Rees v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Rees v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance

5 S.E.2d 154, 216 N.C. 428, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 7

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedNovember 1, 1939

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 5 S.E.2d 154 (Rees v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rees v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance, 5 S.E.2d 154, 216 N.C. 428, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 7 (N.C. 1939).

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Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

It is generally understood that the nonpayment of a premium when due, or within the period of grace thereafter, in the absence of some extension or waiver, automatically avoids a policy of insurance. Allen v. Ins. Co., 215 N. C., 70, 1 (2d) S. E., 94. The *430 parties seem to have assumed tbat tbe policy in suit was, by its terms, forfeited by tbe nonpayment of tbe quarterly premium due 14 April, 1938, unless waived, as tbe case bas been presented solely upon tbe question of waiver.

It is in evidence tbat tbe insured was totally unable to work, or to carry on any business, from 8 April, 1938, until bis death on 1 September, following. However, this disability was not continuous for “six or more consecutive months” and due proof thereof furnished tbe company “during tbe lifetime of tbe insured,” as required by tbe terms of tbe policy as a condition precedent to tbe waiver of premiums. Wyche v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 45, 175 S. E., 697. From 8 April to 1 September of tbe same year is less than six months. “It is not deemed relevant to discuss tbe meaning of tbe six months’ clause or for what reason it was inserted in tbe contract. It is there in plain English”- — Brogden, J., in Hundley v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 780, 172 S. E., 361.

Exception is also taken to tbe exclusion of tbe death certificate of tbe insured, offered for tbe purpose of showing tbat be died of “cancer of tbe esophagus.” Copy of the certificate is not in tbe record, and it does not appear whether tbe cause of death was stated therein as a fact oí-as an opinion. Tbe statute, C. S., 7111, provides tbat a properly certified copy of such record shall be admissible in all courts and places as prima facie evidence of tbe facts therein stated. It does not provide tbat opinions or conclusions expressed therein shall be prima facie proof of tbe fact to be determined upon tbe trial of such issue. Ins. Co. v. Brockman, 3 S. E. (2d), (Va.) 480. Moreover, tbe cause of insured’s death was not perforce material to tbe inquiry.

Tbe judgment of nonsuit would seem to be correct.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

It is generally understood that the nonpayment of a premium when due, or within the period of grace thereafter, in the absence of some extension or waiver, automatically avoids a policy of insurance. Allen v. Ins. Co., 215 N. C., 70, 1 (2d) S. E., 94. The *430 parties seem to have assumed tbat tbe policy in suit was, by its terms, forfeited by tbe nonpayment of tbe quarterly premium due 14 April, 1938, unless waived, as tbe case bas been presented solely upon tbe question of waiver.

It is in evidence tbat tbe insured was totally unable to work, or to carry on any business, from 8 April, 1938, until bis death on 1 September, following. However, this disability was not continuous for “six or more consecutive months” and due proof thereof furnished tbe company “during tbe lifetime of tbe insured,” as required by tbe terms of tbe policy as a condition precedent to tbe waiver of premiums. Wyche v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 45, 175 S. E., 697. From 8 April to 1 September of tbe same year is less than six months. “It is not deemed relevant to discuss tbe meaning of tbe six months’ clause or for what reason it was inserted in tbe contract. It is there in plain English”- — Brogden, J., in Hundley v. Ins. Co., 205 N. C., 780, 172 S. E., 361.

Exception is also taken to tbe exclusion of tbe death certificate of tbe insured, offered for tbe purpose of showing tbat be died of “cancer of tbe esophagus.” Copy of the certificate is not in tbe record, and it does not appear whether tbe cause of death was stated therein as a fact oí-as an opinion. Tbe statute, C. S., 7111, provides tbat a properly certified copy of such record shall be admissible in all courts and places as prima facie evidence of tbe facts therein stated. It does not provide tbat opinions or conclusions expressed therein shall be prima facie proof of tbe fact to be determined upon tbe trial of such issue. Ins. Co. v. Brockman, 3 S. E. (2d), (Va.) 480. Moreover, tbe cause of insured’s death was not perforce material to tbe inquiry.

Tbe judgment of nonsuit would seem to be correct.

Affirmed.

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5 S.E.2d 154, 216 N.C. 428, 1939 N.C. LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rees-v-jefferson-standard-life-insurance-nc-1939.

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