OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Estate of Herschell Towsley (the Estate) is suing Homer Electric Association (HEA) for wrongful death. The sole issue presented by this petition concerns the interpretation of AS 18.60.670(1) which prohibits the placement of “any type of ... equipment ... that is capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion, within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor.” The trial court ruled that AS 18.60.670(1) prohibits placing a crane where it is capable of extending its boom to within ten feet of a power line. HEA disagrees, arguing that AS 18.60.670(1) only prohibits placing a crane within ten feet of a power line even if it is possible for the boom to extend into the ten-foot area. We granted [1043]*1043HEA’s petition for review. We agree with HEA and reverse the trial court.
II. FACTS
Decedent Herschell Towsley worked as a laborer for Rollins Truck and Tractor, a subcontractor on a project near Homer. In May 1987 Towsley was holding the tag line of a pile driver as a crane’s lift line was moving the pile driver. The lift line hit a power line owned and maintained by HEA.1 Towsley was electrocuted.
The Estate claims that prior to the accident the general contractor on the project advised HEA that the project would require use of a crane near one of HEA’s power lines. The Estate claims that HEA advised the contractor that the work could legally proceed as long as there was a ten-foot clearance between the power lines and the crane.
After the accident the Estate sued HEA for wrongful death. One theory of liability is that HEA was negligent per se in failing to prevent persons working near HEA’s power lines from violating AS 18.60.670(1).2 The Estate moved for a ruling that AS 18.60.670(1) prohibits placing equipment closer to power lines than the maximum extension of the equipment plus ten feet. The trial court so ruled. We granted HEA’s petition for review.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Contentions of the Parties
Alaska Statute 18.60.670 provides in relevant part that “[a] person ... may not (1) place ... machinery ... that is capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion, within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor.” The trial court interpreted this language to prohibit placing equipment in a location where any part of the equipment could potentially come within ten feet of the power line. HEA argues that the statute allows equipment to be placed where it is possible for a part of the equipment to extend into the ten-foot area, so long as no part of the equipment actually does.
Specifically, HEA argues that the trial court’s interpretation of AS 18.60.670(1) is wrong because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, conflicts with AS 18.60.675, runs contrary to federal interpretations of similar federal laws, runs contrary to industry and Alaska Department of Labor interpretations of AS 18.60.670, and would cause excessive and unwarranted burdens on the construction industry.
Amicus Curiae, the State of Alaska, favors HEA’s interpretation. It argues that the plain meaning of
AS 18.60.670 does not prohibit the placement of and operation of cranes just outside of the 10-foot protective area.... If the legislature wanted to prohibit the placement and operation of cranes anywhere in the vicinity of power lines so that the crane could not possibly invade the 10-foot protective area, it would have done so.
The State also argues that HEA’s interpretation is consistent with the Department of Labor’s two-decade-old interpretation.
The Estate argues that the trial court’s interpretation is correct because safety laws should be broadly construed, HEA’s interpretation would render AS 18.60.670 superfluous, and the trial court’s interpretation is consistent with the Department of Labor’s longstanding construction of the statute.
B. Plain Meaning
Generally, the most reliable guide to the meaning of a statute is the words of [1044]*1044the statute construed in accordance with their common usage. Lagos v. City & Borough of Sitka, 823 P.2d 641, 643 (Alaska 1991). However, even where the statutory language considered alone seems to leave room reasonably for only one meaning, we nonetheless may consult legislative history and the rules of statutory construction, realizing that sometimes language that seems clear in the abstract takes on a different meaning when viewed in context. North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n. 4 (Alaska 1982). In such cases the legislative history and rules of construction must present a compelling case that the literal meaning of the language of the statute is not what the legislature intended. University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 666 P.2d 424, 428 n. 5 (Alaska 1983) (“Where a statute’s meaning appears clear and unambiguous, ... the party asserting a different meaning has a correspondingly heavy burden of demonstrating contrary legislative intent.”); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d at 208 n. 4 (under Alaska’s sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation, the more plain the language of the statute the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative intent must be).
As noted, the trial court interpreted AS 18.60.670(1) to prohibit the placing of equipment in a location where any part of the equipment could come within ten feet of a power line. A literal reading of the statute does not support this interpretation. Read literally, AS 18.60.670(1) merely prohibits equipment from being within ten feet of a power line. The Estate does not cite to, and we have not found, any direct evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning. Although, as discussed below, the Estate argues that there is implicit evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning, we believe this evidence does not present a compelling case that the legislature did not intend AS 18.60.670(1) to be interpreted literally. Thus, we conclude that AS 18.60.670(1) should be interpreted literally.
First, the Estate argues that the existence of section 312-20 of the 1969 Alaska General Safety Code is evidence that when the legislature enacted AS 18.60.670(1) in 1972 it intended the statute to provide the same protection as the code. Section 312-20 provided: “The operation of [equipment] when it is possible to bring any part of the equipment within ten (10) feet of high voltage lines is prohibited....” (Emphasis supplied.)3 Section 312-20 was repealed in 1973 by the Department of Labor.
The Estate’s assertion seems unlikely in view of the language of AS 18.60.670(1). If the legislature had intended to provide the same protection as the code provision it probably would have copied the code provision verbatim or used similarly clear language.
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OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Estate of Herschell Towsley (the Estate) is suing Homer Electric Association (HEA) for wrongful death. The sole issue presented by this petition concerns the interpretation of AS 18.60.670(1) which prohibits the placement of “any type of ... equipment ... that is capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion, within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor.” The trial court ruled that AS 18.60.670(1) prohibits placing a crane where it is capable of extending its boom to within ten feet of a power line. HEA disagrees, arguing that AS 18.60.670(1) only prohibits placing a crane within ten feet of a power line even if it is possible for the boom to extend into the ten-foot area. We granted [1043]*1043HEA’s petition for review. We agree with HEA and reverse the trial court.
II. FACTS
Decedent Herschell Towsley worked as a laborer for Rollins Truck and Tractor, a subcontractor on a project near Homer. In May 1987 Towsley was holding the tag line of a pile driver as a crane’s lift line was moving the pile driver. The lift line hit a power line owned and maintained by HEA.1 Towsley was electrocuted.
The Estate claims that prior to the accident the general contractor on the project advised HEA that the project would require use of a crane near one of HEA’s power lines. The Estate claims that HEA advised the contractor that the work could legally proceed as long as there was a ten-foot clearance between the power lines and the crane.
After the accident the Estate sued HEA for wrongful death. One theory of liability is that HEA was negligent per se in failing to prevent persons working near HEA’s power lines from violating AS 18.60.670(1).2 The Estate moved for a ruling that AS 18.60.670(1) prohibits placing equipment closer to power lines than the maximum extension of the equipment plus ten feet. The trial court so ruled. We granted HEA’s petition for review.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Contentions of the Parties
Alaska Statute 18.60.670 provides in relevant part that “[a] person ... may not (1) place ... machinery ... that is capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion, within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor.” The trial court interpreted this language to prohibit placing equipment in a location where any part of the equipment could potentially come within ten feet of the power line. HEA argues that the statute allows equipment to be placed where it is possible for a part of the equipment to extend into the ten-foot area, so long as no part of the equipment actually does.
Specifically, HEA argues that the trial court’s interpretation of AS 18.60.670(1) is wrong because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute, conflicts with AS 18.60.675, runs contrary to federal interpretations of similar federal laws, runs contrary to industry and Alaska Department of Labor interpretations of AS 18.60.670, and would cause excessive and unwarranted burdens on the construction industry.
Amicus Curiae, the State of Alaska, favors HEA’s interpretation. It argues that the plain meaning of
AS 18.60.670 does not prohibit the placement of and operation of cranes just outside of the 10-foot protective area.... If the legislature wanted to prohibit the placement and operation of cranes anywhere in the vicinity of power lines so that the crane could not possibly invade the 10-foot protective area, it would have done so.
The State also argues that HEA’s interpretation is consistent with the Department of Labor’s two-decade-old interpretation.
The Estate argues that the trial court’s interpretation is correct because safety laws should be broadly construed, HEA’s interpretation would render AS 18.60.670 superfluous, and the trial court’s interpretation is consistent with the Department of Labor’s longstanding construction of the statute.
B. Plain Meaning
Generally, the most reliable guide to the meaning of a statute is the words of [1044]*1044the statute construed in accordance with their common usage. Lagos v. City & Borough of Sitka, 823 P.2d 641, 643 (Alaska 1991). However, even where the statutory language considered alone seems to leave room reasonably for only one meaning, we nonetheless may consult legislative history and the rules of statutory construction, realizing that sometimes language that seems clear in the abstract takes on a different meaning when viewed in context. North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 540 (Alaska 1978); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n. 4 (Alaska 1982). In such cases the legislative history and rules of construction must present a compelling case that the literal meaning of the language of the statute is not what the legislature intended. University of Alaska v. Geistauts, 666 P.2d 424, 428 n. 5 (Alaska 1983) (“Where a statute’s meaning appears clear and unambiguous, ... the party asserting a different meaning has a correspondingly heavy burden of demonstrating contrary legislative intent.”); State v. Alex, 646 P.2d at 208 n. 4 (under Alaska’s sliding-scale approach to statutory interpretation, the more plain the language of the statute the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative intent must be).
As noted, the trial court interpreted AS 18.60.670(1) to prohibit the placing of equipment in a location where any part of the equipment could come within ten feet of a power line. A literal reading of the statute does not support this interpretation. Read literally, AS 18.60.670(1) merely prohibits equipment from being within ten feet of a power line. The Estate does not cite to, and we have not found, any direct evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning. Although, as discussed below, the Estate argues that there is implicit evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning, we believe this evidence does not present a compelling case that the legislature did not intend AS 18.60.670(1) to be interpreted literally. Thus, we conclude that AS 18.60.670(1) should be interpreted literally.
First, the Estate argues that the existence of section 312-20 of the 1969 Alaska General Safety Code is evidence that when the legislature enacted AS 18.60.670(1) in 1972 it intended the statute to provide the same protection as the code. Section 312-20 provided: “The operation of [equipment] when it is possible to bring any part of the equipment within ten (10) feet of high voltage lines is prohibited....” (Emphasis supplied.)3 Section 312-20 was repealed in 1973 by the Department of Labor.
The Estate’s assertion seems unlikely in view of the language of AS 18.60.670(1). If the legislature had intended to provide the same protection as the code provision it probably would have copied the code provision verbatim or used similarly clear language.
Second, the Estate argues that the purpose of the statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend AS 18.60.670 to be interpreted literally. Specifically, the Estate argues that the literal interpretation of the statute “is not consistent with the policy of promoting public safety which underlies the statute.” Thus, the Estate argues that the trial court’s interpretation is the only “construction which preserves [the statute’s] usefulness.” We disagree.
While the trial court’s interpretation promotes a higher degree of safety than the literal interpretation, the latter does not render this statute useless. Section 670’s requirements, as with most safety rules, are a compromise between competing safety and efficiency concerns. Although the literal interpretation of the statute does not eliminate the possibility of contact with a power line, it provides some margin of safety. It also provides the construction industry with a greater degree of flexibility when working near power lines than the trial court’s interpretation.4 This may be [1045]*1045the balance that the legislature intended when it enacted AS 18.60.670. Since the plain meaning interpretation is not unreasonable, the fact that the trial court’s interpretation better promotes safety does not justify departing from the literal interpretation of the statute.
Third, the Estate argues that the literal interpretation of subsection (1) renders it meaningless in view of subsection (2).5 The Estate argues that this provides evidence that the legislature did not intend AS 18.60.670 to be interpreted literally. To begin, we note that the Estate’s analysis may fairly be disputed. Its argument only succeeds if “placing” equipment is comprehended in “storing, operating, erecting, maintaining, moving, or transporting” it. But if that is true, then the Estate’s interpretation of subsection (1) suffers from the same defect: it makes subsection (2) functionless for if equipment can not be placed where it may come within ten feet of a power line it is not necessary to prohibit its storage or operation within ten feet of a power line. For the purpose of evaluating the Estate’s argument, however, we assume that the Estate is correct in urging that the literal interpretation of subsection (1) is redundant because subsection (2) also prevents equipment from coming within ten feet of a power line. While this would be a valid argument that the legislature intended a different meaning than the literal meaning, we conclude that it is not sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption that the legislature intended the statute to be interpreted literally. See State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n. 4 (Alaska 1982).
As a general rule, a “ ‘statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” Alascom, Inc. v. North Slope Borough, Bd. of Equalization, 659 P.2d 1175, 1178 n. 5 (Alaska 1983) (quoting 2A C. Sands, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973)). Application of this rule suggests that the trial court’s interpretation of subsection (1) is correct because the court’s interpretation avoids redundancy. Nonetheless, it is our view that even in light of the rule of construction disfavoring redundant interpretations, section 670(1) cannot reasonably be read as the trial court read it. The actual language of subsection (1) falls so seriously short of expressing a prohibition on placement of equipment where it potentially might come within the ten-foot protected zone that the fact that it may be redundant if construed literally is an insufficiently compelling reason to persuade us that the statute has another meaning.6
Redundancy in legislative drafting, as in other writing, is not uncommon. White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1524, 75 L.Ed.2d 947 (1982). The rules governing use of the doctrine of negligence per se warn against adopting a statute as a negligence standard if its meaning is so [1046]*1046obscure because of, for example, imprecise wording, that the standard of care is not known to reasonable people in the same position or trade as the defendant. Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, 561 P.2d 1176, 1184, aff'd on rehearing, 563 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1977); Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250, 263 (Alaska 1971). Care thus should be taken that the rule disfavoring redundant interpretations is not used mechanistically. It should not be employed in a manner that attributes obscure and unintended meanings to a statutory provision. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 120 (5th ed. 1992) (stating that though a court should generally give effect to every provision in a statute, it should disregard a provision resulting from legislative inadvertence).
Moreover, a comparison to another section suggests that the literal meaning of subsection (1) of section 670 is the intended one. Alaska Statute 18.60.675 provides:
A person individually or through an agent or employee may not operate a crane, derrick, power shovel, drilling rig, hoisting equipment, or similar apparatus, any part of which is capable of vertical, lateral, or swinging motion, unless the operator or the operator’s employer posts and maintains in plain view of the operator, a durable warning sign legible at 12 feet, that reads as follows: “It is unlawful to operate this equipment within 10 feet of high voltage lines.”
Section 675 applies only to equipment covered by section 670(1). The warning mandated by 675 is the literal meaning of section 670(1), namely that the equipment may not come closer than ten feet of a high voltage line. If the legislature had intended 670(1) to express a prohibition on placement of cranes where they might be extended to within ten feet of a power line, it might have mandated a sign stating that, for example, “[i]t is unlawful to place or operate this equipment where it is possible for any part of this equipment to come within ten feet of high voltage lines.” See State, Dep’t of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 603 n. 24 (Alaska 1978) (“In some circumstances, the interpretation of one provision is properly influenced by the content of another provision addressing similar purposes or objects.”).
Fourth, the Estate claims that the Department of Labor’s longstanding construction of AS 18.60.670(1) provides evidence that the legislature did not intend it to be interpreted literally. “When an agency’s interpretation of a statute is long-standing ... it is entitled to some deference by this court.” State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp America, Inc., 674 P.2d 268, 277 (Alaska 1983). However, HEA also claims that the Department of Labor’s longstanding construction of AS 18.60.670(1) supports its respective construction. Both parties cite to conflicting affidavits of Department of Labor employees and construction industry experts to support their arguments.7 The affidavits are not helpful because they are in conflict. However, regu[1047]*1047lations promulgated by the Department of Labor imply that the Estate is wrong.
Section 05.140(a)(2)(D)(v)(b) of the Construction Code provides:
(a) Crane and derricks.
(2) Crawlers, Locomotive and Truck Cranes.
(D) Operating Crew.
(v) The operating crew shall consist of the designated operator plus an attendant who shall act only as a safety observer when the crane is in operation if any one of the following criteria exists:
(b) If the equipment is operating where any part is capable of reaching within 15 feet of an overhead power line in which case the provisions of AS 18.60.670-695 apply[.]
This regulation and a similar one in the General Safety Code8 are the only regulations addressing whether equipment can be located where any part is potentially capable of touching an overhead power line. They require a safety observer when that potential is present. They do not, however, bar placement of the equipment in such a position. If the Department interpreted section 670(1) to prohibit the placement of equipment where any part of the equipment might come in contact with a power line, one would expect a regulation expressing such a prohibition.
IY. CONCLUSION
Alaska Statute 18.60.670(1) should be interpreted literally to prohibit placing a crane within ten feet of a high voltage electrical line. The statute does not prohibit placing a crane where some parts of it might be moved to come within the ten-foot zone. Respondent has not presented a compelling case that this is not what the statute means. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court.
COMPTON, J., dissents.