Hussey v. "John Doe" Licenses Plate HLD 8446 of the owner Mazda, Vehicle

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 4, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-03562·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, 1:23-CV-3562 (LTS) -against- “JOHN DOE” LICENSES PLATE #HLD 8446” ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE OWNERS MAZDA, VEHICLE, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Yessuh Suhyes Hussey, who is currently held in the Eric M. Taylor Center on Rikers Island, filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seeks damages.1 He sues “‘John Doe’ Licenses Plate #HLD 8446 of the Owners Mazda, Vehicle,” and alleges that the defendant is either an actively employed or retired correction officer. By order dated April 28, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP

1 Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York while he was held in the Anna M. Kross Center, also on Rikers Island. By order dated April 18, 2023, that court transferred this action to this court. Hussey v. “John Doe”, No. 23-CV-1780 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2023). 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following: On August 29, 2020, in front of the Red Lion Restaurant in New York, New York, the defendant had been drinking and was under the influence of alcohol. The defendant then “randomly attacked” Plaintiff, who was “a passerby in front of the Red Lion Restaurant.” (ECF 1, at 4.) The defendant’s stated reason for attacking Plaintiff was

because of his belief that Plaintiff was “‘a moron.’” (Id.) The defendant punched Plaintiff in the face “for no logical or apparent reason.” (Id.) As a result of being punched, Plaintiff fell “flat to the ground.” (Id.) Plaintiff “looked at [the defendant’s identification] after [Plaintiff] got up from the ground . . . and noted that [the defendant] is a correction officer who[se] card was expired [and who] might also be retired.”3 (Id.) DISCUSSION The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under that statute, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). “The traditional

definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant . . . exercise[] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Mere employment by a state or municipality[,] [however,] does not automatically mean that [an official’s] actions are taken under the color of state law.” Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1996).

3 Plaintiff has attached to his complaint documents arising from an incident that is not related to the incident alleged in his complaint’s statement of claim. For this reason, the Court will not consider those documents. “[A] defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State.” West, 487 U.S. at 49-50. “It is ‘axiomatic[,] [however,] . . . that acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are plainly excluded’” from the definition of state action for Section 1983 purposes. Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997)

(quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1994)). “[T]here is no bright line test for distinguishing personal pursuits from activities taken under color of law.” Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[m]ore is required than a simple determination as to whether an officer was on or off duty when the challenged incident occurred. . . .

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Hussey v. "John Doe" Licenses Plate HLD 8446 of the owner Mazda, Vehicle, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Hussey v. "John Doe" Licenses Plate HLD 8446 of the owner Mazda, Vehicle (Hussey v. "John Doe" Licenses Plate HLD 8446 of the owner Mazda, Vehicle) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kern v. City of Rochester
93 F.3d 38 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Lore v. City of Syracuse
583 F. Supp. 2d 345 (N.D. New York, 2008)