In Re Annexation of Smith Property

2001 WI App 201, 634 N.W.2d 840, 247 Wis. 2d 946
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedAugust 20, 2001
Docket00-1913 through 00-1916
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 2001 WI App 201 (In Re Annexation of Smith Property) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Annexation of Smith Property, 2001 WI App 201, 634 N.W.2d 840, 247 Wis. 2d 946 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

LUNDSTEN, J.

¶ 1. The Town of Campbell filed four suits against the City of La Crosse, challenging four ordinances which annexed certain properties in the Town to the City. The Town challenged the validity of the annexations on the basis that the annexed property did not meet the contiguity requirement of Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2) (1995-96), 1 and moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in each case in favor of the Town. The City appeals all four judgments. The appeals have been consolidated for disposition in this court. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.

*950 Background

¶ 2. In late 1996 and early 1997, the City of La Crosse annexed by ordinance four different properties from the Town of Campbell. In the pertinent geographic area, the Black River is about 800 feet wide 2 and it separates the shore of the Town from the shore of the City. A bridge spans the Black River several hundred feet to the south of the southernmost disputed annexed property. The bridge does not directly connect the City to any of the annexed properties and at no point do the dry lands of the City and the annexed properties meet.

¶ 3. All annexations were made pursuant to a petition for direct annexation. Wisconsin Stat. § 66.021(2) (a) governs petitions for direct annexation. It provides that "territory contiguous to any city or village may be annexed thereto" under various conditions not at issue here. Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2). 3

*951 ¶ 4. Shortly after the annexations, the Town filed four lawsuits challenging the validity of the four ordinances passed by the City annexing the properties at issue. In its motion for summary judgment, the Town argued that the Black River separates the annexed properties from the City and, therefore, the properties are not "contiguous" to any part of the City as required by Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2). In the Town's view, the City has simply reached over the river at various points and improperly annexed land that is not in direct contact with the City.

¶ 5. After hearing arguments, the trial court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment. Relying upon Town of Delavan v. City of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d 516, 500 N.W.2d 268 (1993), the trial court determined that the annexed properties and the City were neither touching, nor close enough to be contiguous, and invalidated all four annexations.

Discussion

¶ 6. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it granted the Town of Campbell's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the *952 annexed properties were not "contiguous" to the City of La Crosse within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 66.021(2).

¶ 7. This court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standards as the trial court. Smith v. Dodgeville Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 2d 226, 232, 568 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1997). A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).

¶ 8. The construction of a statute and its application to undisputed facts are questions of law which we determine de novo. Smith, 212 Wis. 2d at 233. The guiding principle in statutory construction is to discern legislative intent. State v. Irish, 210 Wis. 2d 107, 110, 565 N.W.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1997). We first look to the language of the statute itself and attempt to interpret it based on "the plain meaning of its terms." State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 248, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986).

¶ 9. The City argues that the trial court erred in granting the Town's motion for summary judgment because the borderline separating the City and the Town lies at the center of the riverbed of the Black River and the contiguity requirement does not mean that dry land must meet dry land.

¶ 10. The Town relies, much as the trial court did, on Town of Delavan to support its argument that a body of water destroys contiguity. In consolidated appeals filed after the consolidated appeals in this case, and involving the same parties and same geographic area, *953 the Town points to State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987), for the proposition that the City and the annexed properties are separated by state land because the state owns the riverbed. 4 The Town's reliance on common law is appropriate, but its analysis is flawed.

¶ 11. The term "contiguous" is not defined in Wis. Stat. § 66.021. It is variously defined in Webster's Third new international DICTIONARY 492 (unabridged ed. 1993) as "touching along boundaries often for considerable distances," "next or adjoining with nothing similar intervening," "NEARBY, CLOSE: not distant," and "CONTINUOUS, UNBROKEN, UNINTERRUPTED: touching or connected throughout."

¶ 12. In Town of Delavan, our supreme court discussed the contiguity requirement and noted "a trend in Wisconsin's courts to require at [a] minimum some significant degree of physical contact between the properties in question." Town of Delavan, 176 Wis. 2d at 528. At the same time, it is apparent that the statutory term "contiguous" does not always mean direct physical contact. Twenty years before Town of Delavan, the supreme court decided that properties separated by a two-lane public road were "close enough" to be contiguous for purposes of the annexation statute. Town of Lyons v. City of Lake Geneva, 56 Wis. 2d 331, 336, 202 N.W.2d 228 (1972).

¶ 13.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2001 WI App 201, 634 N.W.2d 840, 247 Wis. 2d 946, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-annexation-of-smith-property-wisctapp-2001.