in Re Andy Sanchez

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 25, 2017
• Docket: 04-17-00615-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Andy Sanchez #1737041 George Beto Unit ::.-i 1 lN THE cout�� r OF;"..��.: .'. t 'L.

1391 FM 3328 ;\T S.;\N AN rnNiU. : : i_ .. Tennessee Colony, TX 75880 2017SEP25 AHll:56 September 21, 2017 fI� ,,h1t,� 1::- tf{ 0� I • � /st.u:__ Fourth Court of Appeals C/0 Keith E. Hottle, Clerk Cadena-Reeves Justice Center 300 Dolorosa St. RM 3200 San Antonio, Texas 78205-3037

RE: Relator's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Appeals No. 04-17-00615-CR Trial Court Cause Number 2010-JW-.02881 Dear Honorable Hottle: Please find enclosed Relator's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Please stamp and bring to the attention of the Court.

Please suspend any rules regarding copies. And if there are any defectey please ret�rn with instructions.

Thank you very much for your time and attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Andy �e� TDCJ-CID NO. 1737041 George Beto Unit l.391 FM 3328 Tennessee Colony, Texas 75880 _ __ . r:-- 1 1 �-- r -; r. ,, i' J' ', ';- ';-1, :� ,• ' ' : IN 'IHE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALSTT�, 1 n:-_ l�,L: ...�r\·t ��!r- ,.,r ! ._ -·· I • , '-_

FOR 'IHE FOURTH SUPREME COURT ;,.T S ,.\ N ;.\ N f ON I , ; : - :, · · SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 2017 SEP 25 AH II: 56

---------------- CAUSE NO . ------------------ - -- --, , / ,-;.; (,p · t i\ ; ·- 1 /di-; · (}fllL'I: = / 04-17-00615-CR- l _________________....,--�FtT!-�E.t·{DlTLF.f:L_--�-· �-F�<

IN RE A.S.

RE1A10R'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF I:IABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT 10 ARTICLE V, SECTION 8 OF 'IHE TEXAS· CONSTITUTION IN CAUSE NUMBER 2010-JUV-02881 FROM THE 436TH DISTRICT COURT BEXAR CDUNTY, TEXAS

1D 1'HE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, A.S., pro se, hereinafter "Relato1:'," and files this, his Re..­ lator's Petition for writ of habeas �orpus pursuant to Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. TABLE DF CONTENTS

LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES ii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT iii TABLE OF authorities iv STATEMENl^ OF THE CASE STATEMENT OF.JURISDICTION .vi ISSUES PRESENTED GROUND 01^. GROUND TWO GROUND THREE STATEMENT OF FACTS GROUND ONE (ineffective Assistance of Counsel) ..3 GROUND TWO (Trial Court Erred in Denying Relator's Motion to Recuse the Dis trict Attorney's Office where an Actual Conflict of Interest Existed) 7 GROUND THREE (Relator's Case is Rendered Void by Jurisdictional Defect....8 PRAYER 9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 9 LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES

Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 38.1(a), Re- lator lists the following persons who have an interest in the writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of the Court's determining conflicts and recusals:

JUDGE: RELATOR:

Hon. Lisa Jarrett Andy Sanchez TDCJ #1737041 600 Mission Road George Beto Unit San Antonio, Texas 78210 1391 FM 3328 Tennessee Colony, Texas 75880 TRIAL COUNSEL:

Hubert T. McCray 110 E. Nueva

San Antonio, Texas 78283

RELATOR'S COUNSEL:

Pro se

11 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Relator request oral argument. The issues in this case are complex.

Ill tabij: of authorities

Cases

Alaniz v. State, 2 S.W.3d 451 (Tex.App. —San Antonio 1997) 5, 8 Canady v. State, 100 S.W.3d 28 (Tex.App. —Waco 2002) 7 C.E.J. V. State. 788 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1990) 3 Cooper V. State. 769 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex.App. —Houston 1st Dist 1989).3 Ex Parte Hargett. 819 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) .y Ex Parte Patterson. 969 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex.Grim App. 1998) ,9 Ex Parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221 (Tex.Grim.App. 2001) ..8 Ex Parte Spain. 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Grim.App. 1979) 7 Gideon y. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 335 (1963) ....6 Haines V. Kemer, 404 U.S. 5l9 2 Hernandez V. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex.Grim.App. 1986) 3 Mercado v. State. 615 S.W.2d 225, 227-228 (Tex.Grim App. 1981) 3, 4 Rushing v. State. 50 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.App. —Waco 2001).. .5, 8 State Ex Rel. Sherrod y. Garey, 790 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.App. —Amarillo (1990) • 6, 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 3, 4, 5 Watson V. State, 587 S.W.2d 161 5, 8

Constitutions, Statutes and Codes Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 45.017 6 Family Code Section 53.06 5^ 8 Government Code Article 10 Section 9 ,4 Rules of Professional Conduct 1.01(b)(l)(2) 4 Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 10 3 Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 19 7^ 9 Texas Constitution Article 5, Section 8. .i U S. Cdhstitution Amend 5 7, 8, 9 US. Cdhstitution Amend 6 3 U.S. Constitution Amend 14 3. 7^ 8, 9

IV STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Relator was taken into custody on November 18, 2010. On February 24, 2011, Relator and his mother was provided a summons for Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault by his attorney that was recorded as filed on March 25, 2011. On June 2, 2011, Relator's Motion to Recuse the District Attorney's of fice was denied. Continuance was granted on June 6, 2011. Relator was certified as an adult on July 19, 2011, and entered a plea of no contest for the charge Bf Aggravated Kidnapping on August 17, 2011. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has held that Art. V, Sec. 8 of the TEX.CONST, gives th^ District Court plenary power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. See Ex Parte Hargett. 819 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crifn.App. 1991)., The Texas Constitution Art. V, Sec. 8 states in relevant part: "District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, or remedies, except in cases vdiere exclusive, aippellate or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this constitution or other law on some other Court, tribunal or administrative body. District Court judges shall have power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.

VI ISSUES PEJESENTED

GROUND ONE;

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

GROUND IWO:

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RELATOR'S MOTION TO RECUSE IHE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WHERE AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED.

GROUND IHREE: RELATOR'S CASE IS RENDERED VOID BY JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT

statemewt of facts

Relator, a juvenile, was taken into custody dh November 18, 2010, after detective Smith obtain DNA from him pursuant to an alleged warrant on Nov^- ber 17, 2010. Although Relator had received a summons, it was provided to him and his mother for the charge of Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault, dated February 24, 2011, recorded as filed on March 25, 2011. The primary problem that exist under the citciimstances is that, at the time, Relator's mother's parental rights had been terminated. Relator was under the custody of Children Protec tion (CPS). Further, Relator was represented by the district attorney's of fice during all proceedings under the above cause; an actual conflict of in terest.

Relator's attorney. Attorney Hubert T. McCray, sought to rectify the issue surrounding CPS. When the prosecutor intervened with an objection. At torney McCray allowed this to dissuade him, contributing to his failure to fulfill his contractual obligations by entering his own objection for the purpose of perserving the issue for appeal. Despite Attorney McCray's fail ure, this raises jurisdictional concerns. Jurisdictional concerns are also related to the actual conflict of interest regarding the district attorney's simultaneous representation regarding Rela tor. Although a motion to recuse the district attorney's office was filed, the presiding judge. Judge Lisa Jarret denied the motion. Although Relator had been allegedly certified as an adult on July 19, 2011, Relator, in conjunction with the docket sheet, never received a manda- tory examining trial. Relator, because he does not have access to all his records, iTfl-serve for expansion of records. Relator relies on Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, "for less stringent pleading standards," and seek that the Court "lend color to the argument." GROUND ONE

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Issues presented: A. Competence B. Violation of Due Process

Both the United States and Texas Constitutions, as they operate upon Agents, afford the criminal accused the right to assistance Hf counsel. See U.S/ CONST. AMEND. 6; TEX. CONST, art. I, ;>§ 10. "A juvenile is guaranteed all the constitutional rights which an adult would have in a criminal proceeding because the juvenile delinquency proce dures seek a deprivation of liberty. See C.E.J. v. State, 788 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1990). The test for determining vhether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel was established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 806 L.ED.2d 674 (1984). The Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel is shown only vhere the attorney's errors are so serious that he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and, in addition, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial because of the error. For an error to reach that magnitude, there rmjst be a reasonable prob ability that, but for counsel's imprlifessional errors, the result of the pro ceedings would have been different. The Court defined a reasonable probabili ty as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the Outcome. See Cooper y.,,State, 769 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex.App. --Houston 1st Dist. 1989). However, the Suprone Court in Strickland, also held: on the otherhand, we believe that a defendant need not show that coun sel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case. (t)he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence, the proceeding itself unfair, even if the error of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have undermined that out come.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 104 S.Ct. 2068. The standard on the right to counsel is the same under the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI; TEX. CONST, art. 1 § 10; also see Hernandez y. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55-56 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); U.S. CONST. AMEM). 14. An attorney's performance must be guage by the totality of his/her representation. Strickland, supra; Mercado y. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 227-228 (Tex.Grim. 1981). A fair assessment of counsel's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances, and to evaluate counsel's conduct from his/her perspective at the time. Texas case law requires a two-fold show ing by Relator to establish ineffective assistance: (l) an act that consti tute ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that the defendant suffered harm because of this ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 687; 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Mercado, supra.

A. Competence The very first ABA Rule of Professional Conduct is numbered 1.1 and ti tled simply "Competence." Following are the requirements for "Competence": 1. Legal Knowledge and Skill. 2. Thoroughness and Preparation. 3. Maintaining Competence. Rule 1.1 defines the elements of competent representation historical ly developed under the code: competence "requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for representation." This is one of the main rules requiring a. lawyer to obtain every available shred of evidence in a client's case, use that evidence to prepare and thoroughly puirsue every available defense in his client's behalf. V.T.C.A., Government Code Title 2, Subtitle G App., art 10, § 9 rules of Professional Conduct provides a preamble: A lawyer's responsibilities: (3) "In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue clients' interest within the bound of the law. In doing so, a lawyer should be compe tent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain conmunication with a client concerning the representation. A lawyer should keep in confidence infoimiation relating to representation of a client except so far as disclosure is required or permitted by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. Relator asserts that Attorney McCray failed to zealously pursue his interest; failing to maintain competence, communication and confidence. According to Rule 1.01(b)(1)(2), in representing a client, a lawyer shall not: neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer; or frequently fail to carry out completely the obligations that the lawyer owes to a client. As used in this rule, "Neglect" signifies inattentiveness involving a conscious disregard for the responsibilities owed to a client. The duty of diligence is closely related to competence, as one often accompanies the other. The interelated obligations of thoroughness and preparation require a lawyer to investigate the facts of the matter and research the applicable law.

Regarding investigations, the Supreme Court in Strickland held; counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a rea sonable decision that makes particular investigations unecessary. Stickland, 466 U.S. at 691. In accordance with FAM. CODE § 53.06, the juvenile court was mandatorily required to direct the issuance of a summons to: (1) the child named in the petition; (2) the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; (3) the child's guardian ad litem; and (4) any other person who appears to the court to be a proper or necessary party to the proceeding. Relator, assert first, that he was never issued a summons for Aggravated Kidnapping, but for Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault. Assuming arguendo that it was appropriately issued, it would still fail because, first, it was signed by Relator's mother vdio did not have parental rights, and second, the orly summons issued was to Relator by his attorney. See EXHIBIT A SUMMONS. Although Judge Jarrett ordered the Probation Officer Erin J. McQueen, it was issued to Relator by his attorney on February 24, 2011. "Service on secretary of juvenile's attorney of summons and petition for juvenile to ap pear at hearing on waiver bf juvenile jurisdiction, and certification for prilsecution as adult, did not comply with requiranent to personally serve juvenile." See Alaniz v. State, 2 S.W.3d 451 (Xex.App. —San ,^tonio 1997). Although Relator and his mother's signature is on the Summons, it reveals a signature date at February 24, 2011. The summons was not recorded as an official document until March 25, 2011. Attorney McCray was expected to be familiar with well-settle principles of law applicable to Relator s needs. Attorney McCray's disregard equates to his contractual viblation as Texas law, attorney-client relationship, is viewed as contractual relationship, thus, ending up on the table of ineffectiveness. The requisit familiarity with well-settled legal principles extends to matters of procedure. Attorney McCray also had a duty to know the three step requirement "be fore juvenile can be tried as an adult are a transfer hearing, an examiningh trial, and a grand jury's deliberation; trial may then follow; if one of those steps is omitted or rendered void by a jurisdictional defect, there can be no jurisdiction to proceed with the next step." See Watson v. State, 587 S.W. 2d 161; Rushing v. State, 50 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.App. —Waco 2001). Relator asserts that, in conjunction with the criminal docket, there was no examining trial. See EXHIBIT B DOCKEI. A district clerk has the duty to maintain a criminal dcxiket pursuant CODE CRIMINAL FROG. art. 45.017. Further, Attorney McCray sought not to enter an objectiBn in regards to the existence of a conflict of interest. "In a juvenile case, used by a district attorney of facts acquired during the existence of a prior attorney- client relationship with the juvenile would not only violate the attorney- client privilege, but would also deprive the juvenile of his constitutional right to due prilcess and his right against self-incrimination, requiring courts to examinlk,every potential infringment with exacting scrutiny." See State Ex Re. Sherrod v. Carey, 790 S.W. 705 (Tex.App. -Anrarillo 1990). Because Relator was under the custody of CPS, he was represented by the Bexar County District Attorney's office.

B. Violation of Due Process

The ineffectiveness of counsel is a violation of Due Process. "An ac cused person cannot effectively defend himself. The assistance of counsel is necessary to due process and to a fair trial. Without counsel, the accused cannot possibly evaluate the lawfulness of his arrest, the validity of the indictment...vdiether preliminary motions should be filed. He cannot determine whether he is responsible for the crime as charged or a lesser offense. He cannot discuss the possibilities of pleading to a lesser offense. He cannot evaluate the grand or petit jury. At the trial he cannot interpose ejections to evidence or cross-examining witnesses, etc. He is at a lost in the sentenc ing procedure." See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 335 (1963). GROUND TWO

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEMING RELATOR'S MOTION TO RECUSE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE WHERE AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED Issue Presented:

A. Conflict of Interest

The Bexar County district attorney's office was in representation of Relator simultaneous to the above cause.

In accordance with Defendant's 2nd Motion to Recuse the Bexar County District Attorney and Appoint Special Prosecutor, and in reference to case number 2005-PA-01633, the Bexar County district attorney's office filed, on August 5, 2005, petitioning the 150th District Court of Bexar County in re gards to a termination suit. The 150th Judicial District Court of Bexar County appointed the Bexar County district attorney's office to represent Relator. Although Attorney McCray referred to Relator as a former client, in actuali ty, Relator was represented by the District Attorney's office simultaneously to this cause because CPS had not properly been released as Managing Conser vator. "When a district attorney prosecutes someone whom he previously repre sented in the same case, the conflict of interest is obvious and the inte grity of the prosecutor's office suffers." See Ex Parte Spain, 589 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Canady v. State. 100 S.W.3d 28 (Tex.App. — Waco 2002). This is violative of the U.S. CONST. 5, 14; TEX. CONST. Art. 1 § 19. GROUND THREE

RELATOR'S CASE IS RENDERED VOID BY JURISDICTlONAL DEFECT

Jurisdiction to try and punish for a crime cannot be acquired by the mere assertion of it, or invoked otherwise then in the mode prescribed by law, and if it is not so acquired or invoked, any'judgment is a nullity. If a court holds trial without jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it violates not only the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendment of the United States Constitution, but also the Due Course Clause of Art. 1, § 13, 19 of the Texas Constitution. See also. Ex Parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. Crim.App. 2001). Relator, assert first, that he was never issued a summons for Aggravated Kidnapping, but for Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault. Assuming arguendo that it was appropriately issued, it would still fail because, first, it was signed by Relator's mother who had previously had her parental rights temi- nated, and second, the only summons issued was to Relator by his attorney. See Ejchibit A Summons. Although Judge Jarrett ordered the Probation Officer Erin J. McQueen to issue a Summons, it was issued to Relator by his attorney on February 24, 2011. "Service oh secretary of juvenile's attorney of summons and petition for juvenile to appear at hearing on waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, and certification for prosecution as adult,.did not comply with requirement to personally serve juvenile." See Alaniz, supra. Although Relator and his mother's signature appears on the Summons, it reveals a signature date at February 24, 2011. The simmons was not recorded as an official document until March 25, 2011. And the juvenile court, in accordance with FAM CODE § 53.06, was manda- torily requited to direct the issuance of summons to both the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. Relator also assert that the three step requirement "before juvenile can be tried as an adult are a transfer hearing, an examining trial, and a grand jury's deliberation; trial may then follow; if one of those steps is omitted or rendered void by a jurisdictional defect, there can be no juris diction to prbceed with the next step," was not adhered to. See Watson, and Rushing, supra. In conjunction with the criminal docket, there was no examining trial. See Exhibit B Docket.

8 There is also a jurisdictional defect in regards to an actual conflict of interest; The Bexar County district attorney's office was in representation of Relator simultaneous to the above cause.

In accordance with Defendant's 2nd Motion to Recuse the Bexas County District Attdney and Appoint Special Prosecutor, and in reference to cause number 2005-PA-01633, the Bexar County district attorney's office filed on August 5, 2005, petitioning the 150th District Court of Bexar County in re gards to a termination suit. The 150th Judicial District Court of Bexar County appointed the Bexar County district attorney's office to represent Relator. Although Attorney McCray referred to Relator as a former client, in actuali ty, Relator was represented by the District Attorney's office simultaneously to this cause because CPS had not properly been released as Managing Conser vator. See State Ex Rel Sherrod, supra. This is vi!ci>lative of the U.S. CONST. 5, 14; TEX. CONST. Art. I Sec. 19. "A void judgment is a nullity and can be attacked at any time." See Ex Parte Patterson, 969 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex.Crira.App. 1998).

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Relator prays this Honorable Court, after expiration of the time within which the attorney representing the State may file and answer to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It is so moved and prayed that this writ of habeals corpus be, in all things, GRANTED It's in God We Ttust!!!

Respectfully submitted.

Andy Q^Hchez, fro sef^^lator

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing writ of habeas corpus has been sent to the Office of the District Attorney of Bexar Ctiunty, Taxas via U.S. Mail this the 21st day of September, 2017.

-—^ Andy Sanchez, Pro se, Relator EXHIBIT A

SUMMONS F i L P"0 SUMMONS-ORIGINAL PETITION OiSTRICfGLERK BEXAR CO. TEXAS THE STATE OF TEXAS 20fl MAR 25 P j: { Cj TO; MCQUEEN,EIUN J 600 MISSION ROAD SAN ANTONIO,TX 78210

GREETINGS: SUSAN D. REED, Criminal District Attorney, of Bexar County, Texas. WHEREAS, in a certain cause pending on the docket of the Juvenile Court of Bexar County, Texas, being Cause No.: 2010JUV02881 stvled IN THE MATTER OF: ANDY SANCHEZ. A CHILD, in said suit ^d ORIGINAL PETITION FOR WAIVER OF JURISDICTION AND DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT have been filed, copies of which are hereto attached. Upon presentation of said Petitions, the Honorable LISA JARRETT. has entered the following order to issue summons to: ANDY SANCHF/

THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded and required to be and appear before the 436TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT in and for the County of BeXar, Sitting as a Juvenile Court at 600 MISSION, JUVENILE JUSTICEXENTER in the City of San Antonio, Texas, on the OSliday of APRIL 2011 in the-^^H DISTRICT COURT at 08;30A.M. o'clock, then and there to answer the said allegations of the petitions and for the purpose of considering Discretionary Transfer to Criminal Court for ATT AGG SEXUAL ASSA.ULT. pursuant to Section 54.02(b) Texas Family Code. All of said persons are required to appear before said Court at said time.

WITNESS, DONNA KAY M-Kinney, Clerk of the Juvenile Court, of Bexar County, Texas. Issued and given under my hand and Seal of Office, in said Court, in the City of San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas, this 14™ dav of FEBRUARY A.D..2Q11.

Donna Kay M-Kinney, CLERK.of the Juvenile Court of County,Texas . .

OF BY: [Jjkaul dJuam-a^ <5 DEPUTY

ons/iqrigiN^Petition for waiver of jurisdiction and ER TO CRIMINAL COURT were served upon: o- \ / h CHILD/RESPONDENT: DATE: U,ArKl Saf\Ck^E: % ■ ■' V EXHIBIT B

DOCKET jn^N^BOCKETS BISTTRICT COURl 1 . mMgogRBsrowp^nr c OFBl< ^ RNDY STATE: FROBAHON OOmCER: dob 10/19/94 SID: 000117G531 2010-JUU-02881 KESPONDENT: CO sr^ slATEWAIYITOANDARA^Wra^ l^uhcri'l^r'Cy.y ■ ^ . i.lA^ V ZyT\ lOSED ST^TE RubuCED TO LESKSfflK.OEPENSE: r\Ai 7^ • mok]A/£j StAiE AMENDEDPARACatAPH ^ koiom' year COtfKT PFC 2 <) i 05. 1 ^ yiaKltVj 3g|- \\)r?frumi iMirJiA ~ ilia tigvL /li/u/X. /P^) 7j/ m /;i ^ OH 04 ^yii/jr -ZZ2_ ZZ fVij sd- ^ CRIMINAL DOCKET SHEET N4MK OFPARTIES ATTORNEYS COtlRTBEPOR'n^ - 2011-CR-B969 D436 08/11/2011 COURT ACTIVITY JUDGK FREEING A' XWOr-'r STATE OF TEXAS US LohoAa SCO: 0 STATE ATTORNEY NO RECOMMENDAnON/NO PLEA BARGAIN SANCHEZ. RNDY IhAA _MEA BARGAIN ACEREEMENT YRS MDSDY8 CTDCJ-ID)(BDAt)CXSTATE JAIL) AGGRAUATED KIDNRPPINfi r^NSB ATTORNEY / $ FideS Rsstitntioti OFFENSE INFORMATION ym/aU^ CoiimiSnperviiion(Recommetidcd)(SilentXOppoBed) CXJtlRT Def Adjudiottfam(RseomffloitdedXSEnitKOppoied) REDDCEDTOI COURT INTERPRETER Cases to Run Coocinnnt/Coiuocutivety STATE PROCEEDS ON COUNT(•)_-fc=- PASACaiAPB Cases Taken into Cbnsideistion; ENHANCEMENT PASAORAPH(•) . RIGHT THUMBnum- ,Non Binding Recommendations DATE OF ENTRY COURT ENTRIES DYS MQS(BCADCXSTATE JAlLXGond ofSnprvsn) ^[jCL. cTX ^,D [yfiAslP^ ^2—~ I' _ HRS Community Setvioe/ DYS ELNI Sb WAk^. TTX^J- jl): 1——f f

_ Siibstance Abuse Treatment Facility .YRS MDS DYS(TDCWDXBCADCXST JAIL) m S Fii» S_ Restitntion Other. ciinpl a^phtiC a-P CtWJRT RULING (l^ S€X iJ -0YRS MOS DYS(TDCJ-(BCADCXST JAIL) .FiiteS RestitutiQn PayaUe to; - TiXUXAAjdj.'H ¥V\jt •"(- jkdxiMJz Affiinutive Finding of a Deadly Weapmi __ S.ALP.,(Boot Gamp) Shodc Supervision Dfiven License Suspension Start Date; '{\mjL A^iMLfJU-, LnHhjLhii^ End Date; SAFPF(Coniffl SnpervisionXAmended CommSopv.) _ Thempeutic Community Ptogtam r HRS Community Service DYS ELM DYS MOS(BCADCXSTATE JABLXCondofStgnr) (WotkXWeekmid)Release Piognm(Cotid ofStqiervan) Found TRUE to EnhaiisemaitParBgniphas'aRqpeBter Found TRUE to Enhanoemrait Paiagnpha oa a HMtitual Odur; ' MARGARET G. MONTEMAYOR, BEXAR COUNTY DISTBTCT CLERK By: DEPUTY "^'Lrn iN ^i^cou^: ■; A-r^:v.: AT SAN AKilNlC. :EXA: 20irSEP25 ftMH:56 HEIIH r. 1 ■ CicRK c<~> o S A? ^ a ^

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