BISTLINE, Justice.
Article 9, § 1 of the state constitution (“the education clause”) provides: The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.
Article 1, § 2 of the state constitution provides in part:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit____
The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases allege that the current method of funding the public schools does not provide either a “uniform” system or a “thorough” system and, further, violates the equal protection clause.
BACKGROUND
Public schools in Idaho are funded by a combination of local, state, and federal funds. The State partially or totally reimburses the districts for certain expenses (80% of costs of exceptional education personnel; 85% of transportation costs; and 100% of teacher retirement benefits, Social Security, and unemployment insurance). Money is also received from the State Educational Support Program. This program is funded by state revenues, allocated by a “support unit” formula and based on average daily attendance in the district. Each school district’s portion is reduced by a projected “local contribution” equal to the money which would be collected by a .36% property tax levy by the school district. Because a school district with low assessed property value will collect less money than a district with high property values under the .36% formula, a low property value district contributes less money to the Educational Support Program fund than a high property value school district. The school district may also, with voter approval, raise more money through supplemental levies. Supplemental levies are used for both capital construction and day-to-day mainte[578]*578nance and operations. As will be discussed in greater detail below, chartered school districts have greater authority to levy money than do non-chartered districts. Finally, a relatively small amount of a school district’s budget comes from lottery proceeds and various federal programs.
The appellants in this case are the Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity (“ISEEO”), Blaine County School District (“Blaine”), and the Frazier group (“Frazier”). The respondents are the State of Idaho, by and through the Legislature and Governor (“State”), and the Boise City School District (“Boise”).
ISEEO filed a lawsuit in Latah County alleging that the current system of funding public schools is unconstitutional because it does not provide a thorough education in that necessary' resources are unavailable due to lack of money. The Frazier lawsuit was filed in Ada County, also alleging the funding system is not thorough. Frazier further alleged that the disparities in funding caused by the property-tax funded system results in a system that does not provide a uniform education and violates the equal protection clause. The ISEEO suit was moved to Ada County upon motion by the State. ISEEO and Blaine moved to intervene as party plaintiffs in the Frazier suit. Boise moved to intervene as a party defendant. These motions were granted. Eventually, the Frazier and ISEEO suits were consolidated.
The State and Boise moved to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to state a cause of action and for lack of standing. The district court granted the motion. All parties agree that the court, in its memorandum decision, held that: 1) the equal protection claims had been decided adversely to the plaintiffs in Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975), and 2) the uniformity claims had also been decided adversely to the plaintiffs in Thompson. The parties disagree about how the district court resolved the thoroughness question. The defendants argue that the Court held that Thompson decided the merits of the question adversely to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that the court did not consider the merits of the thoroughness question and instead abstained from deciding the question. The court also held that the taxpayer/citizen plaintiffs did not have standing to sue but further held that the other plaintiffs did have standing.
On appeal, the appellants argue that the district court misread Thompson and that the taxpayer/citizens do have standing to sue. The respondents claim Thompson mandates the dismissal of all the appellants’ causes of action and that not only do the taxpayer/citizens lack standing but so do the other individuals and organizations involved in this suit.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is the same as the standard upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment. The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in his/her favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho 635, 637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, this Court has previously considered a case similar to the one at bar. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975). The resolution of the issues on appeal largely depends on the effect of Thompson on this case.
In Thompson, the Court reviewed the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. Ray Durtschi, presiding. Judge Durtschi determined that “the present system [of school funding], with its heavy reliance on the ad valorem property tax, violate[s] Art. 9, Sec. 1, of the Idaho Constitution by failing to provide the requisite ‘uniform system of public schools’ ” and ordered the defendants to restructure the school funding method. Thompson, 96 Idaho at 794, 537 P.2d at 636. Judge Durtschi, however, rejected the claim that the system violated the equal [579]*579protection clause. Thompson, 96 Idaho at 796, 537 P.2d at 638. On review, this Court reversed the order of the district court, finding that the system did not violate the education clause. The Court went on to hold that the funding system did not violate the state equal protection clause. Id.
For the reasons expressed below, we have concluded that Thompson and cases decided after Thompson mandate dismissal of the uniformity claim brought by the appellants and most of their equal protection claims but that they do not resolve the thoroughness claim, which was not litigated by the parties in Thompson. As to that issue, we have further concluded that the plaintiffs have alleged facts which, if proven at trial, would entitle them to relief. We also hold that the citizen/taxpayer plaintiffs do not have standing. Accordingly, we affirm the district court order in part, reverse it in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1. Thompson Held That the System of School Funding Does Not Violate the “Uniformity” Requirement of the Education Clause.
The appellants argue that Thompson v. Engelking should not be followed in that it is not a majority opinion or it is either distinguishable, inapposite, or wrongly decided. We disagree and conclude Thompson reaches the correct result and disposes of the appellants’ claims that are based upon the “uniformity” language of art. 9, § I-
In Thompson, the opinion for the Court was written by Chief Justice McQuade, who was joined by Justices McFadden and Shepard. Justices Donaldson and Bakes dissented. In addition to concurring, Justice Shepard wrote a specially concurring opinion in which Justice McFadden also joined. The appellants argue that in Thompson, the Chief Justice’s opinion must be synthesized with Justice Shepard’s specially concurring opinion in order to discern the view of the majority of the court. We disagree. The special concurring opinion of Justice Shepard only provides additional reasoning. The reasoning of the majority of three is contained in Chief Justice McQuade’s opinion, which was joined by two other members and is the opinion of the Court. That is the portion of Thompson which has precedential effect.
The Court in Thompson held that a funding system which created unequal per student expenditures between school districts did not violate the education clause or equal protection clause:
Artficle] 9, and in particular, Sec. 1, does not guarantee to the children of this state a right to be educated in such a manner that all services and facilities are equal throughout the state.
96 Idaho at 805, 537 P.2d at 647. The Court went on to quote favorably from an opinion of the Washington State Supreme Court that defined a “uniform education” as one administered to “enable[ ] a child to transfer from one district to another within the same grade without substantial loss of credit or standing.” Thompson, 96 Idaho at 810, 537 P.2d at 652 (quoting North-shore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 727, 530 P.2d 178, 202 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 99 (1978)).
In sum, the appellants’ attempt to distinguish their uniformity claim from the claim resolved in Thompson cannot prevail because they mistake the additional rationale of the special concurring opinion for the rationale of the Court’s opinion.
Second, the appellants argue that if the Thompson Court did not construe the word “uniform” to mean substantially equal educational opportunities, we should take that opportunity to do so now. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (construing “thorough and efficient”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989) (construing “efficient”). We decline the appellants’ invitation to extend the reach of Thompson because we continue to believe the uniformity requirement in the education clause re[580]*580quires only uniformity in curriculum, not uniformity in funding.
2. The Equal Protection Clause is Not Violated by the Current School Funding System.
a. Thompson has precedential effect.
The appellants argue that the portion of Thompson which held the funding system did not violate the state equal protection clause need not be followed because it was dicta. In support, they point out that neither party in Thompson appealed Judge Durtschi’s ruling that the equal protection clause was not violated and argue that, therefore, it was not necessary for this Court to reach the issue in order to render a decision.
This argument fails to take into account the fact that where an order of the district court is correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984). This doctrine is sometimes called the “right result-wrong theory” rule. Idaho Appellate Handbook, pg. 3-24 (1985). Thus, even though we disagreed with Judge Durtschi’s holding that the school funding scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the education clause, the Court could have still affirmed his order, if we thought the scheme violated equal protection. In fact, many pages of the respondent’s brief in Thompson are devoted to arguing the equal protection claim. Brief of Marba C. Thompson, et. al, pg. 59-74. Thus, the Court needed to address the equal protection issue in order to fully decide the appeal, and the equal protection holding in Thompson has full precedential effect.
b. Thompson reached the right result.
The Thompson Court reviewed the plaintiffs’ equal protection charge under the rational basis test and concluded the school funding system did not violate that standard. Under that test, the equal protection clause is violated only if a classification is based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals or only if no grounds can be advanced to justify the State’s goals. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 711, 791 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1990). The appellants claim Thompson should not be applied here because recent developments in equal protection doctrine have undermined the analysis in that case. This argument has three subparts. The first is that Idaho’s funding system should be subject to the strict scrutiny test for purposes of the equal protection clause because education is a fundamental interest under the Idaho Constitution. Second, the appellants argue that if the strict scrutiny test is not applied then an intermediate scrutiny test should be used. Third, the appellants argue that even if only the rational basis test applies, plaintiffs are entitled to a trial as to whether the funding system satisfies the test.
We believe the result reached in Thompson as to the equal protection claim was a sound one and we continue to adhere to it.
This Court set out the proper procedure for resolving an equal protection clause argument in Tarbox v. Tax Comm’n, 107 Idaho 957, 695 P.2d 342 (1985):
The first step in an equal protection analysis is to identify the classification which is being challenged____
The second step is to determine the standard under which the classification will be judicially reviewed.
Tarbox, 107 Idaho at 959, 695 P.2d at 344. The third step is to determine whether the standard has been satisfied. See State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.App.1986).
The classifications here are: 1) those citizens who must pay higher tax rates than the norm or higher taxes than the norm in order to bring their local school district to the same level of funding as other districts because of the school funding equalization program, and 2) those students, parents, and school administrators who are receiving less than an equal amount of funding from the State. As to the taxpayer plaintiffs, the proper standard is easily determined. “The established rule in Idaho is that the rational basis test is the [581]*581appropriate standard of review of classifications made for tax purposes.” Tarbox v. Tax Comm’n, 107 Idaho at 959, 695 P.2d at 344; Sheppard v. State Dep’t of Employment, 103 Idaho 501, 504, 650 P.2d 643, 646 (1982).
The proper standard to apply to the second group is more difficult to identify. The appellants suggest that we apply the strict scrutiny standard, which requires that the State bear the burden of proving not only that it has a compelling state interest which justifies the classification but also that the discrimination is necessary to promote that interest. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 33, 803 P.2d 528, 534 (1990); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 713, 535 P.2d 1348, 1350 (1975). The appellants note that the United States Supreme Court has stated that a right is fundamental for purposes of federal equal protection analysis if that right is guaranteed in the federal constitution. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Rodriguez held that education was not a fundamental right under the federal equal protection clause.). The appellants conclude from the above that education should be considered a fundamental right for state equal protection analysis because it is expressly mentioned in art. 9, § 1.
First, we note that the Thompson Court rejected this same argument:
The argument is advanced that under the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test used by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, our system of public school financing violates the equal protection clause of the Idaho Constitution. Its proponents contend that there exists a substantive fundamental right to education, based upon Art. 9, Sec. 1 of the Idaho Constitution.
We believe this to be an inappropriate occasion to adopt for use by this Court in interpreting the Idaho equal protection clause, the two-tiered strict-scrutiny test used by the United States Supreme Court to initially scrutinize Rodriguez____ Nor, are we inclined to adopt, so as to dispose of this appeal, the definition of “fundamental right” as set forth in Rodriguez, i.e., a right explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Thompson, 96 Idaho at 803, 537 P.2d at 645.
Although, as the appellants correctly observe, this Court, in cases decided after Thompson, embraced the strict scrutiny analysis under our state constitution in cases where fundamental rights are involved (the “two-tiered strict scrutiny” test mentioned above), see, e.g., Tarbox, 107 Idaho at 959-60, 695 P.2d at 344-45; Olsen v. J.A. Freeman, Co., 117 Idaho 706, 710, 791 P.2d 1285, 1289 (1990), we have never adopted the Rodriguez definition of fundamental rights. Instead of using the Rodriguez constitutional guarantee test, we have determined whether the right in question was fundamental on a case by case basis. Thus far, this Court has never held that the particular right at issue was a fundamental one but has stated in dicta that voting, procreation, and constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes are fundamental rights under the state constitution. See Tarbox, 107 Idaho at 960 n. 1, 695 P.2d at 345 n. 1 (quoting Newlan, 96 Idaho at 713, 535 P.2d at 1350); see also State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202, 205 (Ct.App.1986).
We have determined that it is time to partially abandon our case by case determination of whether a particular right asserted is fundamental. That approach provides no neutral criteria by which the Court can make that determination and could give the appearance of result-oriented decision making. Further, it gives no guidance to the lower courts when they are faced with making that determination.
We now hold that the “fundamental rights” found in our state constitution are those expressed as a positive right. We have considered but reject the appellants’ suggestion that the Rodriguez definition of fundamental rights be adopted. Although the sections in our state constitution which impose a duty upon the government might be said to invest a derivative right in those [582]*582to whom the duty is owed, the inclusion of those derivative rights in our definition of fundamental rights would be overly broad. For example, art. 3, § 26 provides that the government should promote temperance and morality; however, this section does not create a positive right to the enjoyment of the same. This is not to say that the state constitution is the exclusive source of fundamental rights. As noted above, this Court has stated that procreation is a fundamental right, and the right to procreate is not explicitly mentioned in the state constitution. See Tarbox, 107 Idaho at 960 n. 1, 695 P.2d at 345 n. 1. Rights which are not directly guaranteed by the state constitution may be considered to be fundamental if they are implicit in our State’s concept of ordered liberty.
In light of the above holding, we further hold that education is not a fundamental right because it is not a right directly guaranteed by the state constitution. Rather, art. 9, § 1 imposes a “duty [upon] the legislature [ ] to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common schools.” (Emphasis added.) Art. 9, § 1, “[o]n its face, mandates action by the Legislature. It does not establish education as a basic fundamental right.” Thompson, 96 Idaho at 806, 537 P.2d at 648.
It should also be pointed out that the education article, setting forth the responsibilities of the state in regard to public education and establishing a fund to finance a portion of that system, is on a different plane than is, for example, Art. 1 of the Idaho Constitution, wherein the framers set forth fundamental rights guaranteed to the people by that constitution.
Thompson, 96 Idaho at 806 n. 50, 537 P.2d at 648 n. 50. In sum, we decline to apply the strict scrutiny standard in this case.
The appellants next argue that the intermediate scrutiny test should be applied. That test, sometimes called the “means-focus” test, has the court determine whether the legislation substantially furthers some specifically identifiable legislative end. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 867, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976).
The appellants rely upon State v. Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 686 P.2d 842 (Ct.App.1984), in support of their claim that the intermediate test is applied in cases where the statute blatantly discriminates between classes or where there are especially important interests involved and' there is legislation which creates unusually sensitive classes. That case, however, is distinguishable because it dealt with a federal equal protection claim. The Court of Appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court had applied the intermediate level of review to cases “where especially important, though not necessarily ‘fundamental’ interests are at stake and in cases where unusually sensitive, although not necessarily ‘suspect,’ classes have been created.” Reed, 107 Idaho at 170, 686 P.2d at 850; see also Missamore, 119 Idaho at 33, 803 P.2d at 534 (discussing federal equal protection analysis). The Reed Court went on to observe that this Court in Jones v. State Board of Medicine and Tarbox v. Tax Commission had applied the intermediate scrutiny test only to those classifications which have discriminatory effects which are “blatant” or “apparent on their face.” Id. Thus, the Reed Court perceptively pointed out the difference between the federal and state equal protection analysis as it pertains to the intermediate standard of review. As the appellants here have limited their equal protection argument to the state constitution, we need not apply the intermediate standard of review unless the discriminatory effects of the school funding system are either blatant or apparent on its face pursuant to Jones and Tarbox.
We have examined the statutes in question and have concluded that the only aspect of the funding scheme challenged by the appellants which blatantly discriminates is I.C. § 33-802. That statute treats chartered school districts differently than non-chartered school districts in their respective powers to levy additional taxes. Thus, as to this small part of the appellants’ equal protection challenge, the intermediate standard of review applies. [583]*583As to the remainder of the appellants’ equal protection challenge, there is no suspect class involved, nor fundamental right, and the statutes involved do not blatantly discriminate. Thus, the rational basis test is the proper standard of review of those portions of the school funding system.
Having identified the classes and the appropriate standards of review, we now turn to the third part of the equal protection analysis: whether the standards have been met. As to those statutes which do not blatantly discriminate, we adhere to the holding in Thompson that they withstand scrutiny under the rational basis test.1 Thompson, 96 Idaho at 803, 537 P.2d at 645. As to the challenge to I.C. § 33-802, we remand to the district court for reconsideration under the intermediate standard.
3. Thompson Does Not Hold Whether the “Thoroughness” Requirement of the Education Clause Was Violated in That Case and Thus Does Not Foreclose The Plaintiffs’ Suit.
Notwithstanding our holdings above, we believe that the appellants have stated a claim upon which relief may be granted based on the thoroughness provision of art. 9, § 1. The Thompson Court was not asked to, nor did it, address the meaning of the word “thorough.” Judge Durtschi only ruled that system did not provide a “uniform” education; that was the only ruling before the Court. To the extent that isolated phrases can be taken out of the Thompson opinion which make it appear that we there addressed the thoroughness question, those phrases are taken out of context and are not binding.
The respondents argue that the Court should not involve itself in the complicated determination of what is a “thorough” education and that we should defer to the other branches of government in this matter. Mindful that “[arguments erupt at the drop of a hat as to what is or is not necessary in an educational system [and as to] what is or is not a frill,” Thompson, 96 Idaho at 814, 537 P.2d at 656 (Shepard, J. concurring), and that this Court is not well equipped to legislate “in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy,” Thompson, 96 Idaho at 798, 537 P.2d at 640, we decline to accept the respondents’ argument that the other branches of government be allowed to interpret the constitution for us. That would be an abject abdication of our role in the American system of government.
Passing on the constitutionality of statutory enactments, even enactment with political overtones, is a fundamental responsibility of the judiciary, and has been so since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1813).
Miles v. Idaho Power, 116 Idaho at 640, 778 P.2d at 762. Likewise we are fully confident that once we have fulfilled our constitutional duty to interpret the constitution “the other branches of government also will carry out their defined constitutional duties in good faith and in a completely responsible manner.” Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 88-89 (1978).
Balancing our constitutional duty to define the meaning of the thoroughness requirement of art. 9 § 1 with the political difficulties of that task has been made simpler for this Court because the executive branch of the government has already promulgated educational standards pursuant to the legislature’s directive in I.C. § 33-118. See State Board of Education Rules and Regulations for Public School K-12, IDAPA 08.02. We have examined those standards carefully and now hold that, under art. 9, § 1, the requirements for school facilities, instructional programs and textbooks, and transportation systems as contained in those regulations presently in effect, are consistent with our view of thoroughness. We believe that our acknowledgement of these standards appropriately involves the other branches of state gov-[584]*584eminent while allowing the judiciary to hold fast to its independent duty of interpreting the constitution when and as required.2
Where the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action in alleging that the current funding system does not provide a thorough education, they are entitled to an opportunity to prove their allegations. Should the plaintiffs be able prove that they cannot meet the standards established by the State Board of Education, noted above, with the money provided under the current funding system they will have presented an apparent prima facie case that the State has not established and maintained a system of thorough education. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court dismissing the thoroughness claims.
4. The Taxpayers/Citizens Do Not Have Standing to Sue.
The district court dismissed a group of plaintiffs who sued as citizens of and taxpayers in a particular school district and not as students, parents of students, or school administrators. These plaintiffs alleged that they are adversely affected by the present funding system because they are forced to pay more property tax or pay at a higher tax rate than taxpayers in other school districts in order to maintain the same level of funding. For example, the taxpayers residing in Blaine County allege that, because of the high assessed property value in that county, the State deducts a larger portion of general funds under the “equalization” formula than from school districts with lower assessed values. Thus, the school district receives less State money and must collect more money from the local property owners than other school districts. On the other hand, the taxpayers from the Meridian School District allege that because of the low assessed property value in their district the school district must tax their property at a higher rate in order to raise the same amount of money that “property-rich” school districts raise with a lower tax rate. In sum, these plaintiffs assert the method of funding results in uneven funding between school districts and thus violates the uniformity and thoroughness requirements of the education clause and the equal protection clause.
The district court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to our decision in Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). In Miles we held that in order to have standing, a party must have a “personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation. That is, a party must suffer a “distinct palpable injury” and there must be a “fairly traceable” causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 736 (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978)).
Applying this standard to the remaining thoroughness claim, we conclude that the citizen/taxpayers do not have standing. That claim does not attack the method of funding; it only challenges the amount of funding provided without regard to the method of obtaining that money. Thus, the taxpayer/citizens, who do not attend the public schools, do not have children there, and are not responsible for the operation thereof, do not suffer a “distinct palpable injury” as a result of the alleged lack of school funding.
Miles, moreover, requires the dismissal of the citizen/taxpayers as to the equal protection claim. The only remaining portion of that claim is the challenge to I.C. § 33-802, which treats non-chartered school districts less favorably than chartered school districts and since the citizen/taxpayers suffer no distinct injury from that different treatment they have no standing to sue under Miles.
[585]*585We affirm the district court’s decision dismissing the citizen/taxpayers from the suit.
5. ISEEO and the School Districts Have Standing and the Authority to Bring This Lawsuit.
The State of Idaho argues that we can still affirm part of the district court’s decision dismissing all the claims for reasons not used by the trial court, to wit: that 1) ISEEO lacks standing to bring these lawsuits, and 2) the school districts lack standing and authority to sue.
In support of the second claim the State cites us to authority which holds that a school district cannot sue its creator, the State. East Jackson Pub. Schools v. State, 133 Mich.App. 132, 348 N.W.2d 303 (1984). While we acknowledge the Michigan court has so held, we are unable to adopt that court’s reasoning. The court in East Jackson rejected the argument that the school district’s statutory power to “sue and be sued” did not give it authority to sue the state. 348 N.W.2d at 306 n. 11. This Court, to the contrary, has already held that the “sue or be sued” clause in I.C. § 33-301 was intended to allow the school districts to “prosecute any actions they might deem necessary for the protection and preservation of the school funds and property.” This “unqualified grant of power ... carries with it all powers that are ordinarily incident to the prosecution and defense of a suit at law or in equity.” Independent School Dists. v. Common School Dists., 56 Idaho 426, 55 P.2d 144 (1936). As the school districts allege they are being deprived of the funds they are entitled to under art. 9, § 1, they have the authority under I.C. § 33-301 to maintain this suit.
Next the State argues that the districts do not have standing because they did not represent the rights of the students. Whether or not that is true is beside the point because the districts have the required “personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation. School districts have an interest in receiving enough money to provide a thorough education for their pupils. Taking the school districts’ allegations in the light most favorable to them, as we must, they are not currently receiving that money. Thus the school districts meet the Miles test in that they allege a distinct palpable injury (lack of adequate funds) that has a fairly traceable causal connection to the actions of the State (the amount of money allocated by the Legislature to education).
Finally, the State argues that the superintendents/members of ISEEO lack standing because they have not suffered a distinct palpable injury. We disagree. Like the school districts, the superintendents have alleged they cannot provide a thorough education to their charges due to lack of state funding. Thus they have individual standing under Miles. ISEEO, the association of superintendents, has standing because “an organization whose members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); see Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass’n v. Bird, 106 Idaho 84, 87, 675 P.2d 344, 347 (Ct.App.1983).
CONCLUSION
We affirm Judge Schroeder’s dismissal of the causes of action which allege that the school funding system does not provide a “uniform” system of education. The dismissal of the equal protection claim is also affirmed, except to that part regarding the different treatment of chartered and non-chartered school districts. The dismissal of the Frazier and ISEEO causes of action which allege the funding system does not provide a thorough education is reversed. The order dismissing the taxpayer/citizens from this suit is affirmed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
JOHNSON and TROUT, JJ. concur.