DOYLE, Judge.
This is an appeal1 by Daniel Blystone from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) of Braddock Hills Borough upholding the reduction in rank of Blystone from Chief of Police of Braddock Hills to patrolman.
The Commission made the following pertinent findings.2 Blystone was designated Chief of Police effective January [30]*3015, 1977 by the Borough of Braddock Hills Council. Later that year the Commission was established. Blystone served as Chief of Police until his reduction in rank on April 30, 1986.
According to the Commission’s findings, on January 11, 1986 Douglas Babjak was arrested by Braddock Hills police officer Carl Ayers. At the time of his arrest Babjak had a blood alcohol content of .21%. Blystone advised Ayers, his subordinate, that Ayers was not to file charges for driving under the influence against Babjak but instead to cite him for reckless driving and public drunkenness. Ayers complied. Similar instances occurred on four other occasions and with respect to two of the files for those motorists the Commission found that they were missing from Blystone’s office while under his custody. Finally, the Commission found that on January 4,1984 Blystone wrote a letter to the district magistrate requesting “that all traffic and non-traffic citations be issued to myself only” and that all appearance notices were to be directed to him rather than to the arresting officers. Based on these findings, the Commission determined that Blystone had violated and neglected his duties within the meaning of Section 1190 of The Borough Code; see supra n. 2; it therefore upheld his reduction in rank. Blystone appealed and as previously noted the common pleas court affirmed. See supra n. 2. Further appeal to this Court ensued.
[31]*31On appeal Blystone presents several issues for our consideration. First, he maintains that his right to due process was violated when Civil Service Commissioner Rick Rhodes declined to recuse himself. Blystone asserts that Rhodes had a personal bias against him. The record discloses that in the recusal motion Blystone’s counsel asserted that Rhodes, who had previously been President of the Borough Council, had on two or more occasions been involved in disciplinary actions taken against Blystone. Further, the deposition of one James McClafferty, an individual who had known both Blystone and Rhodes all of his life, reveals that Rhodes stated to McClafferty while Rhodes was Council President that he thought Blystone should have been fired, not just demoted. When asked about this statement at the civil service hearing Rhodes indicated that he had expressed his opinion as a private citizen at a time previous to his becoming a member of the Commission and further indicated that he felt he could fairly adjudicate the case based upon the evidence presented.
A trial court judge may decide his own recusal motion in the first instance. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). We see no basis for a different rule for a Commissioner acting in his judicial capacity. Before it can be said that a judge (or commissioner) should have recused himself the record must demonstrate bias, prejudice, capricious disbelief or prejudgment. Nemeth v. Nemeth, 306 Pa.Superior Ct. 47, 451 A.2d 1384 (1982). If a judge (or commissioner) thinks he is capable of hearing a case fairly his decision not to withdraw will ordinarily be upheld upon appeal. North Canton Enterprises of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Township of Ross, 74 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 479, 459 A.2d 1366 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1283, 79 L.Ed.2d 687 (1984). Our review of this issue is limited to determining whether the judge (or commissioner here) abused his discretion. Reilly. While Rhodes’ statement (which he never denied) could be viewed as prejudging the case, it is important to note that he [32]*32clarified at the civil service hearing that he had merely been expressing his opinion as a private citizen at a time before he became a Commissioner and that he felt he could decide the case as a Commissioner on the evidence presented. Because his statements were not made while he was a Commissioner we believe there was no actual prejudgment and, hence, no abuse of discretion in the decision not to recuse.
Next, Blystone contends that the Borough violated Section 4 of the Sunshine Act, Act of July 3,1986, P.L. 388, 65 P.S. § 274.3 This provision states, “official action and deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public____” Official action is defined in Section 3 of the Sunshine Act, 65 P.S. § 273, as:
(1) Recommendations made by an agency pursuant to statute, ordinance or executive order.
(2) The establishment of policy by an agency.
(3) The decisions on agency business made by an agency.
(4) The vote taken by any agency on any motion, proposal, resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, report or order.
Blystone contends that this provision was violated because the Borough failed to vote on and adopt the charges against him at an open meeting. The record discloses, however, that the district attorney’s office was investigating the non-issuance of citations for driving under the influence charges. Section 16 of the Sunshine Act, 65 P.S. § 286, exempts from the Act’s open meeting provision official actions “which, if conducted in public, would violate a lawful privilege or lead to the disclosure of information or confidentiality protected by law, including matter related to the investigation of possible or certain violations of the law----” We believe that this provision applies here.
Furthermore, Blystone only argues that it was the charges which were not voted on at an open meeting, not [33]*33the vote first to suspend him4 or the final vote to demote him. Reference to the proceedings of the February 17, 1987 public council meeting, however, makes it abundantly clear that the decision to demote Blystone was voted upon by Council at that meeting. That meeting was described as “riotous” and had television coverage.5 It is also clear from [34]*34the transcription of those February 17 proceedings6 that an executive meeting had been held on February 13, 1987 at which time a vote had been taken on whether to serve Blystone with a letter from the district attorney’s office indicating it had not found a basis to prosecute. At that meeting it also appears that Council members discussed their views on Blystone’s demotion. The vote, however, to demote was taken at the February 17, 1987 open meeting. And, the mere fact that the charges
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DOYLE, Judge.
This is an appeal1 by Daniel Blystone from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) of Braddock Hills Borough upholding the reduction in rank of Blystone from Chief of Police of Braddock Hills to patrolman.
The Commission made the following pertinent findings.2 Blystone was designated Chief of Police effective January [30]*3015, 1977 by the Borough of Braddock Hills Council. Later that year the Commission was established. Blystone served as Chief of Police until his reduction in rank on April 30, 1986.
According to the Commission’s findings, on January 11, 1986 Douglas Babjak was arrested by Braddock Hills police officer Carl Ayers. At the time of his arrest Babjak had a blood alcohol content of .21%. Blystone advised Ayers, his subordinate, that Ayers was not to file charges for driving under the influence against Babjak but instead to cite him for reckless driving and public drunkenness. Ayers complied. Similar instances occurred on four other occasions and with respect to two of the files for those motorists the Commission found that they were missing from Blystone’s office while under his custody. Finally, the Commission found that on January 4,1984 Blystone wrote a letter to the district magistrate requesting “that all traffic and non-traffic citations be issued to myself only” and that all appearance notices were to be directed to him rather than to the arresting officers. Based on these findings, the Commission determined that Blystone had violated and neglected his duties within the meaning of Section 1190 of The Borough Code; see supra n. 2; it therefore upheld his reduction in rank. Blystone appealed and as previously noted the common pleas court affirmed. See supra n. 2. Further appeal to this Court ensued.
[31]*31On appeal Blystone presents several issues for our consideration. First, he maintains that his right to due process was violated when Civil Service Commissioner Rick Rhodes declined to recuse himself. Blystone asserts that Rhodes had a personal bias against him. The record discloses that in the recusal motion Blystone’s counsel asserted that Rhodes, who had previously been President of the Borough Council, had on two or more occasions been involved in disciplinary actions taken against Blystone. Further, the deposition of one James McClafferty, an individual who had known both Blystone and Rhodes all of his life, reveals that Rhodes stated to McClafferty while Rhodes was Council President that he thought Blystone should have been fired, not just demoted. When asked about this statement at the civil service hearing Rhodes indicated that he had expressed his opinion as a private citizen at a time previous to his becoming a member of the Commission and further indicated that he felt he could fairly adjudicate the case based upon the evidence presented.
A trial court judge may decide his own recusal motion in the first instance. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). We see no basis for a different rule for a Commissioner acting in his judicial capacity. Before it can be said that a judge (or commissioner) should have recused himself the record must demonstrate bias, prejudice, capricious disbelief or prejudgment. Nemeth v. Nemeth, 306 Pa.Superior Ct. 47, 451 A.2d 1384 (1982). If a judge (or commissioner) thinks he is capable of hearing a case fairly his decision not to withdraw will ordinarily be upheld upon appeal. North Canton Enterprises of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Township of Ross, 74 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 479, 459 A.2d 1366 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1283, 79 L.Ed.2d 687 (1984). Our review of this issue is limited to determining whether the judge (or commissioner here) abused his discretion. Reilly. While Rhodes’ statement (which he never denied) could be viewed as prejudging the case, it is important to note that he [32]*32clarified at the civil service hearing that he had merely been expressing his opinion as a private citizen at a time before he became a Commissioner and that he felt he could decide the case as a Commissioner on the evidence presented. Because his statements were not made while he was a Commissioner we believe there was no actual prejudgment and, hence, no abuse of discretion in the decision not to recuse.
Next, Blystone contends that the Borough violated Section 4 of the Sunshine Act, Act of July 3,1986, P.L. 388, 65 P.S. § 274.3 This provision states, “official action and deliberations by a quorum of the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public____” Official action is defined in Section 3 of the Sunshine Act, 65 P.S. § 273, as:
(1) Recommendations made by an agency pursuant to statute, ordinance or executive order.
(2) The establishment of policy by an agency.
(3) The decisions on agency business made by an agency.
(4) The vote taken by any agency on any motion, proposal, resolution, rule, regulation, ordinance, report or order.
Blystone contends that this provision was violated because the Borough failed to vote on and adopt the charges against him at an open meeting. The record discloses, however, that the district attorney’s office was investigating the non-issuance of citations for driving under the influence charges. Section 16 of the Sunshine Act, 65 P.S. § 286, exempts from the Act’s open meeting provision official actions “which, if conducted in public, would violate a lawful privilege or lead to the disclosure of information or confidentiality protected by law, including matter related to the investigation of possible or certain violations of the law----” We believe that this provision applies here.
Furthermore, Blystone only argues that it was the charges which were not voted on at an open meeting, not [33]*33the vote first to suspend him4 or the final vote to demote him. Reference to the proceedings of the February 17, 1987 public council meeting, however, makes it abundantly clear that the decision to demote Blystone was voted upon by Council at that meeting. That meeting was described as “riotous” and had television coverage.5 It is also clear from [34]*34the transcription of those February 17 proceedings6 that an executive meeting had been held on February 13, 1987 at which time a vote had been taken on whether to serve Blystone with a letter from the district attorney’s office indicating it had not found a basis to prosecute. At that meeting it also appears that Council members discussed their views on Blystone’s demotion. The vote, however, to demote was taken at the February 17, 1987 open meeting. And, the mere fact that the charges were not formally voted on at an open meeting is of no consequence as (1) such vote is not required by the Sunshine Act or the Borough Code and (2) it is clear beyond doubt and not contested that Council knew what the charges were.
Blystone’s third argument is that the Borough failed to present substantial evidence to support the charges. We disagree. Officer Ayers clearly testified with respect to the failure to issue citations for the driving under the influence charges. The fact that Blystone’s testimony or that of other witnesses was to the contrary is no basis for finding a lack of substantial evidence. The Commission, which was the only body to make factual findings in this case, was faced with conflicting testimony and credibility determinations; these determinations were within its province.
Finally, Blystone contends that due process was violated because his hearing was delayed from August 20, 1987 until May 25, 1988. He alleges no particular prejudice because of this delay and in fact was himself able to procure the deposition of James McClafferty during this period. We can see no violation of due process on these facts. Accord Pittsburgh Board of Public Education v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 128 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 324, 563 A.2d 581 (1989) (thirteen year delay).
Affirmed.
[35]*35ORDER
NOW, December 4, 1991, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the above captioned matter is hereby affirmed.