Parrigan v. United States

6 F. Supp. 333, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1028
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Kentucky
DecidedNovember 3, 1933
DocketNo. 1255
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 6 F. Supp. 333 (Parrigan v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Parrigan v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 333, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1028 (E.D. Ky. 1933).

Opinion

ANDREW M. J. COCHRAN, District Judge.

This action is before me on defendant’s motion for new trial. It is an action on a war risk insurance policy. It was tried to a jury which found a verdict for plaintiff. The principal ground of the motion is that defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed peremptorily to find for the defendant. The [334]*334right to siieh instruction depends on whether there was substantial evidence before the jury to the effect that, at the time of plaintiff’s discharge from the army, which was on November 21, 1919, he was totally and permanently disabled from following continuously any substantially gainful occupation. In order to recover, it is essential that he was then totally so disabled and that such total disability was permanent; i. e., would endure for the rest of his natural life. The burden was on plaintiff to establish that such was the fact by a preponderance of the evidence. This was a heavy burden in view of the fact that his action was belated. He refrained for over twelve years in asserting it. In the absence of any showing to the contrary, it should be taken that he knew that his policy provided for the payment of $10,000 in ease of total permanent disability as well as of death. Such is the very first provision in it. That he asserted no claim under it for so long a time can hardly be accounted for save on the ground that he did not consider that he had been totally permanently disabled.

In the ease of United States v. Linkhart (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 747, 748, it was said: “While under the successive statutes enlarging the time wherein such actions may be brought the long delay does not of itself bar the action, it is a fact to be considered with all the other facts in determining, even upon appeal, whether there is substantial evidence to support the claim.”

In the case of Keelen v. United States (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 513, it was said: “This suit was brought on August 31, 1929, more than' ten years after plaintiff’s discharge from the service. During these ten years plaintiff neither paid premiums on his policy nor asserted claim under it. Under these circumstances plaintiff was under a heavy burden to 'show, by evidence contemporaneous with the life of the policy, the then totality and permanence of his disability as a fact existing and accepted, or * * * conditions then existing which, read in their own light and in the light of subsequent events, make it reasonably probable that, though then unclaimed and unrecognized, total and permanent disability did then in fact exist.’ Wise v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 307, 308.”

The affliction relied on as bringing about the required disability within thirty-one days after November 21,1010, .the date of discharge, is tuberculosis. It is particularly hard to make out a ease of such disability at such an early date where such an affliction is the ground for the claim of total permanent disability. It is not so hard to make out a ease of total disability. If it is a case of active tuberculosis, as it usually is, the disability must be taken to be total. Such a case requires complete rest until the disease is conquered. The difficulty presented is in making out that the disability is permanent. This is so because in such eases usually, if not invariably, the disease is in its incipient stage, and whilst it is in such stage it is curable. It is a matter of common knowledge that such is the case. With nothing more to go on than the existing conditions at the time of the soldier’s discharge, it is well-nigh impossible to make out that such incipient tuberculosis, though in an active stage, is a permanent condition. It can only be made out that such was the case by subsequent events. Subsequent events may make out that it is permanent, and hence they should be considered in determining the permanency of the disease.

In the case of United States v. Jones (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 652, it was said: “What happens to-morrow may throw a white light on what exists to-day.”

So it is that it is possible that, if a veteran waits for ten or twelve years before bringing his action, he may be able to recover, though if he had brought it shortly after his discharge he would have failed. Of course a delay to ascertain whether the affliction is permanent should not be counted against the veteran. But the fact that the disease has been of such a character as to totally disable the veteran for such a period of time, if it is possible for it to persist for so long without a fatal result, does not necessarily establish that the disability was permanent at the time of the discharge. That it has persisted so long may be due to the fact that the veteran has neglected to take proper treatment. If he has neglected to do so, it cannot be said that the persistence of the disease establishes that it was permanent at such time.

In the ease of Wise v. United States (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 307, 308, it was said: “It is undisputed that the condition of his shoulder and ankle could have been remedied by a comparatively minor operation. It certainly cannot be said that an injury which in its nature is alleviable by proper treatment is permanent, because many years afterward, no such treatment having been given, it still persists.”

Though possibly, as a rule, it is more easy in such eases to establish total than permanent disability, it should be borne in mind that it is not sufficient to show that there is., [335]*335permanent 'disability at the required time. It must be shown that such disability is total.

In the ease of Wilks v. United States (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 775, 776, it was said: “Granted that when discharged from the army he had a disease which was certain to incapacitate him in the future, partially at first, and totally in time, such proof is insufficient. A condition of both total and permanent disability must exist before his policy lapsed.”

In the case of Garrison v. United States (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 41, 42, it was said: “As has been pointed out in a number of recent cases, the mere fact that a man has tuberculosis does not necessarily mean that he is totally and permanently disabled. The tuberculosis may not result in total disability, and, even if it have this result temporarily, unless the condition is such as to preclude the possibility of arresting the disease, it cannot be said that the disability is permanent.”

The difficulty of making out a case of total and permanent disability at the time of the veteran’s discharge may be brought out by certain statistics. In the six volumes of the 60 F.(2d)’s now out there are reported twenty-six eases where tuberculosis was relied on to make out such ease. They are the following, to wit: U. S. v. Rentfrow (C. C. A.) 60 F.(2d) 488; U. S. v. McCreary (C. C. A.) 61 F.(2d) 804; Garrison v. United States (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 41; U. S. v. Diehl (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 343; U. S. v. Rosborough (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 348; U. S. v. Peters (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 977; U. S. v. Stack (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 1056; U. S. v. Thompson (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 111; Andrews v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 184; Walters v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 299, 301; Schmidt v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 390; Mason v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 63 F.(2d) 791; U. S. v. Hodson (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 119; U. S. v. Perkins (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 243; U. S. v. Thomas (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 245; U. S. v. Bass (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 467; U. S. v. Howard (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 533; U. S. v. Dunaway (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 535; U. S. v. Linkhart (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 747; Bailey v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 779; Falbov U.S. (C. C. A.) 64 F.(2d) 948; McCleary v. U. S. (C. C.

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Bluebook (online)
6 F. Supp. 333, 1933 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1028, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/parrigan-v-united-states-kyed-1933.