DAUDA ILIYA, Case No. 24-cv-03720-TSH
Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR v. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
et al., Defendants. Plaintiff Dauda Iliya, who represents himself, brings this case against the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), alleging security officers at the entrance to the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California forced him to remove his religious cap. Pending before the Court is USMS’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. ECF No. 29. After Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, the Court ordered him to show cause (the third show cause order issued in this case) by April 21, 2025, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. ECF No. 32. The Court warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. As of today, no response has been received. Based on the procedural history of this case, the undersigned finds it appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders.1 Plaintiff states he “is a devout individual who, as part of his religious observance, wears a religious cap, which holds deep religious significance for him.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 28. On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff visited the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California, with the intention of filing documents with the Clerk of Court. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff states that when he approached the entrance of the courthouse, he encountered several U.S. Marshals stationed for security purposes. Id. ¶ 9. Upon noticing Plaintiff’s religious cap, a U.S. Marshal informed him that he would not be permitted to enter the court Clerk’s Office unless he removed the cap. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff explained that the cap was “a mandatory religious article that he wore for religious purposes and requested accommodation to retain the cap while conducting his business within the courthouse,” but the U.S. Marshal insisted he could not proceed unless he removed the cap. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. As a result, Plaintiff “was effectively denied access to the court clerk’s office to file his documentation on the stated date and time.” Id. ¶ 13. On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim regarding the incident, which the USMS formally denied on December 19, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff filed this case on June 20, 2024, naming USMS and Does 1-10 as defendants. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleged seven causes of action: (1) violation of his First Amendment rights, (2) violation of 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.445, (3) violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (“RFRA”), (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligence, (6) discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, and (7) violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 1, 34-88. On September 9, 2024, USMS moved for dismissal, arguing the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 11. After Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, the Court ordered him to show cause by October 11, 2024, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines, as well as why Defendant’s motion should not be granted. ECF No. 13. The Court warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. On October 11 Plaintiff filed an opposition.2 ECF No. 15. On December 20 the Court granted USMS’s motion with leave to amend by January 21, 2025, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and RFRA claims for equitable relief. ECF No. 23. After Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond, the Court again ordered him to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. ECF No. 24. The Court again warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. After Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 25), the Court discharged the show cause order and directed him to file an amended complaint by February 27, 2025. ECF No. 27. Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on February 27, alleging claims under the First and Fifth Amendments and the RFRA.3 USMS again moved for dismissal. ECF No. 29. After Plaintiff failed to file a response, the Court issued a third show cause order, directing Plaintiff to show cause by April 21, 2025, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines, as well as why USMS’s motion should not be granted. ECF No. 32. The Court again warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. No response has been received. 2 Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) (ECF No. 16), which the Court denied, as default had not been entered (ECF No. 19). 3 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states he “asserts claims individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated who may have been affected by Defendants' policies or practices regarding religious attire seeks to represent a class of similarly aggrieved persons.” First Am. Compl. at 2. However, a pro se plaintiff cannot pursue claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (affirming the dismissal of a class action for lack of jurisdiction because a pro se plaintiff “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself”); Morgovsky v. Adbrite, Inc., 2012 WL 1595105, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (holding that a pro se plaintiff in a class action is barred from pursuing claims on behalf of other class members in a representative capacity). This follows from the legal principle that pro se litigants can represent themselves, but themselves only. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664–64 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the “general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity” including class actions); Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non- attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for The Court possesses the inherent power to dismiss an action sua sponte “to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962). Dismissal nonetheless is a harsh penalty and should be used only in extreme circumstances. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate for the failure to comply with court orders or the failure to prosecute, courts consider five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . or where at least thr
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DAUDA ILIYA, Case No. 24-cv-03720-TSH
Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR v. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
et al., Defendants. Plaintiff Dauda Iliya, who represents himself, brings this case against the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), alleging security officers at the entrance to the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California forced him to remove his religious cap. Pending before the Court is USMS’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint. ECF No. 29. After Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, the Court ordered him to show cause (the third show cause order issued in this case) by April 21, 2025, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. ECF No. 32. The Court warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. As of today, no response has been received. Based on the procedural history of this case, the undersigned finds it appropriate to dismiss this case for failure to prosecute. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders.1 Plaintiff states he “is a devout individual who, as part of his religious observance, wears a religious cap, which holds deep religious significance for him.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 28. On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff visited the Ronald V. Dellums Federal Courthouse in Oakland, California, with the intention of filing documents with the Clerk of Court. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff states that when he approached the entrance of the courthouse, he encountered several U.S. Marshals stationed for security purposes. Id. ¶ 9. Upon noticing Plaintiff’s religious cap, a U.S. Marshal informed him that he would not be permitted to enter the court Clerk’s Office unless he removed the cap. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff explained that the cap was “a mandatory religious article that he wore for religious purposes and requested accommodation to retain the cap while conducting his business within the courthouse,” but the U.S. Marshal insisted he could not proceed unless he removed the cap. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. As a result, Plaintiff “was effectively denied access to the court clerk’s office to file his documentation on the stated date and time.” Id. ¶ 13. On March 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim regarding the incident, which the USMS formally denied on December 19, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff filed this case on June 20, 2024, naming USMS and Does 1-10 as defendants. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleged seven causes of action: (1) violation of his First Amendment rights, (2) violation of 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.445, (3) violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. (“RFRA”), (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligence, (6) discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, and (7) violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 1, 34-88. On September 9, 2024, USMS moved for dismissal, arguing the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 11. After Plaintiff failed to file an opposition, the Court ordered him to show cause by October 11, 2024, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines, as well as why Defendant’s motion should not be granted. ECF No. 13. The Court warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. On October 11 Plaintiff filed an opposition.2 ECF No. 15. On December 20 the Court granted USMS’s motion with leave to amend by January 21, 2025, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and RFRA claims for equitable relief. ECF No. 23. After Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond, the Court again ordered him to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines. ECF No. 24. The Court again warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. After Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 25), the Court discharged the show cause order and directed him to file an amended complaint by February 27, 2025. ECF No. 27. Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on February 27, alleging claims under the First and Fifth Amendments and the RFRA.3 USMS again moved for dismissal. ECF No. 29. After Plaintiff failed to file a response, the Court issued a third show cause order, directing Plaintiff to show cause by April 21, 2025, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court deadlines, as well as why USMS’s motion should not be granted. ECF No. 32. The Court again warned that the case may be dismissed if he failed to respond. Id. No response has been received. 2 Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) (ECF No. 16), which the Court denied, as default had not been entered (ECF No. 19). 3 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states he “asserts claims individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated who may have been affected by Defendants' policies or practices regarding religious attire seeks to represent a class of similarly aggrieved persons.” First Am. Compl. at 2. However, a pro se plaintiff cannot pursue claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966) (affirming the dismissal of a class action for lack of jurisdiction because a pro se plaintiff “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself”); Morgovsky v. Adbrite, Inc., 2012 WL 1595105, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (holding that a pro se plaintiff in a class action is barred from pursuing claims on behalf of other class members in a representative capacity). This follows from the legal principle that pro se litigants can represent themselves, but themselves only. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664–64 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the “general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity” including class actions); Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (“While a non- attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for The Court possesses the inherent power to dismiss an action sua sponte “to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962). Dismissal nonetheless is a harsh penalty and should be used only in extreme circumstances. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether dismissal is appropriate for the failure to comply with court orders or the failure to prosecute, courts consider five factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61). Dismissal is appropriate “where at least four factors support dismissal . . . or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). First, “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In view of Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this matter and repeated failure to comply with court orders, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. Second, it is “incumbent” upon courts “to manage [their] docket[s] without being subject to routine noncompliance” of litigants. Id. (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261). Moreover, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest.” Id. Plaintiff delayed adjudication of the claims in this case, not only by failing to respond to USMS’s first motion to dismiss in a timely manner and by failing to file an amended complaint by the deadline, but also by failing to respond to the most recent show cause order altogether. Plaintiff’s repeated failures have “consumed some of the court’s time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket.” Id. Therefore, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). While the “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in and of itself to warrant dismissal,” the risk of prejudice is also related to the plaintiff’s reason for defaulting. Id. at 642-43. Despite being given ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiff has provided no explanation for his failure to respond to USMS’s pending motion and failure to respond to the third show cause order. This failure to offer any explanation weighs in favor of dismissal. See Laurino v. Syringa Gen. Hosp., 279 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] presumption of prejudice arises from a plaintiff’s unexplained failure to prosecute.”); Chico v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2020 WL 2494506, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2020) (concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to provide any reason for the failure to prosecute “counsels in favor of dismissal.”). Fourth, “a district court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. The Court has already attempted less drastic sanctions without success, including issuing three show cause orders and giving Plaintiff multiple opportunities to explain the failure to prosecute. “Though there are a wide variety of sanctions short of dismissal available, the district court need not exhaust them all before finally dismissing a case.” Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). Further, as Plaintiff failed to respond to the most recent show cause order, another order requiring him to respond is likely to be futile. See, e.g., Gleason v. World Sav. Bank, FSB, 2013 WL 3927799, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) (finding dismissal appropriate where the court previously attempted the lesser sanction of issuing an order to show cause and giving the plaintiff an additional opportunity to re-plead). Moreover, the Court has repeatedly warned Plaintiff of the risk of dismissal for failure to prosecute; thus, he cannot maintain the Court failed in its “obligation to warn the plaintiff that dismissal is imminent.” Oliva v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal. Fifth, “the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits strongly counsels 1 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 399). “At the same time, a case that is stalled or 2 unreasonably delayed by a party’s failure to comply with deadlines . . . cannot move forward 3 toward resolution on the merits.” Jd. Thus, “this factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose 4 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes 5 progress in that direction.” Jd. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1996)). 6 Although this factor typically weighs against dismissal, Plaintiff has failed to move this case 7 toward disposition on the merits. This factor is therefore neutral at best. 8 Vv. CONCLUSION 9 Based on the analysis above, the undersigned finds at least four of the five factors weigh in 10 favor of dismissal. Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to comply with court deadlines, failed to respond 11 to USMS’s pending motion to dismiss, and failed to respond to the Court’s third show cause order. 12 Thus, Plaintiff failed to prosecute this case and dismissal is appropriate. However, a less drastic 13 alternative is dismissal without prejudice, which both minimizes prejudice to a defendant and 14 preserves a plaintiff's ability to seek relief. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Thus, “[i]n an 3 15 abundance—perhaps overabundance—of caution,” the Court finds dismissal without prejudice is a 16 appropriate. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 706 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013) (remanding to 3 17 the district court to consider whether dismissal should have been without prejudice). Accordingly, S 18 || the Court DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute and failure to 19 comply with the Court’s deadlines and orders. 21 22 Dated: May 5, 2025 23 LU \ : Lj, THOMAS S. HIXSON 24 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28