H.P. Hood LLC v. Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Co.

39 N.E.3d 769, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 613
CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedNovember 2, 2015
DocketAC 14-P-1605
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 39 N.E.3d 769 (H.P. Hood LLC v. Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
H.P. Hood LLC v. Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Co., 39 N.E.3d 769, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 613 (Mass. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

Milkey, J.

Plaintiff H.P. Hood LLC (Hood) suffered various losses when a bottled beverage it was producing for another company failed certain quality control measures. At issue is whether those losses are covered by the “all risks” property insurance policy that Hood had purchased from the defendant, Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company (Allianz). On cross motions for summary judgment, a Superior Court judge ruled in Allianz’s favor, concluding that Hood’s losses fell within certain exclusions to the policy. Because we agree that any potentially covered losses are excluded, we affirm.

1. Background, a. The product. The essential facts are not in dispute. The product at issue is a milk-based specialty drink marketed by Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) under the trade name *614 Myoplex. Myoplex is a “shelf stable” beverage, meaning that it is designed to require refrigeration only after its bottles are opened. In order to ensure that the product does not spoil before that, it must be manufactured and bottled under strict aseptic conditions, and its bottles must stay hermetically sealed until consumers open them.

b. The contract between Hood and Abbott. In November of 2008, Abbott and Hood entered into a contract under which Hood would produce at least 40 million bottles of Myoplex in the first year. The contract, which was termed a “contract packaging agreement,” required Hood to conduct quality control testing. Attachments to the contract, and subsequent written and oral agreements, added specificity to the particular tests and protocols that Hood agreed to use. Some of the required testing was designed to ensure that the Myoplex was contaminant-free during the production and bottling process (that is, up until the point the bottles were ready for distribution). None of that testing revealed any contamination or other problems in any of the relevant bottles.

Other testing was designed to ensure that the Myoplex bottles would stay hermetically sealed after they left the bottling plant and faced the rigors of transport to eventual end users. One such test, known as the secure seal test, examined whether bottles submerged in water retained their seals even after the pressure inside the bottles was increased. Because this test involved puncturing the bottles (to increase the pressure inside them), it is known as a destructive test.

c. The May, 2009, production run. Hood began a production run of Myoplex on May 14, 2009. Two days later, a bottle in that run failed the secure seal test, meaning that the bottle did not sustain its hermetic seal after the pressure inside the bottle was increased. Production therefore was suspended. After tentatively concluding that the problem likely was isolated, Hood resumed production. However, on May 18, 2009, another bottle failed the secure seal test. As a result, production was suspended again, and Hood conducted extensive investigation in accordance with its quality control protocols. By May 26, 2009, further secure seal testing indicated a failure rate of approximately seven percent. Hood utilized a nondestructive test known as Taptone testing to try to isolate the problem, but it was unable to do so.

On May 27, 2009, Hood reported its preliminary results to Abbott, which responded that it would not accept bottles from the *615 May, 2009, production run. Hood then conducted additional testing and investigation. In all, Hood performed secure seal tests on 5,994 bottles, with 538 failures (a nine percent failure rate). Hood also confirmed that it could not isolate the bottles that were potentially problematic from those that were not. Based on such results, Hood and Abbott agreed that none of the almost 2 million bottles from the May, 2009, production run could be marketed, and those bottles were destroyed.

Subsequent investigation revealed that the problem had to do with the bottle caps that Hood was using. Specifically, Hood discovered that the liner in the caps became more slippery over time, something that affected the amount of torque needed to seal the bottles properly. Because the production process used during the May, 2009, run did not take into account the particular age of the bottle caps that were being used at any given time, this meant that some bottle caps did not receive optimal torque when the bottles were capped.

2. Discussion. Whether the insurance policy here provided coverage is a legal question amenable to resolution on summary judgment. See Cody v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 387 Mass. 142, 146 (1982).

The policy in question delineated its coverage as follows:

“Subject to the terms, conditions, exclusions and limitations contained herein or endorsed hereon and in consideration of the premium paid, this ‘policy’ covers all risks of direct physical loss or damage to Insured Property at Insured Location^), provided such physical loss or damage occurs during the Policy Period.”

Allianz argues, as it did below, that based on this language, actual property damage must occur before coverage is triggered and that only such damage is covered by the policy. It points out that there was no evidence that even one Myoplex bottle lost its hermetic seal or otherwise sustained physical damage (other than those bottles that went through the secure seal testing) before Hood made a business decision to destroy the May, 2009, production run. According to Allianz, the secure seal testing showed, at most, a higher probability that bottles from the May, 2009, run later could become damaged in transit. 1 Allianz contends that, as a matter of law, a mere increased risk of future property damage is *616 not itself covered by the policy here. See Tocci Bldg. Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (D. Mass. 2009) (“It is impossible to read the [‘all risks’] insurance policy [at issue there] as providing coverage for ‘risk’ in the absence of a ‘damage’ ”). See also HRG Dev. Corp. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 377 (1988) (defect in title to boat not covered by “all risks” policy because policy covered only “physical losses and damages”).

In response, Hood argues in effect that special considerations should apply in cases that involve products designed for human consumption. 2 In that context, Hood contends, the requisite property damage has occurred once doubts have been raised as to the product’s fitness for that purpose and the product thereby has lost value. For this proposition, Hood cites to a string of cases from other jurisdictions. 3 Allianz seeks to distinguish such cases based on the particular language of the insurance policies at issue in them, or the specific facts regarding what prevented the product’s marketability. Allianz has also cited to cases that rejected the *617 legal proposition that Hood has put forward. 4

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Viking Construction, Inc. v. 777 Residential, LLC
210 A.3d 654 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
39 N.E.3d 769, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 613, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hp-hood-llc-v-allianz-global-risks-us-insurance-co-massappct-2015.