Humble v. United States

49 F.2d 600, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1323
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Kentucky
DecidedFebruary 18, 1931
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 49 F.2d 600 (Humble v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Humble v. United States, 49 F.2d 600, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1323 (E.D. Ky. 1931).

Opinion

ANDREW M. J. COCHRAN, District Judge.

This cause is before me on final hearing. It is an action by a World War veteran on a war risk insurance policy. The plaintiff enlisted May 2, 1917 and was honorably discharged January 27, 1919. The policy was issued February 6, 1918, and the prescribed premiums were paid until July 2, 1928, when plaintiff ceased to pay same. The claim is that he was totally and permanently disabled when discharged, and henee that his policy then matured and he was thereafter under no obligation to pay any further premiums. It is not claimed that, if he was not then so disabled, he had become so at the time he ceased to pay premiums. The right to recover is based on the existence of total and permanent disability at the time of discharge.

The plaintiff landed overseas June 26, 1917. He entered the trenches at Bethelmont in October, 1917, where he remained ten days and was sent to St. Die and then to Cantigny. He was in the battle at that place May 28, 1918. Thereafter he was in the woods until the battle of Soissons beginning July 18, 1918, in which he participated. On July 22,1918, whilst he was leading a squad consisting of himself and seven other men, he was gassed. The gas came from the explosion of a shell near by which killed the other seven men. It was chlorine and not mustard gas. As a result thereof he was put permanently out of service and returned to this country January 23, 1919, his discharge following immediately there-after. He was awarded three service chevrons for gallantry and one for-. As stated, the claim is that he was then totally and permanently disabled. This claim is based mainly on the claim that he was then suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis. Some reliance is had" on the effect of the gassing, but it is hardly claimed that, apart from the tuberculosis with which it is claimed he was then afflicted, he was so disabled. Nor can I make out that it is claimed •that the tuberculosis was due to the gassing. Possibly it may have lowered his vitality and rendered him more subject to it. If, in fact, the plaintiff was then so afflicted, I think that it follows that he was then totally and permanently disabled. The question as to whether he was is to be determined as if this action had been brought immediately upon his discharge. If he was then so disabled, he was entitled to have payments under the policy to then begin and was not bound thereafter to continue payment of premiums to keep it alive, and if such payments were refused he was entitled to bring an action at once on the policy. Had he so done, the question as to whether he was so disabled would necessarily have been dependent alone on the facts that then existed. Subsequent facts could not be taken into consideration because they had not then happened. If such facts are entitled to be so taken here because they have happened before this action was brought, it can only be so for the light such facts throw on his physical condition at the time of his discharge.

So limiting myself, i. e. to his then physical cbndition,. my conclusion is that if he was then suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis he was totally disabled. He was incapacitated from following continuously any substantially gainful occupation. There can be, I think, hardly any question as to this. My conclusion. further is that he was then permanently disabled within the meaning of the act. It was then impossible to say that the disease would not continue active for the rest of his life. The disposition of the ease could not await subsequent developments to determine whether it would. Besides, the possibility that it might thereafter cease to be active and become arrested did not affect the permanency of the disability and that for two reasons. An arrested tuberculosis may become active again if the vitality is lowered — manual labor performed continuously and to the extent necessary to the success of a substantially gainful occupation is calculated to [602]*602lower the vitality — and plaintiff was adapted only to an occupation involving such labor. The other reason is that the act seems to contemplate that a total disability may at the same time be permanent so as to cause the maturing of the policy notwithstanding it may subsequently turn out that it may not be permanent in which ease the payment of installments- of insurance should cease and the payment of premiums should be renewed to keep the policy alive. If this reasoning is sound, the disposition of this ease-hangs on the question whether plaintiff was suffering from active pulmonary tuberculosis at the time of his discharge. In determining this question subsequent developments have a bearing.

The plaintiff made an application for compensation on account of his physical condition January, 1920, and he has been and is now drawing compensation. I want first to present the results of the examinations made by the Bureau through its physicians upon that application, in regard thereto. Question is made as to the admissibility of such evidence. It is thought that the fact that these examinations were made for compensation purposes renders the results thereof inadmissible in evidence in' an action on an insurance policy. There is nothing what-ever in this consideration affecting their admissibility. They are valuable in determining the truth as to plaintiff’s physical condition. In the case of United States v. Golden (C. C. A.) 34 F.(2d) 367, 370 it was said:

“The doctors making the 'ratings’ are of course competent witnesses, just as doctors examining for other purposes are; but it is their testimony that is competent,, and not the Bureau’s 'rating’ predicated thereon.”

The plaintiff was so examined on nine different occasions: September 6, 1922; January 5, 1923; August 3, 1923; October 24, 1923; February 13, 1924; July 31, 1924; November 26, 1924; February, 1925; and August 7, 1925. September 6, 1922, the diagnosis was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, apparently arrested; January 5, 1923, the diagnosis, which was made by the same physician as the preceding one, was the same; August 3, 1923, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, moderately advanced, quiescent; October 24, 1923, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, active, moderately advanced; February 13, 1924, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis moderately advanced, quiescent, i. e. no present signs of activity, hospitalization needed; July 31, 1924, the diagnosis here being made by the same physician who made that of October 24, 1923, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis apparently arrested; November 26, 1924, the diagnosis here being made by the same physician who made the preceding one, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, apparently arrested; February, 1925, it was chronic pulmonary tuberculosis, quiescent; and August 7, 1925, which was an X-ray examination the disclosure was negative. Bach of these examinations, except the last, covering a period of two and one-half years disclosed the existence of chronic pulmonary tuberculosis. On the first occasion as well as the others the disease was diagnosed as chronic, i. e. it had persisted over a period of time, i. e. for months. On the first two’ occasions it was diagnosed as apparently arrested;, on the third as moderately advanced, quiescent; on the fourth as active, moderately advanced; on the fifth as moderately quiescent; on. the sixth and seventh as apparently arrested and the eighth as quiescent. It will be noted that after having been diagnosed as apparently arrested and quiescent the' diagnosis was active and then again apparently arrested and quiescent.

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5 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Kentucky, 1933)
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Bluebook (online)
49 F.2d 600, 1931 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/humble-v-united-states-kyed-1931.