In Re Ashworth

287 So. 2d 843, 291 Ala. 723, 1974 Ala. LEXIS 1213
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJanuary 10, 1974
DocketMisc. 428
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 287 So. 2d 843 (In Re Ashworth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Ashworth, 287 So. 2d 843, 291 Ala. 723, 1974 Ala. LEXIS 1213 (Ala. 1974).

Opinion

*724 PER CURIAM.

Hon. Virgis M. Ashworth, a circuit judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit has filed a petition with this court to have a judicial determination as to thejjrior service time to which he is entitled to be credited as a basis for retirement status under the provisions of the Judicial Retirement Act passed by the 1973 general session of the Alabama Legislature, which Act was approved by the Governor on 18 September 1973 as Act No. 1163.

The prior service for which Judge Ash-worth has claimed credit is as follows:

Deputy Solicitor for- Bibb County, Alabama, from 1 October 1942 to 1 October 1945 — 3 years.
Member of Alabama House of Representatives from Bibb County, Alabama, from 4 November 1954 to 4 November 1962 — 8 years.
Deputy Solicitor, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, from 4 June 1965 to 27 February 1969 — 3 years, 8 months, and 24 days.
District Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, from 28 February 1969 to 18 January 1971 — 1 year, 10 months, 18 days.

The total of non-judicial time credit claimed by Judge Ashworth is therefore 16 years, 7 months, and 12 days. There can, of course, be no question concerning Judge Ashworth’s service as a circuit judge beginning 16 January 1971 and continuing so long as he remains in office.

The Board of Control of the Retirement System through Mr. Charles A. Holston, Retirement System Executive, has notified Judge Ashworth that the three year time period claimed by him toward retirement credit for the period of time from 1 October 1942 to 1 October 1945, for service as Deputy Circuit Solicitor for Bibb County, has been recommended for disallowance. The basis of this recommended disallowance is that Section 195(1) (e), Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, provides:

“ * * * provided further that his service as deputy circuit solicitor * * * terminated not more than three years prior to his first assuming office of circuit judge.”

It is apparently the view of the Board of Control that since Judge Ashworth’s service as Deputy Solicitor of Bibb County terminated more than three years prior to his assuming judicial office, this claimed credit of time cannot be allowed.

The Board also recommended that Judge Ashworth be allowed only two years and six months as credit for prior legislative service, stating:

“ * * * it is felt that the intent of the Judicial Retirement Act — as it so states in Section 10 — is to limit legislative service credit to two years and six months, if the incumbent is to retire under the Judicial Retirement Act, its provisions should be primary. On the other hand, if the incumbent desired to retire as a supernumerary district attorney under Title 13, Section 260(1 lb), a different recommendation would be considered by us.”

As provided in Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act, Judge Ashworth has filed a petition with this court to have a judicial determination relative to the recommendations of the Retirement Board disallowing credit for retirement purposes of his service as Deputy Solicitor of Bibb County, for the period of time from 1 October 1942 to 1 October 1945, and also disallowing credit for legislative service for more than two years and six months, instead of the eight years to which he asserts he is entitled.

It is Judge Ashworth’s contention that the provisions of Act No. 1873, passed in *725 the Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature of 1971, and approved 20 September 1971, and which for convenience may be found as Section 260(lib), Title 13, Revised Code of Alabama 1958, when read with Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act, entitles him to the credits toward retirement under the Judicial Retirement Act.

Act No. 1873, relating to Supernumerary District Attorneys, in parts pertinent to this review reads:

“Section 1. In addition to any other acts providing for eligibility of supernumerary district attorneys, or other like prosecuting officers, including County Solicitors and former County Solicitors, any person now serving or having formerly served • as District Attorney or County Solicitor, who has served for not less than eighteen years may, when he has reached the age of sixty years, may elect to become a supernumerary district attorney by filing a written declaration to that effect with the Governor and time served as judge of a court of record, a county court, county solicitor or any other county-wide elected official shall be counted as time served; * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

That part of Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act pertinent here is as follows:

“ * * * Provided further that any judge of a circuit court holding office at the time this Act becomes law who is entitled to credit for prior service toward earning supernumerary status in a position other than as a circuit judge, shall be entitled to have all such service credited toward retirement status under this bill provided he does so within three years from the date this Act becomes law by notifying the supreme court in writing of the service for which he is at that time entitled to credit toward obtaining supernumerary status and for which he desires credit toward retirement under the judicial retirement fund provided by this Act. Upon receipt of such notice the supreme court shall make a judicial determination of the amount of such credit to which such judge is entitled and shall notify the board of control of the state employees’ retirement system of this determination and such service shall be credited to such judge’s retirement benefits and shall be counted as time of service as a circuit judge under this Act.” (Emphasis ours.)

Under the Supernumerary District Attorneys Act above mentioned, Judge Ash-worth would be entitled to credit for all of the periods of prior service claimed by him toward supernumerary status as a district attorney in as much as there is no requirement that a period of -time claimed as deputy circuit solicitor must have terminated within three years of a claimant becoming a circuit judge. Nor is there any limitation in the Act on the period of time claimed for service in the legislature, but the Act provides that a district attorney may claim as time served his service as a judge of a court of record, county solicitor, or any other county-wide elective office. A member of the Alabama House of Representatives, at the time of Judge Ash-worth’s service in said body, was a county-wide elected official of Bibb County.

Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act very clearly provides that any circuit judge holding office at the effective date of the Act, “who is entitled to credit for prior service toward earning supernumerary status in a position other than circuit judge, shall be entitled to have all such service credited toward retirement under this bill * * * ” (Emphasis ours.)

Thus when the above quoted provisions of Section 9 of the Judicial Retirement Act are read in light of Act No.

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Bluebook (online)
287 So. 2d 843, 291 Ala. 723, 1974 Ala. LEXIS 1213, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-ashworth-ala-1974.