Hopper v. Hammary Furniture Company

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedApril 14, 1997
DocketI.C. No. 311784
StatusPublished

This text of Hopper v. Hammary Furniture Company (Hopper v. Hammary Furniture Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hopper v. Hammary Furniture Company, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1997).

Opinion

Plaintiff began having significant back problems while employed with defendant Broyhill Furniture in 1991, and became disabled due to his back condition while employed with Hammary Furniture Company after bending or squatting down to count posts he had cut and feeling a sudden, sharp pain in his back. His surgeon testified that:

"A typical history of disk disease is that there is initial injury and the disk then begins to degenerate, and then over a period of time with wear and tear or with additional stress, the disk ruptures. Or it can rupture initially and then the disk fragment moves away from the nerve roots or the pain eases off and another activity causes it to come in contact with it. . . . [T]he disk injury was initiated by the accident of `91 and then perhaps made worse, perhaps exacerbated by other things that happened after that. But from the history he gave, which was very typical of disk problems, I would think that the injury did occur at the time he relates in `91. Now, the other things afterward made us take a nonsurgical situation and turned it into a surgical situation. . . ."

Depo. of Dr. Glugover, pps. 19 20.

The Deputy Commissioner's findings of fact were based on ample evidence, and are affirmed, based largely on his firsthand evaluation of the witnesses. However, those findings describe a "specific traumatic incident" at Hammary. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6). Considering similar facts, our Court of Appeals rejected the argument that an employee seeking to prove a specific traumatic incident should have to show that she was not "exposed to potential injury from bending and squatting separate and apart from her employment. We believe that the answer to this argument is that however she may be exposed apart from her employment her injury occurred while she was working at her assigned duties."Bradley v. E. B. Sportswear, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 450, 452,335 S.E.2d 52 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6). "The effect of the [specific traumatic incident] amendment was to eliminate the need to show an external cause or unusual conditions in order for a worker to receive compensation for a back injury. . . . If the injury arises out of and in the course of employment and is the result of a specific traumatic incident, then the statute as amended mandates that the injury be construed to be `injury by accident'." Caskie v. R. M. Butler Co., 85 N.C. App. 266, 268,354 S.E.2d 242 (1987).

It is clear from the evidence that plaintiff went from having the ability to earn wages to temporary total disability due to the occurrence at the Hammary workplace in 1993, even if most of the damage to his disk may have been done while with his former employer, Broyhill. Unlike some other jurisdictions (see, e.g.,Tenderholt v. Travel Lodge International, 218 Mont. 523, 525,709 P.2d 1011, 1012 (1985) ), North Carolina compensation law makes no exception to the general rule that "the employer takes the employee as he finds him", and bears compensation cost of total disability when the proverbial "straw that breaks the camel's back" arises from its workplace, even if the activity is so commonplace that it could be seen as a natural and probable consequence of a prior injury in a different setting. Vause v.Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951);Heatherly v. Montgomery Components, Inc., 71 N.C. App. 377,379-80, 323 S.E.2d 29 (1984). Despite the apparent unfairness of the rule in some situations, it has the utility — recognized with the "last injurious exposure" rule of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57 — of avoiding litigation over degrees of responsibility, and allocating the obligation to the injured worker to the system participant most likely to be in existence and solvent.

Upon review of all of the competent evidence of record with reference to the errors assigned, and finding good grounds to reconsider the evidence, the Full Commission REVERSES the result and enters the following Opinion and Award:

The following were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as

STIPULATIONS

1. The parties entered into a Pre-trial Agreement dated September 12, 1994, and that document is incorporated into the record [ ].

2. The Industrial Commission shall calculate the plaintiff's average weekly wage from the Form 22 stipulated into evidence.

* * * * * * * *

Based upon all the competent, credible evidence of record, the Full Commission makes the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. At the time of hearing before the former Deputy Commissioner, plaintiff was 35 years of age and his most recent employment history included employment with the City of Morganton, Duracel, Broyhill Furniture Industries, Hammary Furniture Company, and, currently Lexington Furniture Company.

2. On February 11, 1991, plaintiff was employed by defendant Broyhill as a tenon machine operator, and had been so employed since 1987. During the first part of the week of February 11, 1991, the plaintiff was bending down to pick up some logs weighing approximately 50 pounds when he felt a sudden pain in his lower back which ran down his leg. Shortly thereafter, he reported the back injury to his foreman, Reggie Carroll, and later in the same week reported the injury to the Plant Personnel Manager, Larry German. He was told by Mr. German that the injury he described was not an accident covered by workers' compensation, and that he would have to obtain medical treatment at his own expense.

3. Reggie Carroll made a written report on the plaintiff's back injury, but did not file it then because the employer's policy did not require that unless medical treatment was rendered.

4. Plaintiff's back pain became worse, so on Friday of the same week, February 15, 1991, he went to the Emergency Room at Valdese General Hospital for treatment. There he gave a history of having hurt his back at work earlier in the week. Plaintiff was given medication, an x-ray was taken, and he was told to take bed rest over the weekend and return if not improved. Plaintiff reported his medical treatment to Reggie Carroll, and the employer paid the bill for said treatment. The bill from Valdese General Hospital indicated that it was for treatment of a workers' compensation claim, and that the principal diagnosis was sprained lumbar region, and which further indicated that on February 11, 1991, the plaintiff was injured when he "was lifting boards upon a machine at work, and strained back, having pain radiating down hip".

5.

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Related

Tenderholt v. Travel Lodge International
709 P.2d 1011 (Montana Supreme Court, 1985)
Caskie v. R. M. Butler & Co.
354 S.E.2d 242 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1987)
Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co.
63 S.E.2d 173 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1951)
Bradley v. E. B. Sportswear, Inc.
335 S.E.2d 52 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1985)
Heatherly v. Montgomery Components, Inc.
323 S.E.2d 29 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1984)
Parker v. Thompson-Arthur Paving Co.
396 S.E.2d 626 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
Hopper v. Hammary Furniture Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hopper-v-hammary-furniture-company-ncworkcompcom-1997.