Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.

378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13211, 2005 WL 1563545
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJuly 5, 2005
DocketCiv.A.03-1153 GMS
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 378 F. Supp. 2d 459 (Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13211, 2005 WL 1563545 (D. Del. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION

SLEET, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The above-captioned action is a patent infringement suit in which plaintiffs Honeywell International, Inc. and Honeywell Intellectual Properties, Inc. (collectively, “Honeywell”), the owners of U.S. Patent No. 6,035,626 (“the ’626 patent”), accuse defendant Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. (“HSC”) of infringing several claims of the ’626 patent. The invention of the ’626 patent “relates to a control system for regulating the amount of torque applied -by a starter/generator to a gas turbine engine during startup.” ’626 patent, col. 1,11. 9-11. The accused device in this case is HSC’s APS 2300 APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) with a starter generator, “which is used in aircraft to provide compressed air for starting of the main engines and control of the environmental conditions within the aircraft as well as electric power.” (D.I. 158, Ex. 2 at 5.) Presently before the court are two outstanding pre-trial matters: (1) HSC’s request to preclude Honeywell from presenting a damages calculation based on sales projections of the accused product that did not exist at the time of the hypothetical negotiation (D.I.156); and (2) HSC’s motion on prosecution history estoppel (D.I. 158) The court will address each matter in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. HSC’s Request to Preclude Honeywell From Presenting a Damages Calculation Based on Sales Projections of The Accused Product That Did Not Exist at The Time of The Hypothetical Negotiation

Honeywell and HSC both manufacture a wide array of equipment for the aerospace industry. As the two giants in that industry, they are fierce competitors and frequent fliers in this court. Among the customers for whose business they compete is Embraer, a large regional jet manufacturer in Brazil. In 1999, HSC was awarded a contract to supply Embraer with the accused APUs for approximately 20 years. (D.I. 156, Attach. B at 11.) Roughly contemporaneous with that award, each company prepared its own sales projections for the HSC-Embraer contract. HSC projected in 1998 that it would sell 609 APUs to Embraer by 2017. (Id., Attach.E.) Similarly, in 1999, Honeywell projected that *463 HSC would sell between 348 and 600 APUs to Embraer through the life of the contract. (Id., Attach. F; Attach. D at 250:6-12.) However, because the APU was still in development, the first sales were not scheduled until 2003. (Id., Attach.E.) In the interim, on March 14, 2000, the ’626 patent issued.

According to Honeywell, the unforeseen and tragic events of September 11, 2001, caused an unexpected increase in the “importance of the large regional jet market.” (D.I. 159 at 2.) Consequently, Embraer’s demand for HSC’s APUs increased dramatically. The most recent projections, calculated in 2004 and 2005, predict that HSC will sell 1,001 APUs to Embraer by 2017, Honeywell estimates that these new projections increase the damages to which it is entitled from Embraer sales alone by roughly $11 million. (D.I. 156, Attach. C at 6-7.) More specifically, Honeywell contends that if it had engaged in a negotiation with HSC when infringement began, i.e., March 14, 2000, HSC would have accepted a 10% royalty rate to license the ’626 patent until its expiration. 1 (Id., Attach. B at 24-25, Attach. C, Ex. 4a.) Furthermore, Honeywell asserts, HSC would have agreed to pay for the license as a lump sum, discounted to net present value as of March 2000.(Id.) Using the 1998-99 projections as the royalty base yields roughly $17 million in damages flowing from the HSC-Embraer contract. On the other hand, using the 2004-05 projections (in addition to actual sales thus far) as a royalty base yields roughly $28 million in damages. (Id., Attach C at 6-7.) Not surprisingly, the parties disagree on whether the more recent projections may be used as a royalty base to calculate Honeywell’s damages.

HSC objects to Honeywell’s use of the 2004-05 projections because they would not have been available to hypothetical negotiators in March 2000. According to HSC, the, case law has universally rejected the factfinder’s consideration of post-negotiation sales- projections in the context of the hypothetical negotiation construct, particularly where pre-negotiation projections exist. (D.I. 156 at 2-3.) Honeywell answers that HSC’s argument ignores the “book of wisdom” concept set forth by the Supreme Court over seventy years ago in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 53 S.Ct. 736, 77 L.Ed. 1449 (1933), and adopted by the Federal Circuit in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed.Cir.1988). (D.I. 159 at 3.) According to Honeywell, post-negotiation projections are indeed relevant under this precedent. (Id. at 4.) Honeywell further points out that HSC’s damages theory also relies on post-negotiation information, namely, actual sales data from 2003 and 2004. (Id. at 5:) In reply, HSC argues that the “book of wisdom” cases stand “for only the undisputed proposition that some post-negotiation evidence, such as actual sales data, may be considered in some circumstances. They do not support a blanket rule that all post-negotiation evidence is always relevant. To the contrary, the Federal Circuit has made clear that if sales projections existed at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, post-negotiation projections may not be used to determine the amount of a hypothetical up-front lump-sum royalty payment.” (D.I. 163 at 1 (emphasis in original).) Thus, the question presented to the court is whether sales projections that were unavailable at the time infringement began may be used as a royalty base to calculate damages.

*464 Upon a finding of infringement, the plaintiff is entitled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2001). “A reasonable royalty calculation envisions and ascertains the results of a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringing activity began.” Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed.Cir.2003). Therefore, “[t]he first step in a reasonable royalty calculation is to ascertain the date on which the hypothetical negotiation in advance of infringement would have occurred.” Id. at 870. It is important to note, however, that the ascertainment of this date does not rigidly foreclose the factfinder from considering subsequent events. To enforce such rigidity would be to ignore a limitation inherent to the hypothetical negotiation method. “In a normal negotiation, the potential licensee has three basic choices: forego all use of the invention; pay an agreed royalty; infringe the patent and risk litigation.” Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1576.

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Bluebook (online)
378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13211, 2005 WL 1563545, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/honeywell-international-inc-v-hamilton-sundstrand-corp-ded-2005.