Hyldahl v. Barnes

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 25-243
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-243

Filed 5 November 2025

Brunswick County, No. 22CVS002271-090

CHRISTIAN R. HYLDAHL, Plaintiff,

v.

TANNIS AMBER BARNES and JEREMY BARNES, Defendants.

Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 9 July 2024 by Judge Tiffany Powers in

Brunswick County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 September

2025.

Reiss & Nutt, PLLC, by W. Cory Reiss, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Diguiseppe & Doby, Attorneys at Law, by Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, for Tannis Amber Barnes, Defendant-Appellee.

WOOD, Judge.

Christian Hyldahl (“Plaintiff”) appeals the 9 July 2024 order granting partial

summary judgment in favor of Tannis Amber Barnes (“Defendant”) on Plaintiff’s

claim for malicious prosecution. After careful review of the record and applicable law,

we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background HYLDAHL V. BARNES

Opinion of the Court

In August 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant were in a “boyfriend and girlfriend”

relationship. After the sale of his home in late August 2022, Plaintiff moved into

Defendant’s Holden Beach home. In September 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant went

on a European vacation. While there, their relationship soured and each traveled

back home separately. Plaintiff arrived home first and contacted the New Hanover

County Sheriff’s Office claiming Defendant stole belongings of his on their trip and

requested deputies meet Defendant at the airport to retrieve these items of his that

were in her possession. Deputies went to the airport as Plaintiff requested, but

Defendant was not on her anticipated flight. No further action was taken by the

Sheriff’s Office on this matter. Plaintiff then emailed Holden Beach Police Chief

Jeremy Dixon stating he needed to file a report because Defendant stole some of his

property.

On 4 October 2022, Defendant filed a complaint for a domestic violence

protective order (“DVPO”) against Plaintiff in Brunswick County. Defendant alleged,

I have realized that he is not stable, possibly has undiagnosed mental health issues, has an alcohol abuse problem. Over the past month, he has threatened me while brandishing weapons in my home while intoxicated, behaves menacing while intoxicated, all of which culminated in him threatening to burn my home to the ground. He has a history of protection orders against him. I am in fear of this person and no longer want him at my residence or in my life.

An ex parte DVPO was granted, and Plaintiff was ordered to stay away from

Defendant and three residences that Defendant specified. Defendant moved to

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Wilmington shortly after because Hurricane Ian damaged her Holden Beach home.

On 7 October 2022, 21 October 2022, and 22 October 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant

were both present at Seven Mile Post bar in Wilmington, although it is unclear who

arrived first and what happened during each encounter. On 25 October 2022,

Plaintiff’s mother sent a text message to Defendant. After these encounters at Seven

Mile Post and the text message from Plaintiff’s mother, Defendant contacted the New

Hanover County Sheriff’s Office and reported each as a possible violation of the

Brunswick County DVPO. On 1 November 2022, four arrest warrants were issued

for Plaintiff for violations of the DVPO after Deputy Ryan Walker (“Deputy Walker”)

of the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Office appeared in front of the Magistrate. At

this time, Plaintiff was living in Raleigh and was not served until 3 November 2022

when he appeared in Brunswick County for the DVPO hearing.

On 3 November 2022, the Brunswick County District Court dismissed

Defendant’s complaint for a DVPO against Plaintiff. On 15 November 2022,

Defendant filed another complaint for a DVPO, this time in New Hanover County.

The New Hanover County District Court found that Defendant “failed to prove

grounds for ex parte relief” because no new allegations were provided since the

Brunswick County DVPO was denied.

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On 6 December 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant and her

brother, Jeremy Barnes (“Jeremy”).1 The complaint stated three claims for relief: (1)

trespass to chattel, (2) conversion of property, and (3) punitive damages. Defendant

and Jeremy filed an answer to the complaint on 10 February 2023.

On 16 March 2023, the criminal charges against Plaintiff for violating the

DVPO were dismissed, in part by the New Hanover County District Attorney prior to

trial and the remaining charges were dismissed by the New Hanover County District

Court at the close of the State’s evidence. On 20 March 2023, Plaintiff petitioned for

these charges to be expunged; the petition was granted the same day. Following the

dismissed and expunged charges, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“Amended

Complaint”) on 10 July 2023. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff made claims for

relief for: (1) trespass to chattel, (2) conversion of property, and (3) punitive damages.

Further, Plaintiff made claims for relief against Defendant for (1) malicious

prosecution, and (2) abuse of process. Defendant and Jeremy filed an answer to the

Amended Complaint on 26 July 2023.

On 17 May 2024, Defendant and Jeremy filed a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff and

Defendant filed affidavits prior to the summary judgment hearing, which took place

on 8 July 2024. The morning of the hearing, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim

1 Jeremy Barnes is not a party to the issue on appeal.

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for abuse of process against Defendant. At the hearing, Defendant’s attorney made

arguments for summary judgment only on the claims of malicious prosecution and

punitive damages, acknowledging the claims for trespass to chattel and conversion of

property were better suited to be heard before a jury. On 9 July 2024, the trial court

entered its order granting summary judgment on the claim of malicious prosecution

but denying summary judgment on the claim of punitive damages.

The remaining claims proceeded to trial. The jury found that Defendant and

Jeremy had converted several of Plaintiff’s belongings. On 12 August 2024, the trial

court entered a final judgment finding Defendant liable to Plaintiff for conversion of

property in the amount of $12,000.00 plus punitive damages in the amount of

$3,000.00 and finding Jeremy liable for conversion of property in the amount of

$1,400.00. On 9 September 2024, Plaintiff filed notice of appeal of the 9 July 2024

order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the claim of malicious

prosecution.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on the claim of malicious prosecution because a genuine issue of

material fact exists. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Under a de novo standard of review, we review a trial court’s order granting or

denying a motion for summary judgment “to determine whether any genuine issue of

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material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fox v. City of Greensboro, 279 N.C. App. 301, 313, 866 S.E.2d 270, 283 (2021)

(cleaned up). “We review the record in a light most favorable to the party against

whom the order has been entered to determine whether there exists a genuine issue

as to any material fact.” Lopp v. Anderson, 251 N.C. App. 161, 165, 795 S.E.2d 770,

774 (2016) (quoting Smith v. Harris, 181 N.C. App. 585, 587, 640 S.E.2d 436, 438

(2007)).

B. Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the

claim of malicious prosecution because genuine issues of material fact exist

precluding summary judgment. In contrast, Defendant contends summary judgment

was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact about the existence

of probable cause, which is sufficient to defeat a malicious prosecution claim.

To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) the defendant instituted, procured or participated in the

criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) without probable cause, (3) with malice,

and (4) the prior proceeding was terminated in the favor of the plaintiff. Lopp, 251

N.C. App. at 174, 795 S.E.2d at 779. “A defendant may show entitlement to summary

judgment by [] proving that an essential element of the plaintiff’s case is non-

existent.” Fox, 279 N.C. App. at 314, 866 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Hoffman v. Great

Am. All. Ins. Co., 166 N.C. App. 422, 426, 601 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2004)). The presence

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of probable cause for the initiation of the earlier proceeding is enough to defeat a

claim for malicious prosecution. Martin v. Parker, 150 N.C. App. 179, 182, 563 S.E.2d

216, 218 (2002).

Actions by the defendant leading to “initiation” of the prosecution are facts,

“but the trial court’s determination that these actions constituted initiation of a

criminal action is a conclusion of law we review de novo.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Cully’s Motorcross Park, Inc., 366 N.C. 505, 512, 742 S.E.2d 781, 786

(2013). “It cannot be said that one who reports suspicious circumstances to the

authorities thereby makes himself responsible for their subsequent action, even when

the suspected persons are able to establish their innocence.” Becker v. Pierce, 168 N.C.

App. 671, 675, 608 S.E.2d 825, 828 (2005) (cleaned up) (quoting Harris v. Barham, 35

N.C. App. 13, 16, 239 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1978)).

Here, it is undisputed that Defendant contacted the Sheriff’s Office to report

Plaintiff was present at Seven Mile Post bar in Wilmington at the same time she was

present on three separate occasions although he lived in Raleigh at the time and that

Plaintiff’s mother sent Defendant a text message days later. Defendant argues “the

record unquestionably contains uncontroverted evidence sufficient to satisfy the low

probable cause threshold of a mere probability or substantial chance of criminal

activity.”

“Probable cause is defined as the existence of facts and circumstances known

to the decision maker which would induce a reasonable person to commence a

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prosecution.” Martin, 150 N.C. App. at 182, 563 S.E.2d at 218. However, “‘[w]hen the

facts are in dispute the question of probable cause is one of fact for the jury.’ If the

facts underlying the issuance are not in dispute, the determination of probable cause

is for the courts.” Id. (quoting Pitts v. Village Inn Pizza, Inc., 296 N.C. 81, 87, 249

S.E.2d 375, 379 (1978)). At summary judgment, “[t]he moving party bears the burden

of showing that no triable issue of fact exists[,]” and “[o]nce the moving party has met

its burden, the non-moving party must forecast evidence that demonstrates the

existence of a prima facie case.” Adams v. City of Raleigh, 245 N.C. App. 330, 334,

782 S.E.2d 108, 112 (2016) (cleaned up).

The trial court here determined that the underlying facts were not in dispute

and reasoned:

The pleadings and the relevant case law - - and I’m citing Allison [v. Food Lion Inc., 84 N.C. App. 251, 255, 352 S.E.2d 256, 257 (1987)]: “The existence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact . . . . If the facts are admitted - - if the facts are admitted or not in dispute, it is a question of law for the court . . . .”

In this case, what’s not in dispute is there was a valid 50B order. That, on not once, twice, but three times, [Plaintiff] went to a bar that was frequented by the defendant. On Friday, he saw her; the next Friday, he saw her; the Saturday, he saw her. He was the one under the order. So whatever happened in the interim, he put himself in that position. Therefore, regardless of whether it was instituted by the defendant or by the officer, the issue is that there was a - - there was probable cause. And with probable cause, I am finding for the defendant with regard to malicious prosecution and not with regard to the punitive damages.

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Although the record is devoid of details from the purported investigation by

Deputy Walker, “[p]robable cause ‘may be based upon information given to the officer

by another, the source of such information being reasonably reliable.’” Adams, 245

N.C. App. at 336, 782 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting In re Gardner, 39 N.C. App. 567, 571,

251 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1979)). Here, irrespective of who arrived at the bar first or other

information the investigation may have revealed, Defendant reported to Deputy

Walker information to support that Plaintiff and Defendant encountered each other

at Seven Mile Post bar on three occasions and that Plaintiff’s mother sent Defendant

a text message days later, providing some factual predicate for alleging a violation of

the DVPO. This information reported to Deputy Walker by Defendant is sufficient to

have led to a probable cause determination by a magistrate, resulting in the criminal

charges against Plaintiff.

While, in his affidavit, Plaintiff disputes who arrived first at Seven Mile Post

bar, Plaintiff did not submit any other evidence sufficient to rebut Defendant’s

showing of probable cause nor to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude

summary judgment. Plaintiff’s allegation that he arrived at the bar first does not

rebut the fact that he and Defendant were present at the bar at the same time on all

three occasions and the existence of the text message sent to Defendant days later by

Plaintiff’s mother.

The facts pleaded in the prosecution may not have supported a conviction, but

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they were not without a factual predicate to support a finding of probable cause for a

violation of the DVPO. Thus, the presence of probable cause defeats Plaintiff’s claim

for malicious prosecution. See Martin, 150 N.C. App. at 182, 563 S.E.2d at 218.

III. Conclusion

After careful review, we hold the trial court did not err by granting Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution as there

was probable cause for the initiation of the prosecution. Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court’s order.

AFFIRMED.

Judges HAMPSON and GRIFFIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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