Hunter Glover Co. v. Harvey Steel Products Corp.

3 F.2d 634, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1278
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedNovember 12, 1924
DocketNo. 16
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 3 F.2d 634 (Hunter Glover Co. v. Harvey Steel Products Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunter Glover Co. v. Harvey Steel Products Corp., 3 F.2d 634, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1278 (W.D. Tenn. 1924).

Opinion

ROSS, District Judge.

This matter is presented for final consideration upon numerous reports of the special master as to claims filed against the estate of defendant and upon exceptions to certain of such reports.

A receiver was heretofore appointed at the instance of plaintiff for the estate of defendant, and the business was operated-for a time by such receiver until a sale of the property was had, and it is out of the assets in the hands of the receiver that it is now sought to have the claims filed allowed.

Orders have heretofore been entered relative to several of the claims reported on by the master, and, in so far as his reports are now on file as to which special orders have not heretofore been entered, each of said reports is hereby confirmed and all exceptions thereto respectively overruled and disallowed, except as to the report in the matter of the taxes claimed by the state of Tennessee, Madison county, and the city of Jackson, against the estate in the hands of the receiver. As to the claim for taxes the master reported that the state, county, and city respectively were entitled to recover taxes for the years 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921 accordingly as their claims appeared. Numerous exceptions have been filed to the holding of the special master in the matter of the taxes; however only one of such exceptions will bo here especially considered, inasmuch as that exception is determinative of the matter as it is now considered. The particular exception to be disposed of is that the assessments of the properly in question were void for the reason that the officials assessing such property failed to show, as required by law, the value of the property assessed or any valuation relative thereto or the amount of the taxes or any amounts as against the same.

The record discloses that defendant was the successor of the Southern Engine & Boiler Works and the Southern Engine & Boiler Manufacturing Company; that they and defendant were corporations with their principal place? of business respectively at Jackson, Tenn., and that they in turn owned certain real estate and personal property in the city of Jackson, on which real estate or a portion of which there was being operated a manufacturing establishment; that under the law providing for the assessments of property for taxes, and particularly under the Act of 1907 of the Legislature of Tennessee (Laws 1907, c. 602), the officers charged with the duty of assessing property for taxes sought to so assess the property in question, and certified copies of the assessment rolls are filed as exhibits with the record. The record must be considered as presented, and by it the parties are bound. The provisions of the act of 1907 relative to the assessment of property, both real and personal, for taxation are similar in the main to the acts of the Legislature of Tennessee for many years preceding, except as to the provision in the act of 1907 that as to real estate proceedings for the assessment and collection of taxes against the same shall be considered as proceedings in rem. Whether that provision of the act of 1907 is applicable as contended in behalf of the state, county, and city on the one hand or inapplicable, as insisted by the receiver on the other hand, is a matter not here determined, for, as stated, the assessment rolls are made exhibits, and upon the evidence as submitted the rights of the parties must be decided.

Since the decision in the case of Randolph v. Metcalf, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 400, 407, decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1869, it has been the settled law of this state that, where property is assessed for taxes, and the assessment rolls show facts similar to those shown by the exhibits in this ease, such assessments and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are void. In that ease it appeared that the taxes claimed were assessed on sheets or blanks whereon there appeared certain perpendicular lines and certain figures in the columns made thereby, but there was nothing definitely showing, nor was there anything to show, the meaning of such figures, whether they were intended to represent dollars, cents, or either or both, and it was held that it was incumbent upon the state or county seeking to collect taxes to properly assess such property in the first instance, and that a void assessment would preclude a collection of such taxes. In this ease the court said at page 407:

“The evident intention of the Legislature was that the judgment and sale of land for taxes should be held good, if there was a reasonable compliance with the law. Let us test this condemnation and sale by the [636]*636provisions of the act of 1844: The name of the owner of the lot is correctly given; the ' number is properly set forth, but the record fails to disclose, with certainty to a common intent, the amount of the taxes, costs, etc. We see the figures 500 under the head of Yalue, 125 under the head of Tax, 100 under the head of Col., 150 under that of Clerk, etc. There is nothing to show for what these figures stand; whether they represent dollars or cents, or dollars only. There is no .mark to designate the meaning. It is said we may read the report and judgment of condemnation, and, knowing the statute under which said judgment was rendered, would understand its proper connection, meaning, and object; but the act provides the same must be stated with certainty to a common intent. Is this so? We think, not. There is nothing to show for what they stand; whether for dollars, cents, or what they indicate. * * * ”

This case cited McClellan v. Cornwell, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 300; Lawrence v. Fast, 20 Ill. 338, 71 Am. Dec. 274; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 202]

In Barnes v. Brown, 1 Tenn. Ch. page 726, at page 740, the cases of Randolph v. Metcalf, supra, and Anderson v. Post, decided by the court of chancery appeals of Tennessee and reported in 38 S. W. 283, are cited with approval.

In the Barnes Case there appears a portion of the exhibit which was a part of the assessment roll offered in the case which shows a very similar state of, facts to that presented in the instant case, except that in addition to the perpendicular line spoken of in the Barnes Case and appearing on that .exhibit and on the exhibits in the instant case, no dollar mark appeared on the exhibit in the Barnes Case at any place. In passing upon the validity of the assessment it is said at page 740:

“It [referring to the exhibit] has running, across the page 20 spaces, .subdivided by perpendicular lines into numerous smaller spaces. * * * It has been twice held in this state that the absence of the dollar mark is fatal to the assessment. Randolph v. Metcalf, 6 Cold. 400, 405, 406, 407; Anderson v. Post, 38 S. W. Rep. 283. This latter case was decided by the court of chancery appeals, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, and again referred to with approval in the ease of Dunn v. Dunn, 15 Pick., at page 612. This point seems, therefore, to be well settled in this state. Will the perpendicular lines take the place of dollar marks? We know of no such general significance given to them as would authorize the court to adopt that meaning. They are convenient divisions for keeping figures in line (figures of all sorts), in long columns, to facilitate additions, and that is the use to which they are put in business. They are not, so far as we know, generally used as symbols or substitutes for dollar marks. Nor is there any testimony to the effect that there is such habitual general use of them.

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Bluebook (online)
3 F.2d 634, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1278, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunter-glover-co-v-harvey-steel-products-corp-tnwd-1924.