IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-168
Filed 3 September 2024
Carteret County, No. 22 JA 52
In the Matter of: A.D.H.
Appeal by Petitioner from order entered 19 September 2022 by Judge W. David
McFadyen III in Carteret County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22
January 2024.
Bill Ward & Kirby Smith, P.A., by Kirby H. Smith, III, for petitioner-appellant Carteret County Department of Social Services.
Matthew D. Wunsche for guardian ad litem.
Schulz Stephenson Law, by Sundee G. Stephenson and Bradley N. Schulz, for respondent-appellee father.
No brief for respondent-appellee mother.
MURPHY, Judge.
Petitioner-appellee Carteret County Department of Social Services
(“Petitioner”) appeals from an order granting various motions filed by respondent-
father (“Father”) and dismissing the juvenile petition. For the reasons below, we
vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. Prior Proceedings IN RE A.D.H.
Opinion of the Court
A.D.H. (“Alice”)1 was born to Father and respondent-mother (“Mother”) in
2013. In February 2021, Mother filed a complaint in Carteret County District Court
seeking custody of Alice. On or about 9 March 2021, the trial court entered a
temporary custody order granting Mother and Father joint legal custody of Alice, with
Mother having primary physical custody and Father having visitation. Father’s
visitation included overnight visits and a “two weeks on/two weeks off” schedule
during Alice’s summer vacation.
In March 2021, Alice began making statements to schoolmates and her school
guidance counselor that Father had sexually abused her. These reports were
ultimately relayed to Petitioner then forwarded to the Craven County Department of
Social Services (“Craven County DSS”) due to a purported conflict. Craven County
DSS opened an investigation into the alleged abuse and arranged a trauma screen
with the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”), a Child Medical Evaluation (“CME”), and a
Child and Family Evaluation (“CFE”) for Alice. By November 2021, the Ashe County
Sheriff’s Office had also opened an investigation into Father’s conduct.
On 5 April 2022, the trial court entered a permanent child custody order
(“CCO”) in the custody dispute finding any allegations of abuse were unfounded. It
found that “after two (2) investigations by the Ashe County Sheriff’s [Office] it was
determined that there was not sufficient evidence to charge [Father] with any
1 We use a pseudonym to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading.
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wrongdoing.” Additionally, Alice had made no disclosures about sexual abuse during
the CAC trauma screen, CME, or CFE arranged by Craven County DSS.
Furthermore, “[a]ll professionals involved in [the custody] matter[,]” including
Craven County social workers, Ashe County detectives, and the CFE evaluator, “had
concerns that [Mother] was coaching the minor child and feeding into a false
narrative with regards to” the allegations against Father. The trial court found there
had been additional reports of abuse since March 2021, but none of the reports had
been substantiated. Instead, Mother appeared to be creating a false narrative around
Father’s alleged abuse of Alice in an attempt to obtain full custody of Alice by (1)
taking Alice to a substance abuse counselor who “was not qualified to counsel the
minor child as she was not even a licensed clinical mental health counselor, had a
lack of training to interview the child, and was quite possibly indorsing a false
narrative when counseling the child”; (2) “misrepresent[ing] the findings of DSS to
various professionals”; and (3) giving untruthful testimony at the custody hearing.
The trial court ultimately found “[F]ather did not abuse the minor child in any way.
The Court does find as fact that the Defendant father did not engage in inappropriate
parenting or activities with the minor child.” The trial court ordered, inter alia, that
Father be granted primary legal and physical custody of Alice and prohibited anyone
except Alice’s current, qualified therapist from discussing any past allegations with
Alice.
On 17 June 2022, Craven County DSS filed an “Interference Petition Pursuant
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to [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-303” alleging Father was obstructing or interfering with its
investigation. The interference petition alleged that, on 28 March 2022, there was
another report that Father abused Alice. This report was made to Petitioner and
referred to Craven County DSS. The interference petition alleged Alice was
recommended another CME, but Father was refusing to allow Alice to participate in
the examination. Craven County DSS moved for the trial court to order that Father
cease obstructing its investigation and that Craven County DSS be allowed to conduct
home studies, interviews, and medical examinations as necessary for its
investigation.
On or about 15 July 2022, nunc pro tunc 17 June 2022, the trial court entered
an order dismissing the interference petition (“IPO”). The trial court found counsel
for Craven County DSS “stated to the Court that DSS could complete its[]
investigation without requiring a medical evaluation of the child and without
requiring further home visits at the Respondent father’s residence[,] [but] [t]hey did,
however, need a child and family evaluation” completed by someone other the initial
evaluator. The court concluded “[g]ood cause exists to grant Respondent father’s
Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice[,]” and dismissed the interference petition, broadly
reiterating much of what had already been said in the CCO.
B. Current Proceeding
On 29 August 2022, Petitioner filed a juvenile petition alleging Alice was an
abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. The juvenile petition acknowledged the
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ongoing civil custody dispute and interference proceeding but did not discuss any of
the prior orders in detail or delineate which allegations were found noncredible. The
allegations in the juvenile petition recited at length verbatim statements made by
Alice to various reporters that she was repeatedly sexually abused by Father. These
specific statements are not necessary to resolution of this appeal and are not
discussed in detail.
The petition alleged Alice made statements before entry of the CCO and IPO
in March 2021, May 2021, September 2021, October 2021, and March 2022, as well
as statements after entry of the CCO and IPO. Most recently, Petitioner received a
report in July 2022 that, while at a sleepover with a friend, Alice disclosed sexual
abuse by Father. Thereafter, one of Petitioner’s social workers, Kelly Dorman,
interviewed Alice at her school on 29 August 2022. Alice made additional disclosures
of abuse at this interview. However, the timeline of alleged abuse was not clear from
Alice’s statements. Alice stated that the abuse could have occurred as far back as two
years in the past or may have still been ongoing. The juvenile petition ultimately
alleged Alice was abused and neglected due to sexual abuse by Father and dependent
because neither Father nor Mother were able to provide for Alice’s care or supervision
or had appropriate alternative childcare arrangements.
On 29 August 2022, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner
nonsecure custody of Alice.
On 31 August 2022, Father filed various motions to dismiss, motions in limine,
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motions to sanction DSS officials or hold the officials in contempt, and a response to
the juvenile petition. The two relevant motions to dismiss asserted the juvenile
petition should be dismissed (1) pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim and (2) pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The Rule 12(b)(6) motion specifically asserted the juvenile petition failed to
state a claim because “[t]he claims made in the Petition are a restatement of the
claims previously made and litigated in” the CCO and IPO and, therefore, Petitioner
was barred from relitigating these claims in the juvenile petition. The preclusion
motion similarly asserted the CCO, IPO, and a 15 July 2022 temporary emergency
custody order entered in the custody matter, including all findings of fact and
conclusions of law that Father had not abused Alice, were binding on the trial court
and warranted dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. Father also filed one
motion to hold Social Worker Dorman in contempt (“Contempt Motion”) because she
interviewed Alice on 29 August 2022 with full knowledge of the provisions of the CCO
prohibiting anyone but Alice’s therapists from discussing the prior allegations with
Alice. One of Father’s motions in limine requested Father be allowed to examine
Dorman under oath regarding circumstances surrounding the nonsecure custody
order, juvenile petition, and “the events occurring specifically as they relate to the
minor child . . . since the entry of” the nonsecure custody order on 29 August 2022.
On 1 September 2022, the trial court held a hearing and allowed Father to
examine Dorman. On 19 September 2022, the trial court entered a written order
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dismissing the juvenile petition (“Dismissal Order”). Based on Dorman’s testimony,
the trial court found she was aware of the CCO and IPO before she interviewed Alice,
that the CCO found Father did not abuse Alice, and that “[n]o one, other than the
child’s current, qualified therapist” was permitted to discuss the previous allegations
against Father with Alice. The trial court found that, “[b]ased upon the four corners
of the Petition filed in this cause there are no colorable allegations of abuse, neglect
or dependency that are alleged to have occurred subsequent to the” CCO and IPO,
and the prior allegations against Father had been previously litigated and could not
form the basis for the juvenile petition. The trial court granted Father’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, preclusion motion, and motion in limine to examine Dorman; declared “it was
not necessary for the Court to hear, and rule, upon Respondent-father’s other Motions
in this matter”; and dismissed the juvenile petition with prejudice.
Petitioner appealed; and, on 13 May 2024, while the appeal was still pending,
Mother waived her right to counsel before the trial court. On 29 May 2024, we entered
an order providing Mother until 14 June 2024 to file an appellee brief, if desired.
Mother did not file an appellee brief within the allotted time window.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Petitioner presents four issues for our review: (1) whether Father
gave Petitioner adequate notice of his motions to dismiss; (2) whether the trial court
reviewed the juvenile petition under the correct standard when ruling on the Rule
12(b)(6) motion; (3) whether Petitioner was precluded by res judicata and collateral
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estoppel from litigating the issues in the juvenile petition; and (4) whether the trial
court abused its discretion by granting one of Father’s motions in limine and
sanctioning Social Worker Dorman.
We need not address the first issue because the second and third issues are
dispositive; the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Father’s motions, and
we must vacate the dismissal order. We do not address the fourth issue because the
record indicates the trial court did not address Father’s Contempt Motion or
otherwise sanction Social Worker Dorman.2
A. Preservation and Motion to Dismiss Appeal
We preliminarily address preservation of Petitioner’s second and third issues
for appellate review. Father argues both in his brief and in a separate motion to
dismiss Petitioner’s appeal filed before us that Petitioner waived appellate review of
the trial court’s rulings on his motions because Petitioner did not object during
Father’s arguments on his motions or the trial court’s rendering of its ruling on his
motions. But, here, Petitioner’s issues were automatically preserved for review
because Petitioner is very clearly challenging whether the trial court’s decision to
grant Father’s motions is supported by its findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding the preclusive effect of the prior orders on the juvenile petition. Such issues
2 As discussed above, the district court did not rule on Father’s motions other than the Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion, preclusion motion, and motion in limine seeking to examine Social Worker Dorman. The district court did not address contempt in the dismissal order other than to note Father filed the Contempt Motion.
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are automatically preserved for review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (“Any such issue
that . . . was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, including, but not
limited to, whether the judgment is supported by the verdict or by the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, . . . may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal.”);
see also Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 467-68 (1988)
(citations omitted) (“[P]laintiffs’ notice of appeal is sufficient to raise the limited
issues of law relevant to our review of Rule 12(b)(6) motions and summary judgments.
We will therefore . . . address plaintiffs’ basic contention that the face of the record
shows that neither LMCC nor GMC were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”),
aff’d, 326 N.C. 387 (1990). Because the two remaining issues are preserved for
review, we deny Father’s motion to dismiss this appeal and reach the merits of
Petitioner’s arguments.
B. Motions to Dismiss
Both motions assert the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata barred
Petitioner from relitigating allegations of abuse in the juvenile petition that predate
the CCO and IPO. A review of the record indicates the trial court determined, as a
matter of law, that both the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and preclusion motion should be
granted because the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata operated to bar
Petitioner from relitigating allegations in the juvenile petition that were litigated in
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both the CCO and IPO.3 We first address the underlying issue of law, whether
collateral estoppel or res judicata could form the basis for granting either motion to
dismiss based on the findings and conclusions in the CCO, before more specifically
addressing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
1. Preclusion Motion
Whether a court is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata “is a question
of law unrelated to any specific facts of a case. Questions of law are reviewed de
novo.” Bluebird Corp. v. Aubin, 188 N.C. App. 671, 678, disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C.
679 (2008). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely
substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” In re K.S., 380 N.C. 60, 64
(2022) (marks and citations omitted).
Although the parties’ dispute pertains to both collateral estoppel and res
judicata, the present dispute is most squarely governed by collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel prevents “the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined
[factual] issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different
claim.” Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 (2004). “Under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, a final judgment on the merits prevents
3 Most of the trial court’s findings of fact indicate it based its ruling as to Father’s motions on the
preclusive effect of the CCO. However, a review of the dismissal order indicates that the trial court also noted “there are no colorable allegations of abuse, neglect or dependency that are alleged to have occurred subsequent to” the IPO. Especially given the heavy discussion of the CCO in the IPO, we believe the trial court correctly considered the preclusive effect of both orders.
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relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior
action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their
privies.” Johnson v. Starboard Ass’n, Inc., 244 N.C. App. 619, 627 (2016) (marks
omitted) (citing State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 414 (1996)). “Collateral
estoppel will apply when: (1) a prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
(2) identical issues were involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit
and necessary to the judgment; and (4) the issue was actually determined.” Youse v.
Duke Energy Corp., 171 N.C. App. 187, 193 (2005) (marks omitted). For present
purposes, we see no meaningful dispute that both the CCO and IPO were final
judgments on the merits, contained at least some overlapping factual issues with the
present juvenile petition, and were actually litigated and determined. Moreover, for
purposes of privity,4 we note that both Carteret and Craven County DSS intervened
in the custody action; and, as co-actors with respect to this family and arms of the
State, we do not see a reason to treat them as analytically distinct with respect to the
4 We note that the significance of privity as a component of collateral estoppel has been somewhat murky as applied by our Court, with some cases acknowledging privity as an essential element of collateral estoppel, see Perryman v. Town of Summerfield, 899 S.E.2d 884, 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024); Green v. Carter, 900 S.E.2d 108, 114 (N.C. Ct. App. 2024); Johnson, 244 N.C. App. at 627, and others omitting mention of it altogether, see Collier v. Bryant, 216 N.C. App. 419, 423 (2011); Youse, 171 N.C. App. at 193. The cause may be that, when our Supreme Court last spoke at length on the topic, it was unclear whether the concept of privity was subsumed into the requirement that “the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.” Whitacre, 358 N.C. at 15, 35-37 (omitting privity from the basic definition of collateral estoppel while noting later in its analysis that privity is required for collateral estoppel to apply). Without further guidance, we do not intend for this opinion to resolve any outstanding ambiguity as to the role of privity in collateral estoppel cases, only to explain why we discuss privity when some of our other cases have not; we think it the better practice to err on the side of inclusion.
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IPO.
The more meaningful dispute, we think, is whether collateral estoppel applies
in this case given the discrepancy in the standard of review between the CCO and the
present litigation. DSS argues, citing our holding in In re K.A., that “collateral
estoppel cannot apply where the proceedings involve a different burden of proof.” See
In re K.A., 233 N.C. App. 119, 127 (2014) (citing State v. Safrit, 154 N.C. App. 727,
729 (2002), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 65 (2003)). However, this was an
overstatement—and oversimplification—of the existing law, directly contradicting
long-established precedent and failing to fully recognize the conceptual
underpinnings of collateral estoppel. North Carolina’s appellate courts have, for
nearly two centuries, recognized the availability of collateral estoppel as between a
prior criminal proceeding and a subsequent civil proceeding, directly contradicting
the idea that a mere difference in burdens of proof renders the doctrine inapplicable.
Mays v. Clanton, 169 N.C. App. 239, 242 (2005) (citing Burton v. City of Durham, 118
N.C. App. 676, 680 (1995) and Hill v. Winn–Dixie Charlotte, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 518
(1990)) (“[T]his Court has upheld collateral estoppel of an issue in a civil suit when
that issue was previously established as an element in a criminal conviction.”); Griffis
v. Sellars, 20 N.C. 315, 315 (1838) (“In an action for a malicious prosecution, a verdict
and judgment of conviction in a Court of competent jurisdiction[] . . . is conclusive
evidence of probable cause, and precludes the plaintiff in the action for the malicious
prosecution from showing the contrary.”). These cases demonstrate that the actual
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principle animating the result in In re K.A. was that collateral estoppel cannot apply
to a proposition proven in a prior action when the subsequent action involves a higher
standard of proof.
Nonetheless, even this statement falls short of explaining the whole of
collateral estoppel. Our caselaw, when viewed holistically, demonstrates that
collateral estoppel operates on a system of transitivity; a factual proposition is
deemed true or false in the subsequent action if the truth value of the proposition in
that action logically follows from the truth or falsehood of the same proposition in the
prior action, bearing in mind the relative burdens of proof. Put differently, assume
that the extent to which a given proposition is proven in a prior case is quantifiable
as a number X; that the minimum confidence threshold at which any proposition is
deemed proven in a prior case—in other words, the burden of proof—is quantifiable
as a number A; and that the minimum confidence threshold at which at which any
proposition is deemed proven in a subsequent action is quantifiable as a number B.
In such a system, knowing the relationship between X and A, as well as the
relationship between A and B, can—but does not always—necessarily imply a
relationship between X and B.
Our caselaw bears this out. For example, the above-referenced holdings
applying collateral estoppel in a prior criminal case to a subsequent civil case, see
Mays, 169 N.C. App. at 242, Griffis, 20 N.C. at 315, are expressions of the principle
that, if X equals or exceeds A and A exceeds B, then X must exceed B. The outcome
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of these holdings is an expression of the broader transitive relationship outlined
above.
Our holding in In re: K.A. is, taken in context, also an expression of this broader
transitive relationship. In K.A., the trial court declined to apply collateral estoppel
where there was affirmative finding of abuse in a prior custody order. In re K.A., 233
N.C. App. at 127. The subsequent action—a juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency
case—was subject to a higher standard of proof than the first. Id. In other words, if
X equals or exceeds A but A is less than B, we cannot know the value of X relative to
B.
Finally, in Fox v. Johnson, we demonstrated, consistent with the same
transitive relationship, that the doctrine continues to apply when discussing a failure
to meet a burden:
It is well settled that “[a] dismissal under [North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 12(b)(6) operates as an adjudication on the merits unless the court specifies that the dismissal is without prejudice.” Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 404[] . . . (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 345[] . . . (1992); see also [N.C.G.S.] § 1A- 1, Rule 41(b) (2013). However, the federal court did not dismiss Plaintiffs’ federal claims under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6), but rather dismissed them pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). See Fox, 807 F.Supp.2d at 484. No North Carolina case law or statute that we have discovered directly addresses the question of whether a dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) operates as an adjudication on the merits so as to collaterally estop a plaintiff from re- litigating a claim or issue in our State’s courts. Of course, if the evaluation of a claim in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) were identical to the
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evaluation made in response to a motion under North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6), it would be clear that the federal court’s dismissal had adjudicated and settled the same issue Plaintiffs raise in their state complaint. However, our review of the pertinent statutes and case law demonstrates that the standard under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), which the federal court here held Plaintiffs failed to meet, is a different, higher pleading standard than mandated under our own General Statutes. In other words, the fact that Plaintiffs’ allegations of proximate cause in the federal complaint did not meet the pleading standard under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) does not necessarily mean that their allegations of proximate cause would have resulted in dismissal pursuant to North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6).
Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274, 285 (2015), disc. rev. denied, 368 N.C. 679 (2016).
We see in Fox that, if X is less than A but A is greater than B, we cannot necessarily
know whether X is also less than B or somewhere between B and A. See also Hussey
v. Cheek, 31 N.C. App. 148, 149 (1976) (“When the burden of proof at the second trial
is less than that at the first, the failure to carry that burden at the first trial cannot
raise an estoppel to carrying the lesser burden at the second trial.”); Safrit, 154 N.C.
App. at 729 (holding that the prior failure to establish Defendant’s existing
convictions under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard did not preclude a
subsequent finding that those convictions took place under the lower preponderance
standard).
As it pertains to this case, “the applicable standard of proof in child custody
cases is by a preponderance, or greater weight, of the evidence[,]” Speagle v. Seitz,
354 N.C. 525, 533 (2001) (citations omitted), and “[t]he standard of proof for an
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adjudicatory order entered on a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency in a
juvenile matter[] . . . is ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re K.A., 233 N.C. App. at
127 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-805 (2013)); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-805 (2023) (“The
allegations in a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent
shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”). “Clear and convincing evidence
is [a] greater [standard] than the preponderance of the evidence standard required in
most civil cases.” In re A.K., 178 N.C. App. 727, 730 (2006) (marks and citations
omitted). Moreover, the proposition that the movant was required to prove in both
cases was that Father abused Alice—a proposition which, under the preponderance
standard, the trial court ruled had not been proven in the CCO. In other words, in
keeping with the earlier model, we know that X (Father abused Alice) is less than A
(preponderance of the evidence), and we know that A is less than B (clear and
convincing evidence). Since we can necessarily deduce from this relationship that X
must also be less than B, collateral estoppel applies to the issue of whether Father
abused Alice. The doctrine therefore precludes a contrary finding in the present
action, and the trial court properly invoked it as to the allegations of abuse against
Father already covered by the CCO.
Any future litigants, of course, need not cite our holding in this case in
algebraic terms; it is enough to say that, where a party fails to establish a fact in a
prior case under a lower burden of proof, collateral estoppel applies to preclude a
subsequent finding that the same fact has been established under a higher standard
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of proof.
Having established the preclusive effect of the CCO, we now turn to the
preclusive effect of the IPO. This analysis is far simpler: The burdens of proof
applicable to both the interference petition and the juvenile petition were clear and
convincing evidence, see N.C.G.S. § 7B-805 (2023), so collateral estoppel naturally
applies to the failure to prove abuse. As the IPO’s conclusions that Father had not
been shown to abuse Alice were determinative as to the allegations through those
alleged in the interference petition, this means that, in addition to the preclusion of
the allegations contained in the CCO, the IPO also precludes the allegations arising
in the timeframe it alleged; namely, 28 March 2022. Thus, these issues were also
correctly dismissed by the trial court as barred by collateral estoppel.
Nonetheless, to the extent the trial court held that all factual allegations in
the juvenile petition were barred by collateral estoppel, thereby justifying its
dismissal in the entirety, this ruling was too broad. Specifically, we note that the
juvenile petition appears to further allege instances of abuse taking place in July
2022, supported by evidence gathered through at least August of 2022. These
allegations, which were not estopped by the earlier orders, render dismissal
inappropriate. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled estopped most, but not all,
of the factual issues in the juvenile petition; but, since factual issues pertaining to
allegations after March of 2022 remain, the trial court erred in dismissing the entire
petition.
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2. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
The trial court also granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and found “there are no
colorable allegations of abuse, neglect or dependency that are alleged to have
occurred” after the CCO and IPO. As to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
this Court reviews de novo whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint . . . are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We consider the allegations in the complaint true, construe the complaint liberally, and only reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss if plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts which could be proven in support of the claim.
In re K.G., 260 N.C. App. 373, 376 (2018) (citations omitted). Nevertheless,
the review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not involve an assessment or review of the trial court’s reasoning. Rather, the appellate court affirms or reverses the disposition of the trial court—the granting of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—based on the appellate court’s review of whether the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim.
Taylor v. Bank of Am., N.A., 382 N.C. 677, 679 (2022). Therefore, we ordinarily ignore
the trial court’s rationale in granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. But, here,
because the trial court determined the juvenile petition failed to state a claim based
on the idea that collateral estoppel and res judicata precluded Petitioner from
asserting the entire spectrum of abuse allegations contained therein, we note that, to
the extent the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion was based on collateral
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estoppel and res judicata,5 it is erroneous, in part, for the same reasons as above. See
supra Part B-2.
As to whether the juvenile petition states a claim, Chapter 7B specifically
provides that a valid petition must include “allegations of facts sufficient to invoke
jurisdiction over the juvenile[,]” N.C.G.S. § 7B-402 (2023), including allegations that
the juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-200 (2023) (“The
court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is
alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent.”). An abused juvenile, neglected
juvenile, and dependent juvenile are specifically defined in Chapter 7B. See N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-101 (2023) (defining abuse, neglect, and dependency). For purposes of the
instant appeal, a juvenile whose parent commits a sex offense defined by Chapter 14
upon the juvenile is abused. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(d) (2023). A neglected juvenile
is one whose parent “[d]oes not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline[,]” or
“[c]reates or allows to be created a living environment that is injurious to the
juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15)(a), (e) (2023). And a dependent juvenile is
[a] juvenile in need of assistance or placement because (i) the juvenile has no parent . . . responsible for the juvenile’s care or supervision or (ii) the juvenile’s parent . . . is unable to provide for the juvenile’s care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9) (2023).
5 As discussed above, while the preclusion motion discusses both res judicata and collateral
estoppel, collateral estoppel is the more directly applicable doctrine.
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Here, the juvenile petition contained sufficient allegations to state a claim that
Alice was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile within the meaning of
Chapter 7B despite the partially preclusive effect of the CCO and IPO. The petition
alleged that Alice was abused and neglected because Father sexually abused Alice,
and at least some of these alleged acts occurred after those already ruled upon in the
CCO and IPO. The petition specifically alleged that Father committed an
enumerated sex offense under Chapter 14 against Alice and that such abuse
constituted improper supervision and created an injurious environment for Alice.
The petition also alleged that Alice was dependent because neither of her parents
were appropriate caregivers—Father was an inappropriate caregiver due to the
allegations of sexual abuse, and Mother was an inappropriate caregiver due to the
allegations that she had coached Alice to accuse Father of sexual abuse—and there
was no other caregiver available on either side of Alice’s family.
Considering all of the remaining factual allegations, the juvenile petition was
sufficient to state a claim under Chapter 7B, even when excluding factually precluded
subject matter. However, we further note that Father’s pending motions before the
trial court may—depending on the relief granted, if any—result in the striking of
some or all of the petition, which may, by extension, affect the appropriateness of any
further Rule 12(b)(6) rulings on remand. In light of this potential, rather than
reversing the dismissal order, we vacate the order and remand for consideration of
whether, after resolution of all potentially relevant motions and in light of our
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holding, any allegations remain for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
The allegations in the juvenile petition were not fully barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, and the factually precluded portions of the juvenile petition did
not themselves merit dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). As our holding with respect to
collateral estoppel unmoots some number of motions potentially impacting the
materiality of the remaining factual allegations in the juvenile petition, the dismissal
order is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judges COLLINS and HAMPSON concur.
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