Hodgson v. BARGE, WAGGONER AND SUMNER, INCORPORATED

377 F. Supp. 842, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13091
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedJune 23, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 6430
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 377 F. Supp. 842 (Hodgson v. BARGE, WAGGONER AND SUMNER, INCORPORATED) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hodgson v. BARGE, WAGGONER AND SUMNER, INCORPORATED, 377 F. Supp. 842, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13091 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

MORTON, District Judge.

This is an action to enjoin the defendant from violating the provisions of § 15(a)(2) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) and to restrain the defendant from any withholding of payments of overtime compensation allegedly due its employees under the Act.

Defendant Barge, Waggoner and Sumner, Incorporated, is a Tennessee corporation having its office and place of business at 404 James Robertson Parkway, Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. The corporation is an engineering firm engaged in the design and planning of roads, bridges, water and sewage treatment plants, recreation sites, and commercial and industrial sites.

It is admitted that this court has jurisdiction and that defendant’s activities constitute an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of § 3(r) and § 3(s)(l) of the Act.

The question involved in this suit is whether certain employees of the defendant are exempt as professional or executive employees, within the provisions of the Act or the regulations promulgated thereunder.

Ten employees of the defendant are involved in this litigation. Generally, these employees fall into two classifications, as follows:

(1) Employees who are paid for all hours worked, including overtime, at straight hourly rates. Four of the ten employees fall into this category.
(2) Those employees which elect to be a part of the “vacation plan.”

As to those employees who are compensated under the first plan, total weekly hours are recorded and the weekly paycheck of these individuals is determined by multiplying the total hours worked each week by the employee’s hourly rate. There is no guaranteed minimum hourly work week.

As to those employees who participate in the “vacation plan,” records of the hours worked by the employees are kept and variations from the 40-hour work week are recorded. If an employee works more than 40 hours per week, that employee draws a compensation determined by multiplying 40 hours per week by the hourly rate. Any hours in excess of the 40 hours are credited to the employee in the vacation plan. This credit is comparable to a deposit into a savings account for the employee of a sum equal to the excess number of hours worked over 40 per week, multiplied by the hourly rate. In a subsequent week *844 if an employee works, for example, 39 hours per week, the employee receives compensation for 40 hours, with one hour being withdrawn. At intervals throughout the year, normally quarterly, an adjustment is made, and if the employee has hours of credit coming to him, a check is written for the balance in the hour bank. If there is a deficit, this amount is shown on the books as being due to the employer by the employee. At given times bonuses are voted to the employees by the Board of Directors. Any amount shown on the books as being due the employee because the employee has overdrawn his hour bank account in the vacation plan is charged against the bonus.

Defendant insists that all ten employees are exempt from the provisions of the Wage and Hour Law by virtue of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a), which provides in part as follows:

“The provisions of sections 206 and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to—
“(1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, . . . (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary . . .) . . . . ”

Section 541.1 of the Regulations, Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, issued pursuant to the above statutory authority, defines “bona fide executive.” Seetion 541.2 defines “administrative” capacity, and section 541.3 defines “professional” capacity. A copy of these sections of the Regulations is attached to this opinion as Appendix A.

These regulations are valid, binding, and have the force of law. Walling v. Morris, 155 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1946); Craig v. Far West Engineering Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959).

Section 541.3(e) specifically provides that an employee must be “compensated on a salary or fee basis.” A detailed explanation and interpretation of the explanation of a salary basis appears at § 541.118. A copy of this section is attached to this opinion as Appendix B. The pertinent portions of § 541.118(a) require that an employee receive, “each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent, basis a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” Section 541.118(a) further provides that “the employee must receive his full salary for any week in which he performs any work without regard to the number of days or hours worked.”

It is well settled that in order to bring an employee within the claimed exempt classification, the employer must show that all of the enumerated qualifications exist. Walling v. Morris, supra. Since the employees of the defendant were paid on an hourly basis, and were not guaranteed “a predetermined amount,” these employees do not fall within the exemption of § 213(a) of 29 U.S.C. Neither those employees who are compensated under the first plan nor those under the vacation pay plan meet the requirements of the above-cited regulations.

As stated by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:

“The stipulated facts show that the dispatchers are not employed on a salary basis, one of the essential requirements for both the executive and one employed in an administrative capacity. [citing cases]. . . .” Walling v. Morris, supra, at 836.

In the case of Craig v. Far West Engineering Co., supra, 265 F.2d at 259, 260, the court said:

“Although at first blush it does not seem to this Court to be logical, other courts have determined that to qualify as an exempted employee the worker must be paid on a ‘salary basis.’ Walling v. Morris, 6 Cir., 1946, 155 F.2d 832; Helliwell v. Haberman, 2 Cir., 1944, 140 F.2d 833; Walling v. Yeakley, [10 Cir., 140 F.2d 830] supra. Cf. also, McReynolds v. Pocahontas Corp., 4 Cir., 1951, 192 F.2d 301; *845 Delano v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 1950, 136 Conn. 663, 73 A.2d 828, certiorari denied 340 U.S. 840, 71 S.Ct. 28, 95 L.Ed. 616.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska
16 P.3d 729 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2001)
Cowan v. Treetop Enterprises, Inc.
120 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Tennessee, 1999)
Hazel v. Michigan State Employees Ass'n
826 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Michigan, 1993)
Hultgren v. County of Lancaster
753 F. Supp. 809 (D. Nebraska, 1990)
Dole v. Walker & Armstrong
763 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Arizona, 1990)
York v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.
727 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Texas, 1989)
Harris v. District of Columbia
709 F. Supp. 238 (District of Columbia, 1989)
D'CAMERA v. District of Columbia
693 F. Supp. 1208 (District of Columbia, 1988)
Knecht v. City of Redwood City
683 F. Supp. 1307 (N.D. California, 1987)
Anand Prakash v. American University
727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Circuit, 1984)
Lang v. Midwest Advanced Computer Services, Inc.
506 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Michigan, 1981)
Ables v. Mooney
264 S.E.2d 424 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1979)
Marshall v. JC Penney Co., Inc.
464 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ohio, 1979)
Marshall v. Krystal Co.
467 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Tennessee, 1978)
Lane v. M's Pub, Inc.
435 F. Supp. 917 (D. Nebraska, 1977)
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Circuit, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
377 F. Supp. 842, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13091, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hodgson-v-barge-waggoner-and-sumner-incorporated-tnmd-1972.