Horton v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc.

684 P.2d 297, 106 Idaho 895, 1984 Ida. LEXIS 515

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: July 16, 1984
• Docket: 14990
• Status: Published

Opinions

SHEPARD, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission which dismissed claimant’s application for hearing on the basis that it was not filed within five years of the date of the accident. We reverse and remand.

In 1974, claimant Horton suffered a fracture of his right hip from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. During the next eight months, claimant was paid total temporary disability income benefits, together with the costs of his medical treatment, following which he returned to work for Garrett. At the initiation of this action, claimant Horton was 49 years old and had worked for Garrett for approximately 32 years.

Following claimant’s return to work in October 1974, the surety wrote Horton’s doctor inquiring if “you feel that this patient is due any permanent partial disability award because of this accident and if so, please advise how much so that we may compute on that basis.” The doctor responded, “I would strongly advise that his case remain open because arthritis of varying degrees is often associated with a hip fracture such as he had. This may not develop for some time. And there is no way at this time of predicting whether or not he will develop arthritis.” The surety immediately filed a summary and award with the commission setting forth the amounts paid for medical and income benefits at that point and making a request that the file be closed. The surety did not mention any impairment or disability rating. Staff of the commission filed the summary and award form, noting thereon that it was “approved subject to determination of permanent disability, if any.”

Claimant consulted his doctor in December 1978, who found no arthritis, but in August 1981, claimant consulted another doctor, who noted significant progressive degenerative changes in Horton’s right hip joint and advised that claimant would require a total hip replacement or other medical procedure within the next three to five years. Continued slow degeneration of claimant’s hip was again noted in March 1982.

In April 1982, claimant filed an application for hearing with the commission, and at that time Garrett agreed to pay Horton’s medical benefits, but denied liability for any other benefits. At that time claimant was still employed by Garrett. Following hearing in January 1983, the commission held that claimant’s application was barred because not filed within five years of the date of the accident, stating:

“Claimant’s application falls within the terms of section 72-706(2), Idaho Code. That section provides that when payments of compensation have been made, and thereafter discontinued, the claimant shall have five years from the date of the accident causing the injury within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing for further compensation and award. With the exception of the claim for medical benefits, the claimant’s application for hearing and award is barred by this section because his application for hearing was not filed within five years of the date of the accident.”

The holding of the commission was based upon the provisions of I.C. § 72-706(2) effective at the time of the accident. That section provided, in 1974:

“When compensation discontinued. When payments of compensation have been made and thereafter discontinued, the claimant shall have five (5) years from the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, within which to make and file with the commission an application requesting a hearing for further compensation and award.”

Idaho’s workmen’s compensation statutes are designed to provide “sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families ...” I.C. § 72-201. This Court has consistently held that legislative policy requires our statutes be. construed “liberally in favor of the claimant.” Miller v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 105 Idaho 725, 672 P.2d 1055 (1983); Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P.2d 829 (1977); Miller v. FMC Corp., 93 Idaho 695, 471 P.2d 550 (1970); Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). In keeping with that legislative intent, it is a prudent practice for the Industrial Commission to retain jurisdiction in cases where, as here, it is clear that there is a probability that medical factors will produce additional physical impairment in the future. In essence, we approved of this practice in Brooks v. Duncan, 96 Idaho 579, 583, 532 P.2d 921, 925 (1975), stating that limitation periods for filing claims “do not bear upon the authority of the Commission to retain jurisdiction regarding an industrial claim.”

While in Steinebach v. Hoff Lumber Co., 98 Idaho 428, 432, 566 P.2d 377, 381 (1977), we held that the then statute (I.C. § 72-407, now I.C. § 72-706), “contemplates a bar to claims for compensation except those based on necessary medical payments claims which are made within a reasonable time of the injury,” nevertheless, construing Steinebach and Duncan together, we conclude that income benefits are time barred by I.C. § 72-706(2), unless the commission has retained jurisdiction of the claim.

When the surety in the instant case requested closure of the file, the staff of the commission noted that the closure was approved “subject to determination of the permanent disability, if any.” We deem that conditional closure of the file a clear indication of the intent to retain jurisdiction for future determination of permanent disability.

“Although the Commission may not in so many words have reserved continuing jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is usually found when the order by its nature lacks finality, or when it calls for or permits some further step on the part of one of the parties.” 3 Larsen, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 81.53(b) (1982).

We find these further comments of Larsen particularly significant:

“It is odd indeed to find, in a supposedly benificent piece of legislation, the survival of this fragment of irrational cruelty surpassing the most technical forfeitures of legal statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation generally proceed on the theory that a man forfeits his rights only when he inexcusably delays assertion of them, and any number of excuses will toll the running of the period. But here no amount of vigilance is of any help. The limitations period runs against a claim that has not yet matured; and when it matures, it is already barred. For good measure, the exclusive remedy provisions of the Compensation Act also abolish claimant’s common-law remedies.” 3 Larsen, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 78.42(b) (1982).

We hold that the Industrial Commission has retained jurisdiction of this claim for a future determination of permanent disability, and the order of the Industrial Commission, to the extent it is inconsistent herewith, is reversed. Costs to appellant. No attorney’s fees allowed.

BISTLINE, J., and OLIVER, J. pro tem., concur. DONALDSON, C.J., concurs in the result.