Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Isensee

211 S.W.2d 613, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1275
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided May 6, 1948·No. No. 2794.·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

LESTER, Chief Justice.

This is a suit brought by appellee against appellant under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. Art. 8306 et seq., for alleged accidental injuries sustained by his wife in the course of her employment oh April 1, 1946, as an employee of the Owens-Illinois Glass Company. The Industrial Accident Board refused to award compensation to the claimant, which was based upon an alleged injury to her lower abdomen, muscles, ligaments, internal organs and possible injury to bony structure. From the decision of the Board appellee appealed to the district court, where he alleged that “on or about April 1,‘ 1946, his wife was working at the Owens-Illinois Glass Company in Waco, Texas, inspecting glass cases that came along a conveyor, it being a part of her duties to remove any cases that had defects to a table and then onto the floor; that on the occasion in question, while she was handling one of said boxes, she suffered a strain in the course of her work and she felt a sudden pain in her abdomen, which caused her to feel sick; that she continued thereafter to. have pain in her abdomen, but that she thought she would recover from said trouble and that she continued to work, though she was not physically able to do so, until April 6th; * * * that as a result of said injuries plaintiff’s wife continued to suffer severe pain in her abdomen and her condition grew worse until she suffered a miscarriage on May 31, 1946, and as a result of her injuries and the conditions following the same her nervous system was affected, and as a result of her injuries and miscarriage caused by said injuries she suffered an antiflexed uterus and developed a mass in the left culdesac resulting in adhesions and binding of the uterus, particularly on the left side; that as a result of her injuries and the effect of said injuries on her system, said injuries and resulting condition either affected her heart or complicated an existing heart condition from which she did not know she was suffering prior to said injury; that the injuries and resulting conditions herein complained of resulted from said accidental strain and injury on the occasion aforesaid, and said accidental injury was the producing and procuring and direct cause of this plaintiff’s wife becoming totally incapacitated for work, and that said total incapacity for work continued from April 1, 1946, for a period of thirteen weeks, and said accidental injuries and the conditions resulting therefrom were a producing cause and procuring cause and a direct cause of permanent partial incapacity to work and *615 plaintiff’s wife has suffered therefrom a permanent partial incapacity to work as hereinafter more particularly shown.”

The case was submitted upon special issues and the jury found that Mrs. Isensee sustained an accidental injury to her body, and that she sustained total incapacity to work for 13 weeks and 60% permanent partial incapacity thereafter. Based upon such findings the court entered judgment for appellee for $196 for 13 weeks of total incapacity from the date of said injury, and $625.83 covering partial incapacity to date of judgment, and $9.07 per week from the date of judgment for a period of 231 weeks thereafter.

Appellant contends that the court erred in permitting a recovery for partial incapacity to work in the futüre, in that said issue was unsupported by medical or other competent evidence; that the heart condition was wholly disconnected from her abdomen injury, and therefore not compensable.

The statement of facts contains approximately 300 pages, which makes it impracticable to set out all the testimony pro and con pertaining to the foregoing assignment.

The rule is that after disregarding all adverse evidence and considering the evidence most favorable to appellee, giving it all reasonable conclusions and inferences that might be drawn therefrom, if such evidence is of sufficient probative force that reasonable minds might differ as to the ultimate conclusion to be reached, it will be held that the evidence supports the judgment. Associated Employers Lloyds v. Self, Tex.Civ.App., 192 S.W.2d 902; Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Moser, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W.2d 390; Associated Employers, Lloyds v. Groce, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 103; Great American Indemnity Co. v. Beaupre, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 883.

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Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Isensee, 211 S.W.2d 613, 1948 Tex. App. LEXIS 1275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).

211 S.W.2d 613 (Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Isensee) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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