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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-AA-332 SIDNICE HUGHES-TURNER, PETITIONER, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT, and SUPERCUTS, et al., INTERVENORS. On Petition for Review of a Decision and Order of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services Compensation Review Board (CRB-20-025)
(Argued September 30, 2021 Decided July 14, 2022)
Matthew J. Peffer for petitioner.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General at the time, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General at the time, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, filed a statement in lieu of a brief for respondent. Robin E. Hauptmann for intervenors. Before GLICKMAN, MCLEESE, and DEAHL, Associate Judges. Opinion of the court by Associate Judge MCLEESE. Opinion by Associate Judge DEAHL, dissenting, at page 19. 2
MCLEESE, Associate Judge: Petitioner Sidnice Hughes-Turner challenges a
decision of the Compensation Review Board (CRB) limiting her eligibility for
disability payments. We vacate and remand.
I.
Except as indicated, the following facts appear to be undisputed for purposes
of this petition for review. Ms. Hughes-Turner worked as a hairstylist for intervenor
Supercuts. She suffered a work-related injury that limited her ability to work. In
the following years, she received several different types of disability benefits,
including temporary partial benefits, temporary total benefits, and “non-schedule”
permanent-partial benefits. (We briefly explain those various kinds of disability
benefits later in this opinion.)
A question eventually arose about whether D.C. Code § 32-1505(b) (2019
Repl.) limited Ms. Hughes-Turner’s ability to receive further disability benefits.
Section 32-1505(b) provides that, “[f]or any one injury causing temporary or 3
permanent partial disability, the payment for disability benefits shall not continue
for more than a total of 500 weeks.” After extensive proceedings, the CRB
concluded that § 32-1505(b) precluded Ms. Hughes-Turner from receiving more
than an aggregate total of 500 weeks of temporary total benefits and “non-schedule”
permanent-partial benefits. Hughes-Turner, CRB No. 20-025, 2020 WL 7226238,
at *1-2 (Comp. Rev. Bd. Mar. 31, 2020) (Hughes-Turner IV).
II.
The District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), D.C. Code
§ 32-1501 et seq. (2019 Repl.), classifies disabilities as either temporary or
permanent and also as either partial or total. D.C. Code § 32-1508. A disability
becomes permanent rather than temporary once the claimant’s condition reaches
“maximum medical improvement.” Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t
of Emp. Servs., 726 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A claimant suffers from total disability if [the claimant’s] injuries prevent [the
claimant] from engaging in the only type of gainful employment for which [the
claimant] is qualified.” Clark Constr. Grp., LLC v. District of Columbia Dep’t of 4
Emp. Servs., 163 A.3d 768, 776 (D.C. 2017) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Temporary partial benefits are capped at five years. D.C. Code § 32-1508(5).
Temporary total benefits are capped at 500 weeks. D.C. Code §§ 32-
1508(2), -1505(b); Clement v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 126 A.3d
1137, 1139-41 (D.C. 2015).
[The WCA] divides permanent partial disabilities into two categories, “schedule” and “non-schedule.” Schedule disabilities are those involving the loss or impairment of certain specified body parts, e.g., the loss of an arm, leg, or eye. For each such injury, a worker is entitled to receive [compensation] for a fixed number of weeks that varies depending on the particular body part injured and the degree of its impairment, regardless of the actual wage loss the worker sustains as a result of the injury. In contrast, for other partially disabling injuries (i.e., to parts of the body not listed in the “schedule,” such as the back or neck), the worker’s disability compensation is measured by his or her actual or imputed wage loss attributable to the injuries.
Brown v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 83 A.3d 739, 743 n.6 (D.C.
2014) (citations omitted). “Non-schedule” permanent partial benefits are capped at
500 weeks. D.C. Code §§ 32-1508(3)(V), -1505(b). 5
Finally, there is no durational cap on permanent total benefits. D.C. Code
§ 32-1508(1).
One provision of the WCA specifically addresses whether claimants can
receive more than one type of disability benefits in connection with a single incident.
See D.C. Code § 32-1508(3) (permanent partial benefits are “in addition to
compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability”). We
also have decided cases addressing various other permutations of that general
question. See, e.g., Brown, 83 A.3d at 752-756 (addressing issues arising from
award of both “non-schedule” and “schedule” permanent partial benefits). It is
undisputed in this case that Ms. Hughes-Turner can permissibly obtain temporary
partial benefits, temporary total benefits, and “non-schedule” permanent partial
benefits. It also is undisputed that Ms. Hughes-Turner can receive no more than five
years of temporary partial benefits, no more than 500 weeks of temporary total
benefits, and no more than 500 weeks of “non-schedule” permanent partial benefits.
Rather, the dispute is about the extent to which D.C. Code § 32-1505(b) imposes an
aggregate cap on Ms. Hughes-Turner’s recovery of such benefits.
As previously noted, § 32-1505(b) provides that, “[f]or any one injury causing
temporary or permanent partial disability, the payment for disability benefits shall 6
not continue for more than a total of 500 weeks.” This court has already squarely
addressed one ambiguity in § 32-1505(b): whether the 500-week cap applies to
temporary total benefits. Clement, 126 A.3d at 1139-41. Considered in isolation,
§ 32-1505(b) is ambiguous on that point, because it is not clear whether the word
“temporary” modifies only “disability” or instead modifies “partial disability.” Id.
at 1140. On the former reading, the 500-week cap would appear to apply both to
temporary partial benefits and to temporary total benefits, whereas on the latter
reading the 500-week cap would apply to temporary partial benefits, but not to
temporary total benefits.
Our holding in Clement that § 32-1505(b) is ambiguous on the point then at
issue did not rest solely on the text of § 32-1505(b) in isolation. To the contrary, we
explained that “even where statutory language has a superficial clarity, a detailed
consideration of other factors, such as the specific context in which that language is
used and the broader context of the statute as a whole, when viewed in light of the
statute’s legislative history, may reveal ambiguities . . . .” 126 A.3d at 1139-40. We
then addressed other such considerations, including the legislative history of the
WCA and the fact that the WCA provides a separate five-year cap on temporary
partial benefits. Id. at 1140-41. In light of those considerations, we held that § 32- 7
1505(b) is ambiguous and that the CRB had reasonably concluded that the 500-week
cap in § 32-1505(b) does apply to temporary total benefits. Id.
This case presents a different question about the meaning of § 32-1505(b):
Does the 500-week cap apply individually to each different type of benefits to which
the cap applies, so that a claimant could receive up to 500 weeks of temporary total
benefits and up to an additional 500 weeks of “non-schedule” permanent partial
benefits; or does the 500-week cap instead apply in the aggregate, so that a claimant
could get no more than 500 weeks of all benefits subject to the cap?
As noted, the CRB concluded that the 500-week cap applies in the aggregate.
Hughes-Turner IV, 2020 WL 7226238, at *1-2. The CRB explained its conclusion
in several rulings. In Hughes-Turner, CRB No. 18-005, 2018 WL 1696862 (Comp.
Rev. Bd. Mar. 12, 2018) (Hughes-Turner I), the CRB appeared to view § 32-1505(b)
as ambiguous on the point at issue. Id. at *4-6. The CRB resolved that ambiguity
by relying on the view that permitting more than 500 weeks of benefits in the
aggregate would be contrary to the legislative history of the provision. Id. at *5-6.
In Hughes-Turner, CRB No. 19-120, 2020 WL 743005 (Comp. Rev. Bd. Jan. 24,
2020) (Hughes-Turner III), however, the CRB’s reasoning was somewhat different.
In that decision, the CRB concluded that the language of § 32-1505(b) 8
unambiguously provides that the 500-week cap applies in the aggregate. Id. at *3.
The CRB went on to explain that it would have reached the same conclusion even if
§ 32-1505(b) were ambiguous. Id. at *4-5. In support of that conclusion, the CRB
relied on two related points. Id. First, the CRB indicated that applying the 500-
week cap in the aggregate would be more consistent with the legislative history of
the amendments that included § 32-1505(b), which were intended to impose limits
on workers’ compensation costs. Id. at *5. Second, the CRB indicated that applying
the 500-week cap in the aggregate would bring the WCA “more in line” with the
benefits caps in Maryland and Virginia. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
We may reverse a CRB decision “only if we conclude that the decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with
the law.” Placido v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 92 A.3d 323, 326
(D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]his court generally defers to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes under which the agency
acts.” Butler v. Metro. Police Dep’t, 240 A.3d 829, 836 (D.C. 2020). We do not
defer to the agency, however, on whether statutory language is or is not ambiguous.
See, e.g., Medstar Health, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Health, 146 A.3d 9
360, 370 n.30 (D.C. 2016) (“Once we have determined that an administrative statute
is ambiguous, we may defer to an agency’s interpretation of that ambiguity.”).
Finally, “[t]he court ordinarily will not affirm an agency action that is inadequately
explained.” Miranda v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 257 A.3d 467,
471 (D.C. 2021).
We conclude that § 32-1505(b) is ambiguous. We turn first to the language
of the provision. See, e.g., Hosp. Temps Corp. v. District of Columbia, 926 A.2d
131, 136 (D.C. 2007) (“The first step in construing a statute is to read the language
of the statute and construe its words according to their ordinary sense and plain
meaning.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted, § 32-1505(b) provides
that, “[f]or any one injury causing temporary or permanent partial disability, the
payment for disability benefits shall not continue for more than a total of 500 weeks.”
It is not clear how that language should apply to the issue before us.
One possible interpretation is that if the triggering condition is met -- i.e., the
claimant has suffered an injury that caused “temporary or permanent partial
disability” -- then the 500-week cap applies in the aggregate to all types of disability
benefits. In other words, one could interpret “payment for disability benefits” to
mean “total payment for all disability benefits added together.” It appears to be 10
undisputed, however, that this interpretation would not be correct. That apparent
agreement is not surprising. On this interpretation, § 32-1505(b) would have a
remarkable consequence for claimants who initially suffer from a less serious
disability that eventually develops into permanent total disability. As noted,
permanent total benefits are not subject to a time limit. D.C Code § 32-1508(1)
(benefits for permanent total disability are payable “during the continuance
thereof”). If § 32-1505(b) imposed a 500-week aggregate cap on all disability
benefits once the cap was triggered, then permanent total benefits would often
become time-limited. No one has suggested that § 32-1505(b) implicitly repealed
D.C. Code § 32-1508(1) in that way.
It follows that the phrase “payment for disability benefits” in § 32-1505(b)
must be understood to have some implicit limit. One possible approach would be to
interpret “payment for disability benefits” to mean “total payment for all types of
disability benefits subject to the 500-week cap, added together.” In essence, that
seems to be the interpretation that the CRB adopted in this case. Hughes-Turner III,
2020 WL 743005, at *3. On this interpretation, temporary partial benefits might not
count against the 500-week cap, because they are subject to a separate five-year cap.
D.C. Code § 32-1508(5). In fact, the CRB concluded in this case that the 500-week
cap was entirely inapplicable to temporary partial benefits. Hughes-Turner I, 2018 11
WL 1696862, at *4 & n.1. (Neither party in this case disputes the exclusion of
temporary partial benefits from the cap, and we therefore do not need to decide that
issue.) Similarly, on this interpretation of “payment for disability benefits,”
“schedule” permanent-partial benefits might not count against the 500-week cap,
because such benefits have their own specified time limits. D.C. Code § 32-1508(3);
see Brown, 83 A.3d at 753 (noting that most courts hold that claimants can receive
both “schedule” and “non-schedule” permanent-partial benefits, with benefits being
paid consecutively and applicable time limits being “laid end-to-end”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Another possible approach, however, would be to interpret “payment for
disability benefits” to mean “total payment for each specific type of disability
benefits, each subject to its own 500-week cap.” On that interpretation, a claimant
could receive a total of 500 weeks of temporary total benefits and a separate total of
500 weeks of permanent partial benefits.
Considering the text of D.C. Code § 32-1505(b) in isolation, we do not view
the text as unambiguously foreclosing the latter interpretation. Rather, we view it as
somewhat unclear precisely what implicit limitation should be read into § 32-
1505(b)’s 500-week cap. In any event, in deciding whether § 32-1505(b) is 12
ambiguous on the point at issue, we do not restrict our analysis to the text of the
provision considered in isolation. Clement, 126 A.3d at 1139-40.
We have already noted some potential uncertainties that in our view contribute
to the ambiguity of § 32-1505(b), such as the uncertainty as to which types of
disability benefits are even subject to the 500-week cap. We briefly mention several
additional considerations that also support the conclusion that § 32-1505(b) is
ambiguous on the point at issue. First, there seems to be an anomaly under the
CRB’s approach. Imagine the following: (1) a claimant suffers a work-related
injury; (2) the claimant initially is able to work to a degree, and therefore obtains
temporary partial benefits for three years; and (3) the claimant’s condition becomes
permanent, so that the claimant obtains “non-schedule” permanent-partial benefits.
Under the CRB’s approach, the claimant can obtain 500 weeks of “non-schedule”
permanent-partial benefits, because temporary partial benefits do not count against
the 500-week cap. Compare a claimant whose situation is the same except that the
claimant was initially so badly injured that the claimant could not work at all, and
who therefore received three years (156 weeks) of temporary total benefits before
improving and obtaining an award of “non-schedule” permanent-partial benefits.
Under the CRB’s approach, that claimant would be eligible to receive only 344
weeks of “non-schedule” permanent-partial benefits, because the temporary total 13
benefits would count against the 500-week cap. It seems counterintuitive that the
claimant with the more severe disability would be entitled to a smaller amount of
compensation than the claimant with the less severe disability.
Second, we note an ambiguity in the legislative history of the enactment of
which § 32-1505(b) was a part. See Clement, 126 A.3d at 1140-41 (considering
legislative history in determining whether provision was ambiguous). As this court
has previously explained, that legislative history indicates that the enactment as a
whole was intended to bring the workers’ compensation law of the District “closer
in line” with that of Maryland and Virginia. Id. at 1141 (internal quotation marks
omitted). That general legislative history provides ambiguous guidance concerning
the interpretation of the 500-week cap, however. It is undisputed that at the time of
the enactment, Maryland and Virginia took differing approaches to aggregation of
benefits. Compare Va. Code Ann. § 65.2-518 (West) (setting 500-week cap for
“total compensation payable under this title”) with Sealy Furniture of Md. v. Miller,
740 A.2d 594, 598 (Md. 1999) (“[T]emporary total disability, temporary partial
disability, permanent total disability, and permanent partial disability are different
compensable events, each justifying a separate award . . . .”), superseded by Md.
Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 9-610.1(2) (West 2022) (claimant’s permanent partial
benefits can be reduced by amount of previously paid temporary total benefits). 14
Third, we note an important aspect of “the broader context of the statute as a
whole.” Clement, 126 A.3d at 1140 (considering broader context in determining
whether statutory language was ambiguous). “This court follows the principle that
workers’ compensation statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their
humanitarian purpose.” McCamey v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs.,
947 A.2d 1191, 1197 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). That principle
provides additional support for the reading of § 32-1505(b) advocated by Ms.
Hughes-Turner.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 32-1505(b) is ambiguous as to
whether the 500-week cap applies in the aggregate to temporary total benefits and
permanent partial benefits, or whether instead the 500-week cap applies separately
to each type of benefit.
The CRB concluded that it would adopt the same interpretation of § 32-
1505(b) even if that provision were ambiguous. Hughes-Turner III, 2020 WL
743005, at *4-5. We are unable to uphold that conclusion, for two reasons. First,
the CRB’s interpretation of § 32-1505(b) rested heavily on the view that the “stated 15
purpose of the legislation” was to create an aggregate cap “more in line with the 500-
week Maryland and Virginia caps.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). As
we have explained, however, Maryland and Virginia took quite different approaches
to the issue of aggregation at the time § 32-1505(b) was enacted. This important
aspect of the CRB’s analysis is therefore erroneous. That error alone would
ordinarily require us to remand to the CRB. See, e.g., Apartment & Off. Bldg. Ass’n
of Metro. Wash. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 129 A.3d 925, 930 (D.C. 2016) (“Generally,
an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency
acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the rest of CRB’s analysis was quite brief. Hughes-Turner III, 2020
WL 743005, at *5-6. The CRB’s only other point was that applying the 500-week
cap in the aggregate would be more consistent with the legislative history of the
amendments that included § 32-1505(b), which were intended to limit workers’
compensation costs. Id. We agree that this point can reasonably be viewed as
tending to support the interpretation adopted by the CRB. The CRB did not address,
however, the other considerations discussed above, including the principle that the
WCA should be interpreted liberally in light of its humanitarian purposes. See, e.g.,
Douglas-Slade v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 959 A.2d 698, 702 (D.C. 2008) 16
(“An appellate court cannot stand in the place of an administrative agency and
attempt to determine how the administrative agency would have decided a matter if
part of its decisional base is in error for failure to address all relevant contentions.”);
Nelson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 530 A.2d 1193, 1197 (D.C.
1987) (directing CRB on remand to consider humanitarian purpose of WCA). A
remand is therefore necessary for the CRB to more fully consider the proper
interpretation of § 32-1505(b) and more fully explain its conclusions.
The dissent concludes that § 32-1505(b) unambiguously provides for a 500-
week cap applicable in the aggregate to temporary total benefits and permanent
partial benefits. Infra at 19-25. We respectfully disagree, and we note three specific
points. First, the dissent states that the CRB’s decision in Hughes-Turner I, 2018
WL 1696862, did not suggest that § 32-1505(b) is ambiguous as to whether the 500-
week cap “applies to different types of disability benefits in the aggregate.” Infra at
19-20 n.1. To the contrary, the CRB in Hughes-Turner I generally referred to § 32-
1505(b) as ambiguous, explained that “any interpretation should be resolved in light
of the legislative intent and principles of the [WCA],” and based its interpretation of
§ 32-1505(b) not on plain language but rather on the ground that a contrary
interpretation would be inconsistent with the legislative history and purpose of § 32-
1505(b). 2018 WL 1696862, at *4-6. 17
Second, the dissent states that “the word ‘total’ leaves it beyond doubt that
multiple types of disability benefits will be treated cumulatively in assessing when
the 500-week cap is reached.” Infra at 19. We agree that “total” means that
something should be aggregated, but the question is what. Another possibility is that
“total” means that all periods of any given type of disability benefits are aggregated,
even if those periods are not consecutive. In other words, all periods of temporary
total disability, taken together, may not exceed 500 weeks.
Third, the dissent acknowledges that § 32-1505(b) is ambiguous as to the
types of disability benefits that are subject to the 500-week cap. Infra at 20. In the
dissent’s view, that ambiguity is “immaterial.” Id. In our view, however, that
ambiguity is quite material. Section 32-1505(b)’s language, read in isolation, could
perhaps most naturally be interpreted as establishing an overall cap of 500 weeks on
all disability benefits arising from a single injury. The dissent acknowledges,
however, that § 32-1505(b) should not be read in that way. Infra at 21. Rather, the
various tools of statutory interpretation must be used to determine which disability
benefits are subject to the 500-week cap. We conclude that the same is true when
determining how to aggregate the benefits to which the 500-week cap applies. 18
To be clear, we express no ultimate view as to the proper interpretation of
§ 32-1505(b). Rather, we simply remand to the CRB for further consideration of
that issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the CRB and remand for
further proceedings.
So ordered. 19
DEAHL, Associate Judge, dissenting: Section 32-1505(b) places an aggregate
cap on disability benefits per injury, not per type of disability benefit awarded. I
agree with the CRB that this provision is not reasonably susceptible to any other
reading, and thus respectfully dissent from the majority’s vacatur and remand.
Section 32-1505(b) says that “[f]or any one injury causing temporary or
permanent partial disability, the payment for disability benefits shall not continue
for more than a total of 500 weeks.” I do not see how one could read that language
as conveying anything but an aggregate cap on disability benefits, per injury. The
words “any one injury” establish that the unit of analysis is the underlying injury,
not the various awards that might stem from it. And the word “total” leaves it beyond
doubt that multiple types of disability benefits will be treated cumulatively in
assessing when the 500-week cap is reached. The alternative, advanced by Hughes-
Turner and indulged as plausible by the majority, is to treat § 32-1505(b)’s 500-week
cap as applying separately to each particular type of disability benefit claimed. That
would require us to read “any one injury” contrary to its plain meaning, and in the
exact manner that the drafters seemed intent to avoid. 1
1 The majority agrees that the word total means “something should be aggregated, but the question is what,” positing that maybe it means “all periods of any given type of disability benefits are aggregated.” Ante at 17. The statutory text 20
The only textual ambiguity in this provision concerns what classes of
disability are subject to the 500-week aggregate cap. But that ambiguity is
immaterial to the question before us. I have no quibble with the majority that in the
phrase, “causing temporary or permanent partial disability benefits,” it is not clear
whether “temporary” modifies “disability” or “partial disability.” Ante at 5-6. That
raises a question of whether temporary total disability benefits are subject to the 500-
week aggregate cap. But we have already answered that question in the affirmative.
See Clement v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp’t Servs., 126 A.3d 1137, 1140
(D.C. 2015). Whatever other disability benefits are subject to § 32-1505(b)’s cap,
there is thus no question that it applies to the two types of disability benefits at issue
here: temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits. For those benefits,
the statute clearly “imposes a 500-week cap upon the classes of benefits mentioned,
in combination.” Hughes-Turner I, 2018 WL 1696862 at *5 (emphasis added). 2
answers the majority’s question and forecloses the posited reading: what is aggregated is “payment for disability benefits,” not payment for each particular type of disability benefit. 2 I disagree with the majority’s description of the CRB as having “appeared to view § 32-1505(b) as ambiguous” on this point in Hughes-Turner I. Ante at 7. The CRB did not suggest the statute is ambiguous as to whether the cap applies to different types of disability benefits in the aggregate. Instead, as the CRB later recapitulated, the only ambiguity in § 32-1505(b) “relates to what classes of benefits will fall under the cap,” while “[t]here is no ambiguity” that the cap is an aggregate one applicable to whatever classes of benefits it applies to. Hughes-Turner III, 2020 21
As to the (here, immaterial) question of what other types of disability benefits
are subject to the cap, I agree with the majority that permanent total disability
benefits are not. The text of § 32-1505(b) excludes them by omission, by specifying
“permanent partial” benefits. Plus, § 32-1508(1) seems to instruct that there is no
durational limit on permanent total benefits. See ante at 9-10. With temporary total
and permanent partial benefits subject to the cap, and permanent total benefits
exempt from it, the only open question regards temporary partial benefits. The best
reading of the statutory text is that temporary partial benefits are subject to the cap
as well; regardless of whether “temporary” modifies “disability” or “partial
disability,” temporary partial disability fits within either reading. Though we have
previously suggested—and perhaps held, quizzically in my view—that temporary
partial benefits are not subject to § 32-1505(b)’s cap. Clement, 126 A.3d at 1141.
In Clement, we reviewed a CRB determination that § 32-1505(b)’s 500-week
cap applies to temporary total benefits. 126 A.3d at 1138. We affirmed the CRB’s
interpretation that it does, and rejected an argument by petitioners that it should be
read to apply only to temporary partial and permanent partial benefits. Id. In
WL 743005 at *3. It is at the very least uncharitable for the majority to attribute an inconsistency to the CRB’s decisions where none is evident, particularly where the CRB member who authored Hughes-Turner III was a member of the Hughes-Turner I panel, and vice versa. 22
rejecting that argument, we opined that the 500-week cap does not apply to
temporary partial benefits at all, because temporary partial benefits are already
subject to a separate 5-year limit under § 32-1508(5), and imposing an additional
500-week cap on them would be “superfluous.” Id. at 1140. That reasoning does
not withstand scrutiny—there is nothing redundant about placing a cap on the
amount of time a claimant can receive a given benefit, and simultaneously placing a
larger cap on the amount of time that claimant can receive various benefits in
combination. I doubt it is a holding, but that is admittedly a thorny question. Alfaro
v. United States, 859 A.2d 149, 154 n.8 (D.C. 2004) (“Language in an opinion” that
is “entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case . . . has no effect as indicating
the law of the District.”); Diamond v. Hogan Lovells US LLP, 224 A.3d 1007, 1019-
20 (D.C. 2020) (“[F]or purposes of binding precedent, a holding is a narrow concept,
a statement of the outcome accompanied by one or more legal steps or conclusions
. . . ‘necessary’ to explain the outcome; other observations are dicta.” (citation
omitted)). But whether or not Clement holds that temporary partial benefits are
excluded from § 32-1505(b)’s cap, that does not alter the conclusion that § 32-
1505(b)’s cap applies to disability benefits in the aggregate.
The majority, however, treats the above ambiguity as if it casts doubt on
whether § 32-1505(b) is an aggregate cap at all. It notes that if temporary partial 23
benefits are excluded from the cap—as we posited in Clement 3—it would be
anomalous to treat § 32-1505(b) as an aggregate cap in at least one scenario. Ante
at 12. Namely, a claimant who suffers a temporary partial disability, and then sees
their condition become permanent such that they would qualify for permanent partial
benefits, would be in a position to receive more benefits than the claimant who
initially suffers a temporary total disability. In other words, the less severely injured
individual could collect more benefits than the more severely injured counterpart,
because temporary partial benefits would not count against the 500-week cap, while
temporary total benefits would. I agree that would be a “counterintuitive” result,
ante at 12, and perhaps even an absurd one. But that is a reason to reject our
statement in Clement that temporary partial benefits do not fit under the cap, rather
than to extend its illogic further.
3 The CRB in this case treated Clement as binding precedent for the proposition that temporary partial benefits do not fall under § 32-1505(b)’s cap, Hughes-Turner I, 2018 WL 1696862, at *4 & n.1, and nobody disputes the point here. Notably, Clement purported to defer to the CRB on this point, noting that even if it was “defensible” to include temporary partial benefits under § 32-1505(b)’s cap, the CRB’s contrary interpretation was not “plainly erroneous.” 126 A.3d at 1140. It would thus seem that the CRB is free to reconsider whether temporary partial benefits are subject to § 32-1505(b)’s cap, notwithstanding what we said in Clement, and it may thereby avoid the absurdity the majority posits. 24
Even assuming Clement’s discussion of temporary partial benefits is binding
precedent, that is no reason to reject the plain reading of § 32-1505(b) as imposing
an aggregate cap. Generally, we avoid statutory readings that lead to “absurd
consequences which the legislature could not have intended.” See, e.g., James
Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 567 A.2d 43, 46 (D.C.
1989). But this absurdity doctrine is at its core a proxy for legislative intent; if one
interpretation of a statute would lead to an absurd result, we presume that the
legislature would not have intended it. Id. The doctrine has no force here, because
the posited absurdity is entirely of our own devise. If we held in Clement that
temporary partial benefits do not fall under the 500-week cap, the resulting absurdity
stems from our own misstep. I would not double down on it and override the
unambiguous meaning of a statute just to evade an absurdity we ourselves sowed
into the statute. 4
4 As for the majority’s reliance on the presumption in favor of a liberal reading of the disability statute, ante at 14, that consideration only comes into play when a statute’s meaning is not clear. See Hiligh v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp’t Servs., 935 A.2d 1070, 1075 (D.C. 2007) (“While this court appreciates that the Act is [to] be interpreted in a manner consistent with its humanitarian purpose, that mandate is not so broad as to allow” the CRB to award excess benefits when “there is no provision . . . from which the [CRB’s] interpretation can reasonably arise.”); Butler v. Metro. Police Dep’t, 240 A.3d 829, 836 (D.C. 2020) (limiting deference to “reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes”). The statute here is clear on the point at issue, so there is no need to resort to that rule-of-thumb. 25
In short, because § 32-1505(b) is unambiguous as to the only question in this
case, I would affirm. By remanding back to the CRB, requiring it to consider
Hughes-Turner’s case for a fifth time, the majority prolongs an already protracted
dispute, and does so to seek clarity on questions that I believe are not implicated by
this case.