Hose v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.

154 F.R.D. 222, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8561, 1994 WL 106375
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedMarch 9, 1994
DocketNo. 1-92-CV-70026
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 154 F.R.D. 222 (Hose v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hose v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8561, 1994 WL 106375 (S.D. Iowa 1994).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING C & NW’S MOTION TO LIMIT EXPERT FEES

BENNETT, United States Magistrate Judge.

The central issue raised in this discovery dispute concerns the increasingly recurring problem of assessing the reasonableness of an expert witness’ fees which may be charged to an opposing party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. One of Plaintiffs’ treating neurologists, Dr. Jan Golnick, of Pa-pillion, Nebraska, is seeking to be compensated for his deposition taken by Defendant Chicago and North Western at a requested hourly rate of $800.00. Thus, the court is compelled to revisit its earlier decision in Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.Iowa 1992), where the court held that a liability expert in a products liability case requested a deposition fee to the defendants of $500.00 per hour, twice what he was charging the plaintiff, was grossly excessive and unreasonable. A second issue concerns whether the party seeking the deposition of an expert may be required to pay compensation for time spent by the expert preparing for the deposition.

I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter is before the court pursuant to Defendant Chicago and North Western Transportation Company’s (“Chicago and North Western”) Motion to Limit Expert Fees and Plaintiffs’ Objection to Chicago North Western’s Motion to Limit Expert Fees. Defendant Chicago and North Western objects to Dr. Jan Golnick’s request to be compensated at an hourly rate of $800.00 for his deposition taken by Chicago and North Western.1 Chicago and North Western further objects to Dr. Golnick’s request to be compensated for time spent reviewing medical records in preparation for his deposition.

This is a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action in which Plaintiff alleges he sustained personal injuries during the course of his employment with Chicago and North Western. Dr. Golnick, who was deposed by Chicago and North Western on November 18, 1993, requested compensation of $800.00 per hour for his deposition. Following the deposition, Dr. Golnick submitted his bill to the Defendant in the total amount of $1,360.00. The bill reflected a $1,200.00 charge for his 90-minute deposition and an additional charge of $160.00 for reviewing medical records.2

[224]*224Dr. Golnick, a physician specializing in neurology and disability evaluations, maintains a private practice in Papillion, Nebraska. Dr. Golnick is Plaintiffs treating neurologist. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Disability Evaluation Physicians. Aff. of Dr. Jan Golnick, ¶ 1, filed Jan. 3, 1994. Additionally, Dr. Golnick states he has testified on many occasions as an expert witness on the subject of neurology and disability evaluation. Id.

Dr. Golnick asserts that his requested hourly fee of $800.00 for his deposition is based on the fact that he was unable to conduct neurological testing during the time expended reviewing the medical records and giving his deposition—services for which he usually charges approximately $800.00 per hour. Id. at ¶ 3. He also asserts that his usual and customary rate for reviewing records in preparation for depositions is $110.00 per hour. Id. at ¶ 4. One of Chicago and North Western’s medical experts, Dr. Neil Rosenberg, also a neurologist, charged Plaintiff a fee of $1,500.00 for a one-half day deposition.3

II. ANALYSIS

A. Reasonableness of Dr. Golnick’s fee

The requirement that the party seeking discovery pay an adverse party’s expert for time spent in responding to discovery is now well ensconced. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(C) states in pertinent part: “Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under this subdivision ...” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C). “The purpose of the rule is to avoid the unfairness of requiring one party to provide expensive discovery for another party’s benefit without reimbursement.” United States v. City of Twin Falls, Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 879 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., City of Twin Falls, Idaho v. Envirotech Corp., 482 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 3185, 96 L.Ed.2d 674 (1987); Hurst v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 319, 321 (D.S.D.1988) (“[T]he goal of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is to compensate experts for their time in participating in litigation and to prevent one party from unfairly obtaining the benefit of the opposing party’s expert work free from cost.”); see also 4 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 26.66[5] (2d ed. 1985). “The language of the rule is mandatory (‘shall’), unless manifest injustice would result.” City of Twin Falls, Idaho, 806 F.2d at 879.

Neither party cited any authority in their submissions and, unfortunately, there is a paucity of decisions on this question. In Goldwater v. Postmaster General of the United States, 136 F.R.D. 337 (D.Conn.1991), the court aptly observed that “[tjhere is very little authority as to what is meant by the term ‘a reasonable fee’ in Rule 26(b)(4)(C).” Id. at 339. In Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 493, 495 (S.D.Iowa 1992), this court agreed with the statement in Goldwater that “ ‘[wjhat little authority does exist does not supply the court with much guidance ...’ in determining a reasonable fee for an expert witness.” Id. at 495.4

Following the court’s lead in Goldwater, in Jochims this court concluded there are seven factors which a court should consider in determining the reasonableness of an expert’s fee: (1) “the witness’s area of expertise”; (2) “the- education and training that is required to provide the expert insight which is [225]*225sought”; (3) “the prevailing rates of other comparably respected available experts”; (4) “the nature, quality and complexity of the discovery responses provided”; (5) “the fee actually being charged to the party who retained the expert”; (6) “fees traditionally charged by the expert on related matters”; and (7) “any other factor likely to be of assistance to the court in balancing the interests implicated by Rule 26.” Id. at 495-496. Since this court’s decision in Jochims was handed down, other courts have adopted the analysis set out in that decision. See Dominguez v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 149 P.R.D. 166, 167 (S.D.Ind.1993); Pierce v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Iowa 1993).

Upon consideration of the seven factors delineated in Jochims, the court is lead to the inescapable conclusion that Dr. Golniek’s requested hourly rate of $800.00 for deposition testimony is grossly excessive—or as one court described a requested fee, as “unconscionable” and “astronomical”. Anthony v. Abbott Lab., 106 P.R.D.

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Bluebook (online)
154 F.R.D. 222, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8561, 1994 WL 106375, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hose-v-chicago-north-western-transportation-co-iasd-1994.