NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 128,666
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
DONNA HUFFMAN,
Appellant,
v.
FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., et al., Appellees.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from Jefferson District Court; CHRISTOPHER ETZEL judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed August 21, 2026. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Donna L. Huffman, appellant pro se.
Kevin L. Bennett, of Bennett and Bodine, P.A. of Shawnee, for appellees.
Before HILL, P.J., ISHERWOOD and BOLTON FLEMING, JJ.
HILL, J.: In this contest between competing motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company and denied summary judgment to Donna Huffman. Huffman appeals. We review such questions de novo because we are in the same position as the district court— dealing with uncontested findings of fact and suggestions of controlling law—and are not bound by the district court's findings or holding. Based on their submissions, neither party has shown us sufficient facts that would compel us to grant summary judgment.
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Thus, we hold that summary judgment should not be granted to either party here. We reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.
A driver claims benefits from her own policy.
This lawsuit is an action to recover personal injury protection benefits from Donna Huffman's automobile insurance policy. On June 24, 2011, while driving on K-92 Highway in Jefferson County, Donna Huffman suffered a traumatic brain injury after her car was struck by a cement truck. She was insured by Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company. Jeffrey Biggs sold her the policy. Huffman had level three Personal Injury Protection "PIP" benefits. These benefits included:
• $9,500 in medical expenses,
• $1,750 per month for loss of earnings,
• $25 per day for substitution services expenses,
• and $4,500 in rehabilitation expenses.
Rehabilitation expenses were defined in the policy as "reasonable expenses for necessary treatment rendered by a licensed psychologist, occupational therapy and such occupational training reasonably needed so the 'insured' can obtain suitable work."
Here is what we can glean from this record.
The chronology of Huffman's claims and Farm Bureau's episodic payments extends over a considerable period. On July 12, 2011, Huffman applied for PIP benefits. In her claim, Huffman included a doctor's note that stated she needed to be off work.
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Pamela Augustine, a senior claims representative for Farm Bureau, adjusted Huffman's claims. By December 19, 2011, Huffman had notified Augustine that she was a self- employed attorney who had just opened her law office before the accident. She believed the average practicing attorney made more than the PIP monthly maximum. She also told Augustine that she was receiving occupational therapy.
On February 15, 2012, Farm Bureau made its first loss of earnings payment to Huffman, for the period June 24, 2011, to August 1, 2011. Relying on Kansas case law, Farm Bureau determined that, as a self-employed person, Huffman's payment should be equal to the reasonable cost to hire someone to perform her work. The maximum monthly benefit under Huffman's policy was $57.53 a day, or $7.20 an hour. Thus, Huffman was entitled to the $1,750 maximum monthly benefit even if she was working part time.
In response, Huffman e-mailed Augustine on March 24, 2012, claiming Farm Bureau was acting in bad faith on her claim for loss of earnings and for substitute transportation.
Then on April 10, 2012, Farm Bureau made another bulk payment for loss of earnings for the period of August 2, 2011, through April 23, 2012. Augustine acknowledged at that time that Huffman was receiving rehabilitation services from the Rehabilitation Institute of Kansas City. She then asked for the identity of those who were providing rehabilitation services so that she could obtain Huffman's records to support her loss of earnings claim. In addition, she asked Huffman to tell her when she was released to return to work full time.
On May 11, 2012, Huffman e-mailed Augustine, claiming a breach of contract by Farm Bureau on her claims for her earnings and substitute services. Farm Bureau responded to Huffman on June 7, 2012, by explaining that she was entitled to $25 per day
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for necessary services incurred (such as cleaning) if she could not perform the duty due to the accident. But her PIP benefits did not cover travel expenses.
In June 2013, Huffman sued the driver of the cement truck and the cement truck company. At a jury trial in October 2018, she was determined to be 25% at fault. For her injuries and damages Huffman was awarded $607,118.25.
Farm Bureau never pays for Huffman's rehabilitation expenses.
On August 20, 2013, Huffman claimed that Farm Bureau had concealed from her the fact that she was entitled to payments for rehabilitation services. She basically argued that they had acted in bad faith and suggested she may sue them.
Farm Bureau received releases for Huffman's records in 2011 and August 2013.
Farm Bureau received rehabilitation records by September 19, 2013. Huffman was diagnosed with a brain injury and visual disturbances following her accident. One of her occupational therapy goals was returning to a level of functioning to be able to work. Huffman was in occupational therapy for "a number of weeks." Huffman was in psychotherapy for 10 years.
On September 19, 2013, Farm Bureau made its third payment for loss of earnings for the period April 24, 2012, to September 23, 2013. Farm Bureau paid the November 2013 payment with the December 2013 payment. Farm Bureau paid the remaining loss of earnings payments timely, but they did not pay interest on any payment to Huffman.
There was no activity on Huffman's PIP claims between 2014 and 2017.
It appears that on June 8, 2017, Augustine updated the PIP log for the last time.
The record does not reveal what the update was. On July 19, 2017, Huffman e-mailed
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Augustine asking about her rehabilitation benefits. Augustine did not respond. Farm Bureau never paid rehabilitation benefits or substitute service benefits to Huffman for cleaning assistance or transportation.
Huffman sues.
On April 15, 2020, Huffman sued Farm Bureau in Leavenworth County. After the Leavenworth County case was dismissed, without prejudice on July 21, 2022, Huffman sued Farm Bureau in Jefferson County, on January 25, 2023. She alleged: (1) breach of good faith and fair dealing in contract; (2) various torts; and (3) the breach of a fiduciary duty by Biggs. Basically, Huffman contended that Farm Bureau:
• failed to investigate,
• did not promptly pay claims,
• concealed her rehabilitation and essential services benefits,
• purposely avoided providing written denials,
• failed to communicate,
• failed to defend her in litigation against the cement truck driver,
• interfered with her case against the driver,
• falsely stated that her PIP benefits had been exhausted, and
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• failed to pay interest on overdue benefits in contravention of the contract and Kansas law.
She also claimed her agent, Biggs, breached a fiduciary duty through his advice and by failing to help get her claims paid.
Huffman moved for partial summary judgment.
Huffman moved for partial summary judgment on two issues: (1) breach of contract for failure to pay the PIP rehabilitation benefit of $4,500 for occupational and/or psychotherapy, and (2) failing to pay her statutory interest on the late payments for her loss of earnings and rehabilitation benefits.
Farm Bureau responded to Huffman's motion by contending there were genuine issues of material fact because Huffman never provided any documentation that her occupational therapy and psychological therapy services were related to her obtaining suitable employment. In addition, they argue that because she had not established there was an obligation for Farm Bureau to pay rehabilitation benefits, she had not shown she was entitled to interest on that claim. Farm Bureau also asserted that Huffman did not show she was entitled to interest on her wage payments because she never provided supporting documentation to establish her wage loss.
Farm Bureau files its own motion for summary judgment.
Farm Bureau's response to Huffman's motion contained a cross motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a motion for dismissal, contending Huffman had failed to state a claim, that her claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and, on some counts, she had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Farm Bureau argued that this action began, for statute of limitations purposes, on April 15,
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2020, the date that Huffman filed her first lawsuit in Leavenworth County under K.S.A. 60-518.
Farm Bureau argued that Huffman's contract claims were barred by the five-year statute of limitations because she claimed breach of the contract on May 11, 2012. Going further, Farm Bureau alleged Huffman's tort claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations because Huffman was aware of the existence of her rehabilitation benefits and substitute service benefits by December 29, 2011.
Farm Bureau also argues that Huffman's complaint about Farm Bureau's actions relating to her lawsuit against the tortfeasor did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Farm Bureau had no duty to defend Huffman; and Farm Bureau had a right of subrogation after Huffman chose to sue the tortfeasor. Farm Bureau also asserted the claim against Biggs, the agent, did not state a valid cause of action and was barred by the two-year negligence statute of limitations. Farm Bureau asked for judgment as a matter of law on all of Huffman's claims.
Rather than respond to Farm Bureau's cross-motion for summary judgment, Huffman simply moved to strike its cross-motion.
The district court grants summary judgment to Farm Bureau.
First, the district court denied Huffman's motion to strike. The court then adopted the facts set out by both parties in their respective motions, since those factual allegations were uncontroverted. After that, the court denied Huffman's motion for partial summary judgment because the uncontroverted facts did not establish that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court did grant Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment. The court noted that Huffman failed to respond to Farm Bureau's summary
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judgment motion at her peril, citing K.S.A. 60-256(e)(2). The court adopted Farm Bureau's arguments and authorities in toto.
After the summary judgment motion hearing, but before the court had ruled, Huffman moved to amend and filed supplemental pleadings. After the judgment, Huffman filed a motion for sanctions, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court denied all three motions.
Huffman appeals.
We boil down Huffman's claims to four. She argues that the district court erred by:
(1) granting summary judgment for Farm Bureau,
(2) denying her partial summary judgment motion,
(3) denying her motion to amend, and
(4) denying her several post-judgment motions.
Kansas cases establish when summary judgment can be granted, how to deal with factual allegations, and how to deal with appeals of summary judgment rulings.
We follow the rules set out in GFTLenexa, LLC v. City of Lenexa, 310 Kan. 976, 981-82, 453 P.3d 304 (2019), for determing when summary judgment can be granted:
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and supporting affidavits show that no genuine issue
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exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " 310 Kan. at 981-82.
To determine the facts:
"The district court must resolve all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing summary judgment, a party must produce evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issue in the case." 310 Kan. at 982.
To deal with appeals:
"Appellate courts apply the same rules and, where they find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate. Appellate review of the legal effect of undisputed facts is de novo." 310 Kan. at 982.
We take these rules to mean that we must review a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. If reasonable minds could differ about the conclusions drawn from the evidence—if there is a genuine issue about a material fact— then summary judgment should be denied. John Doe v. M.J., 315 Kan. 310, 313, 508 P.3d 368 (2022).
Summary judgment motions can be dispositive of issues or entire cases and should not be ignored. Importantly here, we note that a failure to respond to a motion for summary judgment constitutes an admission that there are no disputed issues of material fact warranting a trial. But failure to respond is not a waiver by the nonmoving party of legal arguments based on the undisputed facts. Lumry v. State, 305 Kan. 545, 566, 385
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P.3d 479 (2016). "'A party may not remain silent in the face of a motion for summary judgment and later claim there is additional evidence to support its claims.' [Citation omitted.]" U.S.D. No. 232 v. CWD Investments, 288 Kan. 536, 560, 205 P.3d 1245 (2009).
We begin with the court's grant of summary judgment to Farm Bureau.
Basically, the district court ruled that Huffman's claims were barred by either the tort or the contract statute of limitations. We are not so convinced. Simply put, Farm Bureau's statement of uncontroverted facts was insufficient to support its motion for summary judgment. It is unclear what dates Farm Bureau relied on to conclude that Huffman's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Huffman may have claimed breach of contract early on but still have had accruing medical bills that would be ripe for payment.
A motion for summary judgment must "state concisely, in separately numbered paragraphs, the uncontroverted contentions of fact on which the movant relies" and each fact must "contain[] precise references to pages, lines and/or paragraphs . . . of the portion of the record on which the movant relies." Supreme Court Rule 141(a) (2026 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 220). The purpose of Rule 141 is to identify what facts are controverted or uncontroverted and what evidence the parties have relied on. Sperry v. McKune, 305 Kan. 469, 490, 384 P.3d 1003 (2016).
Farm Bureau's motion did contain a few separately numbered statements of fact with references to the record along with many references to the record with no statements of fact. For the latter, Farm Bureau merely referred to exhibits without stating which fact the exhibit supported.
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Farm Bureau's failure to identify what facts it relied on makes it impossible to determine whether the district court correctly found the statute of limitations had passed on many of Huffman's claims. The district court merely adopted Farm Bureau's uncontroverted facts and made no further findings. By so doing, we are forced to speculate about which findings are appropriate.
When entering summary judgment, a district court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law. K.S.A. 60-252(a). The district court does not inherently violate K.S.A. 60-252(a) by adopting a party's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Breedlove v. State, 310 Kan. 56, 60, 445 P.3d 1101 (2019); Huffman v. City of Maize, 54 Kan. App. 2d 693, 703, 404 P.3d 345 (2017). But Farm Bureau's statement of facts is insufficient to establish that Huffman's claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proved by the defendant. LCL, LLC v. Falen, 53 Kan. App. 2d, 651, 658, 390 P.3d 571 (2017), aff'd 308 Kan. 573, 422 P.3d 1166 (2018).
Farm Bureau reasoned that Huffman's claims were barred by the statute of limitations because at some point she claimed breach of contract in an e-mail. But that reasoning does not establish at what time Huffman's medical expenses were no longer accruing. Additional findings of fact are necessary to conclusively establish that Huffman's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. We will not fill them in for Farm Bureau.
Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Farm Bureau.
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We turn to Huffman's motion for partial judgment.
Huffman argues that because Farm Bureau did not controvert her statement of facts, it failed to establish a disputed issue of material fact. Farm Bureau argues Huffman failed to support her motion because she did not provide evidence that her occupational therapy or psychotherapy were related to her ability to obtain suitable employment. Similarly, Huffman failed to provide documentation to support her loss of earnings claim.
Huffman's claims relating to policy coverage for psychotherapy were not barred by the statute of limitations. But Huffman was not entitled to summary judgment on this claim. An insurance company does not become liable for payment of PIP benefits until it has received notice of a claim and reasonable proof of the loss along with the amount of the expenses incurred. Miner v. Farm Bureau Mut. Insurance Co., 17 Kan. App. 2d 598, 604-05, 841 P.2d 1093 (1992). There is no documentation in the record supporting Huffman's claim for reimbursement of psychotherapy expenses. There is nothing in the record showing that psychotherapy was necessary for Huffman to get back to work. There is no documentation that she attended psychotherapy, or for how long. Though the parties' statements of facts were uncontroverted, the facts did not establish that Huffman was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
Huffman was also not entitled to summary judgment on her claim for statutory interest on late payments for her loss of earnings and rehabilitation benefits. The record does not conclusively establish when Farm Bureau had reasonable proof of those claims and in turn when those payments were due. The fact that interest was owed and the amount of such interest are disputed despite the uncontroverted facts.
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We examine Huffman's motion to amend and supplement her pleadings.
Based on new evidence discovered from depositions taken after the hearing on the summary judgment motions, Huffman sought to add claims of negligence per se, concealment, and fraudulent inducement. She argues the district court erroneously denied her motion to amend and supplement her pleadings. Farm Bureau argues the amendment would have been futile because the claims were either barred by the applicable statute of limitations or did not state a viable cause of action under Kansas law.
The district court found the motion was a mere restatement of the original causes of action pled in the original petition. They were already considered by the court as part of the summary judgment arguments.
The rule is that a district court should freely give leave for a party to amend its pleading when justice so requires. K.S.A. 60-215(a)(2). We review the district court's denial of a motion to amend a pleading under K.S.A. 60-215 for abuse of discretion. Zaragoza v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 320 Kan. 691, 711, 571 P.3d 545 (2025).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court correctly found that Huffman's motion to amend merely restated the claims she had made in her petition. She simply added statements from people she had deposed after the hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment. Those statements do not pertain to the statute of limitations. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to amend the pleadings and there are no grounds for reversal.
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We find no error in denying Huffman's post-judgment motions.
Huffman is not clear in making her claims. From what we can tell, she appears to argue that the district court erred in denying her motion for sanctions and her motion to alter or amend judgment. Farm Bureau argues Huffman's motion for sanctions was frivolous and her motion to alter or amend did not present any new arguments or evidence. We will review those motions in that order.
(1) Motion for sanctions
Under K.S.A. 60-211(c), the district court may impose an appropriate sanction on an attorney for any misrepresentation to the court. But the imposition of sanctions under that statute is discretionary. We review a district court's decision imposing or denying sanctions for abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Bergmann and Sokol, 49 Kan. App. 2d 45, 50, 305 P.3d 664 (2013).
The district court found no misrepresentations by defense counsel. Based on our review, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for sanctions. In her motion, Huffman conflated the statute of limitations to sue for breach of contract, with the time limitation to file a claim for benefits under her insurance contract. Nothing prevented her from responding to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment by arguing that she was still incurring rehabilitation expenses.
(2) Motion to alter or amend judgment
The arguments raised in Huffman's motion to alter or amend the judgment have been addressed above. There was no need to amend because those statements were a retelling of what was already argued.
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The district court's grant of summary judgment to Farm Bureau is reversed. The court's denial of summary judgment to Huffman is affirmed. The district court's denial of the various post-trial motions is affirmed. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.