Hogan v. Brown

507 F. Supp. 191
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 30, 1981
Docket78-1034, 78-1050
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 507 F. Supp. 191 (Hogan v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hogan v. Brown, 507 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Ark. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROY, District Judge.

These two cases, which were consolidated for trial purposes, concern the Felsenthal National Wildlife Refuge. Congress authorized the Felsenthal National Wildlife Refuge in Section 118 of the River and Harbor Act of 1970, P.L. 91-611, approved on December 31, 1970. The authorization modi *193 fied the existing Ouachita and Black Rivers Navigation Project (River .and Harbor Act of July 14, 1960, P.L. 86-645) as follows:

The project for the Ouachita and Black Rivers, Arkansas and Louisiana, authorized by the River and Harbor Act of 1960, is hereby modified to provide for the acquisition of lands for establishment of natural wildlife refuges, under the provisions of Public Law 85-624 and Section 6(c) of Public Law 89-72, at an estimated additional Federal cost of $13,500,000, substantially in accordance with the report of the Chief of Engineers dated November 5, 1970, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Army and the President.

The President approved the project on April 19, 1971 and the Secretary of the Army approved it on May 4, 1971. 1 The report of the Chief of Engineers provides for the acquisition of approximately 65,000 acres of land to be dedicated as a wildlife refuge. House Document No. 92-109 was the original environmental impact statement for the Felsenthal National Wildlife Refuge. This environmental impact statement was later updated by an environmental impact statement filed in December of 1974 for the entire Ouachita-Black Navigation Project, of which the refuge is a part. A programmatic environmental impact statement has been filed for the entire system of national wildlife refuges. See, Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 897 (D.C. Cir.1978).

Plaintiffs herein own or lease portions of a 235-acre tract which has been described as a “fishing camp” or “resort area.” A condemnation action was filed by the defendants against this property, in 1978 and plaintiff Hogan filed the instant action in May of 1978 and the other plaintiffs filed in July of 1978. Plaintiffs have cited the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., as the jurisdictional basis for this lawsuit. They have alleged that the Corps of Engineers has not fulfilled the procedural requirements of this Act in its preparation of the environmental impact statements which specifically concern the refuge. The plaintiffs are not attempting to prevent the construction of the Ouachita and Black River Navigation Project as such. They obtained a stay of the condemnation proceedings pending the outcome of this case, but only the establishment of the Felsenthal National Wildlife Refuge which was purportedly authorized as mitigation lands because of the establishment of the navigation project was at issue.

The defendants sought and the court granted a separate hearing on its affirmative defense of laches. A one-day trial limited to this issue was held September 12, 1979. The defendants have the burden of proving the affirmative defense of laches. 2 This is a very heavy burden. In Organizations United for Ecology v. Bell, 446 F.Supp. 535, 546 (M.D.Pa.1978) the court stated:

The Defendants must meet three independent criteria before the equitable doctrine of laches can be applied. First, the Defendants must show a delay by the Plaintiffs in asserting a claim. Second, they must establish that the delay was not excusable. Third, they must show that there is undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim was asserted.

At trial, defendants introduced evidence showing that three of the plaintiffs, Mrs. Louise McCall Hogan, Mr. Russell Marks, and Mr. Proctor Evers, attended a public meeting held by the Corps of Engineers on August 22, 1973 in the Union County Courthouse in El Dorado, Arkansas. At this public meeting the purposes and objectives of the refuge were discussed, and a question-and-answer session was held. Defendants also introduced evidence that twelve articles concerning the refuge appeared in the El Dorado News and five appeared in Crossett News Observer during *194 the period from November 1970 through February 1973.

The defendants’ position is that the plaintiffs knew of the project at least as early as the 1973 public meeting and did not file their complaints until 1978 and that the delay was not excusable.

The plaintiffs contend first that there was no delay in seeking relief as soon as practicable after definite information concerning the project became available. Furthermore, they strongly urge that if the court does find any delay on the part of plaintiffs it was excusable since the delay, if any, was caused by defendants’ agents furnishing inconsistent, inaccurate, and incomplete information to plaintiffs’ inquiries.

Although the public was told the boundary lines were definite at the August 23, 1973 meeting, the proof indicated the boundaries were changed at least three times thereafter. The record reflects that the individual landowners were led to believe there would be exceptions from the boundary lines as drawn at that time and that each case would be considered separately.

If plaintiffs did delay in asserting their rights, that delay was excusable in light of the above described facts because it was reasonably assumed that the plans for the Refuge were not final and that the parties would be notified when they did become final. Temporary plans or plans which are not final ordinarily are not subject to injunctive action.

From the testimony and exhibits the court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

(1) William Hogan, son of plaintiff Mrs. Hogan, testified that Colonel Reece promised in the 1973 meeting to contact affected landowners following the public meeting.

(2) No contact was made by the Corps of Engineers between 1973 and November 1977. The November 1977 meeting with the Corps was initiated by Mr. Hogan, and not the Corps of Engineers. The testimony at the hearing revealed that congressional appropriations were not available for acquisition of the plaintiffs’ lands until 1976, three years after the first public meeting. The testimony of the government’s witnesses revealed that, notwithstanding that this long period had elapsed, no subsequent meetings were scheduled or held by the Corps concerning specifically the issue of acquisition until 1977.

(3) Mrs. Hogan received a letter in 1976 stating that acquisition of the lands for the Refuge (and therefore, presumably construction of the Refuge) would not be accomplished due to lack of funds. The Corps of Engineers made no effort to keep leaseholders advised as to the modifications and rescheduling of the government’s acquisition plans. The testimony established that the project was subject to an executive moratorium under the Nixon administration whereby public works projects were suspended for budgetary reasons. Likewise, Russell Marks, one of the lessees, was advised by H. K.

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507 F. Supp. 191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hogan-v-brown-arwd-1981.