirected. She stated that “the

majority of the time, the parents would ignore it or dismiss what [the children were] saying, how they’re feeling” and that there had been “quite a few . . . emotional

outbursts, emotional breakdowns from the children because they are feeling that

their parents are not being supportive of what they are experiencing or how they’re

feeling.” She indicated that the parents would often “reward the children with

things” even though the children were not cooperating and were disrespectful to the

parents and that the adults would also engage in “inappropriate conversations” with

the children at visits, such as telling the children that their dog had died, causing the

children to become “highly upset,” even though the parents were in therapy to learn

how to properly relay information to the children.

Morales offered a similar view of visitation. She testified there was “a

lot of conflict” between the older girls during visitation, who would be cursing,

“calling each other out,” and “disagreeing with . . . what the adults were telling

them.” She stated that this would impact the younger children, who were observing

the conflict, and that the younger children would sometimes repeat what their older

siblings were saying. She indicated that Mother would, at times, seek to intervene

to redirect the children but that her efforts were often unavailing. She stated that

D.D. and Sa.D. would also attempt to interfere with Mother’s parenting of the

younger children, acting as if they were the parents of the younger children rather

than Mother, and that Mother was unable to successfully redirect them when this

occurred. Morales testified that Mother was clearly bonded with J.D. and K.D. and,

at times, also showed affection for the older children. With respect to Grandmother, Patterson testified that although

Grandmother had a bond with all three older children, she had an especially strong

bond with St.D. and, during visitation, “would mainly be attentive” to him. Morales

testified that Grandmother attempted to engage with all the older children during

visits but that, at times, “it shows like she’s more engaged with [St.D.],” causing D.D.

and Sa.D. to feel jealous, which “could cause conflict between them.”

Patterson stated that Mother and Grandmother had each completed

two parenting programs — a regular parenting program and a nurturing parenting

program. Patterson testified that she had attempted to make arrangements for a

parenting coach for supportive visitation but that, because of an issue with the

agency’s contracts with the foster network — i.e., because the “foster agencies who

ha[d] the children under them” did not offer parenting coaches — she was not able

to put supportive visitation in place and “nothing ever came of it.” Both she and

Morales acknowledged that Mother and Grandmother were willing to engage in

recommended services.

Patterson stated that although she received “positive” reports from

providers regarding Mother and Grandmother’s participation in parenting classes,

she did not believe that they had benefited from the parenting classes and, therefore,

did not believe they had made significant progress on the parenting elements of their

case plans. Patterson indicated that she had continuing concerns regarding whether

Grandmother would be able to meet the children’s educational needs if they were

reunified with her, including ensuring the children consistently attended school, completed their homework, and turned it in on time, based on Grandmother’s

failure to attend St.D.’s individualized education program (“IEP”) meetings or

“participate[] in some of the concerns that they may have had throughout the school

year”; failure to ask the children, the foster parents, or the case worker about the

children’s educational needs, goals, and progress; and failure to assist the children

with their homework during visits without being prompted by the case worker to do

so.6

Morales stated that, in her view, Mother’s and Grandmother’s

behaviors were not “the types of things you would expect to see from people who

have completed two parenting courses.” She indicated that Grandmother and

Mother never discussed school with the children unless the children mentioned

school and that if the children were returned to Mother or Grandmother, she did not

believe their educational needs would be consistently met “[d]ue to the past history

with the children not going to school.” Both Patterson and Morales testified that

Mother and Grandmother were not at a point where they could recommend

unsupervised or overnight visits with the children.

Patterson testified that the agency made referrals to CMHA and

Community Collaborative to assist Mother and Grandmother with housing and that

they used the Community Collaborative referral to obtain housing. Patterson stated

that when Mother moved in with Grandmother after separating from Father, this

6 Patterson acknowledged, however, that Grandmother had not been notified of the IEP meetings. posed a potential barrier to reunification because D.D. “did not want to live with

mother,” “[s]he feared to live with mom, and she didn’t want to stay with the mom,”

so Patterson explained to Mother that Mother needed to find housing independent

from Grandmother.

Patterson indicated that although Grandmother had been evicted

from her home in September 2024, she and Mother found another home and had

been living in that three-bedroom home continuously since November 2024. She

stated that Mother’s 20-year-old disabled and “medically fragile” son was also living

in the home; Grandmother was his legal guardian and received a social security

disability payment as his caregiver. Patterson indicated that, in her view, neither

Mother nor Grandmother had made significant progress on the housing case-plan

objective because when she last saw the house in or around November 2024, they

“still had, like, items or just things just stacked in different areas in the home,”

“things stacked on top of each other . . . [e]verything, like, toys, clothes, books, just

piles of things, just everywhere,” and did not have the necessary furnishings for all

five children. Patterson stated, however, that she had not observed any rotten food,

rodents, insects, or anything else that would present a health issue in the home.

Patterson testified that utilities were on and there were no concerns regarding

Mother or Grandmother’s ability to provide sufficient food for the children. Morales

similarly described the condition of the home as “cluttered,” “like, bags of stuff, toys,

clothes . . . on surfaces[,] on the floor, the couch, in the living room. So it’s like all

over basically.” She stated that the home seemed to get “more cluttered” the longer she was on the case, but indicated that the home was not in such a state as to put the

children at risk and that weekly visits had been held in the home since at least

November 2024.

With respect to the children’s placements, Patterson testified that the

two oldest children, D.D. and Sa.D., had been placed in the same foster home; that

they had “bond[ed] well” with their foster caregivers; that they respected, listened

to, and communicated with their foster caregivers; and that they followed the rules

of the household. She indicated that the children attended school regularly, that

they completed their classwork and homework, and that they “did really good in

school.” She stated that D.D. received individual counseling and that Sa.D. received

individual and group counseling (both for “behavioral issues” and “to address the

trauma”) and that their foster caregivers ensured that the children were consistently

engaged in counseling services. Patterson testified that whereas Sa.D. had

difficulties communicating with Mother and Grandmother regarding “certain things

that she felt like she wanted to communicate,” when the foster parents

communicated with Sa.D., “it’d be a whole different other story. Like, she didn’t

have an issue. She didn’t have a problem.”

Morales testified that when she observed D.D. and Sa.D. in their foster

placement, “they’re always talking to each other normally, no disagreement,” that

they did not exhibit the behaviors in the foster home that they showed at visits, and

that the girls were “well adjusted” and had “no concerns,” “as if they’re different children between the ones in the foster home and at family visits.” According to

Patterson, their caregivers had not expressed an interest in adopting D.D. or Sa.D.

Patterson testified that the two youngest children, K.D. and J.D., had

been placed in one foster home from July 2023 until January 2024 and were then

placed together in a second foster home. She indicated that the children had

“structure” and “stability” in the foster home and had “bonded very well” with their

caregivers, who had expressed an interest in adopting them. Morales similarly

testified that K.D. and J.D. were “bonded with” and “attached to” their foster

caregivers. She indicated that because the children exhibited negative behaviors and

were, at times, “defiant” after visitation, “play counseling” had been recommended

for the children, which the agency was in the process of scheduling.

St.D. had multiple placements while in temporary custody. Patterson

testified that St.D. had initially been placed in a group home as a temporary

placement, then in two foster homes, before being placed in Genacross, a residential

group home in Toledo, in September or October 2024. Patterson and Morales

indicated that Mother and Grandmother visited with St.D. regularly and that he

continuously expressed a desire to return to Grandmother’s custody.

Patterson testified that, while in counseling, St.D. disclosed to a

therapist that he had been sexually abused by a male family member (no one

involved in the case) and that his “trauma [had] started coming out” in the form of

sexual sounds, sexual statements to peers at school, and sexualized behaviors that

ultimately led to his being removed from foster placement and placed in Genacross for treatment.7 Morales described an incident involving a peer in school for which

St.D. could have been criminally charged but the family of the peer declined to

pursue the matter. Morales testified that St.D. had been diagnosed with ADHD and

had an IEP, that he participated in individual counseling once or twice a week and

group therapy five times a week, that his individual therapy incorporated specialized

therapy to address his sexualized behaviors, and that he was prescribed medication

with which he was compliant. Morales stated that it was unknown when St.D. would

complete his treatment at Genacross. She indicated that there were still issues with

St.D.’s behaviors, that he would be in need of therapy for the foreseeable future, and

that she believed St.D. posed a risk to the safety and well-being of the other children

and his disabled older brother if he were to return home. Morales stated that the

therapeutic services Genacross provided to St.D. could be provided elsewhere if

St.D. were to return home but that she did not believe St.D. would, in fact, receive

necessary services if he returned home.

Morales discussed the proposed sleeping arrangements if all five

children were to return to the home and indicated that she did not believe there was

adequate space or furnishings for all of the children. In particular, she noted that

7 Morales testified that this behavior included “humping furniture,” stealing and wearing peers’ clothing and undergarments, spending excessive amounts of time in his room or the bathroom, and “excessive masturbation.”

Patterson testified that the abuse occurred while St.D. was in Grandmother’s custody. No evidence was presented as to the date, location, or circumstances of St.D.’s abuse or the identity of the perpetrator. Patterson testified that a police report had been filed but that no one had been charged with a criminal offense against St.D. the room proposed to be used by St.D. did not have a door, raising concerns

regarding lack of privacy and St.D.’s tendency to expose others to his sexualized

behaviors.

Patterson testified that although the agency had attempted to identify

other relatives or interested persons with whom to place the children, no one

suitable had been identified. Patterson stated that, in her opinion, the agency should

be granted permanent custody of all five children because “the kids have made

progress being in a home where they are able to receive structure, discipline,

stability. The kids were able to flourish . . . in these environments.” She further

indicated that she did not believe Mother or Grandmother would be able to

successfully enforce rules with the children and that that was something they would

need to do to ensure that the children’s educational needs were met if the children

returned home. Morales likewise stated that, in her view, granting permanent

custody to the agency would be in the best interest of all five children.

Morales testified that she had discussed the issue of reunification with

both Mother and Grandmother and that neither had expressed a desire to have

custody of all five children. She stated that Mother informed her that she wished to

reunify with J.D. and K.D. and that Grandmother informed her that she wished to

reunify with the three oldest children.

2. Mother’s Witness

Hooper, Mother’s therapist, was Mother’s sole witness. Hooper

provided brief testimony regarding her telehealth-counseling sessions with Mother. She stated that she began working with Mother in June 2025, that Mother

“consistently” attended video-counseling sessions, that the sessions were

“productive,” that Mother “showed progress” as they worked on “her treatment goal

plan,” and that Mother was continuing to engage with treatment. Hooper indicated

that she had never seen Mother interact with her children.

3. Recommendation of the Guardian Ad Litem

The guardian ad litem recommended that the agency be granted

permanent custody of all five children. She indicated that there were “a lot of

moving parts” and she had “seriously considered” whether “the kids could be split

up and different things could be arranged” for one or more of the children to return

home, but that, ultimately, she did not think returning home would be in any of the

children’s best interests “because of the continuing concerns all together that ha[d]

been brought up to the Court’s attention.”

The guardian ad litem reported that although she had not attended as

many visits as the CCDCFS case workers, she did not witness the behaviors by the

older children described by Patterson and Morales. The guardian ad litem stated

that, in her view, although it was “chaotic with a bunch of kids,” they were “all acting

age appropriate,” i.e., “that’s how it is when you have a family, a large family,” and

that she did not have any “issues” or “ongoing concerns with that.” The guardian ad

litem indicated that her “biggest concern” was “the safety and the sleeping of the

children in the home.” With respect to St.D., the guardian ad litem reported that Genacross

is “a facility that helps children with behaviors where they can’t be placed anywhere

else.” She noted that St.D. has stated that “he wants to return home to [G]randma

and that he would like to go back as soon as possible,” but that, “[u]nfortunately,

due to his behaviors,” that is not “an option.” She explained: “He’s got a serious case

of ADHD. . . . He doesn’t want to listen. He doesn’t want to follow directions. He

disconnects from reality. He, I mean, yes, he’s acting out sexually, but there’s so

much more. . . . [H]e doesn’t want to go to school. And if he wasn’t forced, he

wouldn’t.”

She stated that St.D.’s providers “have not said that he can be

released,” that he still needs inpatient treatment, and that she has concerns about

the harm that could result from potential interactions between St.D. and other

children and/or his disabled older brother if he were to return home.

With respect to D.D. and Sa.D., the guardian ad litem reported that

D.D. is happy in her placement, that all of the girls’ needs are being met, that the

foster parents put a lot of structure in place and help the girls as much as possible,

and that D.D. has indicated that she does not want to return home. The guardian

ad litem reported that Sa.D. initially “had issues” in her placement, feeling as if there

was “a lot of animosity toward her” because she identifies as “they” and “them” and

“likes to dress as an animal,” but that those issues were addressed. The guardian ad

litem indicated that Sa.D. was allegedly abused by the same person who abused St.D., that Sa.D. has “ongoing issues and concerns” and sometimes “acts out,” and

that she is engaged in “specialized treatment for her behavior.”

The guardian ad litem reported that Sa.D. had also expressed a desire

to return home to Grandmother but that “the concerns that brought this case to the

[c]ourt and the [a]gency,” “the sexual trauma that happened to her,” and “the

interaction with her mom in the previous case” were continuing causes for concern

and that the guardian ad litem did not believe it would be in Sa.D.’s best interest to

return home, “just her.” The guardian ad litem acknowledged that “[Sa.D’s] older

and she’s on a whole different path and plan than any of the other kids. So I mean,

her situation’s different.” She indicated that if the court were inclined to return

Sa.D. to Grandmother’s custody with protective supervision, “that would be

something that I think would be okay for her,” but that she “would just be cautious”

“in case any concerns happened again with schooling or acting out or conflict in the

home” and to make sure Sa.D. continued to receive counseling.

With respect to J.D. and K.D., the guardian ad litem reported that they

were placed in a home with nine children and that they were “really happy” there

and “really bonded” with their caregivers. The guardian ad litem stated that

although they love Mother and want to see her, they also say they want to stay where

they are and are too young to properly articulate their wishes. The guardian ad litem

stated that, given Mother’s history and continuing concerns, she was not certain

whether basic needs would be met “just having the two little ones return home to

the home right now . . . just them and with mom.” B. The Juvenile Court’s Decision

On September 3 and 4, 2025, the juvenile court journalized judgment

entries in each child’s case denying Mother’s motion for legal custody, granting the

agency’s motion for permanent custody, terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights as to all five children, and terminating Grandmother’s legal custody of D.D.,

Sa.D., and St.D.

Mother appealed (Appeal No. 115605), raising the following two

assignments of error for review as to all five children:

Assignment of Error No. 1:

The trial court’s judgments granting permanent custody [to] the agency were not based upon sufficient clear and convincing evidence, were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the findings of permanent custody are not in the best interests of the five children.

Assignment of Error No. 2:

The trial court erred in denying the mother’s motion for legal custody.

Grandmother also appealed (Appeal No. 115622), raising the

following two assignments of error for review as to D.D., Sa.D., and St.D.:

The trial court committed reversible error when it granted permanent custody of the minor children to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services, as its decision was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence, in violation of R.C. 2151.414.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court committed reversible error by finding that permanent custody to Appellee was in the best interest of the children, where the evidence demonstrated that a fit, willing, and appropriate relative— Appellant-Grandmother—was available for placement.

We have consolidated these appeals for disposition.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standing

Before we consider the merits of these appeals, the agency has raised

an issue of Grandmother’s standing to appeal. “[O]nly aggrieved parties have

standing to appeal.” In re An.M., 2022-Ohio-2873, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing Goodman

v. Hanseman, 2012-Ohio-1587, ¶ 1 (“To have appellate standing, a party must be

“‘aggrieved by the final order appealed from.”’”), quoting State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio

Dept. of Natural Resources, 2011-Ohio-4612, ¶ 28, quoting Ohio Contract Carriers

Assn., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 140 Ohio St. 160 (1942), syllabus. “‘Generally, a

party cannot appeal an alleged violation of another party’s rights. However, “an

appealing party may complain of an error committed against a non-appealing party

when the error is prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.”’” In re Th.W., 2005-

Ohio-2852, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Mourey, 2003-Ohio-1870, ¶ 20 (4th Dist.),

quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 13 (6th Dist. 1991).

The agency asserts that because Grandmother is “a non-parent and

former legal custodian,” she “possesses no residual rights to the children that might

have been affected by the decisions of the trial court” and, therefore, lacks standing

to appeal the juvenile court’s permanent-custody order “in relation to her claims.” Grandmother was granted legal custody of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. by

court order in 2015. R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) defines “[l]egal custody” as

a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

Thus, as D.D., Sa.D., and St.D.’s legal custodian, Grandmother had rights as the

children’s legally recognized caretaker, which were subject only to the residual rights

of their parents. Legal custody is intended to be permanent. See R.C. 2151.42(B);

see also In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-3873, ¶ 17-35 (9th Dist.) (where agency did not seek

to terminate or modify prior legal custody order under R.C. 2151.42(B),

grandmother did not lose her status as child’s “custodian” as it related to

reunification and case-plan efforts when the juvenile court later placed the child in

the temporary custody of the agency); In re E.E.D., 2022-Ohio-4014, ¶ 48 (8th

Dist.).

The juvenile court’s permanent-custody orders not only terminated

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights but also expressly terminated Grandmother’s

rights as legal custodian of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. Although Grandmother, as a

nonparent, former legal custodian, lacks standing to challenge the juvenile court’s

permanent-custody order to the extent it terminates Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights, see, e.g., In re Ez.D., 2021-Ohio-3041, ¶ 16-17 (8th Dist.), she would have

standing to challenge the permanent-custody order as it relates to the termination of her rights as legal custodian of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. See, e.g., In re E.E.D. at

¶ 46-49; In re K.S., 2025-Ohio-4773, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.); In re C & C, 2022-Ohio-3751,

¶ 21 (1st Dist.).

In her assignments of error, Grandmother asserts that the juvenile

court “committed reversible error” in (1) granting permanent custody of her

grandchildren to the agency because “its decision was not supported by clear and

convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence, in

violation of R.C. 2151.414” and (2) finding that permanent custody was in the

children’s best interest because “the evidence demonstrated that a fit, willing, and

appropriate relative,” i.e., Grandmother, “was available for placement.”

Likewise, in her appellate brief, Grandmother’s arguments are

directed to the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights — not the

juvenile court’s ruling terminating her legal custody rights — as to D.D., Sa.D., and

St.D. See, e.g., Grandmother’s appellate brief at 14 (“It is our position today that the

Appellee has not met its burden under R.C. 2151.414(B) to justify the termination of

parental rights and the grant of permanent custody.”). Grandmother does not

reference the standard applicable to legal-custody determinations or any other legal

authority related to the termination of legal-custody rights in her appellate brief. At

oral argument, Grandmother’s counsel confirmed that Grandmother was

challenging only the termination of Mother’s parental rights as to D.D., Sa.D., and

St.D. — not the failure to return the children to Grandmother’s legal custody. Because Grandmother lacks standing to challenge the termination of Mother’s

parental rights, we dismiss Grandmother’s appeal.

B. Requirements for Granting Permanent Custody to CCDCFS

Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant a public

children-services agency’s motion for permanent custody if it determines, by clear

and convincing evidence, that (1) permanent custody is in the best interest of the

child and (2) any of the following circumstances exists:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody.

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.

“Clear and convincing evidence” is that “‘measure or degree of proof’”

that “‘produce[s] in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the

facts sought to be established.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. “It is

intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such

certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not

mean clear and unequivocal.” (Emphasis deleted.) Cross at 477.

R.C. 2151.414(D) sets forth the factors a juvenile court is to consider

in determining what is in the best interest of a child in a permanent-custody hearing.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) states that in determining whether permanent custody is in a

child’s best interest, the court “shall consider all relevant factors,” including, but not

limited to, the following:

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period . . . ;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; [and] (e) Whether any of the factors in [R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11)] apply in relation to the parents and child.[8]

The best-interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent.

In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). Although the juvenile court is required

to consider each relevant factor in determining what is in a child’s best interest, no

one factor is required to be given greater weight than the others. In re A.L., 2024-

Ohio-1992, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. Further,

only one of the factors needs to be resolved in favor of permanent custody to find

that permanent custody is in the child’s best interest and terminate parental rights.

In re R.M., 2024-Ohio-1885, ¶ 60 (8th Dist.); In re N.B. at ¶ 53.

A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody of a child to

CCDCFS is reviewed under sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-

the-evidence standards of review depending on the nature of the arguments

presented. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 11; In re T.W., 2026-Ohio-124, ¶ 44 (8th

Dist.). Mother raises both types of challenges here.

8 In addition to the best-interest factors identified in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), R.C.

2151.414(D)(2) sets forth a list of circumstances that, if all are found to exist, mandates a finding that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and (D)(2) are alternative means for determining whether permanent custody is in a child’s best interest. In re Za.S., 2023-Ohio-1477, ¶ 60 (8th Dist.). Because the juvenile court’s analysis here was limited to the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), we do not address R.C. 2151.414(D)(2). C. The Juvenile Court’s Findings

In awarding permanent custody to the agency, the juvenile court

found that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and (e) applied, i.e., that as of the time the agency

filed its motion for permanent custody on September 19, 2024, the children had

been in temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period

and that “[t]he child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from

whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused,

neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state

or another state.”

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states: “For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this

section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an

agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28

of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from

home.” The record reflects that the children were placed in agency custody

beginning in July 2023 and were adjudicated neglected or dependent on August 3,

2023. Accordingly, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding under

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) by clear and convincing evidence. Mother does not dispute

the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); however, she challenges

the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) on the grounds that the

exhibits CCDCFS introduced to support that finding were not “discussed,”

“identified,” or “used at the hearing” and the juvenile court’s judgment “does not

specify the child/children adjudicated three times.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) and (e) are alternative findings. Only one is

required to support the granting of permanent custody to the agency. Given that

Mother concedes the condition in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was met, we need not

address the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e).

In its September 3, and 4, 2025 journal entries, the juvenile court

identified the specific factors it considered, including all of the factors specified in

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), in determining that permanent custody was in the children’s

best interest. The juvenile court explained:

With respect to the best interest of the child, the Court has considered the following factors under O.R.C. 2151.414(D)(1):

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child.

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child. GAL recommendation is for permanent custody to CCDCFS.[9]

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period.

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody.

(e) Whether any factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and the child.

9 In the judgment entry for the case involving D.D., the juvenile court further

found, as to the wishes of the child, that “per the child’s attorney, this child is in agreement as well.” The juvenile court also found “by clear and convincing evidence” that

the children cannot be placed with one of their parents or Grandmother within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent or Grandmother, based

on the following findings pursuant R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (11), and (16):

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. Applies to the mother, father, and legal custodian.

(11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of the child pursuant to this section or section 2151.353 or 2151.415 of the Ohio Revised Code, or under an existing or former law of this state, any other state, or the United States that is substantially equivalent to those sections, and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. Applies to the mother.

(16) Any other factors the Court considers relevant: There is a lack of consistent engagement or demonstrated benefit from case plan services, the Legal custodian and Mother reside together and neither have demonstrated it would be in the best interest of this child to return to either of their care or custody.[10]

10 The findings in the judgment entries related to J.D. and K.D. removed the references to the legal custodian. For example, in those cases, the juvenile court’s finding as to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) states: “(16) Any other factors the Court considers relevant: There is a lack of consistent engagement or demonstrated benefit from case plan services by Mother.” With respect to the juvenile court’s statement (in its finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(16) in the judgment entries relating to D.D., Sa.D., and St.D.) that “neither [Mother nor Grandmother] have demonstrated it would be in the best interest of this child to return to either of their care or custody,” as the agency concedes, it was not Mother or Grandmother’s burden to prove that it would be in the children’s best interest to return the children to their care or custody. However, because (1) Mother has not challenged this statement in her appellate brief and (2) for the reasons stated below, the juvenile court’s The child’s continued residence in or return to the home of the mother, [T.C.], the father, [S.D.], and the legal custodian, [T.H.], would be contrary to the child’s best interest.

As to R.C. 2151.414(E)(16), the juvenile court further found as to St.D.

that “[t]here would not be an adequate space for this child to reside with them safely,

the child is in residential treatment for behavioral concerns including significant

sexualized behaviors.”

D. Mother’s Challenges to the Juvenile Court’s Findings

In her first assignment of error, Mother contends the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating her parental rights should be reversed because its

determination that permanent custody was in the children’s best interest was not

supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

“‘[S]ufficiency is a test of adequacy.”’ In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at

¶ 13, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When applying a

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, an appellate court should affirm a trial court

when the evidence is legally sufficient to support the factfinder’s determination as a

matter of law. In re Z.C. at ¶ 13.

Weight of the evidence, on the other hand, “‘“is not a question of

mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.”’” (Emphasis deleted.)

Id., quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed. 1990).

best-interest determination is otherwise supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we do not further address the issue here. When reviewing a juvenile court’s decision regarding permanent custody for

manifest weight of the evidence,

the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” [Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179,] ¶ 20. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 Ohio B. 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

In re Z.C. at ¶ 14.

Mother contends that the juvenile court’s best-interest determination

was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and was against the manifest

weight of the evidence because (1) “[w]ith respect to the interaction and

interrelationship of the children with the Mother, the evidence was in favor of this

factor for the Mother”; (2) Mother had been “consistently involved with the children

through visits, therapy, etc.,” had “substantially completed her case plan,” and was

“willing to do whatever is asked of her”; (3) Mother and Grandmother are “able to

provide a home, love, support and education for the children”; and (4) permanent

custody should not have been granted for all five children “when one, some, or all of the children could come back to [Mother and/or Grandmother] with protective

supervision.”

Mother also specifically challenges the juvenile court’s findings under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (11), and (16) and its determination that the children could not

be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

Mother. She argues that “the evidence presented proved Mother is willing to engage

in services to their completion; a Mother who was present for her children; a Mother

who was trying, completed parenting two times and sought the help of

OhioGuidestone; and a Mother whom the children loved.” Mother further contends

that “[t]he agency must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family prior to

termination of parental rights” and that “[t]o the extent there was any deficiency in

. . . Mother’s case plan,” it was because the agency did not do more to support

successful reunification, including providing a parenting coach and giving

Grandmother “a chance to ensure the children went to school.”

1. The Juvenile Court’s Determination that the Children Could Not be Placed with Mother within a Reasonable Time or Should Not be Placed with Mother

With respect to the juvenile court’s determination that the children

could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed

with Mother, we first address the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

Uncontroverted evidence was presented through witness testimony and judgment

entries that two of Mother’s other children had been previously committed to the

permanent custody of CCDCFS. Because Mother previously had her “parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling” of the children, Mother had the

burden under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that,

notwithstanding the prior termination, she could “provide a legally secure

permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety” of the

children. See, e.g., In re M.A., 2025-Ohio-4473, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.); In re J.H., 2017-

Ohio-940, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); see also In re A.W., 2022-Ohio-3715, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.)

(“R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) allows a parent to rebut the presumption — created by the

previous involuntary termination — that he or she is an unfit parent.”); In re M.J.,

2024-Ohio-1261, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.) (interpreting R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) as requiring a

parent “to present clear and convincing evidence of his or her current ability, at the

time of the hearing, to provide an appropriate home for the child”); In re K.R., 2023-

Ohio-936, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.) (“R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) allows a parent to establish that

despite the prior ruling, they can now provide a legally secure placement and

adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.”).

The record supports the juvenile court’s determination that Mother

failed to meet her burden.

Aside from her counsel’s cross-examination of the CCDCFS case

workers, the only evidence Mother presented at the permanent-custody hearing was

the testimony of her therapist. As detailed above, Mother’s therapist merely

indicated that Mother had consistently attended video-counseling sessions since

June 2025 and was showing progress on “her treatment goal plan.” Although

Mother’s decision to engage in counseling was laudable, individual counseling was not an element of Mother’s case plan. The therapist did not identify Mother’s

treatment goals or explain how, if at all, they related to these cases. The therapist

never observed Mother with the children.

The testimony of Patterson and Morales did not support Mother’s

claim that she could provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate

care for the health, welfare, and safety of the children. Although the record reflects

that Mother had obtained housing by living with Grandmother, had completed

parenting classes, and had participated in family counseling, after more than two

years of services, she was still not in a position where she could have unsupervised

visits or overnight visits with the children, much less in a position to have the

children returned to her care and custody — and there was nothing in the record to

suggest that she would be in a position to do so at any reasonable time in the future.

Despite Mother’s claims of compliance with case-plan services, even substantial

compliance with case-plan services is not, in and of itself, “dispositive on the issue

of reunification” and “does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social

services agency.” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 90 (8th Dist.); see also In re R.D.,

2022-Ohio-4519, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). Simply because a parent completes services

identified in a case plan does not mean he or she has achieved the objectives of the

case plan related to those services or has substantially remedied the conditions that

caused the child to be removed from the home. See, e.g., In re J.B. at ¶ 90; In re

C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.) (“A parent can successfully complete the terms

of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed — the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal itself. . . .

[T]he successful completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of

permanent custody to a social services agency.”). ‘“The issue is not whether the

parent has substantially complied with the case plan, but whether the parent has

substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s removal.’” In re J.B.

at ¶ 90, quoting In re McKenzie, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4618, *11 (9th Dist. Oct. 18,

1995); In re R.D. at ¶ 59.

Mother had not had custody of the three oldest children since 2013.

The record reflects that there were serious, unresolved concerns regarding Mother’s

ability to appropriately address conflict with and among the children, to

appropriately discipline and parent the children, and to provide a safe, secure, and

appropriate home environment for them. After more than two years, the family’s

interactions remained chaotic during their weekly, two-hour supervised visits and

were marked by (1) emotional outbursts, breakdowns, and fighting; (2) a perceived

lack of support from Mother and Grandmother; and (3) the inability of the family to

effectively communicate with one another — notwithstanding their engagement in

family counseling.

“‘A legally secure permanent placement is more than a house with four

walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a stable environment where a child will live

in safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for the child’s needs.’”

In re Z.F., 2024-Ohio-1698, ¶ 45 (1st Dist.), quoting In re M.B., 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56

(4th Dist.). While Mother may have affection for the children and a desire to be a supportive parent, the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that she

had not met her case-plan objectives and that Mother did not present clear and

convincing evidence that she was able to provide a legally secure placement and

provide for the health, welfare, and safety of all or some of the children.

The juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) as it relates to

Mother was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Where the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing

evidence, that at least one of the factors specified in R.C. 2151.414(E) exists as to

each of the child’s parents, the juvenile court “shall” find that the child cannot be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

either parent. R.C. 2151.414(E). Accordingly, the juvenile court was required to find

that the children could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time or should

not be placed with Mother. Because a court need only find that one of the

R.C. 2151.414(E) factors applies to compel a finding that a child cannot be placed

with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent, we

need not address Mother’s challenges to the juvenile court’s findings under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (16) pertaining to Mother. R.C. 2151.414(E); In re A.E.,

2025-Ohio-1466, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.); In re L.V., 2024-Ohio-5917, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.).

2. Mother’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s Reasonable-Efforts Determination

With respect to Mother’s claim that agency failed to make reasonable

efforts to reunify her with her children, the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that reasonable efforts were made to reunify Mother with her

children.11

“Reasonable efforts means that a children’s services agency must act

diligently and provide services appropriate to the family’s need to prevent the child’s

removal or as a predicate to reunification.” In re H.M.K., 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 95 (3d

Dist.), quoting In re D.A., 2012-Ohio-1104, ¶ 30 (6th Dist.). What constitutes

“reasonable efforts” varies with the circumstances. In re C.B.C., 2016-Ohio-916,

¶ 76 (4th Dist.). “The issue in a reasonable-efforts determination is not whether the

agency could have done more, but whether the agency’s case planning and efforts

were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case.” In re A.F., 2021-

Ohio-4519, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). “Reasonable efforts” does not mean “‘all available

efforts.’” In re J.B., 2020-Ohio-3675, ¶ 21, quoting In re Lewis, 2003-Ohio-5262,

¶ 16 (4th Dist.). “Otherwise, there would always be an argument that one more

additional service, no matter how remote, may have made reunification possible.”

Lewis at ¶ 16; accord In re K.W., 2018-Ohio-3314, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.).

As detailed above, the record shows that CCDCFS implemented a

workable case plan that included parenting classes, counseling services, and

11 Further, a juvenile court is not obligated to make a determination at the permanent-custody hearing that the agency used reasonable efforts to reunify the family, where, as here, the juvenile court had previously determined that reasonable efforts had been made. In re C.F. at ¶ 41, 43. In this case, reasonable-efforts determinations were made in the juvenile court’s August 3, 2023 adjudication and temporary custody order, its April 14, 2024 order extending temporary custody, and at a February 2025 pretrial conference (in which the juvenile court noted in its February 12, 2025 journal entry, that “[a]ll parties stipulated to the reasonable efforts finding”). referrals for Community Collaborative services to address concerns regarding

Mother’s parenting, issues with inappropriate discipline, conflict within the home,

and Mother’s ability to provide a safe, stable, and appropriate home for the children.

The evidence presented demonstrates that CCDCFS provided substantial services to

Mother and worked with Mother for more than two years in an effort to reunite her

with her children. Accordingly, Mother’s arguments are meritless.

3. The Juvenile Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider Legal Custody as an Alternative to Terminating Parental Rights

In her first assignment of error, Mother also contends that the juvenile

court’s best-interest determination was not supported by clear and convincing

evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence because evidence was

presented that Mother and/or Grandmother was able to provide a suitable home,

love, support, and education for the children and one or more of the children could

have been returned to Mother and/or Grandmother’s custody with protective

supervision “as a less restrictive alternative to permanent custody.”

In her second assignment of error, Mother similarly challenges the

juvenile court’s denial of her motion to grant her legal custody of the children or,

alternatively, to grant legal custody of the children to an unidentified “relative”

(whom she claims is Grandmother), “reiterat[ing]” her prior arguments “as to why

the best interest of the children was not permanent custody, but rather custody with

her and/or [Grandmother].” “[A] child’s best interests are served by the child being placed in a

permanent situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re M.S., 2015-

Ohio-1028, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319,

324 (1991). While courts must consider multiple factors in determining a child’s

best interest, “they are not required to find that termination is the ‘only option’ or

that no suitable relative placement exists” before granting permanent custody to the

agency. In re C.J.F.-O., 2024-Ohio-6056, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.), citing In re Schaefer,

2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 64 (The juvenile court’s duty under R.C. 2151.414(D) does not

“include the requirement that the juvenile court find by clear and convincing

evidence that no suitable relative was available for placement. . . .The statute does

not make the availability of a placement that would not require a termination of

parental rights an all-controlling factor. The statute does not even require the court

to weigh that factor more heavily than other factors.”); see also In re B.K., 2023-

Ohio-1820, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.) (“‘A juvenile court need not find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that a relative is an unsuitable placement option prior to granting an

agency’s motion for permanent custody.’”), quoting In re C.H., 2016-Ohio-26, ¶ 26

(8th Dist.).

In support of her arguments regarding a preference for relative

placement, Mother cites to the agency’s duties under Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-42-

05(E)(1) and (5) and (F). However, as this court has previously recognized, “OAC

Section 5101 pertains to CCDCFS’s obligations and its determination regarding

substitute-care placement, rather than a trial court’s permanent custody determination.” In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.F., 2018-

Ohio-96, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.); see also In re B.K. at ¶ 31 (“While it may be preferential in

custody actions that children be placed with an appropriate relative, the preference

applies only to case plans and not to custody determinations.”). “‘[T]he willingness

of a relative to care for a child does not alter what the court must consider in

determining permanent custody’” and the juvenile court “‘is not required to favor a

relative if, after considering all the factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the

agency to be granted permanent custody.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting In re M.S. at ¶ 11. If

granting permanent custody to the agency is determined to be in a child’s best

interest, legal custody to a relative “necessarily is not.” In re Z.D., 2025-Ohio-969,

¶ 20 (8th Dist.); In re D.E., 2025-Ohio-654, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

The record shows that the juvenile court considered the relevant

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, the evidence presented at trial, and the

recommendation of the guardian ad litem in determining that permanent custody

to the agency was in the children’s best interest.12 Despite Mother’s arguments to

the contrary, the record supports the juvenile court’s best-interest determination as

to all five children.

a. J.D. and K.D.

By the time of the permanent-custody hearing, the children had been

in agency custody for more than two years and were in need of a safe, stable,

12 Because the juvenile court found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) applied, it was required to again consider that factor in its best-interest analysis. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e); In re L.N., 2026-Ohio-1383, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.); In re C.B., 2025-Ohio-5614, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). permanent placement. “[A] trial court’s finding that it cannot or should not place a

child with a parent precludes the court from considering returning the child to

Mother’s custody.” In re T.S., 2024-Ohio-827, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.), citing In re E.J.,

2023-Ohio-1376, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), and In re Mayle, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379,

*20-21 (8th Dist. July 27, 2000). Thus, the juvenile court’s finding that it could not

or should not place the children with Mother precluded return of the children to

Mother’s care and custody.

Although Grandmother had been the legal custodian of the older

children for more than eight years when they were committed to the temporary

custody of the agency in 2023, Grandmother had never been the legal custodian of

J.D. (age 5) or K.D. (age 4), the two youngest children. She had not filed a statement

of understanding for legal custody with respect to those children, and there was

nothing in the record to otherwise indicate that she was willing and able to assume

legal custody of them.13 Further, Morales testified that when she discussed the issue

13 Citing R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), the agency argues that because Grandmother did not

file a motion for legal custody, was not specifically identified in a motion for legal custody, and did not submit a statement of understanding for legal custody in these cases, not only could she not be granted legal custody of J.D. and K.D., but that “[t]he trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider granting [Grandmother] custody of [any of] the children.”

Grandmother was granted legal custody of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. in 2015 in Cuyahoga C.P. Juv. Nos. AD14913112, AD14913113, and AD14913114, and was the legal custodian of the children at the time the agency filed its complaint. There is nothing in the record to indicate that, prior to the juvenile court’s September 3 and 4, 2025 permanent-custody orders — which explicitly terminated Grandmother’s rights as legal custodian of D.D., Sa.D., and St.D. — she had permanently lost her status as the legal custodian of those children. Judgment entries from Cuyahoga C.P. Juv. Nos. AD14913112, AD14913113, and AD14913114, offered into evidence by the agency, show that Grandmother was granted legal custody of these children in those cases “upon the written motion” of the agency and that Grandmother had, at that time, signed a statement of of reunification with Grandmother, Grandmother did not express a desire to have

custody of all five children; rather, Grandmother informed Morales that she wished

to reunify with the three oldest children.

Because (1) J.D. and K.D. could not be placed with Mother given the

juvenile court’s finding the children cannot and should not be placed with Mother

under R.C. 2151.414(E), (2) Father stipulated to the termination of his parental

rights, and (3) no other suitable relative or interested persons had been identified

with which to place the children, the only option for a legally secure permanent

placement for J.D. and K.D. was permanent custody.

b. D.D.

D.D. was nearly 15 years old at the time of the hearing. Based on the

evidence presented at the hearing and the report of the guardian ad litem, D.D.

demonstrated sufficient maturity to meaningfully express her wishes regarding

placement. The record reflects that D.D. had repeatedly and consistently stated —

to her counsel, to the CCDCFS caseworkers, and to her guardian ad litem — that she

did not want to return to Grandmother’s care and preferred to be placed in the

permanent custody of the agency. Whereas in Grandmother’s care, she had faced

housing insecurity, had been regularly embroiled in conflict and/or physical

altercations with Mother, missed school frequently, and did not consistently engage

understanding for legal custody as to the children. Under the circumstances, it seems illogical that Grandmother would need to file another motion for legal custody or another statement of understanding for legal custody to continue as the children’s legal custodian in these cases. Nevertheless, because the issue is not dispositive, we need not resolve it here. See In re E.E.D., 2022-Ohio-4014, at ¶ 58, fn. 6 (8th Dist.). in counseling, evidence was presented that D.D. was doing well in her current

placement, that she felt safe in the foster home, that she had bonded well with her

foster caregivers, that her behaviors had improved, and that she was attending

counseling and school regularly. D.D.’s wishes were consistent with the

recommendation of the guardian ad litem.

c. Sa.D. and St.D.

Sa.D. (age 13) and St.D. (age 12) both expressed a desire to return to

Grandmother’s custody. Although the juvenile court is required to consider child’s

wishes “as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem,

with due regard for the maturity of the child,” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), a child’s

wishes are not determinative in assessing whether the granting of permanent

custody is in the child’s best interest.

At the time of the hearing, St.D. was continuing to have issues with

sexualized behaviors, he was still receiving inpatient treatment, and it was unknown

when his treatment would be completed and he would be approved for release. At

Genacross, St.D. received individual and group counseling, including specialized

treatment for his sexualized behaviors. He regularly attended school and his

behaviors were carefully monitored. Although Morales indicated that the services

St.D. received at Genacross could be provided elsewhere if he were to return home,

there were serious concerns whether St.D. would, in fact, receive the treatment he

needed if he were returned to Grandmother’s care. Evidence was presented that St.D. posed a risk to the safety and well-being of other children and/or his disabled

older brother if St.D. were to be returned home.

The record reflects that Sa.D. had mental-health issues for which

consistent counseling was essential for her well-being and that she was engaged in

specialized treatment to address issues with her “acting out” and the trauma she had

experienced. Whereas in Grandmother’s care, Sa.D. had faced housing insecurity,

failed to consistently attend school or engage in counseling, and faced issues of

conflict, evidence was presented that in the security and structure of her placement,

Sa.D.’s behaviors had improved, she was attending school and counseling regularly,

she was able to communicate more openly with her caregivers to resolve issues, and

conflict was reduced. Although the guardian ad litem acknowledged that a return of

Sa.D. to Grandmother’s care with protective supervision could be a possible

outcome, she did not believe it would be in Sa.D.’s best interest, given Sa.D.’s history

with Mother and all the existing concerns relating to Sa.D., for Sa.D. to be returned

to a home shared by Mother and Grandmother “alone,” without any of her other

siblings.

III. Conclusion

This is a difficult case. Although Grandmother and the three oldest

children and Mother and the two youngest children appear to share a genuine

affection for, and bond with one another, we cannot say, based on the record before

us, that the juvenile court erred in granting permanent custody of the children to the

agency. The record shows the juvenile court made the requisite statutory determinations, supported by clear and convincing evidence, in granting permanent

custody to the agency. Following a thorough review of the record, having weighed

the evidence and all reasonable inferences and having considered the credibility of

the witnesses, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that its judgment must be reversed and a new

trial ordered. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14. Further, we cannot say that the

juvenile court erred in denying Mother’s motion for legal custody. Accordingly, we

overrule Mother’s assignments of error.

Appeal No. 115622 dismissed; judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for these appeals.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR