[550]*550PER CURIAM
This is. a case of mandatory review pursuant to ORS 1.430(1) of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability (the Commission)1 recommending that the Accused, the Honorable Edward N. Fadeley, an Associate Justice of this court, be censured for wilful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Accused admits the violations of the Code of which he is accused, but he argues that, for various statutory and constitutional reasons, he may not be disciplined for the conduct in question. We do not find any of the Accused’s statutory or constitutional arguments to be well taken. The Accused is censured.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Personal solicitation of campaign funds by a candidate for judicial office is forbidden by Canons 7B(7) and 7D of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provide:
“B. A judge may not:
«* * * * *
“(7) personally solicit campaign contributions; but a judge may establish committees to secure and manage financing and expenses to promote the judge’s election and to obtain public statements of support for the judge’s candidacy;
* * * *
[551]*551“D. The provisions of this canon apply to each judge in the state at all times and to any other person who becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office. A person becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office when the person announces the candidacy or when steps are taken, with the person’s approval, to place his or her name on an election ballot.”
On May 12,1989, the Commission notified the Accused that it had received a complaint that the Accused had personally solicited campaign contributions in connection with his 1988 campaign for the position that he now holds. An investigation followed, during which the Accused fully disclosed to the Commission those of his activities during his campaign for election to this court that clearly or even arguably fell within the prohibitions of Canons 7B(7) and 7D.
On September 1, 1989, the Commission served the Accused with a complaint, alleging that the Accused had violated Canons 7B(7) and 7D by personally soliciting campaign funds. The Commission held hearing on February 16,1990, at which the Accused and counsel for the Commission stipulated as to these facts:
“1. [The Accused] was elected to the Supreme Court of Oregon in the November, 1988 general election, and has served as an associate justice on that court continuously since January 2,1989.
“2. On or about December 2, 1988, the Oregon Labor Press published, as a letter-to-the editor, a letter signed by [the Accused, who was then an associate justice-elect of this court] soliciting contributions to defray expenses of his campaign committee incurred in the campaign for election to the court.
“3. In June, 1988, at a campaign organizer meeting, [the Accused] participated in a request for pledges to his campaign committee.
“4. Personal solicitation of campaign contributions to his committee occasionally resulted from [the Accused’s] asking business representatives to serve on his campaign finance committee, during 1988.
“5. [The Accused] personally solicited campaign finance pledges from some members of the Oregon State Bar, during 1988.”
[552]*552On March 27,1990, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation. The Commission found the facts stipulated by the Accused. It concluded that the acts in question violated Canons 7B(7) and 7D of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It unanimously recommended that the Accused be censured “in the strongest terms” by this court. The matter is now before us for final action. ORS 1.420 and 1.430.2
The Accused does not dispute the Commission’s Findings of Fact. Neither does he dispute that those findings demonstrate that he has violated both Canons 7B(7) and 7D of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Instead, the Accused confines his arguments in this court to legal assertions that (1) the Commission had no jurisdiction over the Accused, the acts in question, or both, and (2) if the Commission did have jurisdiction, then sanctioning the Accused for the acts in question would violate his free speech rights under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon (ACLU), amicus curiae, argues separately that, under the Oregon Constitution, regulation of elections is a matter entrusted to the legislature, not this court, and Canon 7B(7) impermissibly encroaches on the [553]*553legislature’s authority. We shall consider each of these contentions in turn. Before doing so, however, a brief historical discussion is in order.
THE COURT, THE COMMISSION, AND THE CODE
Until 1967, there was no provision in the Oregon Constitution specifically governing removal of judges from office by this court.3 In that year, the legislature referred to the people an amendment to the judicial article, Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution, adding a new section 8:
“Section 8. (1) In the manner provided by law, and notwithstanding section 1 of this Article, a judge of any court may be removed from his judicial office by the Supreme Court for:
“(a) Conviction in a court of this or any other state, or of the United States, of a crime punishable as a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude; or
“(b) Wilful misconduct in a judicial office involving moral turpitude; or
“(c) Wilful or persistent failure to perform judicial duties; or
“(d) Habitual drunkenness or illegal use of narcotic drugs.”
Or Laws 1967, Senate Joint Resolution (SJR) 9. The amendment was adopted at the November 5,1968, general election.
Contingent on passage of SJR 9, the 1967 legislature also passed the act creating the Judicial Fitness Commission. Or Laws 1967 ch 294. Section 6 of that 1967 Act4 became ORS 1.420. The section has since been amended to expand the range of sanctions that the Commission can recommend (Or Laws 1971 ch 511, § 3) and to add the phrase “and Disability” to the official name of the Commission (Or Laws 1987 ch 520, § 5), but its basic thrust has remained the same. Thus, since the adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 8, of the [554]*554Oregon Constitution, there has been in place a mechanism for disciplining judges through a judicial fitness commission and this court. See In re Piper, 271 Or 726, 730-33, 534 P2d 159 (1975) (discussing history of the statute).
Neither the 1967 constitutional amendment nor its statutory implementation mentioned the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code was not adopted by this Court until March 11, 1975. Before that time, judicial conduct was governed by the earlier Canons of Judicial Ethics, adopted by this court in 1952. In re Piper, supra, 271 Or at 736 n 12. Canon 7B(2) of the 1975 Code contained essentially the same provision embodied today in Canon 7B(7), but in the form of a recommendation. Former Canon 7B(2) provided, in part:
“A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates should not himself solicit campaign funds; he may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and manage the expenditures of funds for his campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers. A candidate’s committees may solicit funds for his campaign.”
Roughly a month after the adoption by this court of the 1975 Code of Judicial Conduct, a resolution was introduced in the legislature, seeking to refer to the people an amendment to Article VII (Amended), section 8, that would permit this court to remove, suspend or censure judges for “[w]ilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be established by the Supreme Court.” Or Laws 1975, Senate Joint Resolution 48. The voters approved the referred constitutional amendment on November 4,1975, thereby creating what is now Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8(l)(e):
“(1) In the manner provided by law, and notwithstanding section 1 of this Article, a judge of any court may be removed or suspended from his judicial office by the Supreme Court, or censured by the Supreme Court, for:
«* * * * *
“(e) Wilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be established by the Supreme Court[.]”
[555]*555Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8, thus assumed the form that it has retained to this day.
Most recently, on December 1,1983, this court promulgated a revised Code of Judicial Conduct, this time couched in mandatory terms.5 It contains the present form of Canons 7B(7) and 7D. With the foregoing history in mind, we turn to the arguments made by the Accused.
JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Accused first asks this court to hold that the Commission had no jurisdiction to inquire into his failure to abide by the Code of Judicial Conduct, because ORS 1.420 does not mention the Code in its description of the Commission’s role.6 The Accused reasons this way: At the same time the people originally granted this court authority to remove judges by the 1967 constitutional amendment, the Judicial Fitness Commission statute became operative and gave the Commission jurisdiction to inquire into any “complaint from any person concerning the conduct of a judge.” At that time, because there was no Code of Judicial Conduct in existence in Oregon, no complaint concerning a violation of the Code could have been made to or considered by the Commission. Later, in 1975, when this court adopted the former version of the Code and the people, by their enactment of Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8(1)(e), authorized this court to remove, suspend or censure a judge for “[w]ilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be established by the Supreme Court,” ORS 1.420 was not amended to specify that [556]*556violations of the Code came within the purview of the Commission. It follows, the Accused argues, that the Commission has no jurisdiction to consider such complaints.
That argument is ingenious, but unacceptably hyper-technical. A wilful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is as much “the conduct of a judge,” as that phrase is used in ORS 1.420, as would be any of the other forms of conduct reviewable by the Commission before 1975. Moreover, this court has never held that, before 1975, a judge’s violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics (adopted by this Court in 1952) would have been irrelevant to an inquiry by the Commission “concerning the conduct of a judge.” If anything, we have implied the contrary. See In re Piper, supra, 271 Or at 736 n 12 (discussing prior Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, but indicating that it had been “superseded by Canon 5F of the new [1975] Code”). Any legislative expansion of the jurisdictional statement of the Commission in ORS 1.420 to include “violations of the code of professional conduct” therefore would have been surplusage; the Commission had that jurisdiction at least from the day the Code itself became binding on judges. This argument is not well taken.
The Accused also argues that, because all of the acts of which he was accused occurred while he was a candidate for a judgeship or when he was a judge-elect, and none occurred after he assumed his judicial duties, the Commission lacks jurisdiction over him. Again, we disagree.
It is clear, in the first instance, that “judge” includes a candidate for a judicial position under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 7D specifically provides:
“The provisions of this canon apply to each judge in the state at all times and to any other person who becomes a candidate for an elective judicial office.”
(Emphasis supplied.) It is equally clear that to apply the limitations of Canon 7B(7) to sitting judges, while allowing their as-yet-unelected opponents to campaign unfettered by Canon 7B(7), would create an advantage for the challenger. The legislature did not intend the Commission to have so little and so ineffective jurisdiction over judicial activity. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Commission’s authority to [557]*557inquire into a complaint “concerning the conduct of a judge” encompasses the acts of the Accused in this case.
Finally, the Accused argues that
“the proceeding before the court is an election complaint. The Commission’s lack of statutory authorization is especially troubling when it seeks jurisdiction over constitutionally mandated elections. Canon 7B(7)’s prohibition on personal solicitation seems in conflict with election statutes placing responsibility for election conduct upon the candidate and requiring the candidate to personally authorize publications. ORS 260.522 and 260.532(2).”
The statutes cited by the Accused7 deal with the personal responsibility of candidates for public office concerning published campaign matter.
[558]*558There is no necessary inconsistency between the Commission’s proceedings and the statutes in question, or with the election laws in general. Nothing in Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8, or in ORS 1.420, purports to limit the jurisdiction of this court or the Commission to inquire into wrongful conduct, even when that same conduct also is or might be punishable in some other forum on the basis of other laws.
Amicus curiae ACLU puts a different spin on this aspect of our inquiry by arguing that, to the extent that the proceedings of the Commission and this court constitute the regulation of elections, such proceedings violate Oregon Constitution, Article IV, section 1 (“The legislative power of the state * * * is vested in a Legislative Assembly * * *.”) and Oregon Constitution, Article III, section 1 (Separation of Powers).8 When these two constitutional provisions are read in conjunction with Oregon Constitution, Article II, section 8 (“The Legislative Assembly shall enact laws to support the privilege of free suffrage, prescribing the manner of regulating, and conducting elections, and prohibiting under adequate penalties, all undue influence therein, from power, bribery, tumult, and other improper conduct.”), ACLU argues, it is clear that the constitution leaves to the legislature alone the power to regulate elections and to provide penalties for violations of election rules.
We are not persuaded. We find nothing in the foregoing constitutional sections that establishes that the judicial branch may not itself regulate election activities of its members and potential members. We also think that, to the extent that such matters are deemed to have been originally within the purview of the legislative branch alone, or of the people, the adoption by the people of Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8, and the enactment by the legislature of ORS 1.420 may be seen as a limited relinquishment of a portion of their power over such matters by the people and the legislative branch to the judicial branch.
[559]*559We hold that the Commission had jurisdiction to proceed against the Accused concerning the acts with which he is charged. We hold that we, likewise, have jurisdiction to discipline the Accused for those acts, to the extent they constitute wilful violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We proceed to examine the constitutional arguments of the Accused and amicus.
OREGON CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution proscribes any law “restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever.”9 This court has repeatedly held that the provision means what it says: although certain harmful effects of speech may be forbidden, restrictions aimed not at the harm but at the content of the speech itself normally are impermissible. See, e.g., Oregon State Police Assn. v. State of Oregon, 308 Or 531, 783 P2d 7 (1989), cert den_US _(1990); State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982). It is also undeniable that the restriction in Canon 7B(7) against a judicial candidate personally soliciting campaign funds is a restriction on speech aimed at least in part at the content of the speech. From this, the Accused reasons in syllogistic fashion that Canon 7B(7) is unconstitutional under Article I, section 8.
Not even Article I, section 8, is absolute — there are exceptions to its sweep. Among the exceptions are certain rules of professional conduct, see, e.g., In re Lasswell, 296 Or 121, 673 P2d 855 (1983) (prosecutor may validly be restricted in what he says during the pendency of a criminal prosecution), as well as certain historical exceptions, see, e.g., State v. Robertson, supra, 293 Or at 412 (stating rule). It may be possible to fit the proscription on direct campaign fund solicitation in Canon 7B(7) into an historical exception or, as we discuss post, a rule of professional conduct. We think, however, that we may reach one answer to the problem before us in a more straightforward way.
[560]*560As we have previously noted, the 1976 amendment to Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8, contained a specific reference to the right of this court to discipline judges for “[w]ilful violation of any rule of judicial conduct as shall be established by [this court].” Moreover, there already existed, at the time when that amendment to the constitution was submitted to the people, former Canon 7B(2), which contained the same restriction on personal solicitation of campaign funds that is under consideration here. This was, therefore, a situation in which the phrase “rule of judicial conduct” had a specific meaning that any voter could have looked up, if he or she wished to do so. In referring to “any rule of judicial conduct,” the proposed constitutional amendment was referring to rules that at the time did, and in the future might, restrict to some degree the ability of judges to speak freely. The amendment was adopted by the people.
Because the amendment was adopted, there are two potentially conflicting provisions in the constitution — Article I, section 8, and Article VII (Amended), section 8. It is our function to harmonize the two.
We have no difficulty in holding that, in this context, it is Article I, section 8, that is modified. When the people, in the face of a pre-existing right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, adopt a constitutional amendment that by its fair import modifies that pre-existing right, the later amendment must be given its due. See Hoag v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 75 Or 588, 612, 144 Pac 574, 147 Pac 756 (1915) (“It is a familiar rule of construction that, where two provisions of a written [constitution are repugnant to each other, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred * * *.”). To hold otherwise would be to deny to later-enacted provisions of the constitution equal dignity as portions of the same fundamental document. We hold that Canon 7B(7) does not offend Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 8, because rules such as Canon 7B(7) were contemplated as a consequence of the adoption by the people of Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8. See In re Piper, supra, 271 Or at 735 (pointing out that later-enacted Oregon Constitution, Article VII (Amended), section 8, modified pre-existing directive in section 1 of the same Article to the effect that compensation for judges “shall not be diminished during the term for which they are elected”); see also In [561]*561the Matter of Sawyer, 286 Or 369, 387, 594 P2d 805 (1979) (Linde, J., dissenting) (“Article VII (amended), section 8(l)(e), supra, in effect has given this court farreaching power to legislate for other judges in the form of rules of judicial conduct, enforceable by potential removal from office by the judgment of the same body that made the rule. That is a power to be used only with scrupulous care in stating the rules and attention to their literal implications.” (Footnote omitted.)).
Even if the adoption by the people of subsection (e) to Article VII (Amended), section 8, of the Oregon Constitution were not a qualification on the rights guaranteed by Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, traditional analysis under Article I, section 8, would yield the same result in this case. The right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, is not absolute. It may be curtailed, for example, in the regulation of certain professions. The case of In re Lasswell, supra, is illustrative.
Lasswell was the District Attorney of Douglas County. His office was prosecuting approximately 50 persons for involvement in large-scale drug activity. Lasswell commented in both a newspaper interview and a television program on facts relating to the then-pending cases. The Oregon State Bar charged him with violating DR 7-107, which forbids extrajudicial comment by either prosecution or defense on a range of topics related to the merits of the underlying prosecution. Lasswell defended on the ground that his statements were protected by Article I, section 8.
Because this court’s approach to the Lasswell case is so pertinent to the analysis here, we set out that approach at some length:
“Unquestionably any rule that in terms directs persons not to make particular kinds of statements is difficult to square with constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, particularly those of the Oregon Constitution. * * *
“* * * [The] guarantee [of Article I, section 8] forecloses the enactment of prohibitory laws, at least in the form of outright prohibitions backed by punitive sanctions, that in terms forbid speech or writing ‘on any subject whatever,’ unless it can be shown that the prohibition falls within an [562]*562original or modern version of a historically established exception that was not meant to be ended by the liberating principles and purposes for which the constitutional guarantees of free expression were adopted. * * * [This court’s] decisions would preclude enactment of the text of [the particular disciplinary rule at issue] as an outright prohibition against disclosure or discussion by persons generally or against publication by those to whom the disclosure or comments were made.
“But that does not decide the present issue. [The disciplinary rule] is not a general prohibition against anyone who might disclose or discuss facts bearing on a pending criminal prosecution. The parts of [the rule] involved here are addressed specifically to ‘[a] lawyer * * * associated with the prosecution of a criminal matter.’ And the potential sanction, though of course serious to a lawyer, is not punitive but professional. It is civil, not penal. * * *
“* * * [T]he rule addresses the incompatibility between a prosecutor’s official function, including his responsibility to preserve the conditions for a fair trial, and speech that, though privileged against other than professional sanctions, vitiates the proper performance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case. In short, a lawyer is not denied freedom to speak, write, or publish; but when one exercises official responsibility for conducting a prosecution according to constitutional standards, one also undertakes the professional responsibility to protect those standards in what he or she says or writes. * * *
a* * * * *
“The disciplinary rule deals with purposes and prospective effects, not with completed harm. It addresses the prosecutor’s professional responsibility at the time he or she chooses what to speak or write. At that time it is incompatible with his or her professional performance in a concrete case to make extrajudicial statements on the matters covered by the rule * * * when a lawyer knows or is bound to know that the statements pose a serious and imminent threat to the process and acts with indifference to that effect. * * * [T]he question is not whether the tribunal believes that the lawyer’s comments impaired the fairness of an actual trial, which may or may not have taken place. The question, rather, is the lawyer’s intent or knowledge and indifference when making published statements that were highly likely to have this effect.”
In re Lasswell, supra, 296 Or at 124-26 (citations omitted).
[563]*563The analogy between Lasswell and the present case is obvious: Each case involves the regulation of speech of a public servant; each involves an allegation of violation of a code of professional conduct; and each involves a claim of conflict between the code of professional conduct and the protection of Article I, section 8. However, the Accused argues that there are at least three distinctions between Lasswell and the present case that make the reasoning and the result in Lasswell inapposite.
The Accused first argues that in order for a restriction on the speech of a public servant like himself to be valid under Article I, section 8, the speech in question must be “incompatibl[e]” with the public servant’s “official function.” In re Lasswell, supra, 296 Or at 125. That is true, but it does not establish how this case is different.
In Lasswell, the incompatibility was between the rights of a District Attorney to speak freely and the right of a criminally accused to a fair trial. Some balancing of those competing rights was required. The disciplinary rule in that case was constitutional because of the relatively minimal burden it placed on the District Attorney’s ability to speak. Id. at 125. The same rationale justifies Canon 7B(7).
The stake of the public in a judiciary that is both honest in fact and honest in appearance is profound. A democratic society that, like ours, leaves many of its final decisions, both constitutional and otherwise, to its judiciary is totally dependent on the scrupulous integrity of that judiciary. A judge’s direct request for campaign contributions offers a quid pro quo or, at least, can be perceived by the public to do so. Insulating the judge from such direct solicitation eliminates the appearance (at least) of impropriety and, to that extent, preserves the judiciary’s reputation for integrity. On the other side of the ledger, the candidate is not seriously impaired either in the ability to solicit and receive funds — a committee is permitted to do that — or in the ability otherwise to communicate the candidate’s position on any issues the candidate is entitled to address — something the candidate himself or herself may do, as long as the message does not include a request for funds.
The Accused next argues that the Lasswell rationale [564]*564should not apply in any case in which the interest in opposition to that protected by Article I, section 8, is not constitutional in magnitude. We see no justification for so confining Lasswell; it is clear that no language from that case itself requires such a limitation. Rather, the issue ought to be whether the offsetting societal interest — whether derived from the constitution of from some other source — is of fundamental importance to a degree akin to the concerns expressed in the constitution. For the reasons already stated, we hold that the interest in judicial integrity and the appearance of judicial integrity is an offsetting societal interest of that kind.
It also may be said that, at least with respect to the limitation placed on judges by Canon 7B(7), the competing interest is of constitutional magnitude. When a judge directly solicits funds, the request puts pressure on the person solicited, especially when (as is often the case) the person solicited is a lawyer. The lawyer has an absolute constitutional right to support whom he or she pleases, both with money and with a vote.
The Accused also argues that, to the extent that the Lasswell rationale depends on the phrase in Article I, section 8, that “every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right [of free speech],” the device of defining a kind of speech as an “abuse” is a dangerous approach which threatens the general freedom conferred by Article I, section 8. Our analysis here does not depend on that rationale.
We hold that enforcement by this Court of Canon 7B(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, pursuant to the authorization of Article VII (Amended), section 8(e), of the Oregon Constitution, does not impair the Accused’s right to free expression under the Oregon Constitution.10
FIRST AMENDMENT
The Accused argues that, even if the restrictions on speech embodied in Canon 7B(7) do not offend the Oregon Constitution, they do impermissibly interfere with political speech protected by the First Amendment to the United [565]*565States Constitution,11 which is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The parties agree, and we assume, that seeking donations to support a campaign for elective office (including judicial office) is a form of speech and, more particularly, a form of political expression under the First Amendment. Political expression is at the heart of the values expressed in the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1, 25, 96 S Ct 612, 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976). However, even in this most sensitive area of public discourse, not every law and regulation limiting speech is unconstitutional. Relatively significant limitations on protected First Amendment rights “may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Id. at 25.
As we have elsewhere explained, the interest that Canon 7B(7) (made applicable to the Accused through Canon 7D) protects is the state’s interest in maintaining, not only the integrity of the judiciary, but also the appearance of that integrity. The persons most actively interested in judicial races, and the persons who are the most consistent contributors to judicial campaigns, are lawyers and potential litigants. The impression created when a lawyer or potential litigant, who may from time to time come before a particular judge, contributes to the campaign of that judge is always unfortunate. Although many or most lawyers may act with pure motives, viz., to ensure a qualified judiciary and to ensure vigorous public debate, the outside observer cannot but think that the lawyer or potential litigant either expects to get special treatment from the judge or, at the least, hopes to get such treatment. It follows that, if it is at all possible to do so, the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over money to judicial candidates should be avoided if the public is to have faith in the impartiality of its judiciary.
So long as judges are chosen by the electoral process, it will be impossible to deny lawyers and potential litigants the [566]*566right to give to campaigns or to deny judges the right to seek contributions. Both activities are too important in the scheme of things to permit either to be forbidden outright. See First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 US 765, 98 S Ct 1407, 55 L Ed 2d 707 (1978) (Massachusetts statute forbidding certain national banking corporations and business corporations from making expenditures in an attempt to influence the outcome of votes on referendum proposals held unconstitutional abridgment of First Amendment rights). Some other, less intrusive method is needed.
Canon 7B(7) is that method. It permits the judge to obtain funds to carry out a campaign but eliminates the specter of contributions going from the hand of the contributor to the hand of the judge. The limitation on the ability to raise funds need not cause the campaign to suffer, if the judge picks good people for his or her campaign finance committee. It is true that the committee, however well suited to the task, may have trouble obtaining as much as the judge might have raised by personal buttonholing, but that is the point.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court that we find most helpful in this area is Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447, 98 S Ct 1912, 56 L Ed 2d 444 (1978). The case involved the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of an Ohio State Bar Association rule forbidding in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys for pecuniary gain.12 Ohralik, the lawyer, had solicited two women to use him as their attorney in an attempt to obtain benefits under the uninsured motorist clause of an insurance policy. Each of the young women eventually discharged Ohralik, who thereafter sued each to obtain one-third of their later settlements with the insurance company.
Both women complained to Ohralik’s county bar association, which censured him. The case was then reviewed [567]*567by the Ohio Supreme Court, which increased the sanction to an indefinite suspension. The United States Supreme Court granted review in the case to address Ohralik’s claim that his solicitation of the two women’s legal business was speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. That Court held that the disciplinary action against Ohralik did not violate the constitutional protections upon which he relied.
The Court had previously held that advertising concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services was protected commercial speech. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 97 S Ct 2691, 53 L Ed 2d 810 (1977). Ohralik relied on Bates. The Court found Bates inapposite. Although it was true, the Court acknowledged, that commercial solicitation was entitled to a limited degree of protection, it was clear that many forms of such speech could be limited by laws regulating the sale of securities, the exchange of price and production information among competitors, and the like. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra, 436 US at 456. The Court more specifically distinguished Bates this way:
“[I]n-person solicitation serves much the same function as the advertisement at issue in Bates. But there are significant differences as well. Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision-making; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual.”
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra, 436 US at 457 (footnote omitted).
On the other hand, the Court noted,
“The state interests implicated in this case are particularly strong. In addition to its general interest in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions, the State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of the licensed professions. * * *
* * * *
“* * * The Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic [568]*568measures whose objective is the prevention of harm before it occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences the State seeks to avert. In such a situation, which is inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed.”
Id. 436 US at 460, 464 (citations omitted). A prophylactic rule under such circumstances did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 466.
Although the Court in Ohralik was at pains to point out that it was dealing with commercial, not political, speech, 436 US at 458, we think that the underlying point is equally applicable here. There is, in the context of in-person solicitation of campaign funds, a certainty of an appearance of impropriety and a high degree of likelihood of overreaching or undue influence by the requesting judge. The state has a fundamental interest in avoiding those consequences, an interest that it has vindicated by promulgating Canon 7B(7). Moreover, that Canon asserts the state’s interest in the narrowest, least intrusive way possible consistent with the legitimate purpose of the rule. We think that Ohralik supports the result that we reach in this case.
The Accused relies principally on In re Primus, 436 US 412, 98 S Ct 1893, 56 L Ed 2d 417 (1978), decided the same day as Ohralik. In that case, Primus, a lawyer, was publicly reprimanded by the South Carolina Supreme Court for soliciting a client in violation of South Carolina’s bar disciplinary rules. Primus, who was a cooperating lawyer with the ACLU, had contacted a woman who had been forced to accept sterilization in order to keep her eligibility for welfare payments and informed the woman that the ACLU was prepared to pay for her legal representation if the woman wished to sue the parties responsible for her sterilization. Primus sought review of her disciplinary case in the United States Supreme Court, claiming her First Amendment rights of free speech and association had been infringed by the action of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court accepted review of [569]*569Primus’ case and reversed the disciplinary action. The Court first recognized that states enjoy broad powers in the regulation of professions, extending even to the power to forbid, in certain instances, “in-person solicitation by lawyers who [are seeking] to communicate purely commercial offers of legal assistance to lay persons.” In re Primus, supra, 436 US at 422 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra). Primus’ case differed from Ohralik, the Court said:
“This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery. And her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain.”
436 US at 422.
That distinction from Ohralik made all the difference, so far as Primus’ First Amendment rights were concerned. The Court had long held that collective activity aimed at obtaining meaningful access to the courts was a fundamental First Amendment right. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415, 83 S Ct 328, 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). Like the NAACP in the Button case, the ACLU in Primus was engaged in offering legal services not primarily for its own profit, but to further civil libertarian goals that the ACLU had long espoused. Therefore, the Court held, South Carolina’s action in punishing Primus for soliciting a client for political purposes could stand only if it survived the “exacting scrutiny” applicable to such limitations on “core First Amendment rights.” In re Primus, supra, 436 US at 432 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 US at 44-45).
Judged by that exacting standard, application of the disciplinary rule against soliciting a client impermissibly infringed Primus’ First Amendment rights. The solicitation letter did not involve undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy — the substantive evils that the bar rule was meant to alleviate. Neither did there appear to be any danger of conflict of interest or of the creation of a frivolous lawsuit. 436 US at 435-37. “At bottom,” the Court held,
“the case against [Primus] rests on the proposition that a [570]*570State may regulate in a prophylactic fashion all solicitation activities of lawyers because there may be some potential for overreaching, conflict of interest, or other substantive evils whenever a lawyer gives unsolicited advice and communicates an offer of representation to a layman. Under certain circumstances, that approach is appropriate in the case of speech that simply ‘propose[s] a commercial transaction^]’ In the context of political expression and association, however, a State must regulate with significantly greater precision.”
Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). On the other hand, had Primus’ actions been such as to involve undue influence, overreaching or the like, it seems clear that the Court’s approach would have paralleled that in Ohralik. Not even the political nature of Primus’ offer entirely immunized her from scrutiny.
This case is not like Primus. The Canon here does not sweep so broadly as did the disciplinary rule there. Solicitation of funds by a surrogate of the judge’s choice is permissible; only personal solicitation by the judge is foreclosed. The limitation on the Accused’s protected First Amendment expression and association is far less extensive than was the limitation in Primus. Equally important is the fact that the Canon forbids direct expression by the Accused on one extremely narrow subject only, viz., a request for a campaign contribution. The Accused is free to urge his candidacy on anyone in any other way. The activity of the Accused in this case far more resembles the in-person solicitation of clients, with its inherent dangers of overreaching and undue influence, which the Supreme Court held could be forbidden in Ohralik, than it does the solicitation of a client to carry forward a civil liberties cause that the Supreme Court found to be protected in Primus.
Although case law on the issue before us is not exactly legion, the Accused has cited no case (and we have found none) in which a court has sustained an argument that a judge is excused entirely by the First Amendment from complying with the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Cases to the contrary include In re Kaiser, 111 Wash 2d 275, 287-89, 759 P2d 392 (1988) (upheld sanctioning judge for campaign statements that included, in a nonpartisan race, statements clearly intended to indicate the candidate’s long-time affiliation with [571]*571a particular political party); Nicholson v. State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 50 NY 2d 597, 431 NYS 2d 340, 409 NE2d 818 (1980); and Morial v. Judiciary Comm. of State of La., 565 F2d 295 (5th Cir 1977) cert den 435 US 1013 (1978) (upheld prohibition against sitting judge seeking other, non-judicial office).
In summary, although we accept the analytical framework that the Accused and the dissent invoke in this sensitive First Amendment area, our analysis under the approach of Ohralik and Primus leads us to conclude that Canon 7B(7) does not violate the First Amendment rights of the Accused. The degree of interference with the First Amendment rights of the judicial candidate is minimal, the state’s interest in protecting the integrity of its judiciary is profound, and the means chosen to carry out the state’s purpose are the least intrusive possible if there is to be any chance to achieve the desired aim.13
SANCTION
The Commission carefully and thoughtfully explained its reasoning in selecting a recommended sanction. Because the Commission’s analysis substantially mirrors our own, we set it out at some length:
“The Commission unanimously recommends that the Oregon Supreme Court censure [the Accused] in the strongest terms.
“The rule against personal solicitation is not a mere technicality. At the root of this requirement is the obligation of judges and judicial candidates alike to maintain the independence and impartiality of the judicial system, both in fact and in terms of the public’s perceptions. When a judge personally solicits campaign contributions, lawyers, litigants and citizens may come to believe that the Judge will be influenced in [572]*572the future by direct knowledge of who has contributed to his or her campaign. The Canon is aimed at promoting public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system by insulating a judicial candidate from the solicitation of campaign contributions. The Canon also serves to protect members of the bar from direct pressure and solicitation by judges before whom they may appear on a regular basis. Violation of the canon politicizes, and damages the integrity of, the judicial election process.
66* * * * *
“[The Accused] has admitted that he personally solicited campaign contributions as a routine matter throughout his campaign in total disregard of a rudimentary, yet essential, tenet of judicial election campaigns. Such disregard for a judicial canon is particularly discomforting when the person in violation is a Supreme Court Justice. The Supreme Court is Oregon’s most visible court. Thus, the conduct of its members reflects upon all judges of the State. Moreover, the Oregon [Constitution vests in the Supreme Court the ultimate responsibility to discipline judges who violate the law or rules of judicial conduct. A Justice of the Supreme Court, who sits in judgment for the conduct of other judges, must scrupulously adhere to the rules which the Supreme Court itself has adopted. In short, a Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court must be held to the highest standard for judicial ethics. By violating the Court’s own ethical rules, [the Accused] failed to meet the standard of conduct expected of the high office to which he was elected.
“The Commission has had difficulty determining the appropriate sanction to recommend to the Supreme Court. The Commission has taken into account a number of factors, including whether [the Accused’s] violations were likely to have affected the outcome of the election. Some considerations pointed towards a more severe sanction, and there was some support on the Commission to go beyond a censure. * * *
“On balance, though, the Commission believes that public censure in the strongest terms by the Supreme Court is the sanction which best fits the circumstances of this case. * * * [The Accused] * * * admitted his violations and voluntarily provided many details about them. Certainly, the ignominy of being the first Supreme Court Justice in Oregon to be subjected to discipline by his colleagues is no minor penalty. The Commission therefore unanimously recommends that [the] Oregon Supreme Court publicly censure [the Accused].”
[573]*573We agree that censure is the appropriate sanction. There can be no doubt from this record that the Accused wilfully violated Canon 7B(7). On the other hand, there was nothing surreptitious or underhanded about his conduct. He not only admitted his actions, but also assisted the Commission in identifying the extent to which he had had personal contact with potential contributors to his campaign. We have no reason to think that the incidents will be repeated or that the Accused requires any greater sanction than the publication of this opinion and the publicity attendant to this proceeding.
The Accused is censured.