OPALA, Justice.
The issues presented are: (1) Does 51 O.S.Supp. 1986, § 155(14)
immunize the State from tort liability in a suit brought for a nonstate employee’s wrongful death which resulted from an on-the-job accident compensable by the decedent’s employer under the workers’ compensation law? and if not, (2) Can prejudgment interest be added to the maximum amount of liability prescribed in 51 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 154(A)(2)?
We answer both questions in the negative.
Late one night in June, 1986 Roy Dean Huff [decedent] was struck and killed by an Oklahoma Highway Patrol car while in
the course of his employment with a private company as he walked upon a marked crosswalk. The decedent’s wife, Minerva Lou Huff [plaintiff], who was then receiving compensation benefits from her husband’s employer, sought recovery from the State under the Governmental Tort Claims Act.
The trial court rendered judgment upon stipulated facts in the plaintiff’s favor for $100,000.00, together with prejudgment interest.
We affirm the judgment against the State
only
insofar as it awards the principal amount of recovery.
I
SECTION 155(14) IMMUNITY
Relying on the provisions of 51 O.S. Supp. 1986 § 155(14),
the State argues that it cannot be held liable to the plaintiff because her claim was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act.
In
Jarvis v. City of Stillwater,
a case with facts virtually the same as those in the case at bar,
we held that the immunity provided by 51 O.S.
1981
§ 155(14) was confined to tort liability pressed
by employees of political subdivisions
whose claims are covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act. On the question whether § 155(14) also afforded. immunity from like liability to
nongovernmental
employees, we concluded that the statute was either silent or ambiguous on the point and we declined to construe its provisions so as to clad the political subdivisions in a mantle of all-inclusive immunity.
Because § 155(14) has been amended since
Jarvis,
we must now decide whether the after-enacted changes expanded the class of claimants who are barred from suing the State to include nongovernmental employees protected by their own employer’s liability for on-the-job injury or death pursuant to the workers’ compensation law.
When
Jarvis
was decided the terms of § 155(14) were:
“A political subdivision or an employee acting within the scope of his employment shall not be liable if a
loss
results from:
* * * * * *
14.
Any claim covered by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act
or any claim covered by the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act.” [Emphasis added.]
The 1984 amendment
of § 155(14) now in force provides:
“The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a
loss or claim
results from:
* * * * * *
14.
Any claim
covered by
any workers’ compensation act
or any employer’s liability act.” [Emphasis added.]
We are of course mindful that when amending a statute the legislature is presumed to be familiar with the then extant judicial construction that is in force.
The issue now to be resolved is whether an intent to change the meaning of § 155(14) clearly appears from the
post-Jarvis
amendatory enactment.
We can discern no intent to enlarge the subsection 14 immunity to the extent pressed by the State. The terms of the amended statute are not substantially different from the earlier version and must hence be accorded the construction identical to that placed upon them by antecedent case law.
Further support for our conclusion can be found in the amendment’s legislative history and the statutory schemes of both the Governmental Tort Claims Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act.
A.
The
Jarvis
version of § 155(14) came to be amended with the repeal of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act which was replaced by the
post-Vanderpool
enactment of the Governmental Tort Claims Act in 1984.
When the bill was first introduced the text of what later became § 155(14) stated:
“The state shall not be liable if a claim arises from:
* # * * * *
16.
Any loss
to
any claimant
covered by any workers’ compensation act, any employer liability act or any unemployment act_”
[Emphasis added.]
The phrases “any loss” and “any claimant” were eventually deleted from the proposed act and replaced with “any claim.” Since “loss” means death or bodily injury,
and “any claimant” would include any aggrieved person who files a claim,
excising the “any loss” and “any claimant” phrases from the proposed bill while in the process of legislative consideration clearly evinces the intent to keep the class of exempted claims confined to those made by the State’s and political subdivisions’ own
employees,
We hence conclude that the 1984 amendment must be deemed to have left undisturbed the
Jarvis
construction of § 155(14).
B.
The State argues that the language of the 1984 amendment of § 155(14) shows disapproval of that statute’s construction in
Jarvis.
On the contrary, changing the class of claims, for which the State may not be held liable, from “[a]ny claim covered by
the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act” to “[a]ny claim covered by any workers’ compensation act” makes the statute consistent with the provisions of 85 O.S. 1981 § 4.
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OPALA, Justice.
The issues presented are: (1) Does 51 O.S.Supp. 1986, § 155(14)
immunize the State from tort liability in a suit brought for a nonstate employee’s wrongful death which resulted from an on-the-job accident compensable by the decedent’s employer under the workers’ compensation law? and if not, (2) Can prejudgment interest be added to the maximum amount of liability prescribed in 51 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 154(A)(2)?
We answer both questions in the negative.
Late one night in June, 1986 Roy Dean Huff [decedent] was struck and killed by an Oklahoma Highway Patrol car while in
the course of his employment with a private company as he walked upon a marked crosswalk. The decedent’s wife, Minerva Lou Huff [plaintiff], who was then receiving compensation benefits from her husband’s employer, sought recovery from the State under the Governmental Tort Claims Act.
The trial court rendered judgment upon stipulated facts in the plaintiff’s favor for $100,000.00, together with prejudgment interest.
We affirm the judgment against the State
only
insofar as it awards the principal amount of recovery.
I
SECTION 155(14) IMMUNITY
Relying on the provisions of 51 O.S. Supp. 1986 § 155(14),
the State argues that it cannot be held liable to the plaintiff because her claim was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act.
In
Jarvis v. City of Stillwater,
a case with facts virtually the same as those in the case at bar,
we held that the immunity provided by 51 O.S.
1981
§ 155(14) was confined to tort liability pressed
by employees of political subdivisions
whose claims are covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act. On the question whether § 155(14) also afforded. immunity from like liability to
nongovernmental
employees, we concluded that the statute was either silent or ambiguous on the point and we declined to construe its provisions so as to clad the political subdivisions in a mantle of all-inclusive immunity.
Because § 155(14) has been amended since
Jarvis,
we must now decide whether the after-enacted changes expanded the class of claimants who are barred from suing the State to include nongovernmental employees protected by their own employer’s liability for on-the-job injury or death pursuant to the workers’ compensation law.
When
Jarvis
was decided the terms of § 155(14) were:
“A political subdivision or an employee acting within the scope of his employment shall not be liable if a
loss
results from:
* * * * * *
14.
Any claim covered by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act
or any claim covered by the Oklahoma Unemployment Compensation Act.” [Emphasis added.]
The 1984 amendment
of § 155(14) now in force provides:
“The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a
loss or claim
results from:
* * * * * *
14.
Any claim
covered by
any workers’ compensation act
or any employer’s liability act.” [Emphasis added.]
We are of course mindful that when amending a statute the legislature is presumed to be familiar with the then extant judicial construction that is in force.
The issue now to be resolved is whether an intent to change the meaning of § 155(14) clearly appears from the
post-Jarvis
amendatory enactment.
We can discern no intent to enlarge the subsection 14 immunity to the extent pressed by the State. The terms of the amended statute are not substantially different from the earlier version and must hence be accorded the construction identical to that placed upon them by antecedent case law.
Further support for our conclusion can be found in the amendment’s legislative history and the statutory schemes of both the Governmental Tort Claims Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act.
A.
The
Jarvis
version of § 155(14) came to be amended with the repeal of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act which was replaced by the
post-Vanderpool
enactment of the Governmental Tort Claims Act in 1984.
When the bill was first introduced the text of what later became § 155(14) stated:
“The state shall not be liable if a claim arises from:
* # * * * *
16.
Any loss
to
any claimant
covered by any workers’ compensation act, any employer liability act or any unemployment act_”
[Emphasis added.]
The phrases “any loss” and “any claimant” were eventually deleted from the proposed act and replaced with “any claim.” Since “loss” means death or bodily injury,
and “any claimant” would include any aggrieved person who files a claim,
excising the “any loss” and “any claimant” phrases from the proposed bill while in the process of legislative consideration clearly evinces the intent to keep the class of exempted claims confined to those made by the State’s and political subdivisions’ own
employees,
We hence conclude that the 1984 amendment must be deemed to have left undisturbed the
Jarvis
construction of § 155(14).
B.
The State argues that the language of the 1984 amendment of § 155(14) shows disapproval of that statute’s construction in
Jarvis.
On the contrary, changing the class of claims, for which the State may not be held liable, from “[a]ny claim covered by
the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act” to “[a]ny claim covered by any workers’ compensation act” makes the statute consistent with the provisions of 85 O.S. 1981 § 4.
The latter section allows a worker to elect between the compensation law of Oklahoma and that of the state in which the accident occurred. The amendment to § 155(14) merely modifies
the State’s immunity to encompass within its ambit not only Oklahoma-based claims but also those which may be authorized by another state’s compensation laws.
A compensation claimant is entitled by 85 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 44
to proceed against a third-party tortfeasor who is a stranger to the employment relation. There is no legislative imprimatur for placing the State in a class different from that of any other third-party tortfeasor defending against a claim for injuries or death by one who, when injured or killed, was in the employ of another.
II
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Over the State’s objection
the trial court added prejudgment interest to the $100,000.00 awarded plaintiff in damages. The State contends it should not be held liable for any sum in excess of $100,000.00 and notes the statutory limit prescribed in 51 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 154(A)(2).
We agree and hold that prejudgment interest may not be awarded when, as here, the total recovery would exceed the State’s maximum statutory liability.
The plaintiff argues that § 154(A)(2) merely limits the State’s liability to the amount claimed before or at the time an
action is filed. We disagree. That subsection limits the State’s liability “on
claims
... to One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) to any claimant for his claim_” [Emphasis added.] “Claim” is defined as “any written demand presented by a claimant ... to recover money,”
and prejudgment interest is allowed by 12 O.S. Supp. 1986 § 727(A)(2)
from the time an action is filed to when a damage award or verdict is rendered.
The plaintiff seems to contend that because prejudgment interest does not begin to accrue until
after
suit is commenced, it should not be held included within the maximum tort recovery limit.
Whenever appropriate, prejudgment interest is a statutorily authorized item of recovery; it constitutes but a part of the judgment to which it is attached.
As an item of recovery prejudgment interest must be added to other damages in calculating the State’s total liability. A contrary construction of the § 154(A)(2) recovery limit would violate the proscription in 51 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 154(F)
against judicial enlargement of the State’s maximum liability for tort.
The allowance of prejudgment interest cannot stand because, by its addition to the judgment, the trial court impermissibly exceeded the statutory limit on total recovery against the State.
THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. •
DOOLIN, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
SIMMS, J., dissents.
KAUGER, J., recused.