Carley, Justice.
Dornell Fabrian Holmes and Michael Rhodes were tried jointly before a jury. Rhodes was acquitted, but Holmes was found guilty of the felony and malice murder of Dushun Hoggro, and the commission of an aggravated assault upon Troy Edwards. Since the felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of OCGA § 16-1-7, the trial court properly entered a judgment of conviction only on the malice murder and aggravated assault verdicts. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410 (478 SE2d 762) (1996); Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The trial court sentenced Holmes to life imprisonment for the malice murder and to a term of years for the aggravated assault. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, and he appeals.1
1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Hoggro and Edwards tried to assist Donte Tanksley who was fighting with Dexter Gordon. Rhodes then fired two shots into the air. While Hoggro and Edwards were fleeing, Holmes grabbed the gun from Rhodes and fired four or five times. Hoggro was killed. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Holmes guilty of malice murder and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); McCord v. State, 268 Ga. 499 (1) (491 SE2d 360) (1997); Love v. State, 268 Ga. 484, 485 (1) (490 SE2d 88) (1997).
2. Holmes contends that the trial court erred in holding that Edwards’ and Gordon’s out-of-court statements were admissible under the "necessity” exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). Holmes concedes that Edwards was unavailable due to his death, but argues that there was insufficient evidence of Gordon’s unavailability.
In order for a party to introduce testimony under the necessity [139]*139exception, the Georgia courts have always required that the declarant be dead or unavailable and that there be particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 202 (2) (429 SE2d 668) (1993); McKibbons v. State, 226 Ga. App. 452, 454 (2) (486 SE2d 679) (1997). We recently added the requirements that the statement be relevant to a material fact and that it be more probative on that material fact than other evidence that may be procured and offered. Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 155 (4) (510 SE2d 802) (1998). These requirements were borrowed from the “catch-all” hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 807 and similar state rules of evidence, because “death or unavailability of the declarant cannot alone satisfy the necessity component without allowing the exception to swallow the rule.” Chapel v. State, supra at 155 (4). With the safeguard of the new requirements in place, there is clearly no need, if there ever was, to restrict the meaning of “unavailability” to instances of death, privilege, and deliberate hiding, as urged by the special concurrence. Otherwise, the hearsay declaration of a missing witness could never be admitted unless the hard-to-prove circumstance of a deliberate hiding were shown, even if the proponent made a thorough search for the witness, met Chapel’s additional requirements, and demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability. Federal Rule 807 does not even require unavailability, and the majority of states which make unavailability a condition of certain hearsay exceptions permit the proponent of the evidence to show unavailability by demonstrating due diligence in procuring the declarant’s attendance. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 6:28 (15th ed. 1998); 23 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1129; 29 AmJur2d, Evidence, § 698. Indeed, we know of no jurisdiction which defines unavailability so narrowly as would the special concurrence. Consistent with the majority rule, the Court of Appeals has already held that, to meet the necessity exception, “[t]he State must show . . . that the declarant is unavailable to testify and that it made reasonable efforts to locate the declarant and secure [his] presence. [Cits.]” Wilbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (2) (448 SE2d 37) (1994). This test of unavailability is a strict one which the Court of Appeals borrowed from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 74 (IV) (A) (100 SC 2531, 65 LE2d 597) (1980); Adams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 16, 17 (2) (381 SE2d 69) (1989); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253, p. 134 (4th ed. 1992). This fact does not detract from the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals has successfully avoided the disparate definitions of unavailability that exist in some jurisdictions which use a more lenient standard of unavailability in cases where confrontation requirements do not apply. See 2 McCormick, supra at § 253, pp. 134-135. Nothing in the language of OCGA § 24-3-1 (b) requires that the test for unavailability be even more strict than [140]*140that which the Confrontation Clause mandates. If constitutional requirements are met, the statutory requirements of OCGA § 24-3-1 (b) are also satisfied since the statute does not specify any additional requirements. Use of the Confrontation Clause test has the added advantage of providing a uniform standard which applies equally to all hearsay exceptions which make unavailability a condition of admissibility. Thus, the test of unavailability or “inaccessibility” is the same for both the necessity exception and the “prior testimony” exception to the hearsay rule. Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 166, 168 (2) (296 SE2d 598) (1982); Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 663 (2) (503 SE2d 563) (1998).
The evidence here showed that investigators for both the State and Rhodes could not locate Gordon after diligent and extensive efforts. Although Holmes urges that the State did not begin to look for Gordon until fourteen months after the murder, most of that delay is attributable to Holmes himself, who eluded police for nine to ten months before turning himself in. The State began its unsuccessful search for Gordon a month-and-a-half before trial. Compare Rosser v. State, 211 Ga. App. 402, 406 (1) (439 SE2d 72) (1993). Under the circumstances, Holmes has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in deeming Gordon to be unavailable. Jay v. State, supra. See also Jones v. State, supra at 168 (2).
Holmes also argues that Edwards’ and Gordon’s statements have insufficient indicia of reliability. Although Edwards and Gordon were on opposing sides of the fight, they consistently identified Holmes as the one who shot at Hoggro and Edwards. Chapel v. State, supra at 155 (4); McGee v. State, 267 Ga. 560, 566 (5) (480 SE2d 577) (1997). Compare Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 706 (3) (482 SE2d 314) (1997).
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Carley, Justice.
Dornell Fabrian Holmes and Michael Rhodes were tried jointly before a jury. Rhodes was acquitted, but Holmes was found guilty of the felony and malice murder of Dushun Hoggro, and the commission of an aggravated assault upon Troy Edwards. Since the felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of OCGA § 16-1-7, the trial court properly entered a judgment of conviction only on the malice murder and aggravated assault verdicts. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 410 (478 SE2d 762) (1996); Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). The trial court sentenced Holmes to life imprisonment for the malice murder and to a term of years for the aggravated assault. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, and he appeals.1
1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Hoggro and Edwards tried to assist Donte Tanksley who was fighting with Dexter Gordon. Rhodes then fired two shots into the air. While Hoggro and Edwards were fleeing, Holmes grabbed the gun from Rhodes and fired four or five times. Hoggro was killed. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Holmes guilty of malice murder and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); McCord v. State, 268 Ga. 499 (1) (491 SE2d 360) (1997); Love v. State, 268 Ga. 484, 485 (1) (490 SE2d 88) (1997).
2. Holmes contends that the trial court erred in holding that Edwards’ and Gordon’s out-of-court statements were admissible under the "necessity” exception to the hearsay rule. OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). Holmes concedes that Edwards was unavailable due to his death, but argues that there was insufficient evidence of Gordon’s unavailability.
In order for a party to introduce testimony under the necessity [139]*139exception, the Georgia courts have always required that the declarant be dead or unavailable and that there be particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Roper v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 202 (2) (429 SE2d 668) (1993); McKibbons v. State, 226 Ga. App. 452, 454 (2) (486 SE2d 679) (1997). We recently added the requirements that the statement be relevant to a material fact and that it be more probative on that material fact than other evidence that may be procured and offered. Chapel v. State, 270 Ga. 151, 155 (4) (510 SE2d 802) (1998). These requirements were borrowed from the “catch-all” hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 807 and similar state rules of evidence, because “death or unavailability of the declarant cannot alone satisfy the necessity component without allowing the exception to swallow the rule.” Chapel v. State, supra at 155 (4). With the safeguard of the new requirements in place, there is clearly no need, if there ever was, to restrict the meaning of “unavailability” to instances of death, privilege, and deliberate hiding, as urged by the special concurrence. Otherwise, the hearsay declaration of a missing witness could never be admitted unless the hard-to-prove circumstance of a deliberate hiding were shown, even if the proponent made a thorough search for the witness, met Chapel’s additional requirements, and demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability. Federal Rule 807 does not even require unavailability, and the majority of states which make unavailability a condition of certain hearsay exceptions permit the proponent of the evidence to show unavailability by demonstrating due diligence in procuring the declarant’s attendance. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 6:28 (15th ed. 1998); 23 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1129; 29 AmJur2d, Evidence, § 698. Indeed, we know of no jurisdiction which defines unavailability so narrowly as would the special concurrence. Consistent with the majority rule, the Court of Appeals has already held that, to meet the necessity exception, “[t]he State must show . . . that the declarant is unavailable to testify and that it made reasonable efforts to locate the declarant and secure [his] presence. [Cits.]” Wilbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (2) (448 SE2d 37) (1994). This test of unavailability is a strict one which the Court of Appeals borrowed from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 74 (IV) (A) (100 SC 2531, 65 LE2d 597) (1980); Adams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 16, 17 (2) (381 SE2d 69) (1989); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 253, p. 134 (4th ed. 1992). This fact does not detract from the Court of Appeals’ conclusion. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals has successfully avoided the disparate definitions of unavailability that exist in some jurisdictions which use a more lenient standard of unavailability in cases where confrontation requirements do not apply. See 2 McCormick, supra at § 253, pp. 134-135. Nothing in the language of OCGA § 24-3-1 (b) requires that the test for unavailability be even more strict than [140]*140that which the Confrontation Clause mandates. If constitutional requirements are met, the statutory requirements of OCGA § 24-3-1 (b) are also satisfied since the statute does not specify any additional requirements. Use of the Confrontation Clause test has the added advantage of providing a uniform standard which applies equally to all hearsay exceptions which make unavailability a condition of admissibility. Thus, the test of unavailability or “inaccessibility” is the same for both the necessity exception and the “prior testimony” exception to the hearsay rule. Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 166, 168 (2) (296 SE2d 598) (1982); Jay v. State, 232 Ga. App. 661, 663 (2) (503 SE2d 563) (1998).
The evidence here showed that investigators for both the State and Rhodes could not locate Gordon after diligent and extensive efforts. Although Holmes urges that the State did not begin to look for Gordon until fourteen months after the murder, most of that delay is attributable to Holmes himself, who eluded police for nine to ten months before turning himself in. The State began its unsuccessful search for Gordon a month-and-a-half before trial. Compare Rosser v. State, 211 Ga. App. 402, 406 (1) (439 SE2d 72) (1993). Under the circumstances, Holmes has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in deeming Gordon to be unavailable. Jay v. State, supra. See also Jones v. State, supra at 168 (2).
Holmes also argues that Edwards’ and Gordon’s statements have insufficient indicia of reliability. Although Edwards and Gordon were on opposing sides of the fight, they consistently identified Holmes as the one who shot at Hoggro and Edwards. Chapel v. State, supra at 155 (4); McGee v. State, 267 Ga. 560, 566 (5) (480 SE2d 577) (1997). Compare Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 706 (3) (482 SE2d 314) (1997). Both Edwards and Gordon gave their statements to detectives a few hours after the shooting and those statements were made in the course of an official investigation, before either had an opportunity to consult with any other witness. Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 796 (4) (505 SE2d 16) (1998); White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 30 (2) (486 SE2d 338) (1997); Luallen v. State, 266 Ga. 174, 179 (6) (465 SE2d 672) (1996); Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 663, 664 (1) (461 SE2d 224) (1995); McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188, 189 (3) (429 SE2d 655) (1993). Neither was a suspect in the murder and, thus, neither had a motive to fabricate a story regarding the murder. Chapel v. State, supra at 155 (4). Compare Carr v. State, supra at 705-706 (3). The statements were corroborated by the physical evidence and by other witnesses. Perkins v. State, supra at 796 (4); Luallen v. State, supra at 179 (5). Neither Edwards nor Gordon ever recanted or disavowed his statements. Perkins v. State, supra at 796 (4); White v. State, supra at 31 (2); Luallen v. State, supra at 179 (5); Drane v. State, supra at 664 (1); McKissick v. State, supra at 189 (3). Thus, the State laid a sufficient [141]*141foundation for the admission of each of the statements.
Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of Edwards’ and Gordon’s out-of-court statements. Moreover, any error would be harmless because other eyewitnesses also identified Holmes as the one who shot at Edwards and Hoggro. Suits v. State, 270 Ga. 362 (2) (507 SE2d 751) (1998); Hayes v. State, 265 Ga. 1, 3 (3) (453 SE2d 11) (1995).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Sears and Thompson, JJ., who concur specially, and Fletcher, P. J., who concurs in Division 1 and in the judgment.