Hundley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.

172 S.E. 361, 205 N.C. 780, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 69
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJanuary 24, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 172 S.E. 361 (Hundley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hundley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 172 S.E. 361, 205 N.C. 780, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 69 (N.C. 1934).

Opinion

BeogdeN, J.

Tbe serial certificate issued to Sam H. Hundley by tbe defendant contained tbe following provision: “Any employee insured under this plan, who shall become wholly and permanently disabled while in our employ, before reaching tbe age of sixty, either by accident, injury or disease, and is thereby permanently, continuously and wholly prevented from pursuing any and all gainful occupation, will be regarded as a claimant by tbe Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Six months after tbe receipt of due proof of such disability, tbe insurance company will begin making payments of tbe amount of insurance under any one of tbe following plans at tbe option of tbe person insured,” etc.

An analysis of tbe foregoing clause in tbe policy discloses tbat in order to recover, the plaintiff must offer competent evidence tending to show: (a) permanent disability as defined before age sixty; (b) due proof of such “disablement”; (c) tbat six months have elapsed since furnishing such proof, and tbat there has been a failure to pay. Tbe record discloses tbat summons was issued on 3 November, 1931. Tbe wording of tbe contract clearly specifies tbat tbe company shall not begin to make payments until six months after tbe receipt of tbe proof. Obviously, payment could not be enforced before tbe lapse of six months, and hence it follows tbat tbe action was prematurely brought. It is not deemed relevant to discuss tbe meaning of tbe six months’ clause or for what reason it was inserted in tbe contract. It is there in plain English. Nor is tbe fact tbat tbe defendant denied liability material for tbe reason tbat tbe parties bad contracted to postpone payments until six months after tbe receipt of proof.

Affirmed.

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154 S.W.2d 191 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1941)
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Bluebook (online)
172 S.E. 361, 205 N.C. 780, 1934 N.C. LEXIS 69, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hundley-v-metropolitan-life-insurance-co-nc-1934.