T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
The people, in adopting the 1963 State Constitution, provided the procedure to carry out legislative reapportionment.1 However, for the second time in eight years the Court has had thrust upon it a proceeding which historically has been a legislative rather than a judicial one.
The activities of the political parties during the 1964 Commission on Legislative Apportionment, and the political shenanigans of both political parties making up the Commission this year, as brought out in oral argument before this Court, convinced a majority of the Court that it would be futile to remand this cause to the Commission for further proceedings.
We, having no reasonable alternative, must carry out the constitutional mandate placed upon us by the people of this state, and that is to determine “which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements” and direct that it be adopted by the Commission and published as provided in Const 1963, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7. In [451]*451short, it is constitutionally incumbent upon our Court to evalúale, approve and mandate.
There is, however, one procedural problem which is present in the Republican’s “Motion to Foreclose” which, as a threshold issue, must be resolved, viz., whether § 6, paragraph 7 requires expressly or impliedly that a “proposed plan” must have been submitted to the Commission as a condition precedent to submission of the proposed plan to our Court.
It is submitted, and we agree, that the word “proposed” is a limitation not upon the source of the plan, i.e., originating from the Commission but rather a limitation upon the sponsor of a plan, i.e., the plan must come from one or several of the Commissioners. The Constitutional Convention debates support this construction.2 Conversely viewed, the drafters never intended to freeze the plans as submitted to the Commission but, rather, to allow compromise and collaboration between the members of the Commission in coming up with a plan after a member’s or party’s pet plan has failed to secure a majority but before submission of the compromise “proposed plan” was submitted to our Court. In short, once the Commission failed to agree, a Commissioner — but only a Commissioner — could propose his plan to our Court.
The balance of the arguments, pro and con, upon the motion to foreclose consideration have little merit. As to the “applicable principles of law,” the Republicans candidly concede that “the above cases are not [452]*452dispositive of the present controversy. They all arose in. factual situations radically different from the present case.” As to the “public policy consideration,” neither party is coming into our Court with clean hands. Both have engaged in partisan maneuvering. Both sides frankly admit they did not pass upon all of the plans submitted to the Commission. This is borne out by the Commission’s minutes, which reflect that 19 last hour motions for adoption of plans by the members failed for want of a concurrence of a majority. We hold it was not necessary to submit to our Court only plans previously presented to the Commission. Finding it unnecessary, we do not rule on the question of whether the various plans were in some form or other before the Commission.
In March, 1971, the State Central Committees of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively appointed four members to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 6. Upon the advice of Attorney General Kelley,3 Secretary of State Richard Austin, acting as the constitutionally designated Secretary of the Commission, convened the Commission on April 23, 1971. Chairman and co-chairman of the Commission were elected and rules of procedure were adopted. On September 17,1971, the Commission unanimously established midnight of January 28,1972, as a tentative deadline for completing its work.
Statewide public hearings on reapportionment plans and proposals were conducted. During the 16 formal meetings of the Commission, including the [453]*453final meeting field on January 28, 1972, some 23 complete or partial Senate plans and 20 complete or partial House plans were submitted by tfie members of tfie Commission. Tfie Commission, despite 19 “last hour” motions for adoption by its members, failed to agree on a plan for want of a “concurrence of a majority of tfie members.” Also at tfie January 28, 1972 meeting, four separate motions were made to extend tfie deadline set by tfie September 17, 1971 resolution. All motions failed for want of a majority. Chairman Goebel adjourned tfie meeting, without future date, at 12:05 a.m. on January 29,1972.
Order of tfie Court (Black, J., dissenting) entered February 9; 1972, promulgating procedures for proceeding under, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7, which in essence advised submission of any other proposed plans on or before February 18, 1972, the filing of written objections to any such plan on or before February 25, 1972, and offered opportunity for oral presentation or objections, upon written demand therefor filed on or before the latter date, before tfie specially convened bench on March 6, 1972. Subsequently, four apportionment plans were submitted.
Tfie controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies, involving bicameral state legislatures, under tfie equal protection clauses of tfie Federal and state Constitutions is equality of population as nearly as practicable. As more fully stated by this Court in 373 Mich. 250, 251, adopting the holding of Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964):
“ ‘We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the equal protection clause requires that tfie seats in both houses of a bicameral State legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. # # #
“ ‘By holding that as a Federal constitutional requisite both houses of a State legislature must be ap[454]*454portioned on a population basis, we mean that the equal protection clause requires that a State make cm honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Although the Court in Reynolds states that “mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite” (pp 569, 577) and suggests other relevant but subordinate state considerations (pp 576-577), subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have largely clarified and confirmed or dispelled and disclaimed this dicta. Thus, in Swann v Adams, 385 US 440, 444; 87 S Ct 569, 572; 17 L Ed 2d 501 (1967), the Court rejected the argument that de minimis population variances were tolerable, without any justification or explanation, under the “as nearly as practicable standard,” and consonantly concluded:
“On the contrary, the Reynolds opinion limited the allowable deviations to those minor variations which ‘are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’ 377 US 533, 579. Thus that opinion went on to indicate that variations from a pure population standard might be justified by such state policy considerations as the integrity of political subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legislative districts or the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines.”
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T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
The people, in adopting the 1963 State Constitution, provided the procedure to carry out legislative reapportionment.1 However, for the second time in eight years the Court has had thrust upon it a proceeding which historically has been a legislative rather than a judicial one.
The activities of the political parties during the 1964 Commission on Legislative Apportionment, and the political shenanigans of both political parties making up the Commission this year, as brought out in oral argument before this Court, convinced a majority of the Court that it would be futile to remand this cause to the Commission for further proceedings.
We, having no reasonable alternative, must carry out the constitutional mandate placed upon us by the people of this state, and that is to determine “which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements” and direct that it be adopted by the Commission and published as provided in Const 1963, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7. In [451]*451short, it is constitutionally incumbent upon our Court to evalúale, approve and mandate.
There is, however, one procedural problem which is present in the Republican’s “Motion to Foreclose” which, as a threshold issue, must be resolved, viz., whether § 6, paragraph 7 requires expressly or impliedly that a “proposed plan” must have been submitted to the Commission as a condition precedent to submission of the proposed plan to our Court.
It is submitted, and we agree, that the word “proposed” is a limitation not upon the source of the plan, i.e., originating from the Commission but rather a limitation upon the sponsor of a plan, i.e., the plan must come from one or several of the Commissioners. The Constitutional Convention debates support this construction.2 Conversely viewed, the drafters never intended to freeze the plans as submitted to the Commission but, rather, to allow compromise and collaboration between the members of the Commission in coming up with a plan after a member’s or party’s pet plan has failed to secure a majority but before submission of the compromise “proposed plan” was submitted to our Court. In short, once the Commission failed to agree, a Commissioner — but only a Commissioner — could propose his plan to our Court.
The balance of the arguments, pro and con, upon the motion to foreclose consideration have little merit. As to the “applicable principles of law,” the Republicans candidly concede that “the above cases are not [452]*452dispositive of the present controversy. They all arose in. factual situations radically different from the present case.” As to the “public policy consideration,” neither party is coming into our Court with clean hands. Both have engaged in partisan maneuvering. Both sides frankly admit they did not pass upon all of the plans submitted to the Commission. This is borne out by the Commission’s minutes, which reflect that 19 last hour motions for adoption of plans by the members failed for want of a concurrence of a majority. We hold it was not necessary to submit to our Court only plans previously presented to the Commission. Finding it unnecessary, we do not rule on the question of whether the various plans were in some form or other before the Commission.
In March, 1971, the State Central Committees of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively appointed four members to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 6. Upon the advice of Attorney General Kelley,3 Secretary of State Richard Austin, acting as the constitutionally designated Secretary of the Commission, convened the Commission on April 23, 1971. Chairman and co-chairman of the Commission were elected and rules of procedure were adopted. On September 17,1971, the Commission unanimously established midnight of January 28,1972, as a tentative deadline for completing its work.
Statewide public hearings on reapportionment plans and proposals were conducted. During the 16 formal meetings of the Commission, including the [453]*453final meeting field on January 28, 1972, some 23 complete or partial Senate plans and 20 complete or partial House plans were submitted by tfie members of tfie Commission. Tfie Commission, despite 19 “last hour” motions for adoption by its members, failed to agree on a plan for want of a “concurrence of a majority of tfie members.” Also at tfie January 28, 1972 meeting, four separate motions were made to extend tfie deadline set by tfie September 17, 1971 resolution. All motions failed for want of a majority. Chairman Goebel adjourned tfie meeting, without future date, at 12:05 a.m. on January 29,1972.
Order of tfie Court (Black, J., dissenting) entered February 9; 1972, promulgating procedures for proceeding under, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7, which in essence advised submission of any other proposed plans on or before February 18, 1972, the filing of written objections to any such plan on or before February 25, 1972, and offered opportunity for oral presentation or objections, upon written demand therefor filed on or before the latter date, before tfie specially convened bench on March 6, 1972. Subsequently, four apportionment plans were submitted.
Tfie controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies, involving bicameral state legislatures, under tfie equal protection clauses of tfie Federal and state Constitutions is equality of population as nearly as practicable. As more fully stated by this Court in 373 Mich. 250, 251, adopting the holding of Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964):
“ ‘We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the equal protection clause requires that tfie seats in both houses of a bicameral State legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. # # #
“ ‘By holding that as a Federal constitutional requisite both houses of a State legislature must be ap[454]*454portioned on a population basis, we mean that the equal protection clause requires that a State make cm honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Although the Court in Reynolds states that “mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite” (pp 569, 577) and suggests other relevant but subordinate state considerations (pp 576-577), subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have largely clarified and confirmed or dispelled and disclaimed this dicta. Thus, in Swann v Adams, 385 US 440, 444; 87 S Ct 569, 572; 17 L Ed 2d 501 (1967), the Court rejected the argument that de minimis population variances were tolerable, without any justification or explanation, under the “as nearly as practicable standard,” and consonantly concluded:
“On the contrary, the Reynolds opinion limited the allowable deviations to those minor variations which ‘are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’ 377 US 533, 579. Thus that opinion went on to indicate that variations from a pure population standard might be justified by such state policy considerations as the integrity of political subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legislative districts or the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines.”
The “equality of population” criterion received an even more stringent construction in Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394 US 526; 89 S Ct 1225; 22 L Ed 2d 519 (1969), where the Court found that population disparities could not be justified on the ground that the state was attempting to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions or, conversely viewed, at[455]*455tempting to inhibit partisan gerrymandering.4 The Court held in Kirkpatrick v Preisler, supra, pp 533-534:
“Similarly, we do not find legally acceptable the argument that variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State’s attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district lines along existing county, municipal, or other political subdivision boundaries. The State’s interest in constructing congressional districts in this manner, it is suggested, is to minimize the opportunities for partisan gerrymandering. But an argument that deviations from equality are justified in order to inhibit legislators from engaging in partisan gerrymandering is no more than a variant of the argument, already rejected, that considerations of practical politics can justify population disparities.”
It is true that Kirkpatrick is distinguishable in that it involved a congressional districting statute. However, a close reading of the January 24, 1972 per curiam opinion in Connor v Williams, 404 US 549; 92 S Ct 656; 30 L Ed 2d 704 (1972), discloses that population disparities brought on by state legislative [456]*456apportionment along boundary lines raise a substantial constitutional question and that the United States Supreme Court only deferred ruling on the applicability of Preisler and Wells until they have an appropriate appellate vehicle. Prudence would counsel avoidance of the problems presented in Preisler and Wells, vis., attempting to justify population disparities on the basis of anti-gerrymandering techniques.5 In end analysis, mathematical exactitude re equality of population is the primary and controlling standard. As between competing plans with identical “equality of population” factors, attention may then be focused upon other considerations such as compactness, shape, etc.6
Analysis of the Senate and House plans proposed by the respective members of the Apportionment Commission discloses the following data on p 457.
This Court after examining each of the plans finds as a fact that all plans to some degree, and of manifest necessity, cross or recross county, city or township lines.
The Court findings that the so-called Hatcher-Kleiner plan filed in our Court on February 18,1972, purports to be a plan for districting and apportion[458]*458ing of both, houses of the Michigan Legislature based upon districts containing population as nearly equal as practicable. By such plan, districts for both the Senate and House of Representatives are composed of territory containing population as equal as the 1970 Federal Decennial Census permits. Subject to this controlling objective of substantially equal population, and to the extent it would not be subordinated, districts established by such plan are formed as compact, contiguous, and regular in shape, and follow county, city and township boundaries, as nearly as practicable.
[457]*457SENATE (Ideal District 233,753)
Numerical Disparity Population Average Deviation % Capable of Political
Largest to Smallest Variance from Ideal Size Electing Ma- Units Split
Ratio verity (optimun 52,6316)
Hatcher-Kleiner
21 1.0001:1 2.66 or .0011% 52.6310% 59 [33 Counties
(Dist 17=233,762) j15 Cities
(Dist 23=233,741) [ll Townships
GHLT
92 1.0003:1 18.71 or .0080% 52.628% 32 Counties
(Dist 22=233,789) [1.00039:1] <10 Cities
(Dist 31,233,697) 4 Townships
Selin
194 1.0008:1 43.08 or .0184% 52.6228% 40 Í 25 Counties
(Dist 34=233,844) 10 Cities
(Dist 19=233,650) { 5
Hughes
1799 [1.0077:1] [444.08 or [52.5368%] 30 Counties
(Dist 11=234,709 .1900%1 I 11 Cities
(Dist 14=232,910) 1
total Population 1970 Census = 8,882,619
HOUSE (Ideal District 80,751)
Population Disparity Population Average Deviation % Capable of Political
Largest to Smallest Variance from Ideal Size Electing Ma- Units Split
^ority (optimun 52.6316)
25 0003:1 3.1 or .0038% 50.9072% 118 Counties
(Dist 77=80,765) 33 Cities
(Dist 107=80,740) (36 Townships
79 1.0009:1 14.41 or .0178% 50.901% 73 Counties
(Dist 79=80,799) [1.00098:1] [50.9002%] 27 Cities
(Dist 11=80,720) Townships
124 1.00015:1 24.74 or .0306% 50.8939% 96 Counties
(Dist 107=80,833) 31 Cities
(Dist 32 & 82= 80,709) 1.22 Townships
991 [1.01234:1] [94.45 or .1170%] [50.8505%] 78 Counties
(Dist 89=81,313) Cities
(Dist 49=80,322) 14 Townships
[458]*458While it is not possible to develop detailed constitutional requirements, there can be no question of the overriding requirement of “districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” The Hatcher-Kleiner districting and apportionment plan, filed in this Court on February 18,1972, most nearly complies with said constitutional requirement.
Therefore, it is ordered that the Commission on Legislative Apportionment be, and it hereby is, directed to adopt and publish forthwith, as provided in § 6 of article 4 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the aforesaid Hatcher-Kleiner plan, which plan shall be placed in effect for the primary and general elections of 1972, irrespective of whether or not the said plan shall be challenged upon the application of an elector pursuant to the final paragraph of said § 6 of article 4.
Nominating petitions may be filed or the statutory filing fees paid for the office of State Representative at any time after the date of this order up to and including 4 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on June 20, 1972. See MCLA 168.163; MSA 6.1163, and 1 OAGr, 1955, No 2,403, p 784 (December 30, 1955).
[459]*459Considering the limited time which remains for the giving of notices of the 1972 legislative elections, no motion or application for a stay of this order will be entertained by this Court. Any person deeming himself aggrieved by this order may, for the purposes and requisites of USSC Rules 18, 50, and 51 proceed to move or apply forthwith for a stay pursuant to said rules, in the same manner &s if he had previously and vainly moved or applied to this Court for such stay.
Adams, Swainson, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.