In re Gen. Aeronautics Corp.

594 B.R. 442
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah
DecidedDecember 4, 2018
DocketBankruptcy Number: 17-28510
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 594 B.R. 442 (In re Gen. Aeronautics Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Gen. Aeronautics Corp., 594 B.R. 442 (Utah 2018).

Opinion

R. KIMBALL MOSIER, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

General Aeronautics Corporation and other related companies have tried to build and market gyroplanes for over 30 years, but business has not been easy. Funding shortfalls have been common, and the company could not afford to pay employees their full compensation for significant stretches of time. When the last shortfall hit in early 2015, many of its remaining employees resigned or were laid off. The company received new funding in late 2016, and word spread among the former employees and creditors, who joined together to consider their options. On September 28, 2017, Jason Chen, Jacob van der Westhuizen, Robert Wilson, Howard Kent, William Scott Carron, and Henry Parry II filed an involuntary petition against General Aeronautics, asserting claims principally for unpaid rent, unpaid compensation, and loans made to the company.1 They were joined by three additional creditors-Carolynn Taft, Martie Nadauld, and Lori Chigbrow-on June 25, 2018 (with the original six, the Petitioning Creditors).

General Aeronautics controverted the petition and filed a motion to dismiss it and a motion to require the Petitioning Creditors to post a bond. The Court conducted preliminary hearings on those matters *448and set a date for trial. Shortly thereafter, General Aeronautics filed a separate motion to dismiss the case under 11 U.S.C. § 305(a).2 The Court conducted trial on all of these matters on September 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, and 27. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses; and having read the motions, memoranda, and briefs; and having heard the arguments of counsel and conducted its own independent research of applicable law, the Court issued its ruling from the bench on October 4, suspending proceedings for 60 days under § 305(a). The Court reserved the right to enter a written decision memorializing that oral ruling without altering its substance or the Court's final judgment. In accordance with that reservation the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision.3

I. JURISDICTION

The Court's jurisdiction over this contested matter is properly invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and § 157. This a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O ), and the Court may enter a final order. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Debtor's History

David Groen, a former Army helicopter pilot who served in the Vietnam War and flew commercially afterward, founded Groen Brothers Aviation, Inc. (GBA) in the mid-1980s with the goal of developing and bringing to market the technology of sustained autorotative flight using gyroplanes and other similar aircraft. While gyroplane technology has existed for approximately a century-it was the brainchild of Juan de la Cierva in the years shortly after World War I-Groen used his knowledge of helicopters to make improvements, such as the addition of collective pitch control, to gyroplanes. GBA believed that these advances, along with the particular characteristics of gyroplanes that distinguish them from helicopters and airplanes,4 would allow it to carve out a niche in the aircraft market.

GBA grew sporadically. Its funding in the early days consisted of numerous investments from small shareholders, and it was often playing catch-up on its financial obligations. By 2001, it had not brought a product to market that generated any meaningful revenue. That same year, GBA received a $5 million investment, which allowed it to begin a program to achieve FAA certification on an aircraft called the Hawk 4. But the ebb in the aviation industry after the 9/11 terrorist attacks caused GBA to lay off approximately 100 of its 135 employees. It weathered the downturn and secured a contract to begin *449work on a project called the Heliplane for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) around 2005, and employment numbers rebounded. Even so, GBA frequently remained short of cash and required additional investment. Although GBA completed the first of four phases required under the DARPA program, the contract was not renewed. The loss of the contract combined with the Great Recession led to another bout of financial trouble. GBA asked employees to defer compensation and eventually accrued approximately $1 million in unpaid wages and salary, which it later repaid, but it laid off 90 of 96 employees in 2007-08.

After those layoffs GBA stalled. Of the 20 engineers and 20 drafters it employed during the peak of the DARPA project, it retained only one of each after the layoffs. Its debt structure discouraged additional investment, and it produced nothing from 2008-12. GBA eventually changed its name to Groen Brothers Aviation USA, Inc. and developed a financial restructuring and recapitalization plan whereby it would transfer its assets, employees, and operations to a new entity, Groen Brothers Aviation Global, Inc. (GBAG).5 As part of that plan, GBA's creditors would have their debt converted into equity in GBAG. Trade creditors, utilities, and employees were excluded from this conversion arrangement. After some delay, the transfer from GBA to GBAG was carried out in December 2012 (Transition).

Freed from the debt of GBA, GBAG was supposed to attract new investment from certain funds managed by Steven Stevanovich, who is currently one of two Executive Directors of the debtor. The expected funding did not materialize, however, and cash was acutely scarce pre- and post-Transition, which led to reductions in employee pay and, as before, the accrual of unpaid compensation.6 GBAG's finances were uncertain enough that it asked its landlord in December 2013 for some time to vacate the property in the event it could not pay rent.7 In addition, employment numbers had not recovered to prior levels. GBA had 47 employees on its payroll in January 2012, many of them part-time or temporary.8 Those numbers dropped to 13 at GBAG a year later,9 but later climbed to as high as 28 in November 2014.10

In early 2014, Jason Chen, who had previously worked for GBA as a fundraiser from 2004-08 and as an advisor for a shorter six-month period, was asked by GBAG to investigate and pursue a potential deal with Wuhai, a city in Inner Mongolia, China. That deal did not come to fruition.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
594 B.R. 442, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-gen-aeronautics-corp-utb-2018.