Humble v. Louisiana, Dept. of Revenue & Taxation (In re Humble)

209 B.R. 54, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 749
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 30, 1997
DocketBankruptcy No. 95-14755; Adversary No. 96-1176
StatusPublished

This text of 209 B.R. 54 (Humble v. Louisiana, Dept. of Revenue & Taxation (In re Humble)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Humble v. Louisiana, Dept. of Revenue & Taxation (In re Humble), 209 B.R. 54, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 749 (La. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JERRY A. BROWN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came on for trial on February 18, 1997 on the complaint of Tracy Humble (“debtor”) seeking a discharge of State of Louisiana income taxes under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1). After listening to the evidence, reviewing the exhibits and pleadings, and considering the arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the 1983 taxes are dis-chargeable and that the 1986 and 1987 taxes are nondischargeable.1

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Procedural background

The debtor filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 13, 1995. The debtor’s discharge was granted on April 1,1996. A final decree closing the case was entered on April 23, 1996.

On September 20, 1996, the debtor filed the pending complaint to determine the dischargeability of tax debts claimed by the Louisiana Department of Revenue and Taxation (“Department”).

On October 10, 1996, the debtor filed Adversary Proceeding No. 96-1187, seeking to determine the dischargeability of alleged tax debts owed to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). (Ex. P-9). On January 28, 1997, a consent judgment was entered discharging the debtor’s federal tax debts for the tax years 1981 through 1988. (Ex. P-11).

B. The Louisiana taxes

The Department assessed the debtor for Louisiana income taxes on the following dates:

The taxes due for tax year 1983 were formally assessed on August 25,1989.
The taxes due for tax year 1986 were formally assessed on April 22,1988.
The taxes due for tax year 1987 were formally assessed on September 10, 1990.

(Pa. 9, Joint Pre-Trial Order at 1).

In their proof of claim, the Department claims the debtor owes taxes as follows:

Tax Interest Penalty Total
1983 1,015.001,762.90 265.75 $3,043.65
1986 385.00 495.54 96.25 976.79
1987 108.00 122.78 27.00 257.78
$4,278.22

(Ex. P-12).

The debtor testified that he was sure that he had filed tax returns for the three years in question, although he had no copies of the returns.

Joyce Amedee, a revenue audit supervisor and employee of the Department for 27/é years, testified that she was responsible for the proposed assessment of taxes made to the debtor for 1983. (Ex. P-3). She stated that the proposed assessment was based on information received from the IRS through a Revenue Agent Report. The proposed assessment indicated that the debtor owed $2,069.58 in taxes. (Id.)

[56]*56The following language was printed on the bottom of the 1983 proposed assessment:

In accordance with Louisiana Law R.S. 47:1562, this department proposes to assess you for the tax shown above. The adjustments made to your return are based on the adjustments made to your federal return by the Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service furnished to the State of Louisiana information obtained in an audit of your federal return under specific authorization of Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Inquiries should be directed to the office audit section, income and corporation franchise taxes division.

(Ex. P-3).

Ms. Amedee stated that the Department’s records showed that the debtor did not file a 1983 income tax return, and that the above language printed on the 1983 proposed assessment was standard language used for all taxpayers. She testified that the standard language in the 1983 proposed assessment (“the adjustments made to your return”) was wrong in this case because the Department’s records indicate that the debtor did not file a 1983 income tax return.

Ms. Amedee stated that the formal assessment for 1983 taxes (Ex. P-4) was mailed to the debtor by registered mail, and that she was sure a registered mail receipt existed, although she did not have it. She further testified that it is the Department’s procedure to mail all formal assessments by registered mail.

Ms. Donna Perkins, employed by the Department for 20 years, is presently a revenue audit supervisor over the bankruptcy section and the collection division. She is the custodian for the bankruptcy files. She testified that the value of the Department’s proof of claim was determined by reviewing the debtors account and determining outstanding and potential liabilities. She stated that she did not review the debtor’s account to determine whether the notice of assessments had been mailed to the debtor by registered mail.

The debtor requested that the Department produce copies of his tax returns, all documents showing when the taxes were assessed, and the basis for the assessment. See EX. P-1. The Department was not able to produce the tax returns, the registered mail receipts, or the documents referred to in the 1983 proposed assessment that referred to information received by the Internal Revenue Service. See Ex. P-2. All of the documents that the Department did produce, consisting of the proposed assessments and assessments for 1983, 1986, and 1987, were introduced into evidence. (Exs. P-3 through P-8).

The Department’s responses to the debtors interrogatories state that “[t]he records of [the Department] reflect that the Debtor has not filed individual income tax returns for the periods 1983, 1986, and 1987.” (Ex. P-2 at ¶ 2).

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Burden of Proof

The creditor seeking to establish that a debt is nondischargeable bears the burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 523 by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991). Consequently, the Department bears the burden of proving that the debt falls within one of the exceptions to dischargeability of a debt set forth in Section 523.

B. Applicable Bankmptcy Code Sections

Section 523(a)(1) provides in relevant part:

(a) A discharge under section 727, ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—
(1) for a tax or a customs duly—
(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;
(B) with respect to which a return, if required—
(i) was not filed

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).

Section 507(a)(8) defines taxes to include the following:

[57]

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Related

Grogan v. Garner
498 U.S. 279 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Bunge Corp. v. Secretary of the Department of Revenue & Taxation
414 So. 2d 867 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1982)

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Bluebook (online)
209 B.R. 54, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 749, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/humble-v-louisiana-dept-of-revenue-taxation-in-re-humble-laeb-1997.