In Re Accelr8 Technology Corp. Securities Litigation

147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8104, 2001 WL 705628
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedMay 17, 2001
DocketCIV.A. 00-K-938, CIV.A. 00-K-1129, CIV.A. 00-K-1176, CIV.A. 00-K-1268, CIV.A. 00-K-1291, CIV.A. 00-K-1610
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (In Re Accelr8 Technology Corp. Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Accelr8 Technology Corp. Securities Litigation, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8104, 2001 WL 705628 (D. Colo. 2001).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

KANE, Senior District Judge.

This securities fraud class action is before me on Defendant Accelr8 Technology Corp.’s (Accelr8) Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs brought this shareholder class action in the District of Colorado, alleging *1053 that Defendant, Accelr8 Technology Corp. (“Aceelr8”), a Denver-based computer software company, issued a series of materially false and misleading statements regarding their business and financial conditions. Plaintiffs allege these statements were issued intentionally to inflate the trading price of Accelr8 and caused them each financial loss. They assert claims for relief under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).

BACKGROUND.

During the class period, Defendant Ac-celr8’s product line included software and services designed to control the dreaded “Y2k bug.” (Comply 2). The product at issue was marketed as the Navig8 2000 Toolset. (Id.). A component of the tool set, the “analyzer engine,” was designed only to analyze code written for computers manufactured by the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). (Id.). Despite the limited applicability of the software, Accedes officers represented to the public that the program was available to multiple systems, including UNIX and NT environments. (ComplJ 45). These public representations took place through the filing of the company’s Form 10-KSB for the fiscal years ending July 31, 1997 and 1998, and press releases beginning in December 1997 and continuing throughout 1998. (Compl.H 55-60).

On November 16, 1999 the SEC filed a complaint against Accelr8 alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. (ComplJ 113). The following day, the NASDAQ halted trading of the company’s securities at the rate of $1)Í6. (ComplJ 117). On November 22, 1999 the company’s auditors resigned and declared the film no longer felt they could rely on the representations of Aecelr8’s management. (ComplJ 115). In addition, plaintiffs allege the officers of Accelr8 materially overstated the Company’s revenue by improperly recognizing fees relating to licensing and maintenance and by understating their expenses by failing to amortize their capitalized software development costs. (CompLH 76, 87, 92-101.)

DISCUSSION.

Defendants, Accelr8 Technology Corp., have moved to dismiss this class action lawsuit brought against them under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In general, the notice pleading standards set forth at Fed. R. Crv. P. 8(A) are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) but when such motions involve claims of fraud the heightened standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) apply.

Although the particularity requirement of Fed. R. Crv. P. 9(b) does not usually extend to elements involving the condition of a person’s mind, Congress has established heightened pleading standards for securities fraud allegations. Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PLSRA), Congress extended the particularity requirement both to allegations of the defendant’s state of mind and to allegations of misleading statements or omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b). However, pleading with particularity does not require the plaintiff to include in his complaint detailed evidentiary matter. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir.1997). The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to give notice to the defendants of the fraudulent statements for which they are alleged to be responsible. (Id.). The purpose of the PLSRA is to prevent an onslaught of expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices plummet, which could force corporations to set- *1054 tie meritless claims to avoid the expense of discovery and trial.

To state a claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a misleading statement or omission of a material fact; (2) made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (3) with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) reliance; and (5) damages. Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.1997). For any claim alleging fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. Fed. R. Crv. P. 9(b). The PSLRA elucidated the particularity standard and added a specific requirement that averments of intent meet a heightened pleading standard. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).

A plaintiff meets the particularity requirement under the PSLRA by specifying each statement alleged to have been misleading and the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l), applied in Angres v. Smallworldwide PLC, 94 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1173 (D.Colo.2000). If an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint must state with particularity all facts on which that belief is based. Id. The state of mind requirement is met when a plaintiff, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate the securities fraud statutes, “state[s] with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” Id., § 78u-4(b)(2).

The instant motion fails because Plaintiffs have made sufficient specific factual allegations to support their claim under Rule 9(b), as augmented by the PSLRA. The circumstances involving the fraud have been pled with particularity, allegations giving rise to a strong inference of scienter have been made, and Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to suggest their damages were caused by the acts or omissions of the Defendants.

A. Plaintiffs have alleged with specificity that Defendants are responsible for issuing materially misleading statements.

The purpose of the particularity requirement is to ensure defendants are given adequate notice of the statements or omissions for which Plaintiffs allege they are responsible. In this circuit, this means a “complaint must set forth the time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” Schwartz,

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Bluebook (online)
147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8104, 2001 WL 705628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-accelr8-technology-corp-securities-litigation-cod-2001.