Home Federal Bank of Tennessee, F.S.B. v. United States

57 Fed. Cl. 676, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 262, 2003 WL 22232309
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedAugust 26, 2003
DocketNo. 95-541C
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 57 Fed. Cl. 676 (Home Federal Bank of Tennessee, F.S.B. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Home Federal Bank of Tennessee, F.S.B. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 676, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 262, 2003 WL 22232309 (uscfc 2003).

Opinion

OPINION

YOCK, Senior Judge.

On August 8,1995, Home Federal Bank of Tennessee, F.S.B. (“Home Federal” or the “Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint with this Court against the United States (the “Defendant” or the “Government”) alleging breach of contract, breach of contract implied in fact, and uncompensated Fifth Amendment takings. The Plaintiff subsequently withdrew its Fifth Amendment takings claim, and judgment was entered striking this claim from the Complaint. This matter is now before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (as to liability) and the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (as to liability). For the reasons set forth herein, the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied, and the Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

Background

I. Regulatory History

This case is one of the numerous Winstarrelated cases currently pending before this Court. These cases arose in the aftermath of the Government’s efforts to contain the savings and loan crisis of the late 1970’s and the early 1980’s. The details of this financial crisis have been fully articulated in United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996) (“Winstar III’’), and other opinions of this Court. See, e.g., Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 156, 158 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 266 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir.2001).

As the Supreme Court observed in Wins-tar III, the thrift industry was and is a highly regulated enterprise. 518 U.S. at 844, 116 S.Ct. 2432 (citing Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947)). Prior to the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (“FIRREA”), the industry was overseen primarily by two federal agencies: the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the “FHLBB” or the “Bank Board”), which chartered and regulated thrifts, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the “FSLIC” or the “Corporation”), which insured the deposits held by thrifts. Id. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988 ed.)); Home Owners’ Loan Act, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988 ed.)); National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701— 1750g (1988 ed.)). In its capacity as a regulatory agency, the FHLBB required insured institutions to maintain specified levels of net [679]*679worth and oversaw the merger or acquisition of one insured institution with another. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.13(b)(2), 571.5 (1982). For its part, the FSLIC was charged with administering the insurance fund and assessing premiums upon the thrift industry to sustain this fund. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1726, 1727(b) (1988 ed.) (repealed). This Depression-era regulatory regime worked well for many years.

During the late 1970’s and the early 1980’s, however, the thrift industry faced a new financial crisis that threatened to deplete the Corporation’s insurance fund. See Winstar III, 518 U.S. at 846-47, 116 S.Ct. 2432. Short-term interest rates paid to depositors by savings and loan associations rose to a level that exceeded the fixed, long-term interest rates received by such institutions from home mortgage loans, creating a significant threat to the solvency of many thrifts. See id. “By the end of 1982, 415 [savings and loan institutions] with $220 billion of assets were insolvent based on the book value of their tangible net worth. This constituted 13 percent of all [savings and loans] and these institutions held 32 percent of industry assets.” • Nat’l Comm’n on Fin. Inst. Reform, Recovery & Enforcement, Origins and Causes of the S & L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform 31 (1993).

In an effort to save failing thrifts while containing the costs to the FSLIC insurance fund, the FHLBB began to encourage healthy thrifts to take over weak thrifts through “supervisory mergers.” Winstar III, 518 U.S. at 847-48, 116 S.Ct. 2432. The FSLIC and the FHLBB assisted and promoted these mergers through various means, including the use of noncash incentives such as the specialized accounting treatment of “supervisory goodwill.” The special treatment of “supervisory goodwill” allowed a thrift to inflate regulatory capital by using the purchase method of accounting to treat the goodwill recognized as a result of the acquisition as regulatory capital. Such goodwill was calculated as the equivalent of the excess of the fair market value of the liabilities assumed over the fair market value of the assets acquired. Without such a forbearance, the Bank Board would have treated any such goodwill as an intangible asset, which would not have been added to the bank’s regulatory capital. By increasing the thrift’s regulatory capital through such non-cash incentives, the thrift was permitted to keep less cash on hand and make more loans, thereby increasing potential profitability. Id. at 850-51, 116 S.Ct. 2432. Such a forbearance had the dual benefit of encouraging a healthy thrift to take over a failing one, while requiring no cash outlay on the part of the FSLIC.

II. Home Federal’s Acquisitions

The Plaintiff, Home Federal, is a federally-chartered mutual savings and loan that is headquartered in Knoxville, Tennessee. Home Federal operates today in and around the Knoxville region. During the early 1980’s, Home Federal acquired three financially-troubled savings and loans in separate transactions. The Plaintiff asserts in its Complaint that each of these transactions involved a Wmsfar-type contractual promise by the Government to allow the specialized accounting treatment of supervisory goodwill and that these promises were breached by subsequent legislation.

I. First Federal and Security Federal Transactions

First Federal Savings and Loan Association (“First Federal”) and Security Federal Savings and Loan Association (“Security Federal”) were federally-insured savings and loan institutions. Both First Federal and Security Federal were located in counties near Home Federal’s central base of operations: First Federal was operated out of Sevierville, Tennessee, while Security Federal was based in Alcoa, Tennessee.

Home Federal claims that the supervisory agents of the Federal Home Loan BankCineinnati (“FHLB-Cincinnati”) specifically sought out Home Federal as a merger partner for First Federal and Security Federal. The Plaintiff also asserts that such a merger was the only feasible solution to the two institutions’ serious financial difficulties.

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57 Fed. Cl. 676, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 262, 2003 WL 22232309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/home-federal-bank-of-tennessee-fsb-v-united-states-uscfc-2003.