Hong Gao v. Todd Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 18-72500
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HONG GAO; et al., No. 18-72500

Petitioners, Agency Nos. A206-545-551 A206-545-552 v. A206-545-553

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 23, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and SCARSI,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Hong Gao, along with her husband, Hailong Xiang, and her minor

child, Y.X., as derivative applicants, petitions for review of a decision of the Board

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s

(“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

“We review factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de

novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020)). Adverse credibility

determinations are factual findings, so we review them for substantial evidence.

Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). Under the substantial

evidence standard, “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Dong v. Garland, 50

F.4th 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064

(9th Cir. 2020)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. Taking into account the “totality of the circumstances[] and all

relevant factors,” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc)

(alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), the agency

identified several reasons, each supported by evidence in the record, for finding

Petitioner not credible. Specifically, the agency identified inconsistencies in

Petitioner’s description of her employment at the fishery and at Tianen

2 International, Petitioner’s account of the insertion and removal of intrauterine

devices, and Petitioner’s statements about her forced abortion. Petitioner also

admitted to submitting false information about her education history in her visa

application. Although Petitioner argues that the inconsistencies are trivial, the

agency was not required to credit Petitioner’s proffered explanations or disregard

the inconsistencies. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2021).

Together, the agency’s “specific and cogent reasons supporting [its] adverse

credibility determination” satisfy the substantial evidence standard. Shrestha v.

Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010).

Petitioner does not argue that the agency erred in concluding that she lacked

sufficient corroborating evidence, independent of her testimony, to support her

claims of past persecution, so any such argument is forfeited. Iraheta-Martinez v.

Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[B]y failing to develop the argument

in his opening brief, [petitioner] forfeited it.”); see also Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th

1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2024) (as amended).

2. Petitioner argues that the agency erred in its evaluation of her risk of

future persecution because it failed to consider country conditions evidence. But

the country conditions evidence Petitioner relies upon does not support the notion

that Petitioner would be persecuted for having had a second child if she were

3 returned to China.1 Rather, that evidence explains that China eliminated its one-

child policy and has changed to a two-child policy.2 Petitioner points to no other

record evidence suggesting that she has a well-founded fear of persecution or of

torture if returned to China. Because the record does not compel the finding that

Petitioner’s fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable, we conclude that

substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of her applications for asylum

and withholding of removal.

3. Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of CAT relief is forfeited because she

did not challenge the agency’s determination that she did not establish eligibility

for such relief in her opening brief. See Singh v. Bondi, 161 F.4th 560, 565 n.1

(9th Cir. 2025).

Petition DENIED.3

1 Petitioner hints in her brief to our court that perhaps she would face persecution if she tried to have a third child, but the cursory mention of this possibility was not enough to raise this as a separate basis for granting the petition, particularly given that she does not expressly say she hopes to have another child. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”). 2 Petitioner faults the agency for not considering the 2016 Country Conditions and Human Rights Practices Report on China (“Country Report”). But Petitioner does not appear to have submitted that report to the agency and instead included only a quoted excerpt from it in her brief to the BIA. Our review is confined to the administrative record before the agency. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 3 The temporary administrative stay of removal is lifted and the motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 1, is denied.