In re Corrline International, LLC

516 B.R. 106, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3548, 2014 WL 4187200
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 21, 2014
DocketNo. 14-32740; Doc. Nos. 1, 13 & 25
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 516 B.R. 106 (In re Corrline International, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Corrline International, LLC, 516 B.R. 106, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3548, 2014 WL 4187200 (Tex. 2014).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING: (1) PETITIONING CREDITOR’S CHAPTER 7 INVOLUNTARY PETITION; AND (2) DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS

JEFF BOHM, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

The Court writes this Memorandum Opinion to underscore that: (1) there is split case law on how to satisfy certain elements required to obtain an order granting an involuntary petition; and (2) the drafting of a joint venture agreement should take into account the rights of the joint venture itself to oppose an involuntary bankruptcy petition.

[112]*112The Tagos Group, LLC (Tagos) filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against CorrLine International, LLC (CorrLine); Tagos is both a creditor and a minority shareholder of CorrLine. TriGe-nex of Texas, Inc. (TriGenex), a majority shareholder of CorrLine, owns intellectual property rights over a novel anti-corrosion formula, known as CorrX. Tagos and TriGenex created CorrLine to produce, market, and sell the CorrX product. In order to accomplish this objective, Tagos agreed to provide CorrLine with certain business support services for a monthly fee. Tagos also loaned funds to CorrLine under a working capital facility. Tagos contends that CorrLine refused to repay the loaned funds and service fees. Furthermore, Ta-gos asserts that due to a falling out between the Tagos board members and the TriGenex board members, management of CorrLine has become “hopelessly deadlocked,” which has impeded CorrLine’s ability to operate as a viable entity. Thus, Tagos seeks an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation of CorrLine to recover the amounts owed by CorrLine.

CorrLine filed a motion to dismiss the involuntary petition. [Doc. No. 13]. CorrLine contends that this Court should dismiss the petition for any one of the following reasons: (1) CorrLine has at least twelve creditors and therefore Tagos file the involuntary petition alone; (2) Ta-gos is an insider and the recipient of an avoidable transfer; (3) Tagos’ claims are the subject of a bona fide dispute; (4) CorrLine is generally paying its debts as they become due; or (5) Tagos filed the petition in bad faith. Alternatively, CorrLine urges this Court to abstain from hearing the case because it is a two-party dispute and bankruptcy is not in the best interest of all the company’s creditors.

This Court held a simultaneous hearing on Tagos’ petition and CorrLine’s motion to dismiss between June 27, 2014 and July 3, 2014. The parties adduced extensive testimony from several witnesses and introduced multiple exhibits. The Court then heard closing arguments from the parties’ respective counsel on July 29, 2014. Having now considered the evidence, the oral arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, this Court finds that Tagos does have standing to bring its involuntary petition and that granting the petition is warranted. Moreover, the Court declines to abstain from adjudicating this dispute. ■ The Court now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, as incorporated by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 and 9014.2

II. Findings of Fact A. History of the Debtor from its Inception to the Trial in this Court

1. On September 20, 2012, TriGenex and Tagos executed that one certain Limited Liability Company Agreement of CorrLine International, LLC. [Tagos Ex. No. 1].

2. TriGenex and Tagos entered into the Limited Liability Company Agreement of CorrLine (the JV Agreement) in order to develop and market a groundbreaking [113]*113product that prevents or prohibits corrosion. [June 27, 2014 Tr. 28:4-28:15].

3. Section 6.01(a) of the JV Agreement provides that “the powers of the [CorrL-ine] shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of [CorrLine] shall be managed under the direction of, the Managers.” [Tagos Ex. No. 1 at 22].

4. Section 6.02(a) of the JV Agreement allows the board of managers to delegate authority to officers. [Id. at 23].

5. Section 6.12(a) of the JV Agreement provides that each officer shall be designated with the “authority and duties that are normally associated with that office.” [Id. at 26].

6. Section 6.14 of the JV Agreement requires the consent of a majority of managers to: “(c) ... permit the commencement of a proceeding for bankruptcy, insolvency, receivership or similar action against [CorrLine] ... (j) enter into any employment, service or consultancy agreement or any other material cont[r]acts ... or (n) enter into any agreement to do any of the foregoing.” [Id. at 28-29] (emphasis added).

7. Section 6.07(a) of the JV Agreement requires that a majority vote must consist of at least one minority member vote— e.g., a Tagos member vote. [Id. at 24].

8. Section 10.01 of the JV Agreement also provides that CorrLine must “keep books and records of accounts and shall keep minutes of the proceedings of its Members and its Managers.” [Id. at 34],

9. Section 12.01 of the JV Agreement states that CorrLine “shall dissolve and its affairs shall be wound up on the first to occur of the following: (a) the prior written consent of a majority of the Managers; or (b) entry of a decree of judicial dissolution of [CorrLine] under Section 11.314 of the TBOC [i.e., Texas Business Organizations Code].” [Id. at 38].

10. Section 13.01 of the JV Agreement states that “[w]henever [CorrLine] is to pay any sum to a Member, any amounts that such member owes to [CorrLine] may be deducted from that sum before payment.” [Id. at 40] (emphasis added).

11. Section 13.09 of the JV Agreement provides that “[b]y executing this [JV] Agreement, each Member acknowledges that it has actual notice of (a) all of the provisions of this [JV] Agreement, and (b) all of the provisions of the Certificate.” [Id. at 41]. The JV Agreement is signed by Loren Hatle (Hatle), on behalf of TriGe-nex, and Milton L. Scott (Scott), on behalf of Tagos. [Id. at 43].

12. Exhibit C of the JV Agreement lists Majority Managers as Christopher R. “Kip” Knowles (Knowles), Hatle, and Kirk Chrisman (Chrisman). It also lists Minority Managers as Scott and Rodney G. Ellis (Ellis). [Id. at 47],

13. The JV Agreement allows for capital contributions to be made by issuing Common Units “to such Persons, for such consideration and on such terms as the Managers may from time to time determine.” [Id. at 16]. “Capital contributed in connection with the Common Units may consist of money paid, labor performed, or property received by [CorrLine], as well as any other consideration permitted under the TBOC [i.e., Texas Business Organizations Code] and any such amounts received by [CorrLine] therefore will be treated as a Capital Contribution.” [Id.\

14. Section 4.05 of the JV Agreement discusses withdrawal of contributions. “No Member shall have the right to withdraw all or any part of such Member’s Capital Contribution or to be paid interest in respect of its Capital Contributions. An unrepaid Capital Contribution is not a lia[114]*114bility of [CorrLine] or of any Member.” [Id. at 18].

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Bluebook (online)
516 B.R. 106, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3548, 2014 WL 4187200, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-corrline-international-llc-txsb-2014.