Ibrahim Seerar Mah v. ICE Field Office Director

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 IBRAHIM SEERAR MAH, CASE NO. C26-0037-KKE 8

Petitioner(s), ORDER GRANTING HABEAS PETITION 9 v.

10 ICE FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR,

11 Respondent(s).

12 Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that 13 his detention is unlawful and requesting either that the Court order that he is entitled to a bond 14 hearing or order his immediate release. Dkt. No. 3. Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment 15 of counsel. Dkt. No. 5. The Government1 filed its return on January 26, 2026, arguing that it is 16 entitled to detain Petitioner without the opportunity for release on bond, but that if the Court 17 disagrees, the appropriate remedy is an order to hold a bond hearing. Dkt. No. 7. 18 Because the Court finds that Petitioner has established that his detention is unlawful, the 19 Court will grant the habeas petition and deny the motion to appoint counsel as moot. 20

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1 This order refers to Defendant United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Field Office Director 24 as “the Government.” 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a citizen of Somalia who arrived in the United States seeking asylum in March 3 2023. Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 4. He crossed the border not at a port of entry and without valid documents,

4 and was detained shortly thereafter. Id. United States Border Patrol paroled Petitioner into the 5 United States for the purpose of criminal prosecution, and the United States Marshal took custody 6 of Petitioner. Id. 7 In April 2023, Petitioner was convicted of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (improper entry to the 8 United States) in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota and sentenced 9 to 24 days of incarceration with credit for time served. Dkt. No. 9-1. Upon release, Petitioner was 10 instructed to check in with ICE. Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 5. 11 In May 2023, Petitioner visited an ICE office, where he was issued a notice to appear, 12 charging him as inadmissible and removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Dkt. No. 9-2.

13 ICE then detained Petitioner until he was released on an order of supervision in August 2023. Dkt. 14 No. 8 ¶¶ 6–7; Dkt. Nos. 9-3, 9-4, 9-5. He enrolled in an Alternative to Detention (“ATD”) 15 program, imposing certain conditions of release. Id. ¶ 7. 16 In April 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s requests for relief from removal 17 and ordered him removed to Somalia. Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 8. Petitioner appealed this order to the Board 18 of Immigration Appeals, and his appeal remains pending. Id. ¶ 9. 19 In September 2025, ICE detained Petitioner when he appeared for an ICE check-in, due to 20 alleged ATD violations. Dkt. Nos. 9-6, 9-7. Petitioner had a bond hearing scheduled for January 21 23, 2026 (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 12), but “on information and belief” of the Government’s counsel, Petitioner 22 withdrew the bond hearing request at some point (see Dkt. No. 7 at 6) and filed a habeas petition

23 on January 5, 2026. Dkt. No. 1. 24 1 For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Government’s arrest and re-detention of 2 Petitioner without notice of the alleged ATD violations or an opportunity to be heard on them 3 violates his constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, the Court will grant the habeas

4 petition. 5 II. ANALYSIS 6 Federal courts have authority to grant writs of habeas corpus to an individual in custody if 7 such custody is a “violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). In this case, Petitioner contends that his re-detention violates the Due Process 9 Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the federal 10 government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” 11 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. The right to due process extends to “all ‘persons’ within the United States, 12 including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

13 permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 14 “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive 15 individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 16 Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). “The 17 fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and 18 in a meaningful manner.’” Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 19 Determining whether an administrative procedure provides the process constitutionally due 20 generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 21 deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 22 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 23 would entail.

24 Id. at 335. 1 In Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, the Ninth Circuit assumed without deciding that Mathews’ 2 three-part test applies in “the immigration detention context.” 53 F.4th 1189, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 3 2022). District courts have applied the Mathews test in similar circumstances since then. See, e.g.,

4 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2025). The Court will consider each 5 Mathews factor to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detention comports with constitutional due 6 process requirements. 7 A. Petitioner Has a Protected Interest in His Liberty. 8 Petitioner’s interest in not being detained is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]” 9 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). That Petitioner was arrested and remains in custody 10 months later undoubtedly presents a deprivation of Petitioner’s interest in his liberty. 11 Although the Government’s return contends that Petitioner falls within the mandatory 12 detention scheme under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (Dkt. No. 7 at 1–6), Petitioner’s status as a person who

13 has been living in this country for nearly three years counsels against this expanded view of the 14 Immigration and Nationality Act as amended. See, e.g., Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, __ F. Supp. 15 3d __, 2025 WL 3205356, at *20 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2025) (“By subjecting noncitizens like 16 Petitioners to mandatory detention, despite their significant due process rights as individuals 17 present in the U.S., with no consideration of their deep financial, community, and familial ties in 18 the country, the government has proffered an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders 19 constitutional issues.” (citation modified)). “The overwhelming majority of courts to address the 20 issue have agreed that Section 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of Section 21 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen in Petitioner’s position who has resided in the United States 22 for many years.” Aquino v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2904-RSH-MMP, 2025 WL 3158676, at *3 (S.D.

23 Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). The Government’s interpretation of § 1225(b) is 24 unpersuasive when the statutory scheme is read as a whole, when this subsection is read in 1 conjunction with its implementing regulations, and when the subsection is read against the 2 backdrop of shifting agency pronouncements. See, e.g., Llanes Tellez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-08982- 3 PCP, 2025 WL 3677937, at *6–8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).

4 For these reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is properly detained under Section 1226(a) 5 rather than Section 1225(b). This conclusion is consistent with the Government’s earlier actions 6 in this case (releasing Petitioner on an order of supervision), as well as its more recent actions 7 (scheduling a bond hearing). Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s limited, boilerplate 8 arguments to the contrary. See Dkt. No. 7 at 2–6. 9 Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Petitioner’s interest in his liberty 10 is constitutionally protected. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 11 2025) (“[I]ndividuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is 12 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued liberty.”). Accordingly, the first Mathews

13 factor favors Petitioner. 14 B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Liberty is High. 15 The second Mathews factor considers whether a particular process results in a risk of 16 erroneous deprivation of a protected interest, and here, the Court finds a high risk of erroneous 17 deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest in the absence of a hearing. 18 As described earlier in this order, Petitioner was arrested and detained during a check-in 19 appointment based on alleged ATD violations, many of which occurred months earlier. See Dkt. 20 No. 8 at 6. The Government states that ICE revoked Petitioner’s order of supervision in light of 21 these violations, although it acknowledges that it cannot locate “paperwork memorializing” the 22 revocation. Dkt. No. 7 at 6 n.3. It is undisputed that Petitioner did not receive notice or an

23 opportunity to be heard on these alleged violations before the order of supervision was revoked 24 and he was re-detained. 1 The absence of procedural safeguards leads to a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of 2 Petitioner’s liberty, as exemplified by the Government’s inability to produce, even months later, 3 documentation supporting the revocation of Petitioner’s release. Accordingly, the Court finds that

4 the second Mathews factor favors Petitioner. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. 5 C. The Government Interest in Civil Detention Without a Hearing Is Low. 6 In the final Mathews factor, the Court considers the Government’s interest in re-detaining 7 Petitioner without a hearing. 8 The Court finds that the Government’s interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously 9 released without a hearing is “minimal”: any administrative or financial burdens in providing 10 Petitioner a hearing are far outweighed by the risk of erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest 11 at issue. See, e.g., Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the 12 government wishes to re-arrest Ortega at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so;

13 but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). That many of Petitioner’s alleged violations 14 occurred months before they were acted upon undermines any suggestion that the Government’s 15 interests must be satisfied immediately or that the cost of procedural safeguards would be 16 insurmountable. The third Mathews factor therefore favors Petitioner. 17 Based on this review of the Mathews factors, the Court finds that the Petitioner’s liberty 18 interest in his continuing release from custody is entitled to constitutional protections of due 19 process, and that having received no process related to his re-detention, Petitioner’s constitutional 20 rights have been violated. 21 III. REMEDY 22 Having determined that Petitioner’s re-detention violates his constitutional right to due

23 process, the Court concludes his detention is unlawful and will grant his habeas petition. The 24 Court must now determine the appropriate remedy. 1 “In habeas cases, federal courts have broad discretion in conditioning a judgment granting 2 relief.” Lujan v. Garcia, 734 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2013). “Federal courts are authorized, 3 under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, to dispose of habeas corpus matters as law and justice require.” Id.

4 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987)). “Declaratory and injunctive relief are 5 proper habeas remedies.” Perera v. Jennings, 598 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742 (N.D. Cal. 2022). 6 Here, the Court finds that the appropriate remedy for Petitioner’s unconstitutional detention 7 is a bond hearing, as the Government concedes that if the Court finds (as it did) that Petitioner is 8 properly detained under Section 1226(a), rather than Section 1225(b), he is entitled to a bond 9 hearing. See Dkt. No. 7 at 6. Thus, the Court will require the Government to provide Petitioner 10 with a bond hearing that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 11 1196 (2011). 12 IV. CONCLUSION

13 For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 14 Dkt. No. 3. Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied as MOOT. Dkt. No. 5. 15 The Government is ORDERED to conduct, no later than February 19, 2026, a bond hearing 16 before an immigration judge in compliance with Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (2011). As an 17 alternative to a bond hearing, the Government may immediately release Petitioner with the same 18 conditions of supervision that applied before he was detained in September 2025. 19 The Government shall file a declaration no later than February 20, 2026, confirming 20 compliance with this order. 21 Dated this 5th day of February, 2026. 22 A 23 Kymberly K. Evanson 24 United States District Judge