In re A.E.

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 2021
• Docket: 253A20
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-130

No. 253A20

Filed 5 November 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 27

February 2020 by Judge Marion M. Boone in District Court, Stokes County. This

matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021,

but was determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jennifer Oakley Michaud for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of Social Services.

James N. Freeman, Jr., for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother.

Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant father.

ERVIN, Justice.

¶1 Respondent-mother Rosa E. and respondent-father Charles V. appeal from the

trial court’s orders terminating their parental rights in their minor children J.V.,

E.V., and A.V.,1 and respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order

1 J.V., E.V., and A.V., respectively, will be referred to throughout the remainder of

this opinion as “Jake,” “Evette,” and “Alana,” which are pseudonyms used to protect the identity of the juveniles and for ease of reading. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

Opinion of the Court

terminating her parental rights in her minor child A.E. 2 After careful consideration

of respondent-mother’s and respondent-father’s challenges to the trial court’s

termination orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the

trial court’s termination orders should be affirmed.

I. Factual Background

¶2 On 20 February 2018, the Stokes County Department of Social Services

received a report alleging that Ellie, Jake, Evette, and Alana lived in a home that

was “severe[ly] infest[ed]” with German cockroaches and that Ellie, who was always

anxious to eat when she was at school, arrived at school wearing dirty and soiled

clothes. The report was accompanied by videos showing the severity of the cockroach

infestation that depicted “[a] multitude” of cockroaches in all stages of life crawling

up and across all of the surfaces in the home, including the walls, floors, ceilings,

counters, cabinets, and kitchen appliances. In the course of investigating the report,

the social worker observed that cockroaches were ubiquitous throughout the home

and noticed a pile of used diapers by the front door, breakfast cereal scattered around

the home, and food-encrusted dishes in the kitchen area. In addition, the social

worked observed that two of Alana’s front teeth were decaying and that Evette

appeared to have an abdominal hernia. On 20 February 2018, DSS filed juvenile

2 A.E. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Ellie,” which is

a pseudonym used to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading. Ellie’s putative father is not a party to this appeal. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

petitions alleging that all four children were neglected juveniles who lived in an

environment that was injurious to their welfare and were exposed to a substantial

risk of physical injury as the result of conditions created by respondent-mother and

respondent-father and obtained the entry of orders taking the children into nonsecure

custody, a step that resulted in the children’s placement in foster care.

¶3 After the filing of the original petitions, DSS obtained additional information

concerning the children and the conditions in which they lived. Among other things,

DSS learned that Ellie had to have her clothes changed on a daily basis following her

arrival at school because of their filthy condition and the smell that emanated from

them. In addition, the social worker learned that respondent-father allegedly

“whopped” Ellie with a “wood[en] board” when she failed to listen to educational

personnel. The family had been the subject of five prior DSS reports, having been

found in need of services in 2014 in the aftermath of an incident during which Ellie

had been left alone in a vehicle for about fourteen minutes while wearing a heavily

soiled diaper at a time when the outside temperature was ninety degrees. According

to a psychological report, respondent-mother had reduced intellectual functioning

and an untreated mood disorder, did not have sound judgment, and lacked “a good

sense” of appropriate child development.

¶4 Although respondent-mother claimed that Alana had been born with rotten

teeth, subsequently obtained medical records disproved that assertion. An IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

examination of Ellie’s medical records reflected concerns relating to inadequate

nutrition and a history of asthma. In addition, other medical records revealed that

both Ellie and Jake had tested positive for the presence of high levels of lead and that

Ellie exhibited “risk factors for lead toxicity.” Although the available educational

records indicated that, when she was two, Ellie exhibited delays in fine motor skills,

she had been identified as being “globally delayed” upon entering kindergarten and

was receiving special education services on the basis of an Individualized Educational

Plan. In light of this additional information, DSS filed amended juvenile petitions on

8 March 2018 for the purpose of adding allegations that the children had not received

proper care, supervision, or discipline from respondent-mother and respondent-

father.

¶5 On 23 February 2018, respondent-mother and respondent-father entered into

case plans in which they agreed to cooperate with an exterminator in connection with

the elimination of the cockroach infestation, to dispose of trash and other waste

products in an appropriate manner, to receive information concerning the

maintenance of appropriate hygiene and to demonstrate a proper understanding of

that subject by bathing regularly and maintaining a sanitary home, to attend

parenting classes, to obtain a psychological and parenting evaluation and follow all

resulting recommendations, and to provide appropriate snacks for and engage in

appropriate activities with the children during visits. Respondent-mother and IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

respondent-father began work toward satisfying the requirements of their case plans

immediately.

¶6 In a report that was dated 15 March 2018 and had been prepared for use in

connection with the initial adjudication and disposition hearing on 22 March 2018,

DSS noted that respondent-mother and respondent-father had been cooperating with

the exterminator, had begun a fourteen-week parenting class, and had scheduled

appointments for the purpose of obtaining a psychological and parenting evaluation.

DSS noted that, while respondent-mother had displayed adequate parenting skills

and had provided appropriate snacks during visitations, respondent-father had done

“very little” during his visits with the children.

¶7 On 22 March 2018, respondent-mother and respondent-father stipulated that,

at the time that the juvenile petitions had been filed, the children had not been

receiving proper care, supervision, or discipline. On 11 May 2018, the trial court

entered an order finding that all of the children were neglected juveniles based upon

the information to which respondent-mother and respondent-father had stipulated.

The trial court instructed respondent-mother and respondent-father to continue to

comply with their case plans, allowed them to visit with the children for two hours

each week, and established a primary permanent plan for the children of

reunification and a secondary permanent plan of legal custody with a relative. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

¶8 Respondent-mother and respondent-father made some progress toward

satisfying the requirements of their case plans prior to the initial review hearing,

which was held on 14 June 2018. According to a DSS report dated 6 June 2018, both

respondent-mother and respondent-father had completed their psychological and

parenting evaluations, neither of which found the conditions of the family home to be

unsafe or inappropriate for the children. DSS described the improvements in the

condition of the family home as “significant.” Finally, DSS reported that respondent-

mother and respondent-father had visited with the children “faithfully,” were

appropriately engaged with the children during the visits, and had completed the

required parenting classes.

¶9 A report prepared by the guardian ad litem on 7 June 2018, noted, on the other

hand, that respondent-mother and respondent-father often ended their visits with

the children fifteen minutes early and that they had left a three-hour visit in May

2018 at the two hour mark. In addition, the guardian ad litem indicated that

respondent-mother and respondent-father continued to struggle with problems

relating to personal hygiene and that they found it difficult to bring appropriate

snacks for consumption during visits with the children. Similarly, the guardian ad

litem stated that respondent-mother and respondent-father had trouble managing

the children and that only respondent-mother attempted to engage with all four

children during visits. Finally, the guardian ad litem noted the difficulties that IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

respondent-mother and respondent-father had in attempting to understand the

problems that arose from the existence of the children’s special needs. The trial court

did not make any changes to the children’s permanent plan or the existing visitation

arrangements in an order that was entered on 13 July 2018 following the conclusion

of the 14 June 2018 review hearing.

¶ 10 In a report prepared prior to a review hearing that was initially scheduled for

23 August 2018 and held on 13 September 2018, DSS pointed out that both

respondent-mother and respondent-father had participated in Ellie’s appointments

and had expressed a willingness to meet with the specialists responsible for Jake and

Evette as well. According to DSS, respondent-father had difficulty controlling his

emotions when he was confronted with information that he viewed as adverse,

including information relating to the children’s placements. Although it believed that

respondent-mother and respondent-father were continuing to make progress toward

satisfying the requirements of their case plans, DSS pointed out that they “need[ed]

to demonstrate their ability to consistently address the developmental, care and well-

being needs for the children” and “their commitment to the children’s safety and their

ability to protect the children.” In a report relating to the same period of time, the

guardian ad litem identified the existence of similar obstacles to the reunification of

respondent-mother and respondent-father with the children. The trial court did not

make any changes to the primary permanent plan or the existing visitation IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

arrangements in an order entered on 29 October 2018, but it did change the secondary

permanent plan to one of guardianship with a court-approved caretaker.

¶ 11 The progress that respondent-mother and respondent-father were making

toward reunification began to stall in 2019. In a report prepared prior to a review

hearing that was scheduled for 11 April 2019 and held on 17 May 2019, DSS noted

that respondent-mother and respondent-father had failed to attend, or even make

inquiry about, appointments and meetings related to the children’s health and

development. In addition, DSS pointed out that respondent-mother and respondent-

father had continued to bring sugary snacks to their visits with the children and

allowed the children to eat these snacks off of unhygienic surfaces. DSS stated that

respondent-father denied that there was anything wrong with the type of snacks that

the children were being provided or the manner in which those snacks were being

served and questioned whether any of the children had special needs despite having

been provided with information to the contrary. According to DSS, respondent-

mother and respondent-father had become less attentive to their own hygiene, with

their lack of concern about these subjects being indicative of a failure to demonstrate

the ability to use the skills that they had learned during parenting classes and to

meet the children’s needs and suggesting the appropriateness of a change in the

permanent plan for the children from one of reunification to one of adoption. The

position espoused by DSS was supported by psychological evaluations of both parents IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

that had been performed in February 2019, with the guardian ad litem’s report

relating to the same period of time expressing support for DSS’ recommended change

to the children’s permanent plan. In an order entered on 11 July 2019, the trial court

reduced the amount of visitation to which respondent-mother and respondent-father

were entitled and changed the permanent plan for the children to a primary plan of

adoption and a secondary plan of reunification.

¶ 12 On 12 September 2019, DSS filed motions seeking to have respondent-mother’s

parental rights in all four children terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(1), and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), and to have respondent-

father’s parental rights in Jake terminated on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(1); failure to legitimate, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5); and dependency, N.C.G.G.

§ 7B-1111(a)(6), and to have his parental rights in Evette and Alana terminated on

the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1111(a)(6). After a hearing held on 17 January 2020, which neither respondent-

mother nor respondent-father attended, the trial court entered orders on 27 February

2020 terminating respondent-mother’s and respondent-father’s parental rights in the

children on the basis of all of the grounds for termination alleged in the termination

motions and a determination that the termination of respondent-mother’s and IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

respondent-father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interests.3

Respondent-mother and respondent-father noted appeals to this Court from the trial

court’s termination orders.4

II. Analysis

¶ 13 In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination orders before this Court,

respondent-mother and respondent-father challenge many of the trial court’s findings

of fact as lacking sufficient evidentiary support or as otherwise legally deficient and

3 The trial court entered separate adjudication orders and separate dispositional orders for each of the four children, resulting in a total of eight termination-related orders. For the sake of clarity, however, we will refer to the adjudication orders that the trial court entered at the conclusion of the termination proceeding as “termination orders” and reserve the expression “adjudication order” for the order in which the trial court determined that the children were neglected juveniles. 4 In her notice of appeal, respondent-mother states that she is appealing from “the

Adjudication and Disposition Orders, entered . . . on January 17, 2020 as same day orders . . . as well as any subsequent formal Adjudication and Disposition Orders.” Although the termination hearing was held on 17 January 2020, the trial court’s written termination- related orders were entered on 27 February 2020. A notice of appeal is required to “designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken,” N.C. R. App. P. 3(d), with “[c]ompliance with the requirements for entry of notice of appeal [being] jurisdictional[,]” State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 266 (2012) (citing Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197–98 (2008)). “As such, ‘the appellate court obtains jurisdiction only over the rulings specifically designated in the notice of appeal as the ones from which the appeal is being taken.’ ” Sellers v. Ochs, 180 N.C. App. 332, 334, (2006). However, “a mistake in designating the judgment, or in designating the part appealed from if only a part is designated, should not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake.” Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 363 (2005) (quoting Van Ramm v. Van Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 156–57 (1990)). In view of the fact that DSS and the guardian ad litem have not moved to dismiss respondent-mother’s appeal and have fully participated in the proceedings before this Court, they do not appear to have been misled by respondent-mother’s mistake in designating the orders from which she has appealed. As a result, we will address the merits of respondent-mother’s appeal. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

the extent to which the trial court’s findings of fact and the record evidence support

the trial court’s determination that their parental rights in the children were subject

to termination. In conducting a termination of parental rights proceeding, the trial

court begins by determining whether any of the grounds for termination delineated

in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) exist. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2019). “At the adjudicatory

stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under section 7B-

1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f)). “If a trial court finds one or more grounds to terminate

parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds to the dispositional

stage,” id. at 6, at which it “determine[s] whether terminating the parent’s rights is

in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).

¶ 14 We review a trial court’s adjudicatory decision for the purpose of

“determin[ing] whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388,

392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A trial court’s

finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed

conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary

finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019) (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

403–04 (1982)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on

appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019).

A. Respondent-father’s arguments

¶ 15 In his brief, respondent-father challenges the majority of the trial court’s

findings on the basis that they (1) constitute nothing more than recitations of witness

testimony, reports, or the trial court’s beliefs, (2) lack sufficient evidentiary support,

or (3) are overbroad. Respondent-father also challenges the trial court’s conclusions

that his parental rights in Jake, Evette, and Alana are subject to termination.

1. Challenges to Findings of Fact

a. Recitations of Testimony, the Contents of Documents, or the Trial Court’s Beliefs

¶ 16 According to respondent-father, Finding of Fact Nos. 15–18 and 21–27 in the

termination orders relating to Jake and Evette and Finding of Fact Nos. 15–18 and

21–27 in the termination order relating to Alana constitute mere recitations of

witness testimony, reports, or the trial court’s beliefs “without an assessment of

credibility.” As this Court has previously held, “[r]ecitations of the testimony of each

witness do not constitute findings of fact by the trial judge” absent an indication

concerning “whether [the trial court] deemed the relevant portion of [the] testimony

credible.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 75 (2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting

Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 571–72 (2003)). In In re N.D.A., the trial court

found that the father had “testified that he had ‘attempted to set up visits with the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

child but could not get any assistance in doing so,’ ” with the father having argued on

appeal that the finding in question constituted nothing more than a recitation of his

own testimony, a contention with which this Court agreed given the trial court’s

failure to indicate whether the relevant portion of the father’s testimony was credible.

Id. As a result, we disregarded the challenged finding of fact in evaluating the

validity of the trial court’s termination order. Id.

¶ 17 After carefully reviewing the trial court’s termination orders, we agree with

respondent-father that Finding of Fact Nos. 16–18 and 23 in all three termination

orders, Finding of Fact No. 24 in the termination order relating to Alana, and Finding

of Fact No. 22 in the termination orders relating to Jake and Evette constitute mere

recitations of testimony given that each of the challenged findings of fact simply recite

that a particular witness either “testified” or “stated” a particular proposition without

any indication that the trial court evaluated the credibility of the relevant witness or

resolved any contradictions in his or her testimony. As a result, as in In re N.D.A.,

we will disregard these findings of fact in evaluating the extent to which the trial

court properly found that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were

subject to termination.

¶ 18 We note, however, that “[t]here is nothing impermissible about describing

testimony, so long as the court ultimately makes its own findings, resolving any

material disputes,” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 408 (2019) (quoting In re C.L.C., 171 IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

N.C. App. 438, 446 (2005), aff’d per curiam, in part, and disc. rev. improvidently

allowed, in part, 360 N.C. 475 (2006)), which is what the trial court, in many

instances, did in this case. In addition to making findings of fact that recited the

testimony of various witnesses, the trial court made findings of fact that resolved a

number of material disputes in the record evidence by stating that the children were

previously adjudicated neglected juveniles on the basis of a consent order signed by

respondent-mother and respondent-father and that respondent-mother and

respondent-father had “stipulated the juvenile[s] [were] neglected juvenile[s], in that

the juvenile[s] did live in an environment injurious due to the conditions of the home,

including a roach infestation, unsanitary conditions of the home and hygiene of the

juvenile[s]”; the juveniles did not receive proper care from respondent-mother and

respondent-father; that respondent-mother and respondent-father “show[ed] a

pattern of neglect and a failure to understand the need to change diapers, keep the

home and the juvenile[s] clean, and keep themselves clean”; that respondent-mother

and respondent-father did not appear to believe that there were any problems that

they needed to address; that, while the level of sanitation in the family home

appeared to have improved, there was “no indication of acceptance that there was a

problem that needed addressing to begin with”; that respondent-father continued to

assert that the children did not have special needs despite being provided with

documents indicating that the children’s alleged needs were genuine; that the care IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

that respondent-mother provided for the children was insufficient; and that

respondent-father had failed to provide the children with consistent care. As a result,

these findings of fact are appropriately considered in evaluating the lawfulness of the

trial court’s termination orders.

¶ 19 In addition, respondent-father argues that Finding of Fact Nos. 15, 21, and 24–

27 in the termination orders relating to Jake and Evette and Finding of Fact Nos. 15,

21–22, and 25–28 in the termination order relating to Alana are nothing more than

mere recitations of portions of the record. As far as Finding of Fact Nos. 15 and 24 in

Jake’s and Evette’s termination orders and Finding of Fact Nos. 15 and 25 in Alana’s

termination order are concerned, “the trial court in this case relied partly on evidence

from prior proceedings and findings in earlier orders, which . . . is proper and

appropriate.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 408.

¶ 20 In In re T.N.H., the mother argued that certain findings “were improper

because they merely recite prior allegations, describe what various people not in

court, or unidentified, believed about certain events, and do not meet the standard

for evidentiary findings sufficient to support conclusions of law.” Id. In rejecting this

argument, we noted that:

A trial court may take judicial notice of findings of fact made in prior orders, even when those findings are based on a lower evidentiary standard because where a judge sits without a jury, the trial court is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent evidence and relied upon the competent evidence. Munchak Corp. v. Caldwell, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

301 N.C. 689, 694, 273 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1981). As this Court has stated:

[E]vidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights. The trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.

In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984). We agree with the Court of Appeals’ precedent holding that the trial court may not rely solely on prior court orders and reports but must receive some oral testimony at the hearing and make an independent determination regarding the evidence presented. In re A.M., J.M., 192 N.C. App. 538, 541–42, 665 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2008), appeal after remand, 201 N.C. App. 159, 688 S.E.2d 118 (2009) (unpublished).

Id. (alteration in original). After noting that the trial court had taken judicial notice

of certain orders upon which it had relied in making the challenged findings of fact

and that “the social worker assigned to the case testified at the hearing regarding”

the subject matter of the findings, we held that “[t]he trial court’s findings of fact

appear to be based, at least in part, on testimony provided at the hearing, sufficient

to demonstrate that the trial court made an independent determination regarding

the evidence presented.” Id. The same is true of Finding of Fact No. 15 in the

termination orders relating to all three juveniles, to Finding of Fact Nos. 24 and 27

in the termination orders relating to Jake and Evette, and to Finding of Fact Nos. 25 IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

and 28 in the termination order relating to Alana, all of which described what the

social worker did, what DSS had determined, and what the trial court had previously

found or concluded.

¶ 21 The trial court took judicial notice of the findings of fact and orders in the

adjudication orders that were entered relating to all three children. In Finding of

Fact No. 15 in all three adjudication orders, the trial court found that, following the

receipt of the child protective services report, a social worker noted that the home had

“roaches throughout[,] . . . a pile of dirty diapers at the door[,] . . . [and] trash and food

debris scattered around the home.” This finding rested upon the findings that had

been made in prior orders in the underlying neglect proceeding that were

incorporated into reports submitted by DSS and the guardian ad litem. The reports

submitted by DSS and the guardian ad litem detailed the conditions found in the

home and the investigating social worker described these conditions at the

termination hearing, during which she testified that she had personally observed

roaches throughout the home, a pile of dirty diapers within reach of the children, food

scattered throughout the home in the vicinity of roaches, and plates of food and

leftover pans in the kitchen.

¶ 22 Similarly, in Finding of Fact No. 24 in the termination order relating to Jake

and Evette and Finding of Fact No. 25 in the termination order relating to Alana, the

trial court found that DSS had discovered that the juveniles had significant needs, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

that there were concerns about the nutrition that the juveniles were receiving, and

that the juveniles had tested positive for the presence of high levels of lead. As was

the case with the findings discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph, the

challenged trial court findings rely upon orders that the trial court entered during

the underlying neglect proceeding that, in turn, relied upon the DSS and guardian

ad litem reports that detailed the relevant +information. In addition, the trial court

did not place sole reliance upon these reports given that the social worker testified

that her investigation of the medical records led to concerns about the quality of the

nutrition provided in the home, which included sugary drinks and limited food

choices, and that Jake and Ellie had tested positive for high levels of lead exposure.

Similarly, another social worker testified that Jake had been diagnosed with a

chromosomal issue that mimicked autism; that Evette had medical and

developmental issues, including a hernia and speech difficulties, that needed to be

addressed by the parents; that Alana had developed dental problems at four months

of age; and that Ellie had experienced global delays in kindergarten, had an extensive

IEP, and had failed kindergarten.

¶ 23 Respondent-father also argues that Finding of Fact No. 27 in the termination

orders relating to Jake and Evette and Finding of Fact No. 28 in the termination

order relating to Alana constituted mere recitations of record information. In the

challenged findings, the trial court stated that it previously found in the underlying IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

neglect proceeding, following a hearing held on 17 May 2019, that respondent-father

did not believe that Jake needed the recommended therapies and expressed a need

to go to work. Once again, the relevant finding is a reference to a prior order rather

than a mere recitation of record evidence. In re T.N.H., at 408. In a permanency

planning order dated 11 July 2019, the trial court found that respondent-father

participated in an IEP meeting relating to Jake by phone and stated that he did not

believe that Jake needed the services that were being recommended and that

respondent-father needed to get to work. In addition, a social worker testified that

respondent-father had participated in an IEP meeting relating to Jake by phone,

respondent-father had previously testified that Jake’s speech delays did not pose a

problem, and another witness described respondent-father’s focus upon his work

rather than upon the children’s needs.

¶ 24 As a result, the record reflects that, in making each of the challenged findings,

the trial court did not rely solely upon prior orders and reports and, instead, also

heard live testimony from witnesses at the termination hearing. “The trial court’s

findings of fact appear to be based, at least in part, on testimony provided at the

hearing” and are “sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court made an independent

determination regarding the evidence presented.” Id. at 410. Moreover, the

challenged findings of fact, rather than merely reciting portions of the record

evidence, simply acknowledge what a social worker observed, what DSS had IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

determined, and what the trial court had previously found or concluded. Thus, we

hold that respondent-father’s challenge to these findings lacks merit. See also In re

J.M.J.-J, 374 N.C. 553, 558 (2020).

¶ 25 Finally, respondent-father’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding,

Finding of Fact Nos. 21, 25 and 26 in the termination orders relating to Jake and

Evette and Finding of Fact Nos. 21, 22, 26 and 27 in the termination orders relating

to Alana are not mere recitations of the testimony of various witness or other items

of evidence admitted at the termination hearing and, instead, constitute findings

made by the trial court based upon its consideration of the evidence. In re Appeal of

Harris Teeter, LLC, 271 N.C. App. 589, 611 (2020) (stating that “[a] finding of fact is

a ‘determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts’ ”)

(quoting Barnette v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 247 N.C. App. 1, 6 (2016))), aff’d, 2021-

NCSC-80 (2021). As a result, respondent-father’s challenge to these findings of fact

lacks merit.

b. Evidence Provided by Dr. Bennett

¶ 26 In his next challenge to the trial court’s termination orders, respondent-father

asserts that the majority of the trial court’s remaining findings of fact either lack

sufficient evidentiary support or are excessively imprecise. As an initial matter,

respondent-father challenges Finding of Fact Nos. 21 and 40 in the termination

orders relating to Jake and Evette and Finding of Fact Nos. 21 and 41 in the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

termination order relating to Alana, which discuss the psychological evaluation given

to respondent-mother by Dr. Bennett in 2014. According to respondent-father, the

2014 evaluation was so remote in time as to be irrelevant, with respondent-mother

having been under no obligation to comply with any DSS recommendation in 2014.

For that reason, respondent-father urges us to exclude the relevant findings from our

evaluation of the lawfulness of the trial court’s termination orders. However, since

the challenged findings of fact relate to respondent-mother rather than to respondent-

father, they have no bearing upon the validity of respondent-father’s challenge to the

trial court’s termination orders. As a result, we decline to address the validity of this

aspect of respondent-father’s challenge to the trial court’s termination orders. See In

re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407 (stating that “we review only those findings necessary to

support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate

respondent’s parental rights”).

¶ 27 In addition, respondent-father argues, with respect to his own evaluation by

Dr. Bennett in 2018, that any “findings that state or imply [the] report was valid are

erroneous” given that Dr. Bennett’s “conclusions, answers to questions, and

recommendations derive from a gross misunderstanding of the relevant facts.” After

excluding the portions of the challenged findings that we have already addressed in

the earlier portions of this opinion, it appears that this aspect of respondent-father’s IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

argument involves two findings of fact. First, he challenges Finding of Fact No. 20 in

all three of the relevant termination orders, which provides:

That the juvenile was adjudicated neglected via a consent order signed by the mother and putative father on March 22nd, 2018. The mother and putative father stipulated that the juvenile was a neglected juvenile, in that the juvenile did live in an environment injurious due to the conditions of the home, including a roach infestation, unsanitary conditions of the home and hygiene of the juvenile. The juvenile did not receive proper care by the parents.

Although respondent-father attacks this finding as resting upon a failure on the part

of Dr. Bennett to understand the relevant facts, it makes no mention of Dr. Bennett

and is fully supported by the record evidence. The children were adjudicated to be

neglected juveniles by means of a stipulation into which respondent-mother and

respondent-father entered on 22 March 2018 and which stated that the juveniles “did

not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from” respondent-mother and

respondent-father and that respondent-mother and respondent-father waived the

presentation of evidence in support of the stipulation. The trial court took judicial

notice of this stipulation, see In re Ordinance of Annexation No. 1977-4, 296 N.C. 1,

14 (1978) (stating that “stipulations constitute judicial admissions binding on the

parties and dispense with the necessity of proving the stipulated fact” and “continue

in force for the duration of the controversy and preclude the later assertion of a

position inconsistent therewith”), in the 11 May 2018 adjudication order, in which the

trial court stated that: IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

[Respondent-mother and respondent-father], through their respective counsel, acknowledge the children are neglected juveniles, as they were in an environment injurious due to the conditions of the home, including a roach infestation, unsanitary conditions of the home and hygiene of the children. The children did not receive proper care by the parents.

See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715 (1984) (stating that “evidence of neglect by a

parent prior to losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect—

is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights”). In view of

the fact that “respondent[-father] did not appeal from the trial court’s adjudication

order,” he “is bound by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating these

findings of fact.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 409 (citing King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C.

348, 356 (1973) (stating that, in accordance with the doctrine of collateral estoppel,

parties “are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any

prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination”)).

¶ 28 Similarly, respondent-father challenges the trial court’s finding in all three

termination orders that “[r]ecommendations were also made to the putative father by

Dr. Bennett in 2018 through a Psychological Evaluation.” According to respondent-

father, Dr. Bennett was under the impression that, in April 2018, respondent-father

and respondent-mother still lived in filthy conditions and had made no progress

toward improving the condition of their home environment. Assuming, without in

any way deciding, that respondent-father’s factual assertions are valid, they have IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

little bearing upon the issue of whether Dr. Bennett made recommendations relating

to respondent-father in a 2018 psychological evaluation. Furthermore, Dr. Bennett

testified that he evaluated respondent-father in 2018, with the report that he

prepared at the time of this evaluation having been admitted into evidence. Dr.

Bennett’s report recommended that respondent-father participate in parenting

classes, ensure that the children receive safe and adequate care in his care, and

maintain a home that was safe and did not pose a health hazard. As a result, we

conclude that the challenged finding has ample evidentiary support.

¶ 29 In contending that the trial court should have refrained from considering Dr.

Bennett’s report in its entirety, respondent-father points to the presence of a note at

the end of Dr. Bennett’s report stating that respondent-father was with respondent-

mother “when her children were removed in 2014” while arguing that no “removal”

had occurred at that time. In the same vein, respondent-father claims that Dr.

Bennett was not aware that respondent-father and respondent-mother had kept the

home in a cleaner condition from the spring of 2018 until the date of the hearing.

Upon being asked whether Ellie had been removed from respondent-mother’s and

respondent-father’s care in 2014 after respondent-mother had left the child in the car

for approximately fourteen minutes during ninety degree weather, Dr. Bennett

testified that “I don’t see that I’ve made a notation that [DSS] had custody. So, no, I

— I don’t think I knew that at that time.” As a result, given that Dr. Bennett denied IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

any knowledge that Ellie had been removed from the care of respondent-mother and

respondent-father in 2014, we do not believe that the inclusion of a single erroneous

phrase precluded the trial court from relying upon other portions of Dr. Bennett’s

report in deciding the issues that were before it in this case.

¶ 30 Similarly, respondent-father notes that he and respondent-mother were just

“making progress on removing the roaches and cleaning their home” on 22 March

2018 and had begun to keep their house clean beginning in “the spring of 2018[.]” In

view of the fact that the progress that respondent-mother and respondent-father had

made in connection with the cleanliness of their home had just begun at the time of

Dr. Bennett’s report, the record evidence tends to show that Dr. Bennett’s report does

not reflect a misunderstanding of the issues that needed to be addressed by

respondent-mother and respondent-father or the status of the home at the time that

he conducted his evaluation. At the hearing, Dr. Bennett was asked multiple

questions in which he was requested to assume that respondent-mother and

respondent-father had been able to keep their home clean from April 2018 to the date

of the termination hearing. In answering these questions, Dr. Bennett stated, that

“it ha[d] been almost three years since I’d seen them. So that for me would be — is if

that home ha[d] been reasonably clean for those three years, then that would for me

say, well, it sounds like they are able to do that,” and that, “if it’s been clean for three

years, then that would suggest that they had succeeded.” Thus, the record reflects IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

that Dr. Bennett fully considered the possibility that respondent-mother’s and

respondent-father’s ability to maintain their home in a clean and sanitary condition

had improved and that, even considering this factor, he “still ha[d] concerns about

the capacity to parent” and that he “would have real reservations about their ability

to” parent the children. As a result, the trial court did not err in considering Dr.

Bennett’s report and the testimony that he provided at the termination hearing.

c. Other Findings

¶ 31 In his remaining challenges to the trial court’s findings, respondent-father

argues that the record does not support the findings in the termination orders

relating to Jake, Evette, and Alana that he “did not complete parenting classes which

were recommended by Dr. Bennett and Dr. Holm.”5 In view of the fact that a social

worker testified that, despite the absence of any supporting records in the file, she

understood that both respondent-mother and respondent-father had completed

parenting classes and the fact that the reports that both DSS and the guardian ad

litem had prepared for an 11 April 2019 hearing stated that respondent-father had

5 Respondent-father also claims that the findings contained in all three termination

orders relating to respondent-mother’s failure to complete parenting classes and to attend “any therapies” for the juveniles and the trial court’s findings that respondent-mother’s caregiving had been insufficient and that she did not feel that there were issues that needed to be addressed lack sufficient evidentiary support. In light of the fact that these findings have no bearing upon the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights, we will review them in the course of addressing respondent-mother’s appeal. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 408, 407 (2019) (stating that “we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights”). IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

completed parenting classes, we conclude that respondent-father’s contention to this

effect has merit. As a result, we will disregard this finding in determining whether

the trial court erred by determining that respondent-father’s parental rights were

subject to termination. See In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 901 (2020) (disregarding findings

of fact not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence).

¶ 32 In addition, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by finding that

he “ha[d] not attended any therapies.” Once again, we agree that respondent-father’s

contention has merit. A social worker testified that, in May 2019, DSS was instructed

to give respondent-mother and respondent-father the contact information for each of

the children’s medical providers and that she attempted to comply with this

instruction. Although the record does not reflect the number of appointments that

respondent-father and respondent-mother actually attended, a DSS report prepared

in advance of the 12 September 2019 review hearing stated that respondent-father

had routinely attended Evette’s speech therapy appointments and that respondent-

father had attended one of Alana’s dental appointments and a swallow test for Evette

before stating that respondent-father “has not called or participated with any other

appointments or sessions regarding these two or any other children.” The

permanency planning order entered on 11 October 2019, which incorporated the

related DSS report into its findings of fact, found that respondent-father had attended

the appointments listed above while having failed to attend numerous other IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

appointments. As a result, since the record evidence does not support the trial court’s

finding that respondent-father had failed to attend “any” therapies, we will disregard

the trial court’s findings to that effect in determining whether respondent-father’s

parental rights in the children were subject to termination. See id.

¶ 33 Next, respondent-father challenges the trial court’s finding, which appears in

all three termination orders, that, when DSS became involved with the family, there

were “concerns with the juvenile testing positive for high levels of lead.” In

respondent-father’s view, the record does not contain any evidence tending to show

that “all juveniles tested positive for high levels of lead.” Although a social worker

testified that Jake and Ellie had tested positive for high levels of lead, there is no

similar evidence relating to Evette and Alana. As a result, we will disregard any

finding that the trial court might have made to the effect that Evette and Alana had

tested positive for high levels of lead in determining whether the trial court correctly

determined that respondent-father’s parental rights in the children were subject to

termination. See id.

¶ 34 Similarly, respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by making

Finding of Fact No 35 in the termination orders relating to Jake and Evette and

Finding of Fact No. 36 in the termination order relating to Alana, which state that

“there appears to be an improvement in the sanitation of the home as evidenced by

the photos submitted into evidence” on the grounds that the challenged findings IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

“misstate[ ] the record” given that “every order entered . . . since the spring of 2018

[found] that the parents had corrected the conditions in the home.” Aside from our

inability to understand why respondent-father would challenge a finding of fact that

indicated that the sanitation in the home had improved, his own characterization of

the record supports, rather than undercuts, the challenged findings. A social worker

testified that respondent-father and respondent-mother cooperated with the

exterminator and that, when the social worker visited the home in September 2019,

she discovered that, while the exterior of the home showed the presence of clutter,

the inside was “free from trash and waste products,” with the photographs that were

admitted into evidence tending to support this assertion. As a result, the challenged

findings of fact have sufficient evidentiary support.

¶ 35 Furthermore, respondent-father argues that the trial court’s finding that

“there is still no indication of acceptance that there was a problem that needed

addressing to begin with” is only supported by psychological reports “which are based

on erroneous information.” As we have already noted, the record reflects that Dr.

Bennett, a psychologist who has done parenting capacity evaluations for ten to twenty

years, evaluated respondent-father in 2018. After being qualified as an expert in

psychology and conducting parenting capacity evaluations, Dr. Bennett testified that

respondent-father believed that “there was really no problem[,]” that DSS was

picking on him and unfairly interfering in his life, that the situation was being IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

exaggerated, and that everything was fine. Dr. Bennett described respondent-father

as “someone who did not seem to recognize the seriousness of the condition that DSS

was . . . reporting,” who was not focused on the conditions in his home, and who did

not think that those conditions were unsafe or unsanitary. Dr. Bennett stated that,

while most parents whom he evaluates initially believe that there is no reason for

them to be seeing him, at some point they recognize that “they need to make some

changes because whatever was happening was harming a child,” while, on the other

hand, respondent-mother and respondent-father continued to minimize the gravity

of the situation that the children faced and had an attitude of “it’s not that bad,” “our

kids are fine[,]” “[w]e’re doing fine[,]” “[s]tay out of my life.” Finally, Dr. Bennett

testified that respondent-father did not believe that either he or respondent-mother

had done anything worthy of DSS involvement. In the same vein, a social worker

who had interacted with respondent-father and respondent-mother before and after

the children’s removal from the home testified that neither parent appeared to

understand DSS’ concerns with the condition of the home, stating that respondent-

father “often minimized the conditions of the home and wouldn’t take responsibility.”

As a result, the record evidence fully supports the challenged finding.

¶ 36 Moreover, respondent-father argues that certain of the trial court’s findings of

fact, “to the extent they describe a condition or belief that has endured over time or

existed at the termination hearing,” lack sufficient evidentiary support on the theory IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

that the “evidence does not support the findings to the extent they attempt to describe

conditions or views that existed after the spring of 2018.” For example, respondent-

father challenges the finding contained in all three termination orders that

respondent-mother and respondent-father “have shown a pattern of neglect and a

failure to understand the need to change diapers, keep the home and the juvenile

clean, and keep themselves clean.” However, a social worker described the existence

of a problem stemming from a failure to change diapers in a timely manner, both in

2014 and in 2018. In addition, the social worker testified that the home occupied by

respondent-mother and respondent-father was dirty in both 2014 and 2018. Finally,

two social workers and Dr. Bennett described the level of hygiene maintained by

respondent-mother and respondent-father during the initial investigation in 2018, at

the time of Dr. Bennett’s evaluation, and during more recent interactions that began

in March of 2019 and continued during visitation sessions and other face-to-face

meetings. As a result, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the

challenged findings of fact. See In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. 797, 806 (2020) (stating that,

“[a]lthough there was record evidence that would have supported a contrary decision,

‘this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that was before the trial

court’ ” (quoting In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 12)); In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 411

(recognizing that it is the trial court’s “duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon

the credibility of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

from the testimony”); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11 (stating that “our

appellate courts are bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact where there is some

evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings

to the contrary”).

¶ 37 The next challenged finding, which appears in all three termination orders,

states that respondent-father “has failed to provide consistent care with respect to

the juvenile.” Respondent-father contends that this finding lacks sufficient

evidentiary support to the extent that it purports to describe conditions that

continued beyond the spring of 2018. As we have already noted, however, a social

worker described the conditions that existed in the home in 2018 as including the

presence of “roaches throughout[,] . . . a pile of dirty diapers at the door[,] . . . [and]

trash and food debris scattered around the home.” In addition, respondent-mother

and respondent-father stipulated that the juveniles “did not receive proper care,

supervision, or discipline from” them at the time that the juvenile petitions were filed

in the underlying neglect and dependency proceeding. Similarly, Dr. Bennett

testified that respondent-father did not believe that any unsafe or unsanitary

conditions existed in the family home, that he believed that he and respondent-

mother were being unfairly targeted by DSS, that respondent-father did not recognize

the seriousness of the conditions that the family faced and was not focused upon

resolving them, that respondent-father was not the primary “or even a real active IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

parent,” and that respondent-father left the actual parenting to respondent-mother

even though the children were not safe in her care. Furthermore, Dr. Bennett did

not believe that respondent-father could create an environment for appropriate child

development, that he could care for the children’s needs, that the children were safe

in his care, or that he understood the health risks of the living environment. After

hearing the testimony at the termination hearing, Dr. Bennett opined that he still

believed that it was unlikely that respondent-mother and respondent-father could

successfully parent the children in light of several of the children’s special needs and

their limited parenting capabilities.

¶ 38 The concerns that Dr. Bennett expressed were supported by the testimony of

other witnesses. At the termination hearing, a social worker testified that

respondent-father minimized the conditions in the home and did not take them

seriously. Another social worker testified that respondent-mother and respondent-

father had not completed all aspects of their care plans, having fallen short in the

areas of hygiene, the ability to demonstrate parenting skills, and maintaining

consistent communication with DSS. See In re M.A., 2021-NCSC-99, ¶ 32 (stating

that “[a] parent’s failure to make progress in completing a case plan is indicative of a

likelihood of future neglect” (quoting In re M.A., 374 N.C. 865, 870 (2020))). The social

worker testified that, even though respondent-mother took the lead during visits, her

skills were minimal, she could not handle all four children simultaneously, and she IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

tended to ask the visitation worker what to do or hand a child off to the visitation

worker during difficult situations even though respondent-father was present. The

social worker also testified that, if a visitation worker made any suggestions to

respondent-mother or respondent-father, they would argue with the visitation

worker.

¶ 39 According to the social worker, during one visit, respondent-father “got very

frustrated with [Jake], and very loudly in a crowded park was like I’ve had enough of

this to the point where in this crowded park everybody’s head turned,” leading to

respondent-mother’s intervention. According to the social worker, there had been “a

number of issues during the visits[,]” including the fact that respondent-mother and

respondent-father could not manage all four children, resulting in a decision to limit

future visits to two children; the fact that, when all four children were in attendance,

two supervisors needed to be present as well; the fact that, invariably, one of the

children would be left out during the visits; the fact that respondent-father showed a

preference for one child over the others; the fact that respondent-mother and

respondent-father spoke about the case during visits; the fact that, when Ellie

referred to her foster mother as “mom” or “mommy” during a visit, respondent-mother

and respondent-father got upset, with respondent-father having told Ellie that he

would “bust [her] butt” if she called the foster mother “mommy” again; that, when the

visitation worker addressed his conduct, respondent-father “started yelling at the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

visitation worker that he didn’t care” and that “[h]e was gonna do what he needed to

do” and “say what he wanted to say” to Ellie; and that respondent-father would argue

with visitation workers and refuse to comply when redirected during visits. The

social worker testified that, at the time of the hearing, respondent-mother and

respondent-father had not demonstrated the existence of the ability to parent

consistently, any interest in learning what it would take to parent the children, the

ability to parent the four children at the same time, or a desire to do what needed to

be done for the children and to make them a priority. As a result, for all of these

reasons, the record evidence amply supports the trial court’s findings that

respondent-father failed to provide consistent care to Jake, Evette, and Alana and

that the pattern of neglect that existed at the time that the children were removed

from the family home had continued to the time of the termination hearing, so that

this aspect of respondent-father’s challenge to the trial court’s termination orders has

no merit.

¶ 40 In addition, respondent-father argues that the record did not support the trial

court’s findings that he did not believe that the juveniles had special needs, that he

“does not appear to feel that there are any issues that need to be addressed[,]” and

that “there is still no indication of acceptance that there was a problem that needed

addressing to begin with” “to the extent they describe a condition or belief that has

endured over time or existed at the termination hearing.” On the contrary, however, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

respondent-father testified at a permanency planning hearing that Jake’s speech was

normal rather than delayed, with a social worker having described these comments

at the termination hearing. In addition, as we have already noted, the trial court

found in a permanency planning order entered on 11 July 2019 that, during an IEP

meeting relating to Jake, respondent-father denied that Jake needed the proposed

services before indicating that respondent-father needed to get to work. In the same

vein, we also reiterate that Dr. Bennett and a social worker testified that respondent-

father did not agree that the juveniles had any problems and believed, instead, that

DSS was simply harassing the family. The challenged findings are also supported by

the evidence concerning respondent-father’s conduct during visits with the children,

in which he refused to change his behavior when redirected by visitation workers and,

instead, told them that he was going to act as he wished. As a result, the trial court

reasonably inferred that respondent-father’s failure to recognize the problems that

had resulted in DSS intervention continued throughout the course of the underlying

neglect and dependency proceeding and the termination of parental rights

proceeding. See In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. at 806; In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 411; In re

Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110–11.

¶ 41 Next, respondent-father challenges the trial court’s references to him as the

“putative father” in the orders that the trial court entered during the underlying

neglect and dependency proceeding and in Finding of Fact No. 43 in the portion of the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

termination order relating to Jake, which stated that respondent-father had “never

legitimated the juvenile” in the manner required by law or submitted to a DNA test.

In view of the fact that this argument relates to the trial court’s decision that

respondent-father’s parental rights in Jake were subject to termination based upon a

failure to legitimate Jake pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5) and the fact that we

have, for the reasons set forth below, elected to affirm the trial court’s determination

that respondent-father’s parental rights in all of his children were subject to

termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), we need not address

this aspect of respondent-father’s challenge to the trial court’s termination orders

given that “we review only those findings necessary to support the trial court’s

determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights[,]” In re

T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407.

2. Grounds for Termination

¶ 42 In his final challenge to the trial court’s termination orders, respondent-father

argues that the trial court erred by concluding that his parental rights in Evette and

Alana were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1),

and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6), and that his parental rights in Jake were

subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); failure to

legitimate, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(5); and dependency, N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6).

According to respondent-father, the trial court erred by concluding that his parental IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

rights in all three children were subject to termination on the basis of neglect given

the absence of any evidence tending to show that, since the spring of 2018, the

children were subject to any condition that placed them in an injurious environment

or created a risk that they would be subject to improper care or supervision. Although

respondent-father does not deny that he stipulated that his children were neglected

juveniles in March 2018, he claims that the “undesirable conditions existing or

arising from the date of removal to the termination hearing do not rise to the level of

neglect” and that the trial court erred by concluding that a repetition of the neglect

to which the children had been subjected was likely in the event that they were

returned to his care. We do not find respondent-father’s argument to be persuasive.

¶ 43 A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child based upon a

determination that the parent has neglected that child. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)

(2019). A “neglected juvenile” is defined, in pertinent part, as one “whose parent,

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or

discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2019). Although the trial court is entitled to terminate a

parent’s parental rights in a child in the event that neglect is currently occurring at

the time of the termination hearing, see, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592, 599–600

(2020) (stating that “this Court has recognized that the neglect ground can support

termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by abandonment”), the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

fact that “a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of

time prior to the termination hearing” would make “requiring the petitioner in such

circumstances to show that the child is currently neglected by the parent . . .

impossible.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80 (quoting In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426,

435 (2005)). In such circumstances, this Court has stated that “evidence of neglect

by a parent prior to losing custody of a child — including an adjudication of such

neglect — is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights”;

however, “[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in

light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” In

re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715. After weighing the relevant evidence, the trial court may

conclude that the parent’s parental rights in the child are subject to termination on

the basis of neglect if it determines that the evidence demonstrates “a likelihood of

future neglect by the parent.” In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (quoting In re

D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016)). As a result, a parent’s parental rights in a child

may be subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) in the event that

the trial court determines that the child has been neglected in the past and that there

is a likelihood that the child will be neglected in the future if he or she is returned to

the parent’s care. Id. at 841.

¶ 44 According to respondent-father, the trial court’s findings of fact do not support

a determination that his parental rights in his children were subject to termination IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

on the basis of neglect given that the problems that led to the initial adjudication of

neglect were resolved before the termination hearing, with the trial court having

failed to give proper consideration to the changes in his circumstances and the

progress that he had made towards reunification following the initial adjudication.

As we have demonstrated in considerable detail above, however, the record contains

ample evidence tending to show that the children, with the consent of both

respondent-mother and respondent-father, were found to be neglected juveniles in

May of 2018, and that (1) the children had significant needs; (2) respondent-mother

and respondent-father exhibited “a pattern of neglect and a failure to understand the

need to change diapers, keep the home and the juvenile[s] clean, and keep themselves

clean”; (3) respondent-father continued to deny that the children had special needs

even after having been presented with “evidence-based documentation”; (4)

respondent-father did not believe that the family had any problems that needed to be

addressed; (5) respondent-father failed to accept “that there was a problem that

needed addressing to begin with”; (6) respondent-father left most of the parenting

responsibilities to respondent-mother and never made any effort to assume

responsibility for the performance of any parenting duties; and (7) respondent-father

failed to provide consistent care for the juveniles. In our view, these findings fully

support the trial court’s determination that Jake, Evette, and Alana were neglected IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

juveniles and that the neglect that they had previously experienced was likely to

reoccur in the event that they were to be returned to respondent-father’s care.

¶ 45 In addition, respondent-father’s contention to the contrary notwithstanding,

the trial court’s findings do not rest upon any misapprehension of the applicable law.

For example, having found that “there appears to be an improvement in the

sanitation of the home as evidenced by photos submitted into evidence,” it is clear

that the trial court did, in fact, consider the evidence concerning relevant

circumstances up to and including the date of the termination hearing. In addition,

we see no indication that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate standard of

proof or acted on the basis of an understanding that it could not consider the evidence

concerning the efforts at reunification that respondent-mother and respondent-father

did make until the time of the termination hearing given that a social worker testified

concerning the efforts that respondent-mother and respondent-father made in

attempting to satisfy the requirements of their case plans and given that the trial

court made a specific finding that the level of sanitation in the family home had

improved. As a result, the trial court did not err by concluding that respondent-

father’s parental rights were subject to termination on the basis of neglect, N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-1111(a)(1).

B. Respondent-mother’s arguments IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

¶ 46 In her own challenge to the trial court’s termination orders, respondent-mother

begins by arguing that several of the trial court’s findings of fact constitute mere

recitations of the testimony of various witnesses or the contents of various reports,

with these arguments being directed to Finding of Fact Nos. 15–18 in the termination

orders relating to all four children, Finding of Fact No. 22 in the termination order

relating to Ellie, Finding of Fact Nos. 22–23 in the termination orders relating to

Jake and Evette, and Finding of Fact Nos. 23–24 in the termination order relating to

Alana. We have already addressed Finding of Fact Nos. 15–18 in the orders regarding

Jake, Evette, and Alana in addressing respondent-father’s challenge to the

lawfulness of the trial court’s termination orders, with the determinations that we

made in connection with respondent-father’s appeal being equally applicable to the

same findings challenged in respondent-mother’s appeal. Similarly, and for the same

reasons that we gave in connection with our consideration of respondent-father’s

appeal, we conclude that, while Finding of Fact No. 15 in the order relating to Ellie

was not improper, Finding of Fact Nos. 16–18 in the order relating to Ellie should be

disregarded in determining whether respondent-mother’s parental rights in that

child were subject to termination. In the same vein, having determined that Finding

of Fact No. 23 in the termination orders relating to Jake, Evette, and Alana; Finding

of Fact No. 24 in the order relating to Alana; and Finding of Fact No. 22 in the orders

relating to Jake and Evette were improperly made with respect to respondent-father, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

the same is equally true with respect to respondent-mother. Finally, for the reasons

stated above, we also conclude that Finding of Fact No. 22 in the termination order

relating to Ellie was improperly made and will disregard it in the course of

determining whether respondent-mother’s parental rights were subject to

termination.

¶ 47 Next, respondent-mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidentiary support

for several of the trial court’s findings of fact. First, respondent-mother challenges

the sufficiency of the evidentiary support for the finding of fact contained in all four

termination orders that “[t]he mother and . . . father have shown a pattern of neglect

and a failure to understand the need to change diapers, keep the home and the

juvenile clean, and keep themselves clean.” In addition to the evidence that we relied

upon in rejecting respondent-father’s challenge to this finding, we note that the

record also contains evidence tending to show that respondent-mother exhibited a

pattern of “fail[ing] to understand” the need to address problems relating to the

sanitary conditions in the home given that she did not see these conditions as

problematic to begin with. In addition, a social worker and Dr. Bennett, who

evaluated respondent-mother in 2014 and 2018, both testified that respondent-

mother’s intellectual limitations resulted in a lack of understanding of the parenting

skills that DSS had attempted to teach her. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

¶ 48 Dr. Bennett, whose 2014 evaluation of respondent-mother occurred in the

aftermath of the incident in which she left Ellie alone in a car for approximately

fourteen minutes on a ninety-degree day, testified that respondent-mother denied the

existence of any problems in the family, failed to understand the issues that had led

to her referral to Dr. Bennett, and thought that DSS was treating her unfairly.

Furthermore, Dr. Bennett testified that respondent-mother did not appear to

understand child development, that people were attempting to teach her parenting

skills that were not being learned, and that respondent-mother’s attitude was, “ ‘Why

are you bugging me? I’m doing okay.’ There’s not really a problem.” Dr. Bennett

further stated that he did not, in 2014, “see evidence that she exercises the judgment

and the understanding of — of child development and of safety to keep the children

safe” and that he “was concerned that — that she did not have that.” Dr. Bennett

found that respondent-mother did not understand the need to proactively address

problems arising from dealing with dirty diapers, the problems that could result from

isolating a child in a car seat or playpen, and the difficulties that could result from a

failure to address a child’s developmental delays. In conclusion, Dr. Bennett testified

that, “if you don’t believe that there’s a problem, you’re not going to put the effort into

it because why.”

¶ 49 Dr. Bennett expressed similar concerns following the evaluation that he

conducted with respect to respondent-mother in 2018. At that time, Dr. Bennett IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

concluded that respondent-mother did not understand the severity of the conditions

that existed in the home and had not learned anything from the experiences that she

had had in 2014. Dr. Bennett testified that, as was the case in 2014, respondent-

mother lacked the ability to create an appropriate environment for the children, the

children were not safe in her exclusive care, and she did not understand the health

risks that resulted from the maintenance of an environment like the one that existed

in the family home. According to Dr. Bennett, respondent-mother was effectively

saying, “I don’t understand. You guys are kind of — this is unfair. We’re — we’re

doing okay. You know, stay out of my life. I just [don’t] see that she was even aware

that — that the environment was that bad.” Based upon this evidence, we hold that

the challenged finding of fact has ample evidentiary support with respect to all four

children. See In re J.O.D., 374 N.C. at 806; In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 411; In re

¶ 50 In addition, respondent-mother challenges the findings of fact that appear in

the termination orders relating to all four children that she did not complete

parenting classes and has not attended any classes or therapies. A social worker

testified that respondent-mother and respondent-father completed parenting classes,

and the record evidence establishes that respondent-mother attended some of the

children’s medical appointments, while missing others. Having concluded in

connection with respondent-father’s appeal that these findings, at least in part, IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

lacked sufficient evidentiary support, we reach the same result with respect to

respondent-mother.

¶ 51 Similarly, respondent-mother, like respondent-father, challenges the

sufficiency of the evidentiary support for the findings, which appear in all four

termination orders, that respondent-mother “does not appear to feel that there are

any issues that need to be addressed” and that there “is still no indication of

acceptance that there was a problem that needed addressing to begin with.” Having

held that these findings had ample evidentiary support in addressing respondent-

father’s appeal, we reach the same result with respect to respondent-mother,

particularly given Dr. Bennett’s testimony that respondent-mother failed to

comprehend that the family faced significant difficulties that needed to be addressed.

¶ 52 Finally, respondent-mother challenges the finding of fact contained in all four

termination orders to the effect that her caregiving skills and efforts had been

insufficient. As we have already discussed in our consideration of the similar

challenge that respondent-father has directed to these findings of fact, the record,

including, but not limited to, the testimony of Dr. Bennett, provides ample support

for these findings as well.

¶ 53 The record reflects that respondent-mother left Ellie in a hot car in 2014. A

subsequent investigation revealed the existence of problems relating to the

cleanliness of and level of sanitation in the family home. However, according to Dr. IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

Bennett, respondent-mother did not acknowledge the existence of the problems that

were pointed out to her on that occasion and failed to learn anything from the

remedial services that were offered to her at that time. The condition of the family

home continued to be very poor in 2018, as was reflected by the existence of a roach

infestation and a collection of unaddressed dirty diapers. Even so, respondent-

mother continued to fail to recognize the existence of these problems and felt, instead,

that DSS was unfairly interfering in her life. According to Dr. Bennett, respondent-

mother had the same parenting deficiencies in 2018 that she had had in 2014, having

learned nothing from her prior experience. In addition, respondent-mother failed to

take care of herself, suffered from untreated depression, was easily taken advantage

of, allowed a sex offender to live in her home, and failed to understand child

development or how to create an appropriate home environment for the children.

¶ 54 Finally, a social worker described respondent-mother’s failure to satisfy the

requirements of her case plan with respect to issues relating to hygiene, parenting

skills, and the need for regular communication with DSS and the deficient parenting

skills that respondent-mother exhibited during visitation sessions with the children,

during which she demonstrated an inability to care for all four children even when

respondent-father was present. The social worker further testified that she had not

seen any desire on the part of respondent-mother to learn improved parenting skills,

with Dr. Bennett having testified that it was unlikely that respondent-mother and IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

respondent-father could develop the ability to parent the children if the children were

returned to their care. As a result, these findings have ample evidentiary support as

well.

¶ 55 As was the case with respect to respondent-father, respondent-mother

acknowledges that the children had previously been found to be neglected juveniles.

Instead, she argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the children were

likely to experience a repetition of neglect in the event that they were returned to her

care. As we have already explained in connection with respondent-father’s appeal,

however, the trial court’s findings fully support its determination that the neglect

that the children had experienced would likely be repeated in the event that the

children were returned to respondent-mother’s care. In its termination orders, the

trial court found that (1) the children were previously adjudicated as neglected

juveniles with the consent of respondent-mother and respondent-father; (2) the

juveniles had significant needs; (3) respondent-mother, like respondent-father,

showed “a pattern of neglect and a failure to understand the need to change diapers,

keep the home and the juvenile[s] clean, and keep themselves clean”; (4) respondent-

mother did not feel that the family had any problems that needed to be addressed; (5)

respondent-mother did not accept “that there was a problem that needed addressing

to begin with”; (6) respondent-mother did not understand that there had been

problems that needed addressing in 2014 and that, “by the time the 2018 IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V.

psychological evaluation occurred[,] she still did not seem to understand that any

problem needed addressing”; and (7) respondent-mother lacked sufficient caregiving

skills. As a result, we hold that the trial court did not err in determining that

respondent-mother’s parental rights in all four children were subject to termination

on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).

III. Conclusion

¶ 56 Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court did not err

by determining that the parental rights of respondent-mother and respondent-father

in Ellie, Jake, Evette, and Alana were subject to termination on the basis of neglect

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). In view of the fact that the existence of a single

ground for termination suffices to support the termination of a parent’s parental

rights in a child, see In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019), we need not address the

challenges that have been advanced by respondent-mother and respondent-father to

the other grounds for termination that the trial court found to exist in this case.

Finally, since neither respondent-mother nor respondent-father has advanced any

challenge to the trial court’s dispositional decision before this Court, we affirm the

AFFIRMED.