Howell v. Continental Casualty Co.

110 S.W.2d 210, 1937 Tex. App. LEXIS 1245
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 11, 1937
DocketNo. 10662.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 110 S.W.2d 210 (Howell v. Continental Casualty Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howell v. Continental Casualty Co., 110 S.W.2d 210, 1937 Tex. App. LEXIS 1245 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).

Opinion

GRAVES, Justice.

This appeal in a compensation case — advanced for hearing in this court, pursuant to rule — is from a judgment of the Tenth district court of Galveston county, entered upon an instructed verdict that had been duly returned denying the appellant any compensation recovery therein sought against the appellee; the substance thereof being ■ this:

“It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that Mildred P. Howell take nothing by reason of her suit and cross-action against Continental Casualty Company. It is - further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the award of the Industrial Accident Board of the State of Texas, No. V-10733 on the docket of said Board and styled Loy W.Howell (Deceased),' Employee vs. C. S. *211 Shoolroy, Sales Agent, National Cash Register Company, Employer, Continental Casualty Company, Insurer, be cancelled, vacated, set aside and held for naught. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that said Continental Casualty Company, Plaintiff, and Cross-defendant, do have and recover of and from Mrs. Mildred P. Howell all costs in this behalf expended.”

As the appellee frankly concedes, the learned, trial court granted its motion for such peremptory instruction upon these two conclusions:

“(1) Loy W. Howell, appellant’s deceased husband, was an independent contractor, or owner of a sales-agency, and not an employee within the meaning of the Workman’s Compensation Act (Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St. art. 8306 et seq.) ; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that Howell received any injury in the course of employment, which contributed to or' caused his death.”

Wherefore, the sole question presented to this court-is whether or not the granting of the instruction on those two conclusions was error. After careful consideration of this unduly extended record, it is determined that it was, the evidence upon both features raising issues of fact rather than concluding either of- them in the appellee’s favor.

The statement of facts also is extensive, and since the contract between Loy W. Howell, appellant’s deceased husband, and the appellee in his capacity as sales agent, National- Cash Register Company, which was in writing, is somewhat at least of a sui generis character, a full copy of it is appended hereto as an exhibit; invoking paragraphs 32 and 33 thereof upon the trial below, the appellee insisted that the terms of this contract alone can be looked to in determining the question of whether Loy W. Howell worked under the direction of Mr. Shoolroy, or that of someone else, hence no parol testimony was admissible upon such issue.

The trial court, however, overruled that contention, permitting not only the introduction of the written contract, but, -further, oral testimony in extenso in explanation of the actual working of the Shoolroy organization under the same, and as showing how the parties themselves construed and acted under the written agreement, thereby developing the evidence in the proportions indicated; in this ruling it is thought no error was involved, and that only in that way can the real meaning and ultimate effect of the contractual arrangement be arrived at; especially so, since both parties stood upon the contract as written, and the oral testimony received was neither offered nor had the tendency to contradict the written agreement, but rather to show in minute detail how the parties construed it and how in the work-out of their detailed business it was performed.

Looking, therefore, at the body of the evidence as so composed in its entirety, this court is constrained to hold, as indicated supr(a, that in its ultimate reaches and effect this written instrument did not make of the appellant’s husband an independent contractor, or owner of a sales agency, as a matter of law, as so held by the court below, but at the least raised the fact issue as to whether or not he was rather an employee of Shoolroy, within the broad meaning of .the Compensation Law, that should have been submitted to the jury; indeed, while it is not necessary to go that far, the indicia seem to this court to indicate that the ultimate result of the contractual arrangements between the two parties simply was that Shoolroy bargained for and secured the personal services of Howell in prosecuting his sales-agency business for the National Cash Register Company and in the work-out in effect controlled not only the service itself, but the manner in which it was rendered; in so-much as the contract is herein set out in full, it would serve no useful purpose to attempt an analysis or even résumé of its many detailed provisions, since it seems clear that they did not on their face constitute Howell an independent contractor, as a. matter of law; so, when the veil is lifted from these rather complicated written details, and the oral disclosures of what was. done under them are added, the essential nature of the whole relationship as constituting merely a minutely regulated engagement of personal services as an employee seems to us to become reasonably plain; in short, under all the facts here, the question of whether Shoolroy was both given and in fact exercised control of the details of Howell’s work in selling and promoting the sale of National Cash Registers and supplies, appears to us to have been well-nigh reduced to an unescapable inference that he-was; for instance, it was without contradiction shown — in addition to all detailed requirements for daily reports, lists of customers, etc., as set out in the written contract — Howell had to attend an instruc *212 tion school as to his duties at Shoolroy’s Houston office every Saturday, and that he required the joint office the two maintained at Galveston to be kept open from 8 o’clock in the morning to 5:30 in the afternoon each day, and that promptly at 8:30 in the morning,.at the warning of an alarm clock he required kept there for that purpose, Howell must leave the office for work on the outside where he must see every prospective customer, and return for that purpose or otherwise see to it that the office was kept open until the stated time of 5 :30 p. m.; it would serve no useful purpose to detail further indicia of such ever-present and dominating control by Shoolroy over the details of what fjowell was required to do pursuant to the provisions of the written contract, for their name is legion; however, one other contributing detail may be adverted to, and that is the provision of the written contract that either party may terminate it at will; the appellee, in its brief, admits that provision to be susceptible of the indication of the mere relationship of master and servant, but urges that it is only so, “When the right to terminate is used by the employer to place the employee under control as to details of the work, the employee submitting to such detailed control to avoid losing the benefits of a contract in which He did not surrender such right,” urging further that Shoolroy did not in this instance use any such right; but the testimony on that feature would, in the opinion of this court, have authorized the jury to find directly the other way— that is, the right to so control was there, and the unremitting exactions of Shoolroy in keeping Howell’s time and 'movements ever under his watchful eye made it plain that to all intents and purposes he was at all times under the alarm clock kind of control in everything he did.

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Bluebook (online)
110 S.W.2d 210, 1937 Tex. App. LEXIS 1245, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howell-v-continental-casualty-co-texapp-1937.