In Re Bicoastal Corp.

37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,074, 124 B.R. 593, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 204, 1991 WL 24590
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJanuary 23, 1991
DocketBankruptcy 89-8191-8P1
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,074 (In Re Bicoastal Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Bicoastal Corp., 37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,074, 124 B.R. 593, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 204, 1991 WL 24590 (Fla. 1991).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RE: OBJECTION TO CLAIM OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (DLA)

ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.

THE MATTER under consideration in this Chapter 11 case is a seemingly simple controversy which is presented for the Court’s consideration by an Objection to the claim filed by the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), an agency of the United States of America (Government). The claim under challenge was filed by the Government in the amount of $142,300,-000.00 and is based on the proposition that Bicoastal Corporation, d/b/a Simuflite, f/k/a The Singer Company (Debtor), is liable to the Government in the amount claimed as a result of an alleged overfund-ing of the pension and retirement plan sponsored by the Debtor and its predecessors in interest. Based on this, it is the contention of the Government that the ov- *594 erfunding changed the cost of performing the Debtor’s numerous contracts with the Government, and, as the result, the Government paid more to the Debtor for performing these contracts than it would have paid otherwise. Because of certain specific provisions which govern Government contracts in general and which will be discussed below in detail, it is necessary to consider initially a very limited issue, which might very well control the outcome of the entire controversy. This issue relates to the interpretation of the terms used in regulations of “segments” and the interpretation of the term “segment closing”. This is so because if, in fact, the divisions of the Debtor and, later on, the Debtor’s subsidiaries were deemed to be “segments” and when the stocks in the subsidiaries were sold, the sale legally amounted to a “segment, closing”, this would have been the historical event which in turn would have triggered the Government’s right to audit the pension and retirement plan sponsored by the Debtor and assert a claim for over-funding of the plan against this Debtor.

The matter is presented for this Court’s consideration by a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Debtor concerning this additional issue. The Debtor contends that there are no genuine issues of material facts and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in its favor determining that no “segment closing” occurred, therefore, its objection should be sustained and Claim No. 12 filed by the Government should be disallowed in toto.

Some Preliminary Remarks

Ped.R.Civ.P. 56 which governs the procedure for summary disposition of litigation without the necessity of a full scale trial has been adopted by Bankruptcy Rule 7056 in toto. Objection to a claim is a contested matter within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 9014 which in turn automatically adopts and renders operative Bankruptcy Rule 7056, the summary judgment rule, which is part of Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules. Clearly, the principles which govern the use of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 are equally applicable if motions for summary judgment are filed in a bankruptcy court, either in an adversary proceeding or in a contested matter.

It is now well established in this Circuit that summary judgment should not be granted unless the moving party has sustained its burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and when all the evidence can be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, if it appears that the record presented in the early stage of litigation is inadequate because the litigants did not have the full benefit of complete and adequate discovery, it is improper to dispose of the issues in a summary fashion. As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986):

In our view the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial.

In Celotex, the Supreme Court also noted that the moving party cannot rely on the bare pleadings and affidavits filed in support of the Motion but the record must be adequate and must include depositions, if they were taken, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and must designate specific facts showing there are no genuine issues which require a trial.

Facts without Substantial Dispute

Prior to 1988, The Singer Company (Singer), the Debtor’s predecessor in interest, had numerous contracts with the Government under which it provided certain goods and services to the Department of Defense. These contracts were to be performed by one of the Debtor’s many unincorporated divisions. Each of these contracts was governed by the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 601, et seq., and was subject to the Federal Acquisition Regula *595 tions (FAR) and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).

In 1988 Singer was involved in a leveraged buyout. As part of this process, all operating divisions of Singer were incorporated and became either wholly owned subsidiaries of Singer or, at least, Singer had majority interest in these subsidiaries. After the completion of the leveraged buyout, the Debtor, now called Bicoastal, embarked on a grand scale liquidation of its interests in its subsidiaries. In July 1988, as part of this liquidation process, the Debtor commenced to sell the corporate stock in these newly created entities and, with the exception of stock in Librascope, Inc. (Libra-scope), ultimately sold all of its stock in these entities, which, as a result, were no longer connected with Singer after the stock sale. Notwithstanding the sale of the corporate stock in these subsidiaries, the Debtor retained the sponsorship of the defined benefit pension and retirement plan maintained by Singer for each subsidiary’s white collar employees up to the date of sale. It is now without serious dispute that the retained pension and retirement plans have been heavily overfunded.

These entities, in which the corporate shares are now owned by other entities not connected with the Debtor, established their own sponsorship of new pension and retirement plans to cover the very same employees who were covered by the pension and retirement plan retained by the Debtor from the date of the sale forward. Thus, the employees who were formerly employed by the Debtor either when they worked directly for the divisions or later on indirectly when the divisions were incorporated, became participants in two plans, one in the pension and retirement plan retained by the Debtor, that is, the old Singer pension and retirement plan, and the other in the new plans established by the former subsidiaries now independent entities.

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Bluebook (online)
37 Cont. Cas. Fed. 76,074, 124 B.R. 593, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 204, 1991 WL 24590, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-bicoastal-corp-flmb-1991.