OPINION BY
TAMILIA, J.:
¶ 1 Alfie Coats appeals pro se from the February 6, 2008 Order denying and dismissing his appeal from the orphans’ court’s refusal to issue him a marriage license without his personal appearance.1
¶ 2 Appellant is an indigent prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Maha-noy (SCI Mahanoy) in Schuylkill County. When his fiancée went to the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court of Schuylkill County to obtain a marriage license, the clerk would not accept an application because appellant was unable to personally appear at the clerk’s office. Appellant and his fiancée appealed that determination.
¶3 The trial court issued a citation to the clerk of the orphans’ court to show cause why appellant should not be allowed to apply for a marriage license other than by his personal appearance in the clerk’s office. Record No. 101/335. At a February 4, 2003 hearing it was indicated the clerk was acting in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1306, Oral examination,2 which requires marriage license applicants to appear in person. It was also revealed that SCI Mahanoy would allow appellant to appear through video conferencing,3 but that the orphans’ court does not have video conferencing technology. Moreover, the orphans’ court had insufficient staff and [256]*256funds to examine appellant at SCI Maha-noy. SCI Mahanoy would allow appellant to be transported to the clerk’s office but would not provide the transportation. The Schuylkill County Sheriffs Department would transfer appellant but would require appellant to pay a fee to cover expenses, which appellant and his fiancée could not afford to pay. Unable to obtain a marriage license, appellant filed this timely appeal which raises one issue for our consideration.
Can a clerk of the orphans’ court division of a court of common pleas refuse to travel to a prison within its jurisdiction to interview a marriage license inmate applicant lacking funds to pay the county sheriff for transport to the county courthouse for the interview?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
¶ 4 Specifically, appellant (and amici) argues the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to prisoners. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). He asserts the Schuylkill County Clerk of the Orphans’ Court violated his fundamental right by refusing to issue a marriage license to his fiancée and him absent his personal appearance. He states that neither he nor his fiancée can afford to pay the sheriff to transport him to the clerk’s office and argues that county officials may not erect economic barriers to such fundamental rights. Further, he contends the county must provide the orphans’ court clerk with all necessary accommodations, goods and services, (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 2774(b) infra) and that video conferencing technology is a necessary accommodation or service. He also contends it is reasonable and feasible for the clerk or a representative to periodically visit area prisons for the purpose of issuing licenses. In fact, he argues Turner requires the clerk to do so. He asks this Court to reverse and remand' with instructions to issue a writ of mandamus or other relief to compel the clerk of the orphans’ court to conduct a marriage license examination of appellant at SCI Ma-hanoy or by video conferencing technology.
¶ 5 The trial court agrees that 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 1306 requires marriage license applicants to appear in person but would not impose the burden upon the clerk to maintain sufficient staff to travel to area prisons for that purpose.4 It found no basis in law upon which to conclude the clerk of the orphans’ court is required to entertain applications at any location other than its place of business. The court concluded appellant’s dispute was with the Department of Corrections which it reasoned could provide transportation to the clerk’s office as easily as could the county sheriffs office, but speculated it chose not to do so based upon security concerns and a lack of manpower. Judge Baldwin points out that it is not the duty of the Orphans’ Court or the people of Schuylkill County to get the prisoner to the marriage license department, but rather the duty, if one exists, of the Department of Corrections, which was not a party to this action. See Trial Court Opinion, Baldwin, P.J., 2/6/03, at 2. Since prisoners in various state institutions are placed through the prison diagnostic system throughout the state of Pennsylvania, it appears inappropriate for some counties, due to policy decisions concerning location of prisons, to have an unusual if not overwhelming burden of providing certain services. Amicus would respond that they get the benefit of [257]*257jobs and other expenditures which offset the burden. This does not, however, solve the problem of how best to accommodate this activity within the available resources and needs of a multifunctional system.
¶ 6 We are beyond the underlying consideration as to whether prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right to marry — they do. Turner, supra. The facts and legal ramifications in Turner are distinguishable from those involved in this case, however, and the factual situation here is not in anyway comparable to Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) (blood tests for paternity actions), Zablocki, (denial of marriage license if arrears exists on child support). Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (fees for divorces), or Loving, (interracial marriages). The issue not addressed by Turner is whether under the totality of all circumstances involved in operating a prison, court offices and law enforcement agencies, that right can be enforced irrespective of the cost to the ancillary services which have no statutory responsibility to assure that the prisoner and his/her partner get to the marriage license bureau door. These functions of the court, administrative, prison and law enforcement entities (i.e.sheriffs) have no legal duty to assure a prisoner obtains a marriage license. For this Court to direct one of those entities to engage in an activity which would entail unknown expenditures of money, manpower and security concerns and which would divert funds and resources beyond their statutory mandate and in all likelihood, beyond their present budgetary resources at a time when all levels of government are on the verge of bankruptcy is inappropriate. The problem, if there is one, should not be resolved by the courts, as at best we would be called to manage a diverse and desperate number of entities involving different locations, a multiplicity of prisons in a wide array of counties and prisoners of different financial means some of whom could underwrite their own costs while others would be required to proceed informa pauperis. Any solution we would decree the trial court to apply only could be directed to one case, in one prison, in one county, as to one marriage license office. This matter cannot be resolved properly in such a fashion. The only entity which can mandate a uniform statewide proceeding and remedy is the legislature.
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OPINION BY
TAMILIA, J.:
¶ 1 Alfie Coats appeals pro se from the February 6, 2008 Order denying and dismissing his appeal from the orphans’ court’s refusal to issue him a marriage license without his personal appearance.1
¶ 2 Appellant is an indigent prisoner at the State Correctional Institution at Maha-noy (SCI Mahanoy) in Schuylkill County. When his fiancée went to the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court of Schuylkill County to obtain a marriage license, the clerk would not accept an application because appellant was unable to personally appear at the clerk’s office. Appellant and his fiancée appealed that determination.
¶3 The trial court issued a citation to the clerk of the orphans’ court to show cause why appellant should not be allowed to apply for a marriage license other than by his personal appearance in the clerk’s office. Record No. 101/335. At a February 4, 2003 hearing it was indicated the clerk was acting in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1306, Oral examination,2 which requires marriage license applicants to appear in person. It was also revealed that SCI Mahanoy would allow appellant to appear through video conferencing,3 but that the orphans’ court does not have video conferencing technology. Moreover, the orphans’ court had insufficient staff and [256]*256funds to examine appellant at SCI Maha-noy. SCI Mahanoy would allow appellant to be transported to the clerk’s office but would not provide the transportation. The Schuylkill County Sheriffs Department would transfer appellant but would require appellant to pay a fee to cover expenses, which appellant and his fiancée could not afford to pay. Unable to obtain a marriage license, appellant filed this timely appeal which raises one issue for our consideration.
Can a clerk of the orphans’ court division of a court of common pleas refuse to travel to a prison within its jurisdiction to interview a marriage license inmate applicant lacking funds to pay the county sheriff for transport to the county courthouse for the interview?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
¶ 4 Specifically, appellant (and amici) argues the fundamental constitutional right to marry extends to prisoners. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). He asserts the Schuylkill County Clerk of the Orphans’ Court violated his fundamental right by refusing to issue a marriage license to his fiancée and him absent his personal appearance. He states that neither he nor his fiancée can afford to pay the sheriff to transport him to the clerk’s office and argues that county officials may not erect economic barriers to such fundamental rights. Further, he contends the county must provide the orphans’ court clerk with all necessary accommodations, goods and services, (see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 2774(b) infra) and that video conferencing technology is a necessary accommodation or service. He also contends it is reasonable and feasible for the clerk or a representative to periodically visit area prisons for the purpose of issuing licenses. In fact, he argues Turner requires the clerk to do so. He asks this Court to reverse and remand' with instructions to issue a writ of mandamus or other relief to compel the clerk of the orphans’ court to conduct a marriage license examination of appellant at SCI Ma-hanoy or by video conferencing technology.
¶ 5 The trial court agrees that 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 1306 requires marriage license applicants to appear in person but would not impose the burden upon the clerk to maintain sufficient staff to travel to area prisons for that purpose.4 It found no basis in law upon which to conclude the clerk of the orphans’ court is required to entertain applications at any location other than its place of business. The court concluded appellant’s dispute was with the Department of Corrections which it reasoned could provide transportation to the clerk’s office as easily as could the county sheriffs office, but speculated it chose not to do so based upon security concerns and a lack of manpower. Judge Baldwin points out that it is not the duty of the Orphans’ Court or the people of Schuylkill County to get the prisoner to the marriage license department, but rather the duty, if one exists, of the Department of Corrections, which was not a party to this action. See Trial Court Opinion, Baldwin, P.J., 2/6/03, at 2. Since prisoners in various state institutions are placed through the prison diagnostic system throughout the state of Pennsylvania, it appears inappropriate for some counties, due to policy decisions concerning location of prisons, to have an unusual if not overwhelming burden of providing certain services. Amicus would respond that they get the benefit of [257]*257jobs and other expenditures which offset the burden. This does not, however, solve the problem of how best to accommodate this activity within the available resources and needs of a multifunctional system.
¶ 6 We are beyond the underlying consideration as to whether prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right to marry — they do. Turner, supra. The facts and legal ramifications in Turner are distinguishable from those involved in this case, however, and the factual situation here is not in anyway comparable to Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) (blood tests for paternity actions), Zablocki, (denial of marriage license if arrears exists on child support). Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (fees for divorces), or Loving, (interracial marriages). The issue not addressed by Turner is whether under the totality of all circumstances involved in operating a prison, court offices and law enforcement agencies, that right can be enforced irrespective of the cost to the ancillary services which have no statutory responsibility to assure that the prisoner and his/her partner get to the marriage license bureau door. These functions of the court, administrative, prison and law enforcement entities (i.e.sheriffs) have no legal duty to assure a prisoner obtains a marriage license. For this Court to direct one of those entities to engage in an activity which would entail unknown expenditures of money, manpower and security concerns and which would divert funds and resources beyond their statutory mandate and in all likelihood, beyond their present budgetary resources at a time when all levels of government are on the verge of bankruptcy is inappropriate. The problem, if there is one, should not be resolved by the courts, as at best we would be called to manage a diverse and desperate number of entities involving different locations, a multiplicity of prisons in a wide array of counties and prisoners of different financial means some of whom could underwrite their own costs while others would be required to proceed informa pauperis. Any solution we would decree the trial court to apply only could be directed to one case, in one prison, in one county, as to one marriage license office. This matter cannot be resolved properly in such a fashion. The only entity which can mandate a uniform statewide proceeding and remedy is the legislature. If it is to be a court-mandated solution, the remedy must flow from the power of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as monitor of the Unified Judiciary to make a uniform and binding rule for the implementation of an acceptable procedure in the Orphans’ Courts of Pennsylvania. Of course, the Department of Corrections could likewise, as the custodian of the prisoners, become involved in a resolution of this problem statewide by a change in policy.
¶ 7 We also recognize Pennsylvania statutory law requires parties to obtain a marriage license before marrying, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301, Marriage license required, (a) General rule, and Section 1306, Oral Examination, requires a marriage license applicant to appear in person to be examined under oath. Although compliance with this statutory mandate, combined with present circumstances, prevents appellant from exercising his constitutional right, we are unable to grant appellant the requested relief.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will only lie to compel official performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy. A decision to deny mandamus is subject [258]*258to reversal only for abuse of discretion. A decision that a plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in mandamus, however, is subject to plenary review, inasmuch as the lower court has decided that the complaint, as a matter of law, does ■ not make out a claim for relief.
Jackson v. Vaughn, 565 Pa. 601, 604-605, 777 A.2d 436, 438 (2001).
¶ 8 We cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant the requested relief since we are unable to find the clerk owes appellant a duty to implement video. conferencing technology or to travel to area prisons to conduct examinations. The orphans’ court clerk simply performs its ministerial duty in accordance with the statutory mandate that requires applicants to appear in person. There is nothing express or implied in the marriage license statutes that requires the clerk of the orphans’ court to visit prisons for the purpose of issuing marriage licenses. Imposition by this Court of a duty on the county to somehow get a prisoner to the marriage license office if he/she desires to marry could open the door for persons of any disability (real or imagined), including those bedridden, institutionalized and/or unable to travel, to demand similar treatment. Surely, Turner, supra, never intended that its ruling in 1987 was to be extrapolated to provide prisoners to be accommodated regardless of cost or security problems to comply with the ministerial requirements of obtaining a marriage license. As a class action to review the constitutional rights of prisoners to marry, Turner simply declared that prisoners retain the right to marry and can not be denied that right incident to security concerns due to prison administrative policy. In such a case the court had the power to declare the existence of a constitutional right whereas here, the court lacked the power to declare which of several governmental entities with no legislative mandate, had the duty to perform a service. As such, the trial court in this matter correctly reviewed the evidence against the standard required for mandamus actions and found it had no authority to act.
¶ 9 The office of the clerk of the orphans’ court is not sui juris but is dependent on county and legislative provisions to implement its function. This statutory mandate provides as follows:
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2774. Office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division
(a) General rule. — There shall be an office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division in each county of this Commonwealth, which shall be supervised by the clerk of the orphans’ court division of the county who shall, either personally, by deputy, or by other duly authorized employees or agents of the office, exercise the powers, and perform the duties by law vested in and imposed upon the clerk of the orphans’ court division or the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division.
(b) Facilities and services. — The office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division shall be provided with all necessary accommodations, goods and services pursuant to section 3722 (relating to general facilities and services furnished by county).
Id. (emphasis supplied).
¶ 10 The powers and duties of the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division are detailed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2777, Powers and duties of the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division. Nothing in the statutory mandate or detailed powers and duties of the orphans’ court clerk provides for an off site or traveling function, nor is there any provision to order, direct or authorize payment to transport persons, regardless of disability, to the orphans’ court office to accommodate the [259]*259issuance of any license or service provided by law by the orphans’ court. In addition, the law limits the extent and degree to which the orphans’ court or any judicial office can establish duties and compensation of the staff of the clerk of orphans’ court and can only do so “... as otherwise provided by statute or home rule charter or optional plan of government ... and where fixed by a county salary board ... with the clerk as a member of the salary board.” 42 Fa.C.S.A. § 2275(c), Compensation and duties.
¶ 11 As a further limitation to the power of the clerk of orphans’ court, indeed to the power of the trial court to provide staff, facilities and services deemed necessary, legislation clearly and specifically delineates the interrelationship and responsibility vis a vis the courts and local government financial responsibility as to expenditures for court facilities and services. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 3702, General facilities and services furnished by Administrative Office;5 § 3722, General facilities and services furnished by county;6 § 3723, Other facilities and services furnished by Administrative Office; 7 § 3725, Standards of local facilities and services;8 § 3726, Manner of expenditure of local funds;9 and § 3727, Restriction on compelling local action.10
¶ 12 A careful reading of these empowering statutory provisions clearly leads to the following conclusions:
1. Orphans’ court is solely responsible for obtaining the authenticated marriage license and fulfilling the legislation requirement or its equivalent of a personal interview with an applicant for a marriage license (prisoner or otherwise).
[260]*2602. Orphans’ court cannot order sheriffs deputy or prison staff to assume the duty and expense of transporting prisoners to the orphans’ court clerk to interview for a marriage license.
3. Any additional staff or expense incurred by orphans’ court in fulfilling this duty can only be accomplished, in cooperation and by agreement of the political subdivision which would be required to furnish the additional staff or service. § 3727, Restriction in compelling local action, § 3726, Manner of expenditure of local funds.
4. The Administrative office of the Pennsylvania Courts has, the power and authority to provide additional resources to the orphans’ court, which are not supplied by § 3722 (relating to general facilities and services furnished by the county) such as video conferencing, which is akin to the computer network recently implemented for the judiciary.
5. The Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania courts as well as the Administrator of the Common Pleas Courts has the authority to deputize prison personnel for the purpose of conducting onsite § 1306 marriage license interviews, alternatively district justices or senior district justices may also be empowered for this purpose by the court administrator of the county.
6. As a statewide solution and establishing a uniform practice, the orphans’ court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court can create a practice mandated for use in all judicial districts.
7. Finally, the legislature should be urged to consider this issue and to amend the statute to -facilitate the issuance of marriage licenses under this impediment as well as other disabilities which might exist.
¶ 13 While we acknowledge action should be taken to allow appellant to exercise his fundamental right to marry, we agree with the trial court and conclude we have no basis upon which to compel the clerk of the orphans’ court in Schuylkill County to take the requested action.11 In the absence of special treatment of any other disabled class who, like appellant, cannot appear personally before the clerk of the orphans’ court to obtain a marriage license, we perceive no due process or equal protection violation under the facts of this case.
¶ 14 The search for a solution requires that we remand this matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the least costly method to achieve the necessary face to face interview. Con[261]*261siderations should include, but are not limited to, the viability of video conferencing, deputization of prison personnel to conduct the marriage license interview, or the assignment of a clerk or district magistrate to travel to the various correctional facilities within the county for the purpose of conducting the required interview. Each of these methods has been applied successfully in other jurisdictions, and with a degree of cooperation and willingness to accommodate the general intent of constitutional mandates, a solution is available.
¶ 15 Order vacated; case remanded for a hearing and entry of an Order in conformity with this Opinion within 60 days of its filing.12
¶ 16 Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 17 BOWES, J., files a Dissenting Opinion.