Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co.

807 P.2d 808, 106 Or. App. 329, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 423

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: March 13, 1991
• Docket: A8901-00240; CA A63379
• Status: Published

Opinions

EDMONDS, J.

Plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action to recover under an umbrella liability insurance policy issued by defendant.¹ The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.² We affirm.

Defendant sold plaintiffs an umbrella liability insurance policy, which provides that defendant will pay the excess over the “amount recoverable” on the underlying insurance policies listed in the policy. Those policies were for $50,000 with Seaboard Surety Company (Seaboard) and $450,000 with Holland-America Insurance Company (Holland-America). Plaintiffs suffered a covered loss in the amount of $375,000. Seaboard paid the first $50,000 of the loss. However, after the loss was incurred, Holland-America became insolvent and was unable to pay any of plaintiffs’ loss. The policy has no express provision about defendant’s obligation in the event that either Seaboard or Holland-America is unable to pay. Plaintiffs made a demand on defendant for the $325,000 that could not be recovered from Holland-America. Defendant denied liability, and this action resulted. There is no dispute over material facts. The issue is whether defendant’s policy provides coverage for losses not paid by Holland-America.

The policy provides, in part:

“COVERAGE AGREEMENTS

j|c * * *

“II. LIMIT OF LIABILITY. The company shall only be liable for the ultimate net loss the excess of either

“(a) the amount recoverable under the underlying insurances * * *, or

“(b) the amount of the retained limit * * * in respect of each occurrence not covered by said underlying insurances.

“(hereinafter called the ‘underlying limits’):

“and then only up to a further limit as stated in Item 5 of the Declarations in respect of each occurrence — subject to a limit as stated in Item 6 of the Declarations in the aggregate for each annual period during the currency of this policy, commencing from the effective date and arising out of any hazard for which an aggregate limit of liability applies in the underlying policies scheduled or listed herein. In the event of reduction or exhaustion of the aggregate limits of liability under said underlying insurances by reason of payment of claims in respect of occurrences occurring during the period of this policy, this policy, subject to all the terms, conditions and definitions hereof, shall

“(1) in the event of reduction pay the excess of the reduced underlying limit;

“(2) in the event of exhaustion continue in force as underlying insurance.

“The inclusion or addition hereunder of more than one insured shall not operate to increase the Company’s limit of liability.

‡ ‡ ‡ ‡

“CONDITIONS

* * * *

“J. LOSS PAYABLE. Liability under this policy with respect to any occurrence shall not attach unless and until the Insured, or the Insured’s underlying insurer shall have paid the amount of the underlying limits on account of such occurrence. * * *

U* * * * *

“L. OTHER INSURANCE. If other valid and collectible insurance, whether or not scheduled hereunder, which is written by another insurer is available to the Insured covering a loss also covered by this policy, other than insurance that is in excess of this policy, the insurance afforded by this policy shall be in excess of and shall not contribute with such other insurance.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Construction of an insurance policy and interpretation of unambiguous language in the policy are questions of law. Timberline Equip. v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or 639, 643, 576 P2d 1244 (1978). When the policy language has a plain, ordinary meaning and is subject to only one reasonable reading, we may look no further than that language. Mortgage Bancorp. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 67 Or App 261, 264, 677 P2d 726, rev den 297 Or 339 (1984). We read the policy as a whole and not as a collection of separate parts. Fisher v. California Insurance Co., 236 Or 376, 380, 388 P2d 441 (1964).

Plaintiffs argue that the phrase “amount recoverable” in the “LIMIT OF LIABILITY” clause means that defendant is required to pay for amounts that the insured is not able to recover from Holland-America. However, that interpretation of “amount recoverable” creates unacceptable inconsistencies with the other clauses in the policy. The “LIMIT OF LIABILITY” clause in the policy defines the risk assumed by defendant. When read with the “LOSS PAYABLE” clause, the context of the term “amount recoverable” refers to the limits of coverage provided by the underlying policies. The “LOSS PAYABLE” clause provides that defendant can have no liability until the aggregate limits of the underlying insurance have been “paid.” Plaintiffs’ reading would render the “LOSS PAYABLE” clause meaningless, because defendant would be liable, even though Holland-America has not paid anything. It could not have been the parties’ intent to include a meaningless clause in the policy. See Nourigat v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 59 Or App 362, 365, 650 P2d 1075 (1982).

The “OTHER INSURANCE” clause also supports the conclusion that plaintiffs’ reading is incorrect. That clause is intended to limit defendant’s liability under the policy in the event that insurance other than the scheduled underlying insurance is available to the insured. See Alaska Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Insco Ltd., 785 P2d 1193, 1196 (Alaska 1990). Collectibility of those proceeds triggers the operation of the clause. Plaintiffs’ reading would require us to hold that the phrase “amount recoverable” is synonymous with “collectible.” However, defendant’s use of a different term in the “OTHER INSURANCE” clause shows that it was aware of both terms and chose to use them in the same policy in different contexts.

The parties agree that this is a case of first impression in Oregon. There is a split of authority in other jurisdictions.³ We are persuaded that the trial court was correct when it held that, under the plain meaning of the terms in the policy, defendant did not agree to pay a loss that Holland-America would have paid but for its insolvency.⁴

Affirmed.

1 Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against Fred S. James & Co. without prejudice. We refer to Century Indemnity Company as “defendant.”

2 Defendant filed a cross-claim against Fréd S. James & Co., which cannot be fully adjudicated until this appeal has been decided. Under ORCP 67B, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiffs.

3 See, e.g., Alaska Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Insco Ltd., supra; Kelly v. Weil, 563 So 2d 221 (La 1990); Lechner v. Scharrer, 145 Wis 2d 667, 429 NW2d 491, rev den 147 Wis 2d 890 (1988).

4 The dissent argues that it is incorrect to say that “[t]he ‘LOSS PAYABLE’ clause provides that defendant can have no liability until the aggregate limits of the underlying insurance have been ‘paid.’ ” 106 Or App at 334. “Aggregate limits” means a single sum. As the dissent points out, the “LOSS PAYABLE” clause refers to “limits” in the plural. The dissent’s statement that the policy defines “ ‘underlying limits’ to be the ‘amount recoverable’ from the underlying insurer,” 106 Or App at 334, arises from a reading of the “LIMIT OP LIABILITY” clause and not from any definition in the policy.